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
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'THE BOMB IS SET...'

RESPONSES TO CROATIAN POLITICAL ACTIVISM IN AUSTRALIA, 1947-1989

The Age, 23 March 1973, 9



"The bomb is set — now to exercise our democratic right to protest."

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the award of the degree

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

from

UNIVERSITY OF WOLLONGONG

by

KRISTINA KALFIC, BCOMM, BA, BA (HONS)

THE SCHOOL OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL INQUIRY

2017

CERTIFICATION

I, Kristina Kalfic, declare that this thesis, submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the award of Doctor of Philosophy, in the School of Humanities and Social Inquiry, University of Wollongong, is wholly my own work unless otherwise referenced or acknowledged. The document has not been submitted for qualifications at any other academic institution.

31 March 2017

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TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

<i>AHD</i>	Australian Croatian Association (<i>Australsko-Hrvatsko Društvo</i>)
<i>AIF</i>	First Australian Imperial Force, 1914-1921
<i>ALP</i>	Australian Labor Party
<i>ASIO</i>	Australian Security Intelligence Organisation
<i>CIB</i>	Commonwealth Investigation Branch
<i>CPA</i>	Communist Party of Australia
<i>CPF</i>	Commonwealth Police Force
<i>DP</i>	Displaced Persons
<i>FCSYA</i>	Federation of Croatian Students and Youth of Australia
<i>HDZ</i>	Croatian Democratic Union (<i>Hrvatska Demokratska zajednica</i>)
<i>HIRO</i>	Croatian Illegal Revolutionary Organisation (<i>Hrvatska Ilegalna Revolucionarna Organizacija</i>)
<i>HNO</i>	Croatian National Resistance (<i>Hrvatski Narodni Odpor</i>)
<i>HOP</i>	Croatian Liberation Movement (<i>Hrvatski Oslobodilački Pokret</i>)
<i>HRB</i>	Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood (<i>Hrvatsko Revolucionarno Bratstvo</i>)
<i>HSS</i>	Croatian Peasant Party (<i>Hrvatska Seljačka Stranka</i>)
<i>IRO</i>	International Refugee Organisation
<i>LCC</i>	League of Communists of Croatia
<i>NAM</i>	Non-Aligned Movement
<i>NATO</i>	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
<i>NDH</i>	Independent State of Croatia (<i>Nezavisna Država Hrvatska</i>)
<i>NSW</i>	New South Wales
<i>NUMAS</i>	Numerical Multifactor Assessment System
<i>SBS</i>	Special Broadcasting Service
<i>SOHDA</i>	Central Council of Croatian Associations (<i>Središnji Odbor Hrvatskih Društava Australije</i>)
<i>UDBa</i>	Yugoslav Department of State Security (<i>Uprava Državne Bezbednosti</i>)

PRONUNCIATION GUIDE

<i>Letter</i>	<i>Pronunciation</i>
c	like ts in lets
č (hard)	like ch in church
ć (soft)	like ch in cheese
dž	similar to J in June
đ	like j in jam
g	like g in game
h	like h in ham
j	like y in yacht
lj	like l in lure
nj	like Spanish ñ
r	trilled
š	like sh in sheep
ž	like s in measure
a	like a in sofa
e	like e in met
i	like ee in feet
o	like o in dog
u	like oo in boot

ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the political activism of Croatians in Australia between 1947 and 1989. It is clear that the history of opprobrium that this political activism has attracted – sometimes seen as extremist and violent – is unfounded. To understand this activism, this thesis argues that there are three aspects which mediate the relationship between Australia and its migrant ‘Other’ and thus determine Australian responses to Croatian political activism.

First, push and pull factors act as catalysts for migration, and determine the composition and characteristics of the community that develops in Australia. Without understanding these push and pull factors, the migrant ‘Other’ in Australia cannot be contextualised, explained, nor understood.

Second, the concept of the Good Australian Migrant – a highly constructed identity, imbued with a set of expectations and provisions, determine how the migrant ‘Other’ is perceived, understood, and ultimately judged. It embodies what I call the ‘expectations of oughts’ – of what Australia ought to be, of how Australians ought to behave, and of who migrants ought to be and how they ought to behave.

Third, domestic, transnational, and international contexts arbitrate the first two aspects, establishing the paradigms within which they are created and understood. These paradigms shape the responses of legal, political, and media authorities to particular migrant groups, who occupy varying spaces and levels of the ‘Other’.

In the case of Australian responses to Croatian activism in the post-war period, there are three distinct paradigm shifts around which responses can be grouped, 1949-1971, 1972-1979, and 1980-1989. Despite the differences across periods, Australian responses can be distilled to a single but flawed belief – that Croatians were a problematic community. This ‘problem’ was attributable to their radical, and in the eyes of some Australians, irrational political agenda.

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INTRODUCTION



Šutalo, Croats in Australia, 234

The sign on the building Hrvatsko Poslanstvo - Croatian Embassy, together with the [Croat] emblem and the tricolour [the flag], better than any radio or television advertisement, or volumes of thick books, makes the point to everyone that that which Croats want is nothing more and nothing less than their own state.¹

Mario Dešpoja

On 29 November 1977 the first Croatian embassy in Australia opened in Canberra. Ceremony proceedings were as expected for such an occasion. The *Charge d’Affaires*, Mario Dešpoja, welcomed the 200-strong crowd, community leaders from across Australia spoke about the significance of the occasion, a flag was raised, and an anthem played. At the end of the formalities, the doors of the embassy were symbolically thrown open to the Croatian people.² This seemingly unremarkable ceremony in the nation’s capital, however, was both the catalyst for an almost two-year diplomatic nightmare for the Australian Government and the subject of national and international attention. For this was an embassy without a state - the territory of Croatia then one of the six republics of Yugoslavia, and the people of Croatia Yugoslav citizens.

The ‘Embassy’ proclaimed itself a ‘trumpet of Croatian independence in these regions distant from Croatia,’³ and its strength lay in its symbolism. The organisers of the ‘Embassy’ deliberately exploited the political language of diplomacy in order to challenge the sovereignty of the Yugoslav state, rejecting the claim that the Yugoslav Government represented Croatia, Croatians, or their interests, whether in Australia, Yugoslavia, or elsewhere. The Yugoslav Government, through its Ambassador Aleksandar Šokorac, was quick to condemn the ‘Embassy’ as ‘a very grave political provocation against the integrity and sovereignty of Yugoslavia.’⁴ The Australian Government was equally concerned with it, but lacked legal recourse; this was, after all, the first embassy of its kind to be seen in Australia, and perhaps the world.

On 24 August 1978 the *Diplomatic and Consular Missions Act 1978* received Royal Assent, and after another year of legal vacillation, the ‘Embassy’ was forced

¹ Speech delivered at Mother’s Day Luncheon in Wollongong, as found in: ‘News from the Croatian Embassy’, *Spremnost*, 23 May 1978, 6.

²First ‘embassy’ for Croats’, *Canberra Times*, 30 November 1977, 11.

National Archives of Australia, Canberra (hereafter NAA): A1838, 1490/5/51/1, PART 1, ‘Official opening of Croatian Embassy’.

³I. Čizmić, ‘Hrvatska Ambasada U Canberri 1977,-1979’, in V. Kukavica (ed.), *Hrvatski Iseljenički Zbornik* (Zagreb, Hrvatska Matica Iseljenika, 2006), 189.

Original quote: ‘Glavni smisao otvaranja Hrvatske ambasade, prema zamisli osnivača, bio je da 'bude trubač hrvatske državotvorne misli u ovim dalekim krajevima od Hrvatske.’

⁴ B. Juddery, ‘Removal of Croatian ‘Embassy’ demanded’, *Canberra Times*, 10 December 1977, 3.

to close its doors on 25 October 1979. Though the 'Embassy' became the central point from where Croatian political activism in Australia unfolded during its operation, it was neither the first to gain national exposure, nor did its closure signify the end of the community's activism. Rather, the 'Embassy' was simply one episode (albeit a significant and colourful one) in the political activism that defined the Croatian community. That there was no independent Croatian state between 1945-1991 gave a distinct flavour to its Australian community and impetus to their actions. Croatians were most present in the Australian public sphere when advocating for an independent Croatian state, or for a Croatian identity distinct from a Yugoslav one, either through protest and demonstration, in the petitioning of the Australian Government, or in its staunch dedication to preserving Croatian culture and language. During the 1960s and 1970s, allegations of political violence and terrorism pushed the community into the national spotlight, and marked Croatians with a reputation for extremism that still haunts many.

This activism became the defining characteristic of Australia's post-war Croatian community. However, perceptions of this activism - and of the Croatian community in general - have not evolved too far from the 'folksy' image of migrants in Australia. Croatians are often reduced to the familiar migrant markers of speaking a harsh language, eating strange foods, working the blue collar jobs of the construction and manufacturing industries, and most importantly, playing the football that has contributed so much to Australia's sporting life. The stereotype of the 'Balkan Brute' still taints perceptions of the community, particularly in its association with football violence, the supposed ethnic hatred of Serbs, or the hushed accusations of being 'too political', even if very little is known about the activism itself. In casting a light on this unfamiliar history, there is more to gain than just a better understanding of the history of Croatians in Australia. To the trained eye, the legal, political, and cultural legacies that shaped the history of Croatian political activism in Australia are palpable in the present. The imperative to understand the relationship of Australia with its migrant 'Other', whether past, present, or future, will only

increase as unprecedented levels of global migration, technological interconnectedness, and the looming spectre of global terrorism exert their influence on our present.

THESIS OVERVIEW

This thesis is concerned with the various ways Australian political, legal and media authorities have responded to Croatian political activism from 1947-1989. It argues that there are three aspects which mediate the relationship between Australia and its migrant 'Other'. The first are the push and pull factors which act as catalysts for migration. These factors determine the composition and characteristics of the community which develops in Australia, and in turn the activities and causes around which they organise. The second aspect is the concept of the Good Australian Migrant - a highly constructed identity, imbued with a set of expectations and provisions upon which migrants are perceived, understood, and ultimately judged. Finally, domestic and international contexts arbitrate the first two aspects, establishing the paradigms within which they are created and understood.

In the case of Australian responses to Croatian political activism in the post-war period, there are three distinct paradigm shifts around which these responses can be grouped - 1947-1971, 1972-1979, and 1980-1989. Within each period, both the actions of Croatians and their Australian responses were tempered by a complex interaction of contexts from Australia, Croatia, and the wider international political environment. Despite the differences across periods, Australian responses can be distilled to a single but flawed belief - that Croatians were a problematic community. This 'problem' was attributable to their radical, and in the eyes of some Australians, irrational political agenda. The origin of this belief is found in the expectation that migrants would become apolitical upon their settlement in Australia. Ironically, Croatians are perceived as problematic precisely because they take their citizenship as 'Good Australians' seriously - they

do not just buy the rhetoric, but enact it through their political activism. Thus, this history can be read as the tension between the objectives of authorities to create the Good Australian Migrant, and those who, in the eyes of these authorities, do not, cannot, or will not conform.

This thesis addresses these issues with the following structure. Chapter One takes a longitudinal approach to the history of Croatian migration to Australia, both chronologically from the first arrivals in the 1800s to the present, and geographically from the reasons for leaving Croatia to the choice of Australia as the destination, in order to map the contexts which work to define Croatian political activism in the post-war period. These push and pull factors of migration act as catalysts to migration and determine the composition and characteristics of the Croatian community which develops in Australia. These factors motivate certain individuals to leave their country of origin in the first instance, and to choose to settle in Australia in the second. This in turn influences how these migrants organise upon settlement, and the activities and causes around which they organise. Changes in the push and pull factors of migration will influence different individuals to emigrate as motivations change, and in turn change the composition and characteristics of the community and their political activism.

Chapter Two introduces the concept of the Good Australian Migrant. This figure is a post-war construction, introduced by the Australian Government after 1945 to make mass immigration acceptable to an insular and unreceptive society. The three broad functions of the Immigration Department – selection and entry, settlement, and citizenship – ascribed certain characteristics and expectations to migrants which demarcated the social space migrants were to occupy. Though some of these have evolved as historical, political, social, and cultural changes have exerted their influence, these expectations still form the foundations upon which migrants are perceived, understood, and ultimately judged. The Good Australian Migrant is therefore a highly constructed identity, imbued with a set of expectations and provisions which mediate the relationship between Australia and the migrant Other. As such, it embodies what I call the ‘expectations of

oughts' – of what Australia ought to be, of how Australians ought to behave, and of who migrants ought to be and how they ought to behave.

Chapter Three centres on the first post-war period of Croatian political activism, 1947-1971. Like other post-war migrants, the first wave of Croatian migrants established welfare and social organisations in order to respond to the issues raised by migration and settlement in a new country operating under an assimilation policy. However, these organisations also embodied political undertones which sought to establish a Croatian identity as separate from a Yugoslav one and advocated for an independent Croatian state. This was problematic in the eyes of Australian authorities for two reasons - first it contravened the assimilationist expectations of the Good Australian Migrant, and second, replaced it with a political agenda that was problematic. Despite these contraventions, Australian responses were tempered by Cold War politics, and thus afforded the community latitude in its activism. The 1960s brought with it wider social, political and cultural changes, as well as a second wave of Croatian migrants, which disrupted these paradigms.

Chapter Four explores the period of 1972-1979, during which Croatian political activism was conflated with allegations of Croatian/Ustasha terrorism. The election of Gough Whitlam and his government ushered in a new political paradigm, a large feature of which was the disavowal of the Cold War myopia that had defined the preceding 23 years of conservative government rule. It was no longer leftist activism and communism which threatened Australia's national security, but right-wing extremists who had been able to operate under the cover of their anti-communism. Croats were the foremost example of such a group, attested by the unprecedented raid on the headquarters of the Australian Security and Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) by the Federal Attorney-General Lionel Murphy on 16 March 1973 and its aftermath. At the same time, the introduction of multiculturalism by the Whitlam Government, and later supported by Malcolm Fraser's Government, opened up a legitimate space for Croatian activism. This led to the establishment of the Croatian 'Embassy' in 1977,

which sought to redress the terrorist conflation with which the Whitlam Government had branded the community and its activism.

Chapter Five covers the final period of 1980-1990, during which Croatian political activism finds legitimacy. This is due to three main developments that shift the paradigms once more and cause Croatian independence to become politically acceptable, and in some corners, even desirable. First, the reconfiguration of Croatian activism within the paradigms of multiculturalism allowed it to sit better within the Good Australian Migrant framework, while the rise of second-generation Croatians and the arrival of a third wave of Croatian migrants reinforced these changes. Second, Asian immigration caused a disruption in immigration paradigms, challenging the general consensus on multiculturalism as a successful or desired policy. Third, the death of the President of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, and the general demise of communism worldwide, meant that Yugoslavia was no longer of strategic importance in the international political environment. This not only legitimised Croatian nationalism and activism, but led to its encouragement by the very same governments that had been ambivalent (and sometimes vehemently opposed) to Croatian activism in the previous three decades.

This thesis is concerned with establishing a new paradigm through which this history can be approached. It is less concerned with filling the gaps in the literature as it is in expanding the boundaries of it. It seeks to build a foundation from which further research can be extended that moves understandings away from descriptive and confrontational histories to one of critical interrogation that integrate the contexts that define it. It avoids focus on the minutiae of Croatian political activism in Australia itself, but rather focuses on Australian responses to them in order to lay the contextual groundwork for such a project. This history is far more complicated than the varying narratives of good prevailing over evil, or of the successes and failures of integration, found in both Australian and Croatian accounts of the post-war community.

In doing so this thesis will present Croatian political activism not as an anomaly or peculiar trait inherent or exclusive to Croatians, but as the actions of a group of Australian citizens engaging with the body politic about an issue of perceived importance, but whose status as an 'Other' guides the reception of their contributions. Neither the activism of Croatians nor Australian responses to them occurred in a vacuum; both Croatians and Australians were situated in domestic, transnational, and international contexts which informed their understandings and shaped their actions and reactions. Moreover, Croatians were not only the subjects of policy and public debate, but sought to shape them as citizens contributing to a national conversation, articulating explanations and justifications of their actions and of the world around them.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The literature on Croatian political activism in Australia is a paradox – while it is tempting to simply ask 'what literature?', the bibliography for this thesis attests to the disparate avenues of research this activism has been, and can be, associated with. Though the most significant characteristic of the Croatian community has been its political activism, there has been little critical or academic research that explicitly addresses it. Where accounts do exist, they are largely without continuity, lacking comparative study of the activism over time, across geography, against the activism of other migrant communities, or in regards to Australian responses to it. Thus, Croatian political activism is often reduced to isolated case studies, usually as bit-parts to a wider story, and presented descriptively, with little attention to context. This approach shapes the activism as homogenous and stagnant, changing little over time and rarely presented as a contested activism.

That which has been written has largely been in isolation of the other; works by non-Croatians have focused on English-language sources and perceptions, while those by Croatians have focused on Croatian-language sources and

perceptions. These competing histories talk *at* each other, rather than *with* each other. Thus, what is presented is often without nuance, where sources are selective and taken at face value, complex issues glossed over in a paragraph or two, and the 'other side' dismissed without any real dialogue or analysis. An example of this can be found in Fabijan Lovoković's *Hrvatske Zajednice u Australiji: Nastojanja i Postignuća*, a substantial work presented as a 'true representation'⁵ of the history of the post-war Croatian community. Lovoković attempts to integrate English-language sources, such as newspaper articles and quotations from Federal Hansard, to create a compendium of dates, facts and figures that trace the development of the post-war community. Though expansive, it is not an academic work, and as Budak outlines, has many implicit and explicit shortcomings including its lack of structure, narrative, and cohesion, and the misrepresentation, and in some cases omission, of information.⁶

From an Australian perspective, Croatian political activism is almost entirely defined by the allegations of Croatian/Ustasha terrorism and right-wing extremism of the 1960-70s. This means that *all* Croatian political activism is often dismissed as extremist and right-wing in nature, coded as irrational and morally reprehensible. This is facilitated by an explicit 'top-down' approach to the role of Croatian organisations and their leaders within the community, with a focus on alleged links to Ustashism, rather than a 'bottom-up' approach which considers the different reasons why individuals grouped within and around these organisations, and their varied interpretations of Croatian identity, nationhood, and rhetoric.

Croatian political activism in Australia is therefore framed within a narrative of the adjustment of the Croatian community to Australian society, that is, its 'Australianisation', with Australian authorities the driving force of this narrative. The Australian Government is positioned as the subjugator of Croatian

⁵ F. Lovoković, *Hrvatske Zajednice U Australiji* (Kingsgrove: Središnji Odbor Hrvatskih Društava Australije, 2010), xviii.

⁶ L. Budak, 'Review of F. Lovoković, *Hrvatske Zajednice U Australiji, Nastojanja I Postignuća* [Croatian Communities in Australia, Endeavour(ing)s and Achievements]', *Croatian Studies Review*, 8(1), 2012, 161–67.

extremism and terrorism, its legal, judicial, and law-enforcement agencies stamping out the ideological legacies from ‘over there’, in favour of the civilised values of Australian society. This narrative rests heavily on the well-worn Western discourse that Todorova has termed ‘Balkanism’ – the geographical, historical, political, and sociological construction of the Balkans as a pejorative symbol, imbued with negative connotations against which a positive image of Europeanness has been built.⁷ Balkanist discourse creates a dichotomy between the civilized, wealthy, organised, and sophisticated world of the European, with the uncivilised, primitive, crude, and cruel world of the ‘Balkan Brute’. Therefore at the heart of these narratives lies the transformation of Croatian ‘Balkan Brutes’ into Good Australian Migrants.

This Balkanist narrative is explicitly linked with the history of Left and Right politics in Australia, and often arises in literature dealing with Murphy’s ‘raid’ on ASIO. Allegations of Croatian terrorism are treated as just another example of the difference between the conservatism of Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies and consecutive Coalition governments and the progressive, post-Cold War era Whitlam and the Labor (Australian Labor Party –ALP) Government represented: where the Liberals persecuted innocent Australians because of their ideologies, Labor persecuted those who posed a real threat to the security of Australia –

⁷ M. Todorova, *Imagining the Balkans* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).

Although all owe an intellectual debt to Edward Said’s *Orientalism*, scholars of Balkanism vary in their interpretation of the relationship between Balkanism and Orientalism. Some, like Todorova, argue that while Orientalism relates to the differences between ‘imputed types’ (i.e. the ‘Occident’ and the ‘Orient’), Balkanism relates to the differences within one type (i.e. Europe). Others, however, argue that Balkanism is one of the variations of Orientalism, which Bakić-Hayden terms ‘nesting Orientalisms’.

See: D. Bjelić and O. Savić (eds.), *Balkan as Metaphor: Between globalization and fragmentation* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2002).

K. Fleming, ‘Orientalism, the Balkans, and Balkan Historiography’, *American Historical Review*, 105(4), 2000, 1218-1233.

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M. Bakić-Hayden, ‘Nesting Orientalisms: The Case of Former Yugoslavia’, *Slavic Review*, 54(4), 1995, 917-31.

P. Patterson, ‘On the Edge of Reason: The Boundaries of Balkanism in Slovenian, Austrian, and Italian Discourse’, *Slavic Review*, 62(1), 110-141.

V. Drapac, *Constructing Yugoslavia: A Transnational History* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 25–27.

right-wing Croatian terrorists.⁸ This narrative is yet to be challenged, and is best exemplified by the fact that to this day, the evidence for this view is often taken almost *verbatim* from Murphy's Ministerial Statement on Croatian terrorism.⁹ The most recent contribution to the field - Blaxland's volumes of ASIO's official history, *The Protest Years* and *the Secret Cold War* - does little to challenge the implicit assumptions of the literature, even with unprecedented access to ASIO files documenting the most problematic years of Croatian political activism.

Instead, Blaxland repeats many of the tropes already identified as shaping the well-worn narrative of Croatian political activism in Australia. It is defined as extremist, irrational, and morally bereft, borne of the ethnic hatred idiosyncratic of the 'Balkan Brutes' that comprised Yugoslavia, and the result of a 'deep-seated resentment felt by Croat migrants towards the Serb-dominated state of Yugoslavia.'¹⁰ Croatian political activism is reduced to nothing more than the Croatian pursuit of 'righting the perceived wrongs done to them.'¹¹ Again, there is an explicit top-down approach, concentrating on alleged links to Ustashism, where the actions of the few are coded as representative of the many, with almost no contextual engagement, particularly with Croatian history or sources. As might be expected of an official history, the greatest attention is given to the internal machinations of ASIO in dealing with the 'Croat problem'. Like his predecessors, Blaxland frames the perceived successes and failures of managing Croatian extremism within the Left-Right political paradigm of the 1960s and 1970s, rather than questioning the implicit assumptions on which this paradigm is based. Thus it seems that the discourse of the 'Australianisation' of Balkan

⁸ For a detailed investigation into the history of the raid on ASIO and its implications for the Croatian community, see: K. Kalfic, 'Knock Knock. Who's there? Lionel. Lionel Who?: The Attorney-General's Raid on ASIO, 1973' (BA Honours Dissertation, University of Wollongong, 2011).

⁹ Australia, Senate, *Parliamentary Debates*, No. S.13, 1973, 528-547 (See: Appendix 1B). The most striking example can be found in David McKnight's 1994 *Australian Spies and their Secrets*, in which his chapter on Croatian terrorism is openly declared to be almost entirely based on the Ministerial Statement and its tabled documents.

See: D. McKnight, 'Reaping the Whirlwind' in *Australian Spies and their Secrets*, 171-181

This is despite the many challenges raised both then and now questioning the veracity of the statement, including Senator Ivor Greenwood's Statement-in-Reply on 4 April 1973.

Australia, Senate, *Parliamentary Debates*, No.S.14, 1973, 798-807 (See: Appendix 1C).

¹⁰ J. Blaxland, *The Protest Years: The Official History of ASIO 1963-1975*, Vol.II (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2015), 123.

¹¹ *ibid.*

Brutes (or lack thereof) not only informed Australian responses to Croatian political activism, but also continues to inform historical understanding of it.

Croatian-Australian literature has largely been written in response to such allegations, either explaining or defending the actions of the community, or in substantiating counter-allegations that these were incidents orchestrated by the secret service of Yugoslavia (commonly referred to as the *UDBa - Uprava Državne Bezbednosti*), acting as *agents provocateur* in order to discredit Croatian political activism.¹² However, unlike other countries where Croatian terrorism was alleged, such as Germany, Sweden and Bosnia-Herzegovina, allegations of Yugoslav *UDBa* activity in Australia have remained unexplored.¹³ Rather, Australian-Croatian literature tends to focus on the Croatian experience of migration and the establishment, maintenance and contribution of the community to Australian society. Some are triumphant, such as Drago Šaravanja's *The Snowy and Croatians*, some historical, such as Ilija Šutalo's *Croatians in Australia: pioneers, settlers and their descendants*, some encyclopaedic, such as the entries found in both editions of James Jupps' *The Australian people: an encyclopaedia of the nation, its people and their origins*, and others memoirs, such as Mate Alač's *Into the World*.¹⁴

This literature is often celebratory, and acts either as a validation of the Croatian identity and culture, or as a symbolic 'middle finger' to the forces that brought Croatians here. That there was no independent Croatian state from 1945-1995 gave a distinct flavour to the community, which often manifested in the preservation and promotion of a Croatian identity separate from that of being Yugoslav. Australian-Croatian literature has reflected this, asserting the

¹² See: D. Darby, *Why Croatia?* (Cheltenham: Douglas Darby, 197-?).

L. Shaw, *Trial by Slander: a background to the Independent State of Croatia, and an account of the Anti-Croatian Campaign in Australia* (Canberra: Harp Books, 1973).

¹³ See: B. Vukušić, *Tajni rat UDBE protiv Hrvatskoga Iseljeništv* (Zagreb: Klub Hrvatskih Povratnika iz Iseljeništv, 2001)

M.J. Marković, *Udbini Sinovi* (Ljubuški: Press Holding, 2004).

¹⁴ J. Jupp (ed.), *The Australian People: an encyclopedia of the nation, its people and their origins*, 2nd Edition [1st edition, 1988] (Oakleigh: Cambridge University Press, 2001).

D. Šaravanja, *The Snowy and Croatians* (Sydney: D. Šaravanja, 1999).

I. Šutalo, *Croatians in Australia* (Kent Town: Wakefield Press, 2004).

M. Alač, *Into the World* (Fremantle: Fremantle Arts Centre Press, 1992).

‘Croatianess’ of the community and framing it as a diaspora of Croatia first, and as an Australian community second, if at all. However, these histories also follow the general pattern of migrant histories in Australia by positioning the achievements of the community within the accepted scripts and imagery of post-war migrant contribution to Australian society. In doing so, Australian-Croatian literature attempts to bring Croatians in from the cold of their reputation as extremists and terrorists by emphasising their economic contributions through work, their sporting contributions through football, and their cultural contributions through their language, customs, and traditions.

Australian-Croatian histories, like many migrant histories, give a social, cultural, and emotional face to the experience of migration, and the private and public struggles of building a ‘new life’. Although these histories have created, and continue to create, important understandings of what the migrant experience means to migrants and Australians alike, this paradigm has also proven problematic and limiting, contributing to the creation of (lower case) migrant histories which more often than not, sit outside the (upper case) ‘History’ of Australia. Whether upper- or lower-case, each history can be recounted, described, and explained largely outside of the other, save for a few important points of agreed intersection, such as the post-war Displaced Persons (DP) Scheme or Whitlam’s introduction of multiculturalism. As a result, Australian-Croatian histories are characterised by a relative absence of engagement with Australian history, and Australian history characterised by a relative absence of engagement with Croatian history.

As a consequence, Croatians in Australia have largely been written ‘about’ by others, often as the footnotes, highlights, or catalysts to ‘real’ Australian history migrants so often are. When one type of history mentions the other at these agreed intersections, it is namely to add contextual colour. For example, Murphy’s ASIO raid is positioned in Australian historical accounts within the battle of the political Left and Right, the allegation of Croatian terrorism just another example of the difference between them. Australian-Croatian histories, on the other hand, pass the Raid over as yet another obstacle the community has

faced in its struggle for political and cultural recognition, perpetrated by a zealous leftist politician, characterised either as a naïve and gullible *Australac* duped by the Yugoslav Government, or as a malevolent communist-supporting henchman. In each case, the other side is simply dismissed, without any real consideration as to why exactly the Raid happened at that particular time and place, why it was Murphy who carried it out, nor why Croats and their activism featured in the incident.

Aside from the lack of dialogue between Australian and Croatian literature and the integration of English- and Croatian-language sources, there has also been a significant lack of engagement with the subject from academic historians, who have had almost nothing to say about the Croatian community, let alone Croatian political activism. In fact, a large amount of the scant academic literature that does exist is found outside the discipline altogether, and is usually centred on sociological research into identity, nationalism and diaspora relations, such as Val Colic-Peisker's *Migration, class and transnational identities: Croats in Australia and America*, and Zlatko Škrbiš' *Long Distance Nationalism: Diasporas, homelands and identities*.¹⁵ There has been little historical study exploring the influence of international political relations and contexts had on perceptions of the Croatian community and its advocacy of Croatian independence. Particularly, no attention has been paid to how Cold War considerations dictated the political desirability of an independent Croatia as opposed to a united Yugoslavia, and the foreign policy implications this had on Australia.

¹⁵ V. Colic-Peisker, *Migration, Class, and Transnational Identities: Croats in Australia and America* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2008).

Z. Škrbiš, *Long Distance Nationalism: Diasporas, homelands and identities* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 1999).

This replicates the general pattern of studies of European migration to Australia identified by Bosworth and Wilton, whereby researchers have only been interested in the history of migrants upon their arrival to Australia, doing

very little to ask how much of a migrant's politics or culture came from a past which still exists for the migrant, how much the migrant still exists outside Australia, how much a migrant retains or even re-invents a nationality from the country of origin.¹⁶

Conversely, migrants themselves have not been eager to submit their experiences to historical analysis due to a perception of Australia as a naïve, uneducated and uncultured host country unable or unwilling to understand the nuances and intricacies of European history; a sardonic twist on the Balkanist discourse that has shaped Australian perceptions and responses. This silence is further complicated by the fact that the Europe from which post-war migrants came from was a field of fierce and bloody ideological battles, with the Yugoslav territories one of the most marked examples of it. As such, Bosworth and Wilton argue that some post-war migrants, including Croatians, had a vested interest in keeping their pre-Australian lives 'hidden'. While some had malevolent reasons to deny their activities during this period, the experiences of others were so terrible they were glad of the opportunity to escape to the furthest end of the earth and simply forget.¹⁷

Finally, where histories have been written by migrants, 'there is major evidence of a presence of hierarchies and biases which have been carried from Europe to Australia.'¹⁸ Only the story of the 'right' type of migrant is recorded at the expense of others, serving to both reinforce and legitimise the hierarchy of one over the other. The legacies of these silences reverberate in Australian-Croatian histories, particularly in the absence of a comprehensive, longitudinal analysis of Croatian migration to Australia which encompasses both chronological and geographic contexts in Australia and Croatia, and in the invisibility of Croatians who fall outside of the post-war definition of the

¹⁶ R. Bosworth and J. Wilton, 'A Lost History? The Study of European Migration to Australia', *Australian Journal of Politics & History*, 27(2), 1981, 223–24.

¹⁷ *ibid.*, 229–30.

¹⁸ *ibid.*, 225.

‘community’, such as non-Catholic Croatians, those from the political left (including Croatian Yugoslavs), non-Croatian ethnic minorities, and arguably, Croatian women.

This thesis argues that in order to break this cycle of histories which talk *at* each other rather than *with* each other, historians need to put the *Australian* back into Australian-Croatian history, developing new avenues of historical inquiry which build on and expand the ways in which Australian-Croatian history is understood, and which address the community’s intersection with Australia’s imagined nation and the longitudinal rhythms of Australian history. This thesis, therefore, seeks to bridge this gap by contextualising post-war Croatian political activism. Put simply, neither the activism of Croatians nor Australian responses to them occurred in a vacuum. Both Croatian migrants and Australian hosts were situated within complex domestic, transnational, and international contexts that informed their understandings and shaped their actions and reactions. It is precisely here that the paradox of the literature concerning Croatian political activism in Australia is created.

Where an abundance of academic literature rests, and with which Australian-Croatian literature has seldom intersected, is in the broader issues and contexts which shaped the unique experience of Croatians in Australia, such as those of Australia’s history and experiences with immigration, foreign policy, national identity, and the construction of the ‘Other’ in Australian society. Although these works do not reference Croatian political activism directly, they provide theoretical and comparative tools with which the history of Croatian political activism in Australia can be approached and analysed. For example, the works of James Jupp, Andrew Jakubowicz and Stephen Castles on immigration and ethnicity, Richard White, Mark McKenna, David Carter and Marilyn Lake on Australian identity and nationhood, and Henry Reynolds, Heather Goodall, Tom Griffiths, Anna Haebich, and Peter Read in the field of Australian Indigenous history, all frame the socio-political context of Australia that Croatians were perceived and evaluated within, and against which their activism was understood by Australian authorities. Similarly, the work of Ghassan Hage on Arab-

Australians, and Hsu-Ming Teo and Nancy Viviani on Vietnamese-Australians deal with communities that, like the Croatian community, have been stigmatised by their political activism and status as diasporas of international conflict. In fact, it was the political activism of Croats that bequeathed the Vietnamese community the 'pungent epithet for Vietnamese refugees: Yellow Croats; in one phrase, the sum of all these fears.'¹⁹

While there is a relatively small body of literature which explicitly addresses Croatian political activism in the post-war period, there is a vast array of primary material that has remained unexplored or underutilised. The foremost example of this is the large quantity of ASIO, Commonwealth and State Police reports, governmental department files and reports (largely from the Immigration Department and Department of Foreign Affairs), and the personal papers of various politicians who through their appointments or constituents had a vested interest in monitoring Croatian activism, found in the National Archives of Australia in Canberra and in corresponding State Archives. As Croatian organisations often attracted the attention of Australian legal and political authorities from their very foundation, these archival sources are useful in tracing the development of Croatian activism, particularly of that associated with organisations and persons of interest to the authorities. Furthermore, often included in these files are ephemera related to Croatian activism that would otherwise be difficult to locate. The sheer quantity of these archival materials²⁰ means that a great number of research trajectories could and should be pursued that were not possible within the scope of this thesis, but which would shed important information on many of the issues discussed. As an example, a comparative study of the reports from ASIO and the Commonwealth Police Force would provide important answers to the question of whether ASIO's estimation

¹⁹ N. Viviani. *The Long Journey: Vietnamese Migration and Settlement in Australia* (Carlton: Melbourne University Press, 1984), 56.

²⁰ For example, series A432 originating from the Attorney-General's Department includes two items which are over 180 pages in length apiece, detailing various reports on Croats and Yugoslavs for the month of November 1972 alone. See:

NAA: A432, 1972/7051 PART 1,

NAA: A432, 1972/7051 PART 2

of Croatian activism was influenced by the politics of Menzies and his Cold War myopia as has been alleged.

Despite the wealth of information contained in this primary material, there are significant limitations which hamper the research of academic historians, and perhaps help to explain why this topic has received limited attention. The foremost of these limitations is the issue of access. Many of these files have yet to be examined for release, and requesting access can become a protracted process as many of them, particularly those from ASIO which are not subject to the *Freedom of Information Act 1982*, require special permissions from various Commonwealth agencies or are not subject to the usual conditions as outlined by the *Archives Act 1983*.²¹ As a result, some requests for access have been rejected,²² and even when access is granted, it is usually with exceptions. These barriers to access have resulted in the fragmentation of information, and though this is not unique to the case of Croatian political activism, it does nonetheless pose a significant impediment to historical research. This is further compounded by the absence of, or difficulty in, contextualising this primary material. Primary sources 'in the archives' are rarely the objective and balanced documents they present themselves to be, and need to be contextualised in order to be critically analysed. Particularly in the case of an organisation like ASIO, where often the origin of a report is redacted, it can be difficult to discern the contexts, preconceptions, and intentions through which the information contained within these sources has been presented. It is therefore recognised that these sources present only partial accounts that are difficult to contextualise, and that there exists material relevant to the thesis, but to which access is denied.

Nonetheless, for the purpose of this thesis these archival documents were useful in two ways – in elucidating some important minutiae of Croatian

²¹ For example, requests to have files examined that I placed in March 2013 have been only been released as recently as August 2017, well after this thesis was submitted for examination, and even then some information has been deemed withheld.

²² For example, see:

NAA: A1838, 73/1/3/13 PART 31

NAA: A1838, 73/1/3 PART 10

NAA: A1838, 1500/1/24/4 PART 1

activism, such as the dates, names, and details of particular events or people of interest, and in tracing general trends, both in the changing attitudes of Australian authorities and the changing nature of Croatian activism. In fact, it is after a wide reading of these documents that two central arguments of the thesis were first hypothesised – that there were three distinct paradigm shifts around which the responses of Australian authorities could be grouped, and that Croatian activism adapted to these paradigm shifts at least in rhetoric, if not in nature.

Federal parliamentary debates (Hansard) have also been utilised to trace these general trends. The decision to focus on Federal, rather than State, Hansard was guided by the scope and limitations of the thesis. The Federal Parliament, with representatives from every State and Territory, could reflect the general response of Australian authorities to Croatian activism. The digitisation of Federal Hansard also presented a great opportunity to compile diagnostic information about political responses to Croatian activism, such as how many times the issue was raised in any given year, who was raising the issue, and in creating a snapshot of how this debate was shaped from 1949-1989. This proved to be particularly useful in tracking the change in debate from the 1960s to the early 1970s, and in discerning which aspects of Croatian activism caught national attention. Nonetheless, it is recognised that just like archival primary material, these sources present a partial account of parliamentary responses to Croatian activism. A comparative analysis of State and Territory parliamentary debates would tease out the regional differences in responses to Croatian activism, as well as provide a more nuanced explanation as to where, when, how, and why Croatian activism became a matter of concern to some members of Parliament and perhaps not others.

Newspaper articles were used to monitor media responses to both Croatian activism and the responses of Australia's legal and political authorities to this activism. Newspapers and their journalists reflected the 'pulse' of the debate, as they were situated in the nexus between the general population and the political and legal elite. Like Hansard, newspaper articles were chosen with the scope and

limitations of the thesis in mind. First, the three main daily newspapers of Sydney, Canberra, and Melbourne (the *Sydney Morning Herald*, *Canberra Times*, and *the Age* respectively) were chosen as the main sources of primary material because these cities were the greatest sites of Croatian political activism during the periods researched. Second, these newspapers were chosen as they were in high circulation in these cities, and therefore a likely source of news media for the majority of inhabitants. Finally, the ease of access and analysis to these newspapers through their digitisation allowed for diagnostic analyses that would become too cumbersome to complete with non-digitised newspapers.

There are many limitations to this approach. In choosing to focus on newspapers, other media responses, such as television and radio, have simply been omitted. Newspapers, however, were the only constant media source throughout the periods researched, were readily accessible to many, and were considered a trusted source of information. By confining the geographic location of these newspapers to Sydney, Canberra, and Melbourne, analysis becomes East-Australian-centric, and omits any regional differences or perspectives on Croatian political activism – it could very well be that the rest of Australia was not as concerned with Croats and their activism as these cities were. Finally, the choice of the three newspapers targeted is problematic in and of itself as all three newspapers are owned by Fairfax Media – *Sydney Morning Herald* from 1841, *The Canberra Times* from 1964, and *The Age* from 1972. This means that, at least from 1972, all three newspapers would have been under the influence of the same publisher, which has important implications for the editorial direction of the newspapers and their perspectives on Croatian activism. Again, like archival material and parliamentary debates, the contextual considerations of these articles, the journalists who wrote them, and the newspapers that published them, could and should be investigated through comparative studies with other newspapers, journalists, and media sources in order to provide a more nuanced explanation of media responses to Croatian activism.

The absence of oral interviews in this thesis was a deliberate decision rather than an oversight, and one reached with difficulty. The most pressing reason for

this decision was scope – plugging the gaps in the literature, as it were, will be an undertaking far larger than the scope of this thesis, and one I quickly realised in the early months of my research when I was attempting to do just that. Thus, to interview every person, or only key figures, or even a fair sample of them, relevant to the 50-year period would not have been feasible, particularly because this thesis was not intended to be an oral history project. More importantly, however, it would not have challenged or resolved the issues identified in the literature review. Most of the key figures from the period (taken to mean those in positions of power, leadership, or authority) have already made their thoughts known elsewhere, and though they may bring a new fact or unknown perspective to the history, the general narratives of their responses would, I believe, remain the same and thus perpetuate the fractures already present in the literature. ‘

The lack of primary sources originating from the Croatian community, and the dearth of historical research into this means that the overwhelming majority of the ‘bottom-up’ history Croatian political activism needs remains behind private doors, uncollected and diminishing with the passage of time and deaths of older community members. Where these sources (both primary and secondary) have been found, however, I have used my language capabilities to address the lack of integration between English- and Croatian-language sources identified in the literature review. Where applicable, quotations have been personally translated, with the original Croatian form provided in the footnotes. Croatian script has been used where applicable; however, quotes and anglicised terms have been left in their English formats (e.g. Ustaša, Ustasha and Ustashism). However, these too suffer from the same limitations outlined above for both primary and secondary sources. Primary sources, such as the newspaper *Spremnost* and the ephemera found within archival files, are only partial accounts that provide limited snapshots of how only some Croatians viewed their activism. Secondary sources, such as the body of Australian-Croatian literature relied on to help construct Croatian organisational life, are also partial accounts often written in order to justify the Croatian community in the Australian public sphere, and need to be contextualised with this in mind. Though these primary and

secondary sources have been useful in determining some minutiae of Croatian activism and in tracing general trends, the absence of comparative academic research has made it difficult to contextualise their content.

As one of the first (if not the first) doctoral theses to examine Croatian political activism in Australia, this thesis attempts to develop a generalised representation of Australian responses in the period of 1947-1989. It therefore perpetuates some of the issues identified in the literature review in the name of scope. The Croatian 'community' is used as short-hand for the customary post-war definition as those who organised around overtly Croatian organisations that were of the 'proper' political inclination, and in particular those associated with the Catholic Church, folkloric, and football organisations. As such, non-Catholic Croats, those from the political left (including Croatian Yugoslavs) and non-Croatian ethnic minorities from Croatia are overlooked, while the male-centric history of this community, particularly in its leadership, has served to obscure the histories of women within the community and in regards to its political activism. Furthermore, this thesis does not distinguish between the different communities across Australia, and focuses predominantly on those communities in New South Wales, Canberra, and Victoria. Though problematic, these parameters were both how the community defined itself and how the public sphere defined the community, and therefore defines the 'Croatian community' Australian authorities were responding to in this period. This thesis is but a beginning; it is beyond the scope of it to look at everything.

CHAPTER 1: CROATIAN MIGRATION TO AUSTRALIA



Charles Billich, *Marija Kraljice Hrvata* (2004), *Mary Queen of Croats Church, Wollongong*

Migration movements are total social phenomena, in the sense that most structures of social reproduction and of human agency play a role in them: economic, demographic, social, familial, individual, and psychological factors all come into play.'

Ulf Brunnbauer

In the introduction to her book, *The Sting of Change: Sicilians in Sicily and Australia*, anthropologist Constance Cronin remarked that those

who emphasize the group and the culture have by and large failed to realize that cultures or societies do not immigrate and they do not acculturate. Individuals or, at most, families immigrate – taking with them their values, beliefs, and a few material possessions. Their societal institutions do not follow with them, and although individuals may attempt to establish some of their pre-emigration institutions, circumstances force the alteration of these institutions and eventually the values which relate to them.²

She argued that those who study migration must always bear in mind that migrants do not bring with them entire political, religious or economic systems, but rather, ‘they brought only themselves and their ideas.’³ These ideas, Bosworth and Wilton argue, are best described as ‘partially formed and sustained versions of the institutions and traditions of their old world’ which are then ‘further adapted in the new environment.’⁴ This chapter demonstrates that the past does not desert the migrant when they emigrate, but rather resonates in their new environments. Croatian political activism in Australia was rooted in elements and ideas from the old world clashing with and adapting to their new environment in Australia. Sometimes these partially formed and sustained ideas from the old world find semblances in their new environment, and sometimes they jar, forcing these ideas to adapt and change.

The history of Croatians in Australia often begins with Australia’s post-World War II (WWII) immigration program. Croatians were one of the many groups of Federal Immigration Minister Arthur Calwell’s ‘New Australians’ who helped create multicultural Australia. While it is true that this post-war period was the most significant in the expansion of the community, it is not so readily known that Croatian settlement in Australia dates back to the early 1800s. Given this long history, it is somewhat surprising to find that there is no comprehensive or seminal work which documents it, both chronologically from the first arrivals in

¹ U. Brunnbauer, *Globalizing Southeastern Europe: Emigrants, America, and the State since the Late Nineteenth Century* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2016), 6.

² C. Cronin, *The Sting of Change: Sicilians in Sicily and Australia* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 9.

³ *ibid.*

⁴ Bosworth and Wilton, ‘A Lost History?’, 227.

the 1800s and geographically from the reasons for leaving Croatia to the choice of Australia as the destination.⁵

The challenge of historically documenting Croatian migration and settlement may in part explain the reason for this absence, as it is only from 1996 that Australian officials began recording Croatians as a separate group. Instead, they were recorded as citizens of the empire or state that the territories of Croatia fell under. Prior to World War I (WWI), Croatians were variably recorded as Austrians, Austro-Hungarians, Italians, or according to their regional origins, such as Dalmatians. Archival sources from this period are further complicated by the scarcity of naval documents and passenger lists, the Anglicisation and misspelling of names on existing records, the purposeful fabrication of names, dates, and places of birth, and the illiteracy and inability of Croatian settlers to speak English.⁶ In the interwar years, Croatians were recorded as 'South Slavs' or 'Jugoslavs'. With the establishment of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at the end of WWII, 'Yugoslav' became the official nationality of Croatians until its dissolution in the 1990s.

Even when available, however, interpreting census data can be problematic. For example, as at the 2011 Census, there were approximately 126,267 individuals of Croatian ancestry living in Australia, of which 38,316 were born in Croatia.⁷ This seemingly simple statistic of the number of Croatian-born, however, had to be constructed - there are actually 48,828 Australians who were born in Croatia, but only 38,316 of them identify as being Croatian. This leaves 10,512 individuals

⁵ For example, Tkalčević covers the history of Croatians in Australia from the early 1800s, but is more descriptive than analytical, and does not give much consideration to the wider historical contexts, both in Croatia and Australia, which influenced the community and its actions. The academic contributions in Jupp's *The Australian People* also cover the entire period of Croatian migration, but each entry is self-contained. Šutalo has completed the most detailed investigation of early Croatian migration, but his section on post-war migration only includes an overview of the period.

See: Jupp, *The Australian People* [1st Edition], 335-346

Jupp, *The Australian People* [2nd Edition], 235-251

Šutalo, *Croatians in Australia*

M. Tkalčević, *Povijest Hrvata U Australiji* (Melbourne: Cross Colour Printing, 1999)

⁶ Šutalo, *Croatians in Australia*, 1-7; Tkalčević, *Povijest Hrvata U Australiji*, 13.

⁷ The following statistics have been constructed using the ABS Census TableBuilder and data from the 2011 census, see: <http://www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/censushome.nsf/home/tablebuilder> for more information.

who were born in Croatia but do not think of themselves as Croatian. Conversely, 12,393 individuals were neither born in Australia nor Croatia, and of these 4,850 were born in the former territories of Yugoslavia.

That the census is self-declaring further complicates this question of inclusion and exclusion in that only those who identify as being of Croatian ancestry will be recorded - there may be more that are of Croatian ancestry but do not self-identify as such. Of those who declare Croatian ancestry, there is no indication how much of this ancestry is borne out in their identity - some may only carry a Croatian surname, while others may be extremely active in Croatian organisational life, speak Croatian fluently and travel to Croatia frequently. It is clear that at least 34,426 individuals of those included in the figure of 126,267 are of mixed ancestries, listing Croatian as their second ancestry group, and suggesting that they may identify with their first ancestry group more closely. These issues highlight that the Croatian community - though often cited - is difficult to define, and can mean whatever the historian needs it to mean; from anyone with a tenuous link to Croatia, to only those that are actively involved in the narrowly defined 'real' Croatian community, such as overtly Croatian organisations that are of the 'proper' political inclination, or members of a Croatian Catholic church community.⁸

Like most migrant histories, the experience of migration itself (the journey and the establishment of a 'new life'), and the experience of the community once settled (the history of the community) have been the focus of Croatian-Australian histories. Scant attention, however, has been paid to two other important aspects; the push factors of migration, the reasons for leaving Croatia in the first instance, and the pull factors of migration, the reasons for settling in Australia in the second. Jupp reminds us of a third, and in the case of Australia, extremely influential element influencing migration patterns - 'the role of the state in

⁸ For further discussion on the unreliability of census data in researching Croatians in Australia, see: B. Škvorc, 'Nekoliko napomena o broju Hrvata, Hrvatskom Jeziku, školama i Hrvatskim medijima u Australiji', *Društvena Istraživanja*, 7(1-2), 1998, 189-206.
R. Mesarić-Žabčić and D. Mlinarić, 'Some Reflections on the Research Project of the Institute for Migration and Ethnic Affairs (Zagreb) in Relation to Australia', *Croatian Studies Review*, 3-4(1), 2004, 125-141

turning the tap on or off and in favouring and encouraging some classes of immigrant over others.⁹ Although the logical relation between these three aspects is tacitly acknowledged, the historiography of Croatian migration tends to treat each in a vacuum, as though the experience of one has very minimal, if any, effect on the others.

This overlooks the fundamental influence these factors of migration have on the composition of a community, in that the push factors of migration motivated certain Croatians to emigrate, which in turn influenced how they organised, and the ideas, causes, and activities around which they organised. Without understanding the push factors of Croatian emigration, and therefore the characteristics of the Croatians emigrating, the Croatian community becomes a homogenous group of people that simply 'exist' in Australia. This obscures the context of the community's unique development in Australia and overlooks important influences on the trajectory and actions of these people, which differentiated them from other migrant groups.

Likewise, that their destination was Australia was not purely fortuitous. Just as there were reasons for when and why particular Croatians emigrated, there were also reasons for when and why these particular groups came to Australia rather than anywhere else in the world. Without understanding the role of the Australian state within this, the host country can be reduced to an arbitrary migration destination, with very minimal influence in the composition, organisation, and actions of migrant communities, which, at least in the case of Croatians in Australia, is simply not true. Like push factors, these pull factors influenced how and why Croatians in Australia organised themselves, which in turn differentiated the Australian diaspora from other Croatian diaspora's throughout the world.

This approach to Australian-Croatian history has served to obscure both the development of the Croatian community and the fact that the political activism

⁹ J. Jupp, *From White Australia to Woomera: The story of Australian Immigration* (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press), 12.

of the post-war community was not as novel or unique as the literature suggests. Rather, Croats in Australia have consistently engaged in political activism since the turn of the 20th century, with the activism of the post-war community but one of the many forms it has taken. Whether because of the issues with documenting Croats in Australia, the simple loss of history that comes as different stories gain prominence in collective memory, or a more wilful forgetting, the omission of this historical analysis limits our ability to recognise and explain influences on the political activism of the post-war community, as well as Australian responses to them.

This chapter attempts to unravel this comprehensive history in order to better understand the longitudinal trajectory of Croatian migration to Australia. In doing so, it will contextualise the political activism of the post-WWII period in an unprecedented way by expanding the history of the community chronologically and geographically beyond the limitations of earlier works. Section 1.1 will look at the less well-known period of Croatian migration to Australia prior to World War I. Though this emigration was small, Croatia's experience under the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Croatian National Revival it produced significantly shaped ideas about Croatian identity and nationhood that would influence the pre-WWI and inter-war communities in Australia, and Croatian activism in the post-war period. Section 1.2 covers WWI and the inter-war period. The internment of Croats in camps across Australia during WWI, and the experience of migration and settlement at the height of the White Australia Policy served to organise and politicise the community in somewhat surprising ways. That Croatia found itself under another two constitutional monarchies in the inter-war period, and the experience of three failed states in less than 50 years resulted in different and disparate visions for Croatian statehood and its future.

Section 1.3 explores WWII and its aftermath both in Croatia and Australia. Not only was this period the direct cause of the first wave of post-war Croatian migration, but understanding the experience of Croatia during WWII is crucial to understanding the post-war community, and is an experience which still

reverberates throughout the community today. The experience of WWII also profoundly reoriented Australia's relationship to the world and with immigration. Without this reorientation and the post-war immigration program it generated, the Croatian community in Australia would not have developed at the rate and size that it did, nor would it have attracted the unparalleled diversity of intake that created the multicultural Australia of today. Finally, Section 1.4 provides an abridged account of the four waves of post-war Croatian migration that coincide with the timeframe explored in the remainder of the thesis. By covering this very broad and at times seemingly extraneous ground, this chapter will provide the foundations needed to reimagine the historical narrative of Croatian political activism in the post-war period. After all, in the same way we look to the past to understand the present, it is difficult to understand the immediate past without looking at the distant past.

1.1. CROATIAN EMIGRATION PRIOR TO WWI

Croatian migrants experienced Australia at its various stages of social development, from Federation, development of outback industries and urban sprawls, world wars, the great Depression, racism, changes in migration and the application of multicultural ideas.¹⁰

Just who was the first Croatian to arrive and when varies across sources. However, all seem to agree that Croatian migration to the Australian colonies originates somewhere in the early 1800s.¹¹ By the 1880s, Croatian barques were a regular sight in Australian ports, and as Šutalo argues, their repeat arrivals suggest that Australia was a regular trade destination for Croatian sea merchants.¹² Croatian crewmen occasionally deserted these ships and settled in Australia permanently, while for others, a number of shipwrecks forced Croatians to settle in Australia, at least temporarily.¹³ By 1890, over 850 Croatians had lived in Australia, and were almost exclusively single men of peasant origin from the

¹⁰ W. Lalich, 'Migration Generated Expansion of European Influence and the Role of Croatian Diaspora', in E. Smith (ed.), *Europe's Expansions and Contractions: Proceedings of the XVIIth Biennial Conference of the Australasian Association of European Historians (Adelaide, July 2009)* (Unley: Australian Humanities Press, 2010), 152.

¹¹ Tkalčević argues that the first traceable Croatian, A Cumberlitch (Čuberlić or Candrlić), arrived in 1800, though there are indications that attest to even earlier arrivals. Šutalo and Stenning argue that the first arrival for whom we have documentary evidence is Stefano Posić, a convict of Croatian descent, charged with larceny in England and transported to Australia in 1813 under the name of Stephano Haskitt, which he later changed to John Stanton. See:

M. Stenning, *Croatian and Slav Pioneers: New South Wales. 1800s-1940's* (Glebe: Fast Books, 1996), 2–3. Šutalo, *Croatians in Australia*, 15.

Tkalčević, *Povijest Hrvata U Australiji*, 13

¹² Šutalo, *Croatians in Australia*, 114.

¹³ The most famous of these was the shipwreck Stefano, which struck the Ningaloo Reef south of Point Cloates, Western Australia on 26 October 1875, of which 3 survivors ended up living with and learning the language, customs, and ceremonies of an Aboriginal tribe - amongst the first Europeans recorded to have done so. Two of these, Miho Bacić (Baccich) and Ivan Jurić (Jurich) eventually returned to Croatia and recorded their recollections. The original manuscript of these recollections was published by Gustave Rathe, descendent of Miho Baccich in 1992, while the hand-written duplicate copy can be found in the National Museum of Rijeka in Croatia. See:

G. Rathe, *The Wreck of the Barque Stefano off the North West Cape of Australia in 1875* (New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux, 1992).

N. Smoje, 'Shipwrecked on the North-West Coast: The Ordeal of the Survivors of the Stefano', *Journal of the Royal Western Australian Historical Society*, 8(2), 1978, 35-47.

Šutalo, *Croatians in Australia*, 114–15.

Tkalčević, *Povijest Hrvata U Australiji*, 25–29.

coastal regions of Dalmatia.¹⁴ Despite their relatively small number, the contribution of these early Croatians to the development of Australia was significant. They worked in the gold fields of Western Australia and Victoria, as seamen and fishermen, established hotels, wineries and farms, and were among the first of Australia's entrepreneurs, establishing multiple business ventures and trades, as well as making significant contributions to society, culture, and industry.¹⁵

These pioneer Croatian migrants, as Šutalo names them, were the product of a particular context. In Croatia, the lead up to the 1800s had been turbulent, with gains and losses of territory, changes in administrative control, and the disbanding and reinstating of the Croatian Parliament (*Sabor*). Centuries of oppressive and exploitative rule by the Austro-Hungarians in Northern Croatia, and by the Venetian Republic, France, and Austria along the Dalmatian coast, stunted economic development as each empire sought to consolidate their political and economic power through their territorial acquisitions. The advent of the Austro-Hungarian Empire in 1868 and the reunification of northern Croatia with Dalmatia did not bring any assistance or relief. Rather, the Empire deliberately encouraged Croatian emigration by exacerbating the conditions of economic deterioration. This exacerbation was also intended to keep the peasantry politically powerless, while preventing industry competition with others in the Empire.¹⁶

¹⁴ Very few Croatian women migrated at this time, and those that did were overwhelmingly wives accompanying their husbands. Single Croatian women did not begin migrating to Australia in larger numbers until the 1890s with the establishment of chain migration patterns, and it is only in the mid-1890s that we see marriages between Croatian-born men and women occurring. See:

Šutalo, *Croatians in Australia*, 61–90.

¹⁵ *ibid.*, 91-186

¹⁶ B. Banović, 'Push and Pull Factors in the Emigration from Croatia to Australia from the End of the 19th Century to Present Times', *Migracijske i Etničke Teme*, 6(1), 1990, 9.

For more information, see:

B. Banović, 'Emigracijska politika Austro-Ugarske i iseljavanje iz Hrvatske u razdoblju 1867–1914', *Migracijske i Etničke Teme*, 3(3-4), 1987, 313-323

S. Vranjican, 'Dostignuća I Promišaji Gospodarskog Razvoja Hrvatske U Proteklom Stoljeću', 12(3-4), 2005, 334–37.

This process was further encouraged by the introduction of assisted migration which encouraged non-Slav's to move to the region. The monarchy hoped that economic underdevelopment and the dual process of Croatian emigration and non-Slav immigration would help legitimise and secure the sovereignty and authority of the monarchy in this politically unstable territory of the Empire. Although the policies operated identically across both northern Croatia and the Dalmatian coast, the significantly poorer economic conditions in the coastal and island regions resulted in higher numbers of emigration. Without fertile land for subsistence agriculture to fall back on, Banovic estimates that more than 100, 000 Dalmatians emigrated in the period prior to WWI, constituting an exodus of almost 20% of the total population of the region.¹⁷

These push factors of Croatian emigration affected a particular Croatian – the peasant of Dalmatia - and explains why the overwhelming majority of Croatian migrants to Australia during this period were from this region. Croatian historians describe this type of emigration as '*s trbuhom za kruhom*' – literally 'with stomach after bread' - these Dalmatians were pushed out in the search for subsistence. This particularly affected the single male peasant. Faced with little prospect of employment to support oneself, let alone a wife or family, he left to create his fortune elsewhere.¹⁸ This also accounts for the relative invisibility of Croatians throughout the colonies prior to the 1890s. As peasants, many were illiterate and uneducated, did not speak English, and were not wealthy enough to afford the expensive passage to Australia. They were, however, experienced fishermen or seamen and thus worked their passage to Australia. This method of migration found their names anglicised, misspelled, or incorrectly recorded, and in some cases, purposefully fabricated.¹⁹ Further contributing to this invisibility was the imperative of marriage and procreation. Exacerbated by a lack of existing

¹⁷ Banović, 'Push and Pull Factors', 10.

¹⁸For a detailed analysis of various causes of Croatian emigration in this period, see: 'Overseas Emigration from the Balkans until 1914' in Brunnbauer, *Globalizing Southeastern Europe*, 37–92.

¹⁹ Šutalo, *Croatians in Australia*, 1–7.

Tkalčević, *Povijest Hrvata U Australiji*, 13.

family structures, Croatian males simply integrated into the lives of their Australian wives.²⁰

Unlike the Croatians who would come after them, these settler migrants were not highly organised or visible as a community in Australian society. That is not to say, however, that they did not share a sense of community based on their Croatian identity. As Šutalo explains,

[Croatians] worked and ran businesses together, socialised and lived together - and maintained ties with other Croatian settlers in Australia. There is written evidence that over 54% of Croatian settlers had connections with other Croatian settlers in Victoria... They were each other's marriage witnesses, attendees at funerals and godparents to each other's children. They sometimes travelled great distances to be a marriage witness or to be present at a funeral of a Croatian friend.²¹

Similarly, though their activism was not highly visible, these early Croatians were involved, at least individually if not collectively, in Australian public and political life. This involvement was closely tied to the employment of early Croatian migrants, particularly on Australian goldfields and in mining districts. Others still supported various political causes through wider community ties.²²

At the turn of the century, patterns of chain migration began to form. Croatian migration was aimed first at Western Australia, and from there Croatians either settled or migrated eastward. In 1890, the first 'mass' migration of Croatians took place from the town of Račišće on the island of Korčula.²³ They settled in Boulder-Kalgoorlie in Western Australia, whose goldfields soon became home to the largest community of Croatians in Australia. An abrupt deterioration of economic conditions in Dalmatia heralded the onset of these mass migrations, and accounted for the larger number of Croatian arrivals to Australia from the 1890s, particularly with the collapse of the winemaking and

²⁰ Šutalo, *Croatians in Australia*, 61–62.

²¹ *ibid.*, 61.

²² For example, Šutalo documents at least three prominent Croatians, Thomas Pavletich, Mattio Orlovich, and Archbishop of Adelaide Matthew Beovich as supporting the 'Irish cause' in Australia, influenced by their ties to the Catholic Church. See: *ibid.*, 71–81.

²³ Approximately 60% were single men and 30% married men who had left their wives in Croatia, mirroring those that had migrated before them. The remaining 10% of male migrants, however, were accompanied by their wives. See: C.A. Price, *Southern Europeans in Australia* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1963), 175.

shipbuilding industries that had provided some level of economic subsistence in the region.²⁴

The economic disenfranchisement of Croatia under Austro-Hungarian rule was amplified by the Empire's so-called 'Magyarisation' policy, which threatened to erase Croatian identity by enforcing the use of the Hungarian language and resisting the unification of Croatian territories.²⁵ In response to this, a group of young Croatian writers, under the leadership of Ljudevit Gaj, established the Illyrian movement in Zagreb in the early 1830s. This was a cultural and political movement aimed at addressing the position of Croatia within the Empire, its principle goal the establishment of a standard Croatian language as a counter to Magyarisation. This linguistic pursuit sat alongside the development of a Croatian cultural identity and history of nationhood, often referred to as the Croatian National Revival (*Hrvatski Narodni Preporod*).

Based on the theory that South-Slavs were descendants of ancient Illyrians, the movement also advocated a pan-South-Slavism based on linguistic and cultural grounds. The breadth of the movement, however, resulted in the development of two main strains which would shape the next 150 years in the region; a Croatian nationalist movement aimed at the unification and independence of the Croatian people, and a Yugoslav movement, aimed at the integration of all South-Slavs.²⁶ In the 20th Century, both would use figures and ideas from the Illyrian movement to justify their causes.²⁷ The Croatian-Hungarian Agreement of 1868 (commonly referred to as the *Nagodba*) reinforced these cultural developments by granting Croats autonomy over internal affairs in the 'Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia'. This prompted a boom in the institutional

²⁴ I. Goldstein, *Croatia: a History* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1999), 97.

²⁵ G. Vermes, 'South Slav Aspirations and Magyar Nationalism in the Dual Monarchy' in I. Banac, J. Ackerman, and R. Szporluk (eds.), *Nation and Ideology: Essays in Honor of Wayne S. Vucinich* (Boulder: East European Monographs, 1981), 177-200.

²⁶ For a discussion on the reasons for this division, and comparisons between Ante Starcevic and Josip Juraj Strossmayer, see: Tanner, *Croatia; A Nation Forged in War* (New Haven, London: Yale University Press, 1997), 94-107.

²⁷ For more information on the Illyrian Movement and its development, see: E. Despalatović, *Ljudevit Gaj and the Illyrian Movement* (Boulder: East European Quarterly, 1975). Drapac, 'Imagining Savage Europe and Inventing Yugoslavia: 1850-1914' in *Constructing Yugoslavia*, 22-62. Tanner, *Croatia*, 66-81.

development of Croatia, including the renaming of the *Matica Ilirska* to *Matica Hrvatska*, (now one of the oldest Croatian cultural institutions still in operation), the re-establishment of the University of Zagreb in 1874, and the construction of the Croatian National Theatre in 1895.

This period of cultural and national development led to the migration of Croatians with a framework of ideas and language that expressed a Croatian national identity not available to those that migrated earlier in the century. This is best encapsulated in the lamentations of Pavle Vidas, a Croatian traveller who lived in Australia from 1889-1894, and whose diary is one of the precious few written sources detailing the lives of Croatian pioneers. He notes,

Upon our arrival in Sydney, my friend from Hreljin and myself, met a Croat from Primuda in Croatia who had a Hotel in Sydney. We told him that we were from Croatia and he responded that we were Austrians as there was no country called Croatia. *Žali Bože*, he didn't even know where Croatia is, but is a Croatian like us! At the time, at his hotel were several other Croats who also agreed with him and stated that there was no Croatian ethnicity. When we heard such stupidities, my friend and myself, although without money and no other place to go, decided to leave the Hotel rather than waste our time with those ignorant idiots.²⁸

Exposed to the Illyrian movement, the Croatian National Revival, and the development of a Croatian national identity, Vidas was appalled to find Croatians in Australia unaware of their cultural and ethnic heritages, either uneducated or unwilling to express their nationality. Though the tension between 'real' Croatians and those whose allegiances lie elsewhere was a defining characteristic of the post-war community, this exchange demonstrates that the negotiation of Croatian identity, closely tied with the political activism of the community, was not a new phenomenon nor unique to the post-war period.

Although Croatians were more visible in Australia from the 1890s simply because they were more numerous, they also began organising as a distinct community. Like Vidas, the influence of the Illyrian movement can be found in the organisation of these migrants not only as Croatians, but as 'South-Slavs', incorporating the pan-Slavist ideals of the movement. This is best demonstrated

²⁸ T.A. Mursalo, *Isejenstvo Pavla Vidasa*, (Johannesburg: Hensman Graphics, 1985), 18, as cited in M. Tkalčević, *Croats in Australia: An Information and Resource Guide* (Burwood: Victoria College Press, 1988), 8.

in the establishment of the first identifiably Croatian organisation, the Croatian-Slavonic Society of Boulder-Kalgoorlie in 1912. It seems that at least at this juncture in time, a Croatian identity and pan-Slavist ideals were not the mutually exclusive pursuits they became after WWII. It is not difficult to imagine that as an overwhelming minority in the face of such distance and isolation, organising with people from a similar geographic area with similar cultures and languages, under the banner of South-Slav may have had its own advantages, not least because it was reinforced by Australian authorities who did not differentiate between them.

Australia was not by any means the preferred destination for Croatian emigration before WWI. As Banović points out, the emigration of at least half a million Croats from 1868 up until WWI constituted approximately 35% of the total emigration from the Austro-Hungarian Empire for this period. Of this, approximately 5% came to Australia - the overwhelming majority migrated to the United States.²⁹ This can be attributed to the pull factors (or lack thereof) of migration which determined Australia's desirability as a migration destination. Despite the exodus of people from Europe into new settler societies that characterised the 19th Century, Australia was largely bypassed by these migrants on the move.

The most significant reason for Australia's marginalisation in the great migrations of the nineteenth century was the most obvious - the tyranny of distance.³⁰ Australia also had too small of an economy and population to produce the opportunities afforded by North America, and was blemished by the stigma associated with its convict population. These barriers to migration also held true for Croatian emigration. Australia was too distant and too expensive a destination, and not only was it easier to migrate to the United States, but employment opportunities were better and easier to come by for the new migrant

²⁹ Banović, 'Push and Pull Factors', 10.

³⁰ This expression and theory was made popular by Geoffrey Blainey in his book of the same name, *The Tyranny of Distance: How distance shaped Australia's history* (Melbourne: Sun Books, 1966). For the average European migrant, Australia was simply too far, too hard, and too expensive to reach. Australia's distance and expense also meant that emigration to Australia was with a view to permanence, and thus held a high probability of never again returning home.

in the United States, where wealth was faster and easier to accumulate in its industrial-mining industries as compared to Australia's agricultural industry.³¹

Despite these barriers, Banović argues that Australia still remained an attractive migration destination for Croatians - a sparse population that lent itself to growth opportunities, an abundance of free agricultural land for farming, a relatively developed livestock industry (most notably in sheep husbandry), rich deposits in gold and opal for mining, and a relatively unrestricted immigration policy. Western Australia was especially attractive to early Croatian migrants, as it had similar conditions and industries to those in Dalmatia. The proximity to the ocean and fishing industries was reminiscent of the rhythms of coastal life in Dalmatia, while the climate and soil were similarly suited to winemaking. Finally, as chain migration patterns were established towards the end of the century, some Croatians migrated to Australia with the assistance of family and friends who could, at the very least, secure temporary accommodation, assist in finding employment, and help alleviate and navigate the social and cultural anxieties of migration.³²

Due to the distance and expense involved, Australia's relationship to immigration in the 1800s was unburdened with the question of large numbers of unassisted or unwanted arrivals, as was the case in the United States, and those who reached Australia were able to be controlled, subjugated, or ostracised as needed. The introduction of assisted passages to British subjects not only allowed the colonial governments to decide when and how migrants came to Australia, but also *which* migrants came. These conditions developed a long tradition of determining the selection of incoming people, and thus gave Australia the ability to, in effect, design its population. It comes as no surprise then, that one of the first acts of Federal Parliament, the *Immigration Restriction Act 1901*, addressed the role of immigration in the new federation. Though this Act was the central piece of legislation which ushered in what would become known as the White

³¹ Banović, 'Push and Pull Factors', 10.

³² *ibid.*, 10–11.

Australia Policy, it was also only one in a series of acts, amendments, and programmes which would develop over the years of White Australia's existence.³³

The social logic of the White Australia Policy was steeped in rationales of race determinism and mass nationalism which posited humans on a sliding scale of whiteness. Proponents argued that racial homogeneity was essential to national unity, prosperity, and the establishment of a democratic society, and that non-Europeans, as a culturally and biologically different race, were incapable of identifying with, or subscribing to, the values of white British Australia. This social logic found economic expression in the prevention of entry of cheap goods and cheap labour into Australia. It was argued that the manufacture of goods by British Australians, coupled with government assistance in the development of industries would keep living standards high by providing employment. The prevention of 'coloured' labour would keep wages fair and reasonable by preventing their entry into industrial relations as 'cheap' labour, and had the added bonus of keeping the race homogenous, which was thought necessary for the peaceful regulation of industrial relations.

This social and economic logic was buttressed by Australia's geopolitical reality and the profound anxieties caused by it. The tyranny of distance which determined Australia's peripheral status in the great migrations of the nineteenth century also found expression as a fear of invasion. Perceived as an isolated outpost of Western civilisation, Australia's distance from Britain, coupled with the sheer size of the Australian continent comparative to its very small population, created a perception that Australia was liable to be overrun at any given moment by those 'lesser' races surrounding it.³⁴ This anxiety was

³³ As Markus explains, the policy 'was concerned with racial purity in the widest sense,' and can be broadly categorised into three facets. The first is that with which the policy is most readily associated, the control of population movement and the exclusion of non-European migration to Australia. The second included measures to reduce the number of non-Europeans already in Australia, and finally, it also aimed to segregate and ultimately eliminate the Indigenous population for the sake of racial homogeneity.

See: A. Markus, 'Of Continuities and Discontinuities: Reflections on a Century of Australian Immigration Control' in J. Jayasuriya, D. Walker, and J. Gothard (eds.), *Legacies of White Australia: race, culture, and nation* (Crawley: University of Western Australia Press, 2003), 176.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, 177–78.

particularly pronounced due to Australia's uncomfortable proximity to the 'awakening' Asian continent, whose Chinese, Japanese, and Indian populations were on the move in comparable numbers to those from the West. The experience of Chinese immigration during the gold rushes of the 1850s only served to reiterate the legitimacy of these anxieties, and for 60-odd years after its introduction in 1901, the White Australia Policy enjoyed bipartisan and overwhelming public support. As Kelly points out, this longevity and near universal support was 'testimony to the powerful economic and social logic implicit in the policy.'³⁵

³⁵ P. Kelly, *100 years: The Australian Story* (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2001), 52.

1.2. CROATIAN EMIGRATION IN THE INTERWAR YEARS

Australia limited entry not only to British subjects from Asia, but also to southern Europeans, who were regarded as being not quite 'white'.³⁶

WWI served to strengthen Australia's ties with the British Empire and reinforced the White Australian vision of the future; that for reasons of national unity and security, Australia should be predominantly British, that non-Europeans should be denied entry, and that the indigenous population must remain segregated from white British society. The issue of cheap labour was exacerbated by wartime conditions, and led to the internment of various ethnic groups deemed 'enemy aliens'. Alongside others then considered 'Slavs', approximately 740 Croatians were interned first in camps on Rottnest Island and Torrens Island in Western Australia, and upon their closures in 1915, transported across the country to the Holsworthy Internment Camp at Liverpool in New South Wales. Ostensibly interned because of their official status as Austro-Hungarian citizens, Fischer argues that the real reason for the internment of Croatians was 'a campaign by mine workers unions over the question of 'enemy labour' in the goldfields of Boulder-Kalgoorlie where [Croatians] were a sizeable minority in the workforce.'³⁷ While some were released at the end of the war, most of the Croatian internees were deported from Australia in September 1919, as citizens of the then non-existent Austro-Hungarian Empire.³⁸

³⁶ A. Jordens, *Redefining Australians: Immigration, Citizenship & National Identity* (Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1995), 2.

³⁷ G. Fischer, *Enemy Aliens: Internment and the Homefront Experience in Australia 1914-1920* (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1989), 78.

³⁸ For more information on Croatian internment during WWI, see:

Fischer, *Enemy Aliens*, 280–302.

W. Lalich, 'Hrvatski Zarobljenici U Australiji U Doba Velikog Rata', in V. Kukavica (ed.), *Hrvatski Iseljenički Zbornik* (Zagreb: Hrvatska Matica Iseljenika, 2015), 207–30.

A. Splivalo, *The Home Fires* (Fremantle: Fremantle Arts Centre Press, 1982).

M. Stenning, *Austrian Slavs Internment Camps of Australia World War I* (Sydney: M. Stenning, 1995).
Šutalo, *Croatians in Australia*, 200–203.

This internment and subsequent deportation occurred despite the fact that many Croats were outspoken in their opposition of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Its rule over Croatia was considered culturally and economically oppressive by the community in Australia, and had directly or indirectly caused their migration in the first place. The first Croatian political organisation can be dated to as early as 1910, with the establishment of a Peasant Party in Broken Hill that produced its own small publication, *Peasant News*.³⁹ By WWI, it is clear that Croats were active in their denunciation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The Croatian-Slavonic Society in Boulder-Kalgoorlie openly and actively collected funds for the allied war effort and encouraged men to enlist,⁴⁰ while in North Queensland, Croats were encouraged to renounce their Austrian citizenship and instead declare themselves Serbo-Croat or Croat.⁴¹ Such was the activism of the Boulder-Kalgoorlie community that in December 1915, the Boulder Police Station and the *Kalgoorlie Miner* reported that tensions between those advocating for or against the Austro-Hungarian Empire threatened to escalate in violence and spill into the streets.⁴²

Interestingly, this political activism did not include a vision of Croatian unification and the establishment of a Croatian state. Rather, as Tkalčević explains, while some advocated to remain within the Empire (presumably under better conditions), Croatian political activism mostly advocated either a pan-Slavist ideal of the unification of one people, or the utilitarian unification of the different 'South-Slavs' against common threats.⁴³ Nevertheless, the anti-Austro-Hungarian position of Croats was 'clearly recognised by the Australian Government which actively tried to recruit volunteers from among Slav

³⁹ M. Alagich, 'Early Croatian Settlement in Eastern Australia', in Jupp, *The Australian People* [1st Ed.], 336.

⁴⁰ In fact, Marković argues that the very establishment of the Croatian-Slavonic Society was a political act, designed to make clear to Australians that they were Croats, rather than Austrians as they were usually labelled. See:

L. Marković, 'Immigrants in Australia', *Migracijske I Etničke Teme*, 4(1-2), 1988, 208.

⁴¹ Alagich, 'Early Croatian Settlement in Eastern Australia', 335.

⁴² 'Serious Disturbance: Austrians and Slavs at Boulder' *Kalgoorlie Miner*, 28 December 1915, 4

See also: NAA: PP14/1, 4/3/127

⁴³ Tkalčević, *Povijest Hrvata U Australiji*, 37.

migrants,'⁴⁴ and a Croatian contingent of the First Australian Imperial Force (AIF) was created for the front in Salonika. The servicemen in the AIF contingent, however, met a similar fate to their internee counterparts:

After the war some tried to get assisted passage back to Australia, [and] despite being trained by Australians and travelling to Europe to fight for Australia, they were not allowed to return on the navy ships with other Australians.⁴⁵

Their deportation and the failed repatriation of AIF servicemen reverberated throughout the community, the legacy of which would inform the interwar period.

In the aftermath of WWI, the introduction of immigration restrictions and quotas in the United States redirected some of the immigration out of southern Europe to Australia. A significant proportion of these Southern Europeans were Croatian, and as conditions in Croatia deteriorated, a significant growth in Croatian migration to Australia might have been anticipated. The Australian Government, however, moved to restrict this immigration. The influx of Croats and other southern Europeans after the war was perceived as a threat to employment prospects and conditions, and the wartime preoccupation of labour re-emerged as the social, cultural, political, and economic nexus of the White Australia Policy in the interwar period. In 1924 and 1925, the Australian Government introduced quotas on those deemed problematic to Australia's Working Man's Paradise.⁴⁶ This included Southern Europeans, who were perceived as 'not quite 'white',⁴⁷ and a potential source of cheap labour which could undercut the employment prospects of British Australians.

Though these measures significantly restricted the entry of Croats in the interwar period, there was nonetheless a relative growth in Croatian migration. It was also a period of significant expansion in community, social, sporting and

⁴⁴ Fischer, *Enemy Aliens*, 158.

⁴⁵ Šutalo, *Croats in Australia*, 202.

⁴⁶ For a comprehensive history of Australia's industrial relations system during this period, see: K. Buckley and E. L. Wheelwright, *No Paradise for Workers: Capitalism and the Common People in Australia 1788-1914* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1988), in particular 140-184. R. White, *Inventing Australia: Images and Identity 1688-1980* (North Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1981), 29-46.

⁴⁷ Jordens, *Redefining Australians*, 2.

cultural activity, with over 22 Croatian clubs formed.⁴⁸ As Banović argues, this was because the pre-war economic pull factors of Australia also held during the interwar years, and were even augmented by a number of additional reasons. Australia's accelerated urbanisation and industrialisation, the increased exchange of information about Australia as a migration destination through chain and return migration patterns, and the movement of Croatians already in Australia into better paid employment, resulted in a better ability of those already in Australia to help cover the costs of travel and initial settlement of new migrants, and thus convince family and friends to migrate.⁴⁹ The most influential of pull factors according to Banović, however, was the relative standards of living between both countries. When considering the comparative differences in real wages, living standards and earning potential between countries, Australia boasted the highest standard of living during the interwar years, surpassing that of both the United States and Canada.⁵⁰

Following WWI, Croatia found itself under another monarchy - the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Justified by the argument that the three were equal 'tribes' of a single, 'tri-named' nation, the Kingdom ostensibly fulfilled the pan-Slavist ideals of the Illyrian movement.⁵¹ For Croatians, however, the reality resembled more their subordination and grievances under the Austro-Hungarian Empire than the promised equality with its South-Slav neighbours. The fear of Magyarisation under Austro-Hungarian rule was replaced with a fear of Serbianisation under the new monarchy. The issue of language reappeared, as Serbian and the Cyrillic script became the *lingua franca* of the central government.⁵² Disputes over education, the centralisation of government, the reduction in the powers of the Croatian *Ban*, and the dissolution of the *Sabor* yet again, were all reminiscent of issues under Austro-Hungarian rule. Under the

⁴⁸ Šutalo, *Croatians in Australia*, 209.

⁴⁹ Banović, 'Push and Pull Factors', 12–13.

⁵⁰ *ibid.*, 13–14.

⁵¹ S. Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918-2005* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 36.

⁵² This was despite the fact that one of the first acts of the new government was to declare the equality of Cyrillic and Latin alphabets, and to declare the official language as 'Serbo-Croato-Slovenian'. See: *ibid.*, 51.

guise of agrarian reform, the government dispossessed Croat institutions of lands which had been granted to them in perpetuity by the Austro-Hungarian Government, while shutting down a number of departments at the University of Zagreb, and somewhat bizarrely, transporting large quantities of books from Croatia to Belgrade under the pretence that they were no longer needed in Croatia. The monopoly of Serbians in governmental positions contributed to the rising discontent, with Croatian republicans and communists finding themselves barricading against the creeping monarchism of the Serbian Karadjordjević dynasty. This was all underlined by a series of disputes, outrages, and assassinations over the procedures of government and voting that dominated politics for most of the 1920s.⁵³

Stjepan Radić, founder of the Croatian Peasant Party in 1904 (*Hrvatska Seljacka Stranka –HSS*) was a leading figure in Croatia under Austro-Hungarian rule and became a key politician within the new Kingdom. He campaigned under a platform of opposition to the Kingdom itself politically, and Serb hegemony culturally. Credited with turning the Croatian peasantry into a viable political force, Radić and his party enjoyed overwhelming support throughout Croatia, in spite of the considerable challenges imposed by the central government.⁵⁴ On 20 June 1928 these political tensions came to a head when Puniša Račić, leader of the People's Radical Party of Serbia (*Narodna radikalna stranka – NRS*), pulled out a revolver and shot at five *HSS* representatives on the floor of the Parliament. Two died instantly, and two were wounded but later recovered. Radić was the fifth casualty, seriously wounded in the stomach.

The assassination attempt triggered a political crisis from which the Kingdom never recovered. Less than an hour after news reached Zagreb, approximately 19,000 people gathered on the main square demanding the *Sabor* be reinstated in order to separate Croatia from the Kingdom. As Radić succumbed to his injuries

⁵³ *ibid.*, 51-65.

⁵⁴ The extent of this support, and arguably Croat republican aspirations, was best evidenced in the elections of 8 February 1925. Able to list candidates but banned from campaigning, and with most of the party leadership, including Radić, in and out of jail, the *HSS* managed to receive 60.9% of the vote in Croatia, retaining 67 seats in the Assembly. This was only three less than in the 1923 election. See: *ibid.*, 66.

on 8 August 1928, the prevailing sentiment was that the attack on the leaders of the *HSS* was an attack on the Croatian people. Radić's funeral on 12 August attracted crowds in the hundreds of thousands, and 'resembled more the funeral of a great monarch than of a one-time republican politician.'⁵⁵ The death of Radić 'turned into a political manifestation of massive proportions,'⁵⁶ with the triune Kingdom losing whatever legitimacy it may have held with the Croatian people. Rather than allowing Croatia to separate, on 6 January 1929, King Aleksander I Karadjordjević annulled the constitution, dissolved parliament, banned all political parties, introduced harsh censorship of the press, and named a new Government under a system of royal dictatorship. On 3 October 1929, this royal dictatorship became the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

The Kingdom of Yugoslavia served to further convince Croatians of their political, economic, and cultural dispossession at the hands of Serb nationalism. From April 1929, influential opposition leaders were arrested and imprisoned, bands of 'terrorists', composed mostly of the police, were organised in order to subdue dissidents, and a suite of legal reforms were introduced in an attempt to reduce expenditure, corruption and regional differences.⁵⁷ However, as Bellamy outlines,

Most critically for the historical statehood narrative, [the King] abolished the former constituent entities (Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Hercegovina, and Serbia) and introduced nine regional Banovine, which bore the names of rivers. The name Croatia was removed from official use for the first time since it was established in the medieval Triune Kingdom. To rub salt into the wounds, Croatia and Dalmatia were again split into two entities.⁵⁸

Therefore the Croatian migrating during the interwar years was not dissimilar to those pre-WWI; both were citizens under constitutional monarchies not of their own choosing, both consisted of predominantly male peasants pushed out due to economic reasons, and both saw their cultural identities threatened by a

⁵⁵ Tanner, *Croatia*, 124.

⁵⁶ M. Biondich, *Stjepan Radić, the Croat Peasant Party, and the Politics of Mass Mobilization, 1904-1928* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), 241.

⁵⁷ Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias*, 80–81.

⁵⁸ A. Bellamy, *The Formation of Croatian National Identity: A Centuries-Old Dream* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003), 50.

pervasive and persistent 'Other'. The failure of yet another constitutional monarchy - the third in less than 50 years - would have engendered some shared anti-monarchic sentiments between the pre-war and inter-war migrants, particularly when constitutional monarchies were the indirect cause of both migrations.

Inter-war Croatian migration to Australia was also one marked by transience. Between 1924-44, over half of those who came to Australia eventually returned to Croatia, while during the Great Depression, more Croats departed than arrived.⁵⁹ Part of this can be attributed to the policy of emigration pursued by the Kingdom of Yugoslavia which Hranilović describes as 'round-about emigration'; ideally workers would migrate in search of employment, earn their wealth abroad, and return to the Kingdom when the nest-egg was large enough.⁶⁰ This transience meant that information about conditions in Croatia under the unstable politics of the Kingdom made its way to Australia, while information about Australia and its Working Man's Paradise made its way back to Croatia.⁶¹ It also meant that Croats who migrated in this period would have had a minimal influence on the composition and character of the community as a whole simply because they did not have the opportunity to establish themselves within the Australian milieu as did their pre-WWI counterparts.

The interwar years were characterised by a newfound public visibility of the community, driven in part by an increase in their political activism. International socialism was common to the political language of both Australia and Croatia. In Australia, its ideals were considered possible answers to the economic, social, and political problems facing the working class, including access to work, employment conditions, and unionisation.⁶² Poor working conditions in

⁵⁹ Šutalo, *Croats in Australia*, 205.

Price, *Southern Europeans in Australia*, 100–102.

⁶⁰ N. Hranilović, 'Iseljenička politika i služba u Jugoslaviji između dva rata', *Migracijske i Etničke Teme*, 3(3-4), 328.

⁶¹ Alagich, 'Early Croatian Settlement in Eastern Australia', 336.

⁶² The Communist Party of Australia (CPA) was established on 30 October 1920 in Sydney, and would have a significant influence on the trade union movement in the interwar years. For more information about this history, See:

Australia, coupled with this rise of socialist and communist ideals within the mass unions of industries Croatsians were employed in, contributed to the increased visibility of Croatian political activism, and soon found Croatsians participating alongside other Southern European and Australian workers. This was made possible because these movements were able to overcome the ethnic divisions that separated Southern Europeans from British Australia. Local Australians and immigrants (of the working class at least) were able to find common ground in shared employment experience, and a common language in the ideals of international socialism or communism.⁶³

This political activism was centralised in 1928 with the establishment of the *Borbeni Radnički Pokret* (Militant Workers Movement) in Broken Hill. The *Pokret* was a left-wing organisation that supported the international socialist movement, and in 1931 began publishing the first Croatian-language newspaper in Australia, *Borba* (Struggle). At its 1932 National Conference it was decided that the organisation relocate to Sydney and be renamed the *Savez Jugoslavenskih iseljenika u Australiji* (Association of Yugoslav Immigrants in Australia - *Savez*). This was done to better reflect the membership and political orientation of the organisation, which embraced not just Croatsians, but all South Slavs. *Borba* was renamed *Napredak* (Progress) in 1936, and became the official newspaper of the organisation.⁶⁴

The *Savez* initiated a number of political actions in support of the international socialist movement, often co-ordinating with local labour and trade union movements in industrial actions across Australia. The most notable of

W. J. Brown, *The Communist Movement and Australia: An Historical Outline - 1890s to 1980s* (Haymarket: Australian Labor Movement History Publications, 1986).

A. Davidson, *The Communist Party of Australia: A Short History* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1969).

F. Farrell, *International Socialism and Australian Labour: The Left in Australia, 1919-1939* (Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1981).

S. Macintyre, *The Reds: The Communist Party of Australia from Origins to Illegality* (St Leonards, N.S.W: Allen & Unwin, 1999).

⁶³ Price, *Southern Europeans in Australia*, 302–4.

⁶⁴ Tkalčević, *Croats in Australia*, 22–28.

these included strikes in the mines at Broken Hill,⁶⁵ on the wood-lines of Western Australia,⁶⁶ and in the cane-cutters strikes in Queensland.⁶⁷ *Savez* members were active in trade unions, with some rising to prominent positions.⁶⁸ Such was the political activism of the *Savez* that from January 1937, the Commonwealth Investigation Branch (CIB) began surveillance of its members.⁶⁹ The leftist political sentiment found within the pages of *Napredak* was also of interest to authorities, and from 1940-1942 the Australian Government banned *Napredak* from circulation.

With over 30 branches throughout Australia by the beginning of WWII, Lalich argues that the *Savez* was an organisation of such size and scope that it is difficult to find parallels both within and outside Croatia.⁷⁰ Aside from participation in local industrial actions and newspaper publication, the *Savez* concerned itself with a wide range of activities, including Croatian-language instruction, the formation of drama societies and *tamburica* orchestras, and the establishment of sporting and other recreational clubs. Unlike previous Croatian organisations in Australia, the *Savez* was also actively concerned with developments in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, disseminating information and providing support for union and trade movements as well as communist-led organisations within the Kingdom, and in fundraising for various causes.⁷¹

Though the arrival destination of Croatian migration started to move gradually from Western to Eastern Australia, the community in Boulder-Kalgoorlie retained its importance in the interwar period. It is no surprise that the interwar frustrations of poor working conditions, the rising racialisation of labour forces, and inherent disputes in industrial relations which characterised

⁶⁵ Alagich, 'Early Croatian Settlement in Eastern Australia', 336–37.

⁶⁶ C. Gillgren, 'Boundaries of Exclusion: A Study of Italian and Croatian Immigrants in the Western Australian Timber Industry 1920-1940', *Limina*, 3, 1997, 71-82.

⁶⁷ Marković, 'Immigrants in Australia', 210–11.

⁶⁸ M. Alagich and S. Kosovich, 'Early Croatian Settlement in Eastern Australia', in Jupp, *The Australian People* [2nd ed], 236–37.

⁶⁹ NAA: A6122, 181

⁷⁰ V. Lalich, 'Egzodus Iz Australije U Doba Hladnog Rata: Povratak Hrvatskih Iseljenika Iz Australije Brodovima Parizanka I Radnik, 1948-1949 Godine', *Gordogan*, 27(63-66), 2010, 79.

⁷¹ Alagich and Kosovich, 'Early Croatian Settlement in Eastern Australia', 236-239
Tkalčević, *Croats in Australia*, 22–28.

the 1930s, culminated in what was reported as a 'Night of Unbridled Rioting.'⁷² The growing resentment and suspicion of the sizeable non-British mining populations turned the accidental death of a British-Australian during a brawl into a demand for all mine-owners to dismiss southern European miners and employees. The ensuing rioting resulted in three deaths, including that of Croatian Josip Katić, the looting and destruction of southern European shops, hotels and clubs, including the hall of the Croatian-Slavonic Society, and the torching of more than 50 homes in the residential area populated by southern Europeans. Such was the violence, local forces were unable to control the rioters, advising migrants to flee and take refuge in the surrounding bush until the arrival of reinforcements from Perth some three days later. Though subsequent judicial inquiries exonerated the southern Europeans, and even resulted in official compensation and charitable drives, the anxiety and insecurity the riot bred slowly created an exodus of the southern Europeans to Perth and its surrounding farms and vineyards, and the decline of Boulder-Kalgoorlie as the epicentre of Croatian migration.⁷³

In Croatia, international socialism was touted as the answer to the problems of constitutional monarchy and capitalism, and a communist Yugoslav state the only real political expression of pan-South-Slav unity. The Croatian peasantry, under the influence of Radić, had become politicised in the interwar years, and politics in the aftermath of Radić's assassination trended towards extremism, with the emergence of both left and right wing political movements as answers to the problems of constitutional monarchies - a situation not dissimilar to political developments throughout the rest of Europe. Coupled with the fact that the Yugoslav Communist Party had a strong following in Dalmatia prior to its suppression, this meant that those emigrating during the interwar years were

⁷² 'Night of Unbridled Rioting in Kalgoorlie', *Canberra Times*, 1 February 1934, 1.

⁷³ For more information on the riots, see:

B. Bunbury, *Timber for Gold: Life on the Goldfields Woodlines* (North Fremantle: Fremantle Arts Centre Press, 2002).

Lalich, 'Egzodus iz Australije', 75.

Marković, 'Immigrants in Australia', 211–12.

Price, *Southern Europeans in Australia*, 209–10.

more likely to be sympathetic to communist ideals, or to be apolitical.⁷⁴ As Price explains,

more politically conscious peasants and labourers tended to stay in Europe in order to take part in political activities; the less politically conscious were inclined to leave their native land and settle overseas.⁷⁵

Some were politicised upon arrival in Australia, 'shocked by the hostility to immigrants, especially in the industrial areas where unemployment was high.'⁷⁶ For others, there was not much choice; more than 90% of Croats in Australia were organised around the *Savez* during the interwar years, and the few monarchists who existed were completely ostracised.⁷⁷ That communism was already a feature of Australian political life and the Croatian community, while far-right movements such as fascism were less so, obscured any non-communist Croats that may have migrated during the interwar years.

⁷⁴ In the purge of opposition leaders following the proclamation of the royal dictatorship, communists and communist sympathisers found themselves targeted; according to Ramet, between 1929 and 1930 alone, 36 trials involving 357 communists were conducted, while others were murdered or alleged to have committed suicide after being taken into custody.

See: Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias*, 81.

⁷⁵ Price, *Southern Europeans in Australia*, 81.

⁷⁶ Alagich, 'Early Croatian Settlement in Eastern Australia', 335.

⁷⁷ Marković, 'Immigrants in Australia', 209.

1.3. WORLD WAR II AND ITS AFTERMATH

*Violence occurred in many directions. Religious, ethnic, social and political motives for persecution overlapped, both nationally and locally. Boundaries between victims and perpetrators were often blurred; collective violence was interactive, procedural and permanently changing.*⁷⁸

The interwar years politicised the people of Yugoslavia, particularly Croats, and resulted in competing visions for Croatian statehood and the future it should take. WWII and the unconditional surrender of the Royal Yugoslav Army on 17 April 1941 plunged the territory of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia into a ruthless war between rival forces. This had devastating consequences throughout the entire region, and cast a long and dark shadow on the post-war community – one that still reverberates in the present day. The struggle for Croatia was concentrated between the Croatian Ustaša, Serbian Četnik, and Yugoslav Partisan forces. However, a number of ancillary forces, militias, and groups were also involved, all of whom collaborated with and fought against each other in the name of the various ideals and aims they represented.⁷⁹

Both the Ustaša and the Četniks were nationalist-oriented movements concerned with the emancipation and independence of their people. Led by Dr Ante Pavelić, the Ustaša was a movement that advocated ‘with all means possible – including armed uprising – to liberate Croatia from alien rule and establish a completely free and independent state over the whole of its national and historic territory.’⁸⁰ The Četniks were led by Draža Mihailović, and comprised of Serbian royalists whose aim was to ‘realize a vision of an ethnically homogenous greater Serbian state, which they intended to advance, in the short

⁷⁸ A. Korb, ‘Understanding Ustaša Violence’, *Journal of Genocide Research*, 12(1-2), 2010, 2.

⁷⁹ This included forces from Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, the Croatian Home Guard (*Domobrani*), the Slovenian Home Guard, smaller Četnik groups including those of Kosta Pećanac, Milan Nedić, and Dimitrije Ljotić, and the Kingdoms of Hungary and Bulgaria. **See:** J. Tomasevich, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945: Occupation and Collaboration* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).

⁸⁰ Tanner, *Croatia*, 125.

run, by a policy of collaboration with Axis forces.’⁸¹ The Yugoslav Partisans, on the other hand, were an anti-Axis and anti-nationalist force led by Josip Broz Tito who advocated for a fully realised ‘Yugoslav’ society organised under a communist state, in which all the various groups in the Yugoslav region would become equal via a social revolution. By the end of the war, Tito’s Partisans would reign victorious, but not before over 1 million victims across the territory of Yugoslavia had perished.⁸²

1.3.1. THE INDEPENDENT STATE OF CROATIA

Pavelić first achieved national prominence in 1927 as a deputy of the Trumbić-Pavelić bloc, a hard-line Croat nationalist party, and though it did not enjoy widespread support, the bloc was popular in Zagreb. A day after King Aleksander suspended parliamentary government in 1929, Pavelić set up the *Ustaša - Hrvatski Oslobodilački Pokret* (Croatian Liberation Movement) in Zagreb.⁸³ Pavelić and his followers were quickly forced into exile in order to escape imprisonment by the royal dictatorship of King Aleksander, and in November 1929 the courts in Belgrade sentenced Pavelić to death for publicly advocating the overthrow of the state. As Tanner explains, this helped to legitimise Pavelić as a national leader in the poisoned political atmosphere of Croatia in the aftermath of Radic’s death and the dissolution of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes - ‘Pavelić’s sentence contrasted markedly with that of

⁸¹ Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias*, 145.

⁸² The literature concerning the territories of Yugoslavia during WWII is extremely vast, highly partisan, and somewhat inaccessible for those not extremely well versed in the topic. However, Tomasevich’s, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia* is highly esteemed and often recommended as a starting point. Particularly important is his discussion of demographic and real wartime losses of the ‘Alleged and True Population Losses’ chapter. This includes contextual information regarding the calculation of such figures, incorporating the issue of historical over- and under-representation of these figures. Sabrina Ramet’s chapter ‘World War Two and the Partisan Struggle, 1941-1945,’ albeit considerably shorter, is also a worthwhile read, framing the experiences of WWII in relation to the challenges of state-building and legitimacy which would come to define the establishment and collapse of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Tomasevich, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia, 1941-1945*, 718-750.

Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias*, 113-162.

⁸³ Tanner, *Croatia*, 124–25.

[Puniša] Račić, who was sentenced to only twenty years, in spite of killing three deputies in the parliament.’⁸⁴

While in exile, the Ustaša engaged in a series of operations which frustrated Belgrade authorities, reaching their zenith in 1934 with the assassination of King Aleksander on a state visit to Marseilles, France. This further cemented Pavelić’s reputation and that of the Ustaša as synonymous with the struggle for Croatian independence. The assassination, however, also led to the internment of Pavelić and his associates by Italy’s Prime Minister Benito Mussolini, driving the movement underground where it silently continued to organise and recruit members in Zagreb by Pavelić’s right-hand man Slavko Kvaternik, and in cities as disparate and distant as Vienna, Pittsburgh and Buenos Aires.⁸⁵

Following the German invasion of Yugoslavia on 6 April 1941, the Ustaša seized the opportunity to realise its dream. On 8 April, a number of Ustaša supporters revolted against their officers in the Yugoslav army and proclaimed Croatia’s independence in Bjelovar. On 10 April, Kvaternik proclaimed the establishment of the Independent State of Croatia - *Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska* (NDH) on Zagreb Radio, declaring Pavelić its *Poglavnik* (leader) with the backing of both Italian and German authorities. For the Italians, Pavelić was ‘their man’ through his association with Mussolini and his residence in Italy. Fearing that the German invasion would get in the way of their plans for Dalmatia, the Italians tried to ensure Pavelić’s leadership as soon as Mussolini had been informed of German plans to invade.⁸⁶ For the Germans, the leader of the *HSS*, Vladko Maček, had been their preferred leader, as they were impressed by his widespread popularity, control of military, and credibility in dealing with the Yugoslav government in the years preceding 1941. In late March, German agents in Zagreb had contacted Maček and offered him governance of an independent Croatia,

⁸⁴ *ibid.*, 310–11, Footnote 31.

⁸⁵ *ibid.*, 126.

⁸⁶ *ibid.*, 142.

however Maček refused to collaborate with the Germans.⁸⁷ Thus, with seemingly no other viable candidate, Pavelić and his Ustaša came to power by default.

Even with the Ustaša in power, the *NDH* was not exactly the independent state Croats had yearned for. Ustaša power was restricted and the territories divided into German and Italian occupation zones. In the German zone however, German presence was minimal after political and economic interests had been secured, and the Ustaša was free to implement its vision for the state. The regime portrayed itself as the next iteration of Croatian nationalism, laying false claim to the legacies of key figures in Croatia's past to legitimise their leadership.⁸⁸ Armed with a political programme prepared during their exile, and with Pavelić governing via decree rather than parliamentary process, the Ustaša introduced a suite of racial and discriminatory laws that brought the brutality of the regime quickly to the fore. The regime called for the eradication of Serbs, Jews and the Roma, as well as Croats and Muslims found guilty of 'un-Croatian behaviour', i.e. any non-Ustaša Croats who expressed alternative political opinions.⁸⁹ There was an expectation by the regime that it was not enough to simply be Croatian, but that

In the Ustasha state, created by the Poglavnik and his Ustashes, people must think like Ustashes, speak like Ustashes, and – most important of all – act like Ustasha.⁹⁰

Thus, to have been anything other than an Ustaša in the territory of the *NDH* was to put oneself at risk of persecution and death.⁹¹

Though Pavelić and his regime enjoyed the limited support of the Croatian people initially, it was short-lived and as early as the end of 1941 dissatisfaction with the regime was rife, due to both the brutality of the regime and to the annexation of almost the entire Croatian coastline (where 90% of the population was Croatian) to Italy through the Rome Agreement of 18 May 1941. Support for

⁸⁷ Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias*, 110–11.

⁸⁸ Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias*, 117–19.

⁸⁹ *ibid.*, 118.

⁹⁰ *Ustaša*, 13 June 1941, as quoted in Goldstein, *Croatia*, 135.

⁹¹ For a detailed analysis of the origins and development of Ustaša ideology, see:

N. Bartulin, *The Racial Idea in the Independent State of Croatia: Origins and Theory* (Leiden: Brill, 2014).

the Ustaša was strongest amongst the less educated classes and the poor regions of the Dinaric Alps, and from Croats throughout Bosnia and Hercegovina who were happy to have been territorially incorporated into the *NDH*. These regions also bore the brunt of the mass violence of WWII, where ‘Ustaša violence became radicalized, justified or even provoked by counter violence committed by the Četniks or the Partisans and was affected by events that were beyond the Ustaša leadership’s control.’⁹²

That the regime fashioned itself as a natural expression of the desire for a sovereign Croatian state resulted in an overlap of nationalist sentiment between the regime and the people. Due to the disproportionate power and influence granted to the Ustaša by German authorities, it has been argued that the regime was suffered by the people in exchange for the longed-for independent state; a warped sense of *quid pro quo*. While Bellamy suggests that this argument may be more reflective of Croatian historical revisionism in the 1990s,⁹³ historians appear to make a distinction between support for the Ustaša and support for a sovereign Croatian state, arguing that while most Croats supported the state, only a minority supported the Ustasa regime itself.⁹⁴ Croats were for the most part still faithful to the *HSS*, or more sympathetic to the communists than the Ustaša. For members of the *HSS*, the instruction by Maček to co-operate with the new government via radio on the day of the *NDH*’s establishment had been instrumental in ensuring the support of the Ustaša in the early days of the regime.⁹⁵ Maček’s ‘ambiguous proclamation,’ Ramet argues, ‘played a role in

⁹² Korb, ‘Understanding Ustaša Violence’, 11.

⁹³ Bellamy, *The Formation of Croatian National Identity*, 150–52.

⁹⁴ For example, see:

Goldstein, *Croatia*, 131–51.

Tanner, *Croatia*, 153–56.

J.R. Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History: Twice There Was a Country*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 208–10.

B. Shepherd, *Terror in the Balkans: German Armies and Partisan Warfare* (Cambridge, Mass.; London: Harvard University Press, 2012), 72–82.

⁹⁵ According to Tanner, Maček’s behest was not exactly made freely, instead ordered to publically consign authority of the *HSS* to the Ustaša by German authorities. Goldstein on the other hand, argues that supporting the Ustaša may have been Maček avoiding complicated dilemmas and the burden of responsibility of collaboration with the Germans. See:

Tanner, *Croatia*, 142–67.

Goldstein, *Croatia*, 133.

encouraging almost all village mayors to cooperate with the new regime.⁹⁶ It seems that, at least for those who were decidedly anti-communist, there was little else to choose.

The demarcation between regime and state also manifested itself in the organisation of the armed forces, itself an amalgamation of three disparate, and often competing, forces – the Croatian Home Guard (*Domobrani*); the Ustaša Militia; and the Croatian Gendarmerie (*Hrvatsko Oružništvo*). The *Domobrani* were the official army, navy, and air force of the state, and comprised of both volunteers and conscripts, including officers who had served in the armies of Austria-Hungary or the interwar Kingdoms.⁹⁷ The militia, on the other hand was the party army of the regime and enjoyed the privilege of its post. It was mostly populated with volunteers who were members of the movement, its officers not professionally trained but faithful and loyal to the regime and its *Poglavnik*. As Tomasevich explains,

Ideologically, a wide gulf existed between the militia and the army. The army was not politically indoctrinated, while the militia was indoctrinated in Ustasha ideology and was dedicated to the defense of the Ustasha regime and its leader.⁹⁸

This ideological rift left the two forces vying against each other for both legitimacy and resources. The regime discriminated against the army in favour of the militia, and both were deeply mistrustful of the other, at times in direct conflict and at others endeavouring to subsume the other within its own structures.⁹⁹ The Croatian Gendarmerie, on the other hand, was somewhat different in nature to both the army and the militia and consisted of professional officers, and was at first a special attachment to the army, but transferred to the militia in June 1942 - a move greatly resented within the Gendarmerie.¹⁰⁰ Further complicating the issue was that 'Croats served not only in the Croatian armed

⁹⁶ Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias*, 116.

⁹⁷ Tomasevich, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia*, 416–24.

⁹⁸ *ibid.*, 421.

⁹⁹ *ibid.*, 434–56.

¹⁰⁰ *ibid.*, 420.

forces, but also, on the basis of various agreements, in purely German units, in mixed German-Croatian units, and even in an Italian-Croatian legion.¹⁰¹

This confusion of rival factions, formation, disbandment, and reformation under different authorities, was exacerbated by a general lack of resources, cohesion, and allegiance to any one particular cause, force, or leader. Unsurprisingly, this led to a high number of desertions from the *NDH* to the Partisans, particularly from the *Domobrani* who were not only the least supportive of the regime, but also bore the brunt of both Ustaša discrimination and German exploitation. By the time of the unification of the *Domobrani* and the militia under the formal control of the Ustaša and Pavelić in late 1944, those that were left within the ranks of both forces were the uncompromising faithful, unwavering in their support for either the Ustasha or a non-communist independent Croatian state.

Wary of the impending victory of Tito and his Partisans and what this might mean for them, anti-communist forces on Croatian, Serbian and Slovenian sides, including Muslims, fled the country with a large number of civilians. By mid-May 1945, these troops and their dependents had crossed into Austria and surrendered to the British, convinced their shared anti-communist sentiments would keep them safe from Tito and any reprisals he may enact. This fear proved to be not unfounded - for Tito, these individuals represented an imminent and egregious threat to his legitimacy and the establishment of his communist state. However, as Ramet explains, 'for reasons which continue to be the subject of controversy, the British disarmed them and sent these refugees back to Yugoslavia, turning them over to the Partisans.'¹⁰² Tito's Partisans proceeded to massacre these refugees at Bleiburg, Kočevski Rog, and other places along the death marches that became known as the 'Way of the Cross,' with some survivors walking up to 1,000km to the end destination.¹⁰³

¹⁰¹ *ibid.*, 423.

¹⁰² Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias*, 160.

¹⁰³ The exact number of victims of this massacre is difficult to discern. Much like other WWII casualty estimates in Yugoslavia, these figures were used as propaganda by both sides, and suffered from both

1.3.2. TITO'S YUGOSLAVIA

In the immediate aftermath of WWII, the rise of non-communist, anti-fascist parties were perceived as a threat to the legitimacy of the new state, and 'in order to establish their organizational monopoly... the communists had to smash the incipient pluralism; to accomplish this, they were prepared to use the instruments at their disposal, including extralegal ones.'¹⁰⁴ Thus, in Tito's Yugoslavia, to have been anything other than a communist Partisan during the war was to put yourself at risk of persecution and death, and there was no one Tito saw as more of a threat to his power than the Ustaša;

Tito for his part wanted to annihilate as many of the Ustashe[sic] as possible. Now that control over the whole of Yugoslavia was within his grasp, he was determined not to allow the NDH to recoup its strength in exile, or filter back into the country as an anti-Communist fifth element.¹⁰⁵

To achieve this, Tito followed the same strategies as other communist leaders throughout East Central Europe to pacify opposition: the liquidation of opponents, including prominent individuals, as well as civilian anti-communists; trials against 'uncooperative' prelates; the deposition of heads of rival regimes; defamation and de-legitimation of non-communist politicians; banishment of kings and royal families; strict censorship of the press; and the destruction of political pluralism and parliamentary life.¹⁰⁶

Leaving Yugoslavia, either to escape persecution, out of protest, or simply in the search of economic opportunity, was not a straightforward solution. As part of his process of legitimisation and power consolidation, Tito effectively closed

over- and under-estimation. Some Croatian émigré writers place the number of refugees at 25,000, while others at upwards of 300,000, with the total number of victims anywhere between those figures. Most historians, however, now seem to accept Vladimir Žerjavić's estimations of Croatian casualties (and that of Bogoljub Kočović who came to almost the same estimations) as the most accurate to date; A total of 125,000 Ustaša forces, Croatian army troops and Muslims were killed during the war and on the Austrian border in 1945. Of these, 60,000 were killed on the border in 1945, with almost 50,000 killed in connection with the events at Bleiburg, and the further 10,000 in Slovenia and elsewhere. When Serbian and Slovenian victims are added in, a total of 70,000 deaths can be attributed to events at Bleiburg and Kočevski Rog.

See: V. Žerjavić, 'The Demography of Bleiburg' in M. Grčić (ed.), *Bleiburg: Otvoreni dossier*, 2nd enl. Ed. (Zagreb: Vjesnik, 1990), pp.227-232, as cited in Tomasevich, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia*, 764–65.

¹⁰⁴ Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias*, 163.

¹⁰⁵ Tanner, *Croatia*, 169.

¹⁰⁶ Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias*, 164.

the borders of the Yugoslav state. This, Zimmerman argues, led to a profound reorientation in attitudes towards migration. Where migration was once seen as an ordinary response to various political, social, and economic conditions in the years preceding WWII, it was now an act akin to treason, and ‘those that went abroad were generally severing their ties with the Yugoslav political system and migrating for reasons that were either political or viewed as being political.’¹⁰⁷ The strict regulation of the movement of Yugoslav and non-Yugoslav persons alike in an attempt to insulate the people of Yugoslavia from the outside world, predominantly from émigré dissidents, meant that those escaping potential persecution had to do so by illegally crossing the borders of Yugoslavia.

If emigration from Yugoslavia was a politicised act against the state, Tito and his government also politicised the act of repatriation as support for the state. The establishment of a communist Yugoslavia with the charismatic Tito at its head promising a new egalitarian utopia proved sufficiently alluring to those that had emigrated in the interwar years, whether out of nostalgia or out of socialist idealism. From 1945-1949, approximately 15,000 Yugoslavs throughout the world repatriated to Yugoslavia, while in 1948 and 1949, approximately 4060 Yugoslavs returned via the government-owned ships *Partizanka* and *Radnik*.¹⁰⁸ What started as a spontaneous collective act of repatriation in response to the end of WWII became an organised and politicised action by the Yugoslav government who purchased the ships in 1947 in order to aid the return of diaspora Yugoslavs.

1.3.3. WWII AND AUSTRALIA

The outbreak of the Second World War only added to the swirling discontent Croatians in Australia found themselves in towards the end of the interwar period. As with WWI, Croatians were once again vilified and interned as enemy aliens, and much of this echoed the internment practices of WWI. Croatians were

¹⁰⁷ W. Zimmerman, *Open Borders, Nonalignment, and the Political Evolution of Yugoslavia* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), 74–75.

¹⁰⁸ Lalic, ‘Egzodus Iz Australije’, 68.

again interned not because of their Croatian identity but because of their Yugoslav citizenship. Interment was again concentrated in Western Australia, and union pressure in a protracted industrial dispute once more underscored the reason for their internment.¹⁰⁹ With communism the perceived solution to problems both in Australia and Croatia, Croats in Australia lent their support to Tito and his Partisan troops during WWII, establishing the Yugoslav Red Cross Fund in response to the Axis attack on Yugoslavia in April 1941. In 1943 alone, the *Savez* raised over £106 000 in financial and material support, was active in the 'Sheepskins for Russia' campaign, and encouraged its members to join the Australian armed forces.¹¹⁰

Tito's repatriation efforts of 1948/9 had a significant impact on the Croatian community in Australia. Approximately 1,250 of those that repatriated via the *Partizanka* and *Radnik* came from Australia, 52% of which were Croatian.¹¹¹ Promises from the Yugoslav Government that repatriates would be well looked after, propaganda which stressed the need for material and financial aid in postwar reconstruction, as well as the need for labour in order to kick-start industrialisation, and regular articles promoting repatriation in *Napredak* created a general climate of return, which one eyewitness described as a 'frenzied movement of people endlessly intoxicated by an idealised patriotism!'¹¹² As Lalich points out, this repatriation effort was the 'largest organised voluntary collective departure of members of an ethnic community in Australia.'¹¹³

Though statistically small by present standards, this repatriation was felt as an exodus and described by Calwell as such.¹¹⁴ The effect of this sudden mass departure on the community was profound;

¹⁰⁹ K. Saunders, 'A Difficult Reconciliation: Civil Liberties and Internment Policy in Australia During World War Two', in K Saunders and R. Daniels (eds.), *Alien Justice: Wartime Internment in Australia and North America* (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 2000), 114–37.

¹¹⁰ Alagich, 'Early Croatian Settlement in Eastern Australia', 337.

¹¹¹ Lalich, 'Egzodus Iz Australije', 68.

¹¹² B. Srhoy, as cited in Lalich, 'Egzodus Iz Australije', 89. Original quote:

'Po Srhoyu, bio je to grozničavi pokret ljudi beskrajno opijenih idealiziranim patriotizmom!'

¹¹³ *ibid.*, 67.

¹¹⁴ 'Yugoslavs to be warned on returning', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 21 January 1948, 2.

The small community was well acquainted with one another, socialising at work, at picnics, evening dances, at homes, and then suddenly a large portion left, leaving behind a void.’¹¹⁵

Aside from the numerical significance of the repatriation, the exodus also shattered the ideological foundations of the community. It depleted the *Savez* of its leaders, members, and influence, at a time when the anti-communist policies of the Australian government were making it difficult for the *Savez* to remain a viable organisation for the Croatian community to organise around, and communism an impossible ideal to sustain under the anti-communist policies of Menzies.¹¹⁶ Further fracturing the organisation was the Tito-Stalin split of 1948, which caused bitter factional disputes within the organisation.

At the same time that the *Savez* was fracturing and left-leaning, Yugoslav-oriented Croatians were leaving Australia, right-leaning, nationalist-oriented Croatians were arriving as part of Australia’s postwar immigration programme. WWII had profoundly changed Australia’s relationship with immigration. The Pacific Crisis had come perilously close to fulfilling colonial prophecies of invasion from the north. Australia’s reliance on American, rather than British, assistance heightened Australia’s long-standing sense of isolation from the rest of the Empire, and crushed whatever vestiges of reliance on British protection had remained in the interwar years. The war also cemented Australia’s need for defensive and economic self-sufficiency, as it had highlighted Australia’s limited capacity to produce manufactured goods. Coupled with the casualties of war and the declining birth rate, Australia was left feeling particularly exposed. As early as 1942 the Curtin Government had begun to plan for post-war reconstruction, to be characterised by economic security, higher living standards, and social equality. Economists advised that without large-scale population growth, Australia’s

¹¹⁵ Lalich, ‘Egzodus Iz Australije’, 67.

¹¹⁶ During WWII, the Communist Party of Australia was declared a proscribed organisation by Menzies in 1940, lifted by the Curtin government in December 1942. After the war, Menzies attempted to ban the party again with the introduction of the *Communist Party Dissolution Bill 1950*. When this legislation was declared invalid by the High Court, Menzies made a second attempt to ban the organisation via a referendum in order to sidestep constitutional impediments. The referendum was held in 1951 and though narrowly defeated, cemented the anti-communism that would come to define the next two decades of Australian politics.

labour supply would not be able to sustain the economic development needed, while demographers warned that without immigration to offset the declining birth rate, population would decrease at an alarming pace.¹¹⁷

These warnings and the concerns for security that the war had engendered led to the belief that Australia needed to populate, and needed to do it fast if it was to have a future. Thus, it was decided even before the war had ended that a radical reconfiguration of immigration was needed in Australia's post-war reconstruction. By 1943, the Interdepartmental Committee on Post-War Migration was established in order to investigate and report specifically on the creation, planning, and implementation of a post-war immigration policy.¹¹⁸ Two years later on 2 August 1945, Calwell gave his first Ministerial Statement as the newly appointed Immigration Minister. Although policy details were vague, Calwell's Ministerial Statement disclosed four notable departures from Australia's previous approaches to immigration.¹¹⁹

First, Calwell associated immigration to population growth rather than population restriction, and set quantifiable targets, rather than quotas. This changed the nature of immigration planning from the short to the long-term, and from a predominantly reactive enterprise to a proactive one. Second, where economic prosperity was once seen as a pre-condition for immigration, Calwell now positioned immigration as the means to economic prosperity. Third, while Australia's future was once thought to be dependent on rural development and agriculture, Calwell fashioned industrialisation and suburbanisation as the twin pillars of post-war reconstruction. Finally, though not directly, Calwell suggested that a move away from Australia's long-standing tradition of sourcing migrants exclusively from Britain should be considered.

¹¹⁷ J. Lack and J. Templeton, *Bold Experiment: A Documentary History of Australian Immigration since 1945* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1995), 3.

¹¹⁸ For more information on the origins of the post-war immigration programme, see: A. Markus, 'Labour and Immigration: Policy Formation 1943-5', *Labour History*, 46, May 1984, 21-33. J. Zubrzycki, *Arthur Calwell and the Origin of Post-War Immigration* (Canberra: Australian Govt. Pub. Service, 1995).

¹¹⁹ E. Kunz, *Displaced Persons: Calwell's New Australians* (Sydney: Australian National University Press, 1988), 15. Zubrzycki, *Arthur Calwell and the Origin of Post-War Immigration*, 3.

Shortly after this Ministerial Statement, Calwell convened the Immigration Advisory Committee and charged it with a fact-finding mission on the emigration potential of Britain and western Europe. The committee found 'considerable popular enthusiasm, and strong governmental and business support for emigration from the UK, but only mixed prospects in northern and western Europe.'¹²⁰ This meant that, at least initially, Calwell's immigration policy did not differ much from its predecessors. However, by 1947 it became apparent that British immigration alone would not be able to overcome the labour and material shortages needed by the expanding economy, which had reached full employment.

Calwell thus embarked on a 12-week, 23 country tour to see whether the net could be cast wider. What he found was a Europe brimming with refugees that could fulfil Australia's labour demands, and an organisation, the International Refugee Organisation (IRO), willing to provide the elusive and expensive shipping required to get them to Australia. Thus, the Displaced Persons (DP) scheme was created, and though only in effect until 1953, it was responsible for the arrival of approximately 170,000 migrants to Australia. The consequences of this first experiment with mass non-British immigration proved far-reaching, not only establishing that Australia's future was no longer tethered to British immigration alone, but also opening the door for waves of assisted passage agreements with other countries.¹²¹ As Australia was turning its immigration tap on, Croatia's hitherto primary immigration destination, the United States, opted to keep theirs down to a small trickle by re-committing to the interwar system of immigration restrictions. These restrictions helped propel Croatian emigration towards Australia, and by 1954 the community almost tripled its 1947 size.¹²²

¹²⁰ Lack and Templeton, *Bold Experiment*, 5.

¹²¹ For more detailed information regarding the genesis and implementation of the DP scheme, see: A. Markus, 'Labour and Immigration 1946-9: The Displaced Persons Program', *Labour History*, 47, November 1984, 73-90
Kunz, *Displaced Persons*.

J. Persian, 'Displaced Persons and the Politics of International Categorisation(s)', *Australian Journal of Politics & History*, 58(4), 2012, 481-496.

¹²² Šutalo, *Croatians in Australia*, 4, Table 1.1.

1.4. POST-WWII EMIGRATION

*Somewhere on the seas of the Indian ocean, the boats of Yugoslav-oriented repatriates crossed with the boats of nationalist-oriented Croatians on their way to Australia.*¹²³

Unlike their pre-war predecessors who were characterised by their relative homogeneity, post-war Croatian migrants were a thoroughly heterogeneous group. They migrated from a variety of places - rural, urban, within, and outside modern-day Croatia - were of varying socio-economic backgrounds, and included men and women of different ages and marital status, as well as children. Rather than settling in regional cities built around particular industries, such as Broken Hill and Boulder-Kalgoorlie, post-war migrants settled in Australia's capital cities and large regional centres, such as Newcastle, Wollongong and Geelong, favouring the East coast over the West. Post-war Croatian migration, however, was not a singular phenomenon, and comprised of four different waves, each with its own particular set of characteristics and reasons for migration. Croatian migrants can themselves also be loosely categorised into five groups; displaced persons, political migrants, economic migrants, refugees, and family reunion migrants.¹²⁴

1.4.1. DISPLACED PERSONS AND POLITICAL REFUGEES, 1947-1959

The first wave of post-war Croatian migration included those who came under the DP scheme until 1953 and those who illegally crossed Yugoslavia's borders and entered official refugee programs as political migrants in neighbouring countries. Given Croatia's wartime experience, and Tito's persecutions in the aftermath, it is no surprise to find that this first wave was mostly comprised of those that had served in the defeated armies of the *NDH* and

¹²³ Tkalčević, *Povijest Hrvata U Australiji*, 41.

¹²⁴ Family reunion migrants were not a specific feature of any given wave, but rather occurred throughout each of them.

their families.¹²⁵ Often categorised as refugees or political migrants, for the small handful that could be categorised as economic migrants, the act of migration itself had become a politicised act, at least in the eyes of the Yugoslav Government. Whether pro-Ustaša, pro-Croatian independence, or simply anti-communist, one thing was for certain: these people were fiercely nationalistic and vehemently anti-Yugoslav, run out of their homeland by the communist rule they had wished to avoid, risking their own lives and those of their families in their escape.

Across all migrant groups, the ambitious Australian post-war immigration programme created a number of overt and covert issues which were unanticipated, ignored, or held little political capital to policy makers. In the absence of government assistance, 'immigrants resorted to mutual help to solve collectively experienced problems.'¹²⁶ Existing Yugoslav organisations were spurned as the concept of a 'Yugoslav' nationality, with a unified Yugoslav state based on this identity, was anathema to the entire wartime experience of this new cohort of Croatians. To have escaped the clutches of Tito's Yugoslavia, only to find themselves classified as Yugoslavs in Australia and directed towards Yugoslav organisations was an insult of great proportions.¹²⁷ Thus, these 'New Australians' set about establishing organisations under the Croatian name to help with navigating the pressing issues of accommodation, work, and language, while providing venues for social activities in order to mitigate the feelings of displacement and loneliness migration had caused.¹²⁸

Though arguably uncharacteristic of other migrant groups, when considering the wartime experience of Croatians migrating and establishing these new

¹²⁵ L. Paric, 'Croatian Migration since 1970', in Jupp, *The Australian People* [2nd ed.], 243

¹²⁶ W. Lalich, 'Developing Voluntary Community Spaces and Ethnicity in Sydney, Australia', in C. Milligan and D. Conradson (eds.), *Landscapes of Voluntarism: New Spaces of Health, Welfare and Governance* (Bristol: The Policy Press, 2006), 215.

¹²⁷ Tkalčević, *Povijest Hrvata U Australiji*, 61.

¹²⁸ The first Croatian Club was formed in Adelaide as early as 1950, and by 1958, the first Croatian national umbrella organisation, the Central Council of Croatian Associations, was formed in Sydney, incorporating Croatian Associations in Canberra, Geelong, Perth, Sydney, Wollongong, Wodonga, Whyalla, Newcastle, Brisbane, and Hobart. See:

L. Budak, 'Post-War Croatian Settlement', in Jupp, *The Australian People* [1st ed.], 342.

community structures, it is altogether understandable that the issue of Croatian independence would become central to organisational life and give the community a particular and political impetus for its actions. Politicised by the interwar years, and roused by the war, these migrants believed that it was their duty to maintain the struggle for Croatian independence now that they had access to a democracy and its resources of free speech, protest, and political advocacy, relatively free of the consequences such actions back home could bring. The views of these DPs were only reinforced with the return to Australia of the 1948/49 repatriates, who, disillusioned with the Yugoslav Government and its promises of a communist utopia, began returning to Australia as early as the 1950s. These repatriates were at a minimum anti-Yugoslav, if not completely anti-communist.¹²⁹

1.4.2 ECONOMIC (AND POLITICAL) MIGRATION – 1960-1979

The next wave of post-war Croatian migration consisted predominantly of economic migrants, with the largest numbers arriving after the opening up of Yugoslavia's borders to combat rising unemployment of the early 1960s. With migration accepted and even encouraged by the Yugoslav state, the decision to emigrate became available to a much wider demographic, and Croatian migration to Australia increased to numbers unparalleled either before or after. This emigration received legal reinforcement with the bilateral agreement between Yugoslavia and Australia in 1970, which proved to be a significant pull factor of Croatian emigration to Australia. The legal pull factors, Banović argues, were augmented by the same economic pull factors that characterised the interwar years, as the difference in real wages and the standard of living between Yugoslavia and Australia became even larger in the post-war period.¹³⁰

Initially, Yugoslav migration was a Croatian affair. By 1971, Croatians made up slightly more than one-fifth of the total Yugoslav population, yet accounted for

¹²⁹ Lalich, 'Egzodus Iz Australije', 121.

¹³⁰ Banović, 'Push and Pull Factors', 16.

39% of Yugoslavs abroad. Though the 1970 bilateral agreement led to an increase in Croatian migration to Australia, it also led to the increased migration of other Yugoslavs, diminishing the traditional Croatian dominance of Yugoslav migration. That Australia officially recorded these migrations as 'Yugoslav' makes it difficult to know the exact size of Croatian migration during this period. Notwithstanding, Croatians still made up a large proportion of Yugoslav migration, and between 1961 and 1976, the number of 'Yugoslav-Born' people in Australia increased from 49,776 to 143,591. The two year period between 1970 and 1971 was the most substantial period of Yugoslav-born migration to Australia, with approximately 53,363 arrivals. By 1972, however, the number of arrivals halved, and from 1975, failed to reach over 5000 arrivals/year until 1994, with the arrival of refugees from the 1990s wars of independence.¹³¹

Not only were Croatians migrating at unprecedented levels, but they were even more diverse than the first wave of postwar migrants. This resulted in a greater diversity of cultural practice and across a wide variety of issues – from questions of identity formation and tradition, wartime experience, to political belief. This heterogeneity of views in part precipitated the gradual move from the political and welfare organisations of the 1950s to the social and cultural organisations that would define organisational life in the 1960s and 1970s. The political platform outlined by the first post-war organisations did not always fully coincide with the views of those arriving during the years of economic migration. This was particularly the case in the aftermath of the Croatian Spring in 1971,¹³² which resulted in the establishment of new organisations yet again.

Where the Croatian migrant to Australia remained homogenous, however, was on the question of class. The majority of Croatians migrating during this period were drawn from the working class, as this was where the greatest surplus of Yugoslav labour lay. Unlike their predecessors in Australia, who for the most part were uneducated and mostly illiterate peasants from villages, these migrants

¹³¹ L. Paric, 'Croatian Migration since 1970', in *The Australian People: An Encyclopedia of the Nation, Its People and Their Origins*, ed. James Jupp, 2nd ed. (Oakleigh: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 243.

¹³² Tkalčević, *Povijest Hrvata U Australiji*, 62.

were skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled labourers with at least 4-7 years of completed schooling.¹³³ Due to Australia's immigration policies at the time, however, those that may have been better educated would have nonetheless found themselves employed in working class positions, as this was where Australian labour shortages lay and thus the types of jobs available to migrants.

Australia's comparatively open post-war immigration program and consistent high standard of living remained the predominant pull factor of immigration during this period. As migrants poured into Australia in unprecedented numbers, they radically reconfigured the life of the nation, prompting changes in economic and legal structures, as well as socio-cultural and environmental change. The reason the Australian Government was able to accept immigrants for so long, however, was due to changes in the social and cultural place of migrants in Australian society; that is, in the abandonment of the White Australia Policy and the adoption of multicultural policy in its place. This afforded a wealth of opportunity for Croatian migrants already in Australia as it allowed, and in fact encouraged, Croats to express their cultural identity. That multiculturalism stressed ethnicity over nationality meant that Croats were able to legitimately advocate as Croats and bypass the issues raised by Yugoslav citizenship. Furthermore, Croatian political activism was able to resume its traditional patterns in advocating for identity recognition through campaigns for access to services, including that most Croatian of proxy battlegrounds, language recognition. At the same time that Croats were enjoying their newfound visibility in Australian society, Croatian migration to Australia was decreasing at a rapid rate. Whitlam's reduction of immigration to a well-controlled minimum significantly reduced the political and legal ease of migration Croats had hitherto enjoyed.

¹³³ Table 4.11, Table 4.12. in Zimmerman, *Open Borders, Nonalignment, and the Political Evolution of Yugoslavia*, 89,

1.4.3. PROFESSIONAL ECONOMIC MIGRATION – 1980-1990

The third wave of migration was characterised by a high proportion of economic migrants from the professional, rather than working, classes pursuing career advancement and a higher standard of living, often with the aim of living in the ‘western’ world.¹³⁴ The death of Tito in 1980 ended an era spanning 35 years, and as much as time stood still out of grief, it did so out of fear as well. Tito had left behind ‘a system in a state of paralysis, unable to cure itself.’¹³⁵ The greatest threat to the post-Tito regime was economic collapse. The economy had deteriorated to near-catastrophic proportions in the last years of Tito’s life, and it was only in late 1981 that a federal commission was established to examine the crisis. By this time, Yugoslavia’s external debts had already ballooned to a total of approximately \$US 20bn, and the new federal government found it could not service the debt. Though the political interest of the West in keeping Yugoslavia in tact meant that partial moratoriums were granted and international banking institutions continued to fund the state, the debt continued to place immense pressure on the economy.

In the face of these economic and political hardships, some standards across Croatia saw improvement, and the most significant of these was the Croatian ‘education boom’ of the 1970s. This boom produced a new class of professionals engaged with both the interior life of Yugoslavia and that of the world outside. Despite efforts by the collective leadership to minimise the burgeoning economic and political crisis, ‘a literate, urbanized population could hardly be kept in the dark about the growing crisis around them, especially as so many people had extensive contacts abroad.’¹³⁶ Unlike the 1960s and 1970s, where the Croatians emigrating were mostly labourers and tradesmen of the working class, Croatian migration in the 1980s was mostly made up of professionals and academics that could not fulfil their social and professional aspirations within the Yugoslav context. They migrated to the West in search of a higher standard of living and

¹³⁴ V. Colic-Peisker, ‘Ethnic’ and ‘Cosmopolitan’ Transnationalism: Two Cohorts of Croatian Immigrants in Australia’, *Migracijske i Etničke Teme*, 22(3), 2006, 211-230.

¹³⁵ Goldstein, *Croatia*, 188.

¹³⁶ L. Benson, *Yugoslavia: A Concise History* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 140–41.

opportunities for career progression. The Yugoslav ‘brain drain’ resulted in the migration of Croatians who were educated, upwardly mobile, and usually with some English language proficiency.

This cohort of Croatian migrants was also encouraged from Australian quarters, as the Fraser Government moved towards economic rationalism in immigration policy. Whereas before the 1980s immigrants were deliberately attracted by assisted passages and government-led recruiting drives, entry for migrants has become comparatively more difficult and no government-based incentives have since been provided.¹³⁷ The introduction of the Numerical Multifactor Assessment System (NUMAS) in 1979, based on a flexible allocation of points, paved the way for a fundamental change in the way immigration was to be understood. It applied a human capital approach to immigration, whereby points could be adjusted to meet particular occupational or educational shortages or surpluses. Though it did not apply to family reunion or refugee admission, NUMAS was nevertheless designed to only allow entry to those migrants deemed economically viable. Like Whitlam’s reduction of immigration to a well-controlled minimum, Fraser’s introduction of a demand-driven system also significantly reduced the political and legal ease of Croatian migration. However, the introduction of NUMAS encouraged skilled, English-speaking Croatians to migrate to Australia instead of the traditional unskilled and non-English speaking migrants of the 1950-60s, and thus significantly changed the composition of the Croatian community in Australia.

Unlike their predecessors, these migrants felt they ‘fitted better into the Australian way of life than in their native environment’ where the ‘climate of irrationality’ inadequately valued their skills.¹³⁸ Feeling out of place in Croatia, these migrants also felt out of place with the Croatian communities they found in Australia. This new wave was more individualistic and secular in outlook, and experienced the ‘community’ as a straight-jacket for their middle-class

¹³⁷ Jupp, *From White Australia to Woomera*, 12.

¹³⁸ V. Colic-Peisker, ‘Two Waves of Croatian Migrants in Western Australia: Class and National Identity’, *Australian Journal of Social Issues*, 34(4), 1999, 361–62.

‘cosmopolitan’ outlook and aspirations.’¹³⁹ Rather, this wave of Croatian migrants looked to English-speaking and ‘Australian’ community structures to fulfil their identity needs and provide opportunities for socialisation.

1.4.4. WAR REFUGEES AND ONWARDS– 1990-PRESENT

The final great wave of Croatian migration to Australia came with the wars of independence in the 1990s. Perhaps of all of Croatia’s history, none has received more outside historical attention than this period. In contrast, very little academic research has addressed this wave of Croatian migration to Australia, despite the fact that the influx of Croatian refugees from Bosnia changed the community yet again by disrupting long-held narratives of Croatian nationhood and identity.¹⁴⁰ Future academic research, both historical and sociological, will fully assess their impact upon Croatian community life and structures. However, based on personal observation and involvement within my local Croatian community, this impact seems most evident in the reinvigoration of faith and folklore as the organisational centres of the Croatian community. Both Catholicism and folklore were important aspects of local life in Bosnia, as it was across religious and cultural, rather than territorial, lines that identity was drawn. The experiences of Bosnian Croatians both within Yugoslavia and during the war differed, at times significantly, from those in Croatia. These migrants therefore often found themselves at odds with the political agenda of the community in Australia, or were apolitical altogether. In the same way the Yugoslav organisations of the interwar period were unacceptable to post-war migrants, the post-war political organisations misguided to the economic migrants of the 1960-70s, and those in turn partially or completely avoided by the 1980s cohort of Croatian migrants, so too were the organisational centres of the Croatian community during the war problematic to the wave of the 1990s. As a result,

¹³⁹ *ibid.*, 366.

¹⁴⁰ The only study able to be located on this wave is focused on the difference between Croatian Catholic migrants and Bosnian Muslim migrants, rather than between Croatian migrants. See: V. Colic-Peisker, ‘Croatian and Bosnian Migration to Australia in the 1990s’, *Studies in Western Australian History*, 21, 2000, 117–36.

rather than assimilating into the political or social organisations of the community, Croatians from Bosnia tended to concentrate within church structures and folkloric organisations.

Croatian migration to Australia has reduced dramatically since this post-war intake, with only a small, almost negligible, intake of new migrants. Instead, a growing number of Australian-born Croatians are migrating to Croatia, creating what Lalich has identified as a move from traditional diaspora relationships to a transnational social space and flow.¹⁴¹ Furthermore, changes in the community now seem to be generational rather than migrational in nature.¹⁴² The community is becoming increasingly 'Australianised' - 60% of those declaring Croatian ancestry at the 2011 Census were born in Australia, while of those born elsewhere, approximately 70% arrived before 1981. Consequently, it is also an increasingly English speaking community, with less than half of those declaring Croatian ancestry speaking the language itself. Of those who speak Croatian, only 8,037 speak very little, or no English at all, and of these non-English speakers, 67.4% are aged over 65, with a further 21.9% aged 45-64yrs. The community is also becoming increasingly female, with women outnumbering men in every age range from 20-69yrs. Finally, and contrary to popular perception that the community is aging, approximately two-thirds of the community is under the age of 50yrs.¹⁴³ This indicates that perhaps it is not the community itself that is aging, but that younger Croatians are opting out of active participation in traditional Croatian organisations and structures, in the same way migrational waves before them did.

¹⁴¹ W. Lalich, 'From Diaspora to Transnational Flows', *Croatian Studies Review*, 9(1), 2014, 73-97.

See also: J. Čapo, 'The world is my oyster': Well-educated Australian-Croatian citizens in the era of Global Mobilities', *Croatian Studies Review*, 8(1), 2013, 91-112.

¹⁴² For example, see:

V. Čolić-Peisker, 'Australian Croatians at the Beginning of the Twenty-First Century: A Changing Profile of the Community and Its Public Representation', *Croatian Studies Review*, 3-4(1), 2004, 1-26.

R. Mesarić Žabčić and N. Pokos, 'Pogledi Mlađe Generacije Australskih Hrvata Na Život Iseljenika' in V. Kukavica (ed.), *Hrvatski Iseljenički Zbornik 2007* (Zagreb: Hrvatska Matica Iseljenika, 2006), 197-202.

I. Šutalo, 'The Future of the Croatian Community and Identity in Australia', *Croatian Studies Review*, 6(1), 2010, 7-30.

¹⁴³ *ABS Census TableBuilder*, refer to footnote 7.

The traditional structures of faith, folklore and football, however, seem to promise a measure of longevity. Catholicism continues as a central element of Croatian national identity both in Croatia and Australia, and the association between church and Croatian cultural preservation has endured, if not strengthened, over the years. There are 14 Croatian Catholic Centres currently in operation across Australia under the jurisdiction of the Franciscan Provinces of Bosna Srebrena in Sarajevo, Saints Cyril and Methodius in Zagreb, the Archdiocese of Vrhbosna in Sarajevo, and the Archdiocese of Rijeka. These centres not only provide pastoral care for their communities, but also the infrastructure around which most social, sporting and leisure activities of the community are organised. For example, aside from activities related to religious practice, the Croatian Catholic Centre in Figtree is home to the Croatian Folkloric Group Wollongong, hosts club meetings and functions for local Croatian soccer club South Coast United, a women's Pilates class, pensioner social days, Croatian language instruction, and a host of social gatherings, functions, and music concerts throughout the year.¹⁴⁴

Though experiencing a decline in attendance and numbers after the 1990s, folkloric groups are experiencing something of a renaissance, with 15 groups in operation across Australia comprising predominantly of second- and third-generation Croatian children. These groups maintain links with each other through gala nights, the biannual inter-group festival, and the annual children's festival, sometimes involving visiting groups from New Zealand and Croatia. Though not as regular, folkloric groups still participate at multicultural events, particularly in conjunction with the Catholic Church and at local community celebrations such as Australia Day. However, with the establishment of an independent state, the role of folkloric groups seems to be changing from an outward expression of Croatian identity as a serious pursuit, to that as a gateway for second and later generation Croatians and their children to connect with their

¹⁴⁴ For more information, see:

R. Mesarić Žabčić, 'The Role of the Catholic Church in Preservation of Croatian Identity in New South Wales, Australia', *Croatian Studies Review*, 6(1), 2010, 129–40.

Croatian Catholic Centres Australia, *Hrvatski katolički centri u Australiji*, <http://www.hkc.com.au/index.php>, accessed 09 September 2016.

heritage, the focus on fun and entertainment rather than professional performance.


There are currently 34 active Croatian soccer clubs, and the considerable contribution of Croatians to football in Australia is one most readily associated with the community. The fruits of these clubs have been borne out at the highest echelons of the world game. There have been 47 Croatian Australians, including 7 captains, who have played for the Australian national side, and the Australian team is sometimes referred to as the 'second Croatian national side'.¹⁴⁵ A large number of A-League players are of Croatian descent, as are many of Australia's most successful exports of the game. Croatian clubs have also nurtured the talents of Australian greats such as Graham Arnold, Craig Foster, and Robbie Slater, while the Adelaide Raiders was once home to indigenous activist Charlie Perkins. However the greatest indicator of the strength of Croatian clubs in Australia can be found in the annual Australian-Croatian Soccer Tournament. Now in its 43rd year, it is the oldest ethnic football competition in Australia.

That these three avenues of cultural expression – faith, folklore and football – continue to endure is no accident. Rather, they speak to the legacy of Australian responses to immigration policy, migrants, and migrant communities, and in particular the legacy of Australia's post-war immigration programme. In the same way this chapter has followed the history of Croatian migration to Australia and focused on the push and pull factors of this migration, the following chapter will attempt to do the same with Australia's post-war immigration programme, focusing on the construction of an identity which has mediated the relationship between post-war Australia and its migrant 'Other' – the Good Australian Migrant. It is through this national figure, with its inherent expectations and assumptions, that Croatian political activism was and still is perceived and understood.

¹⁴⁵ A. Gray, 'Croatian Community's proud role in Australian soccer still reaping rewards', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 31 May 2014, available from <http://www.smh.com.au/fifa-world-cup-2014/australia-2014/croatian-communitys-proud-role-in-australian-soccer-still-reaping-rewards-20140531-zrtuo.html>, accessed 07 January 2015.

CHAPTER 2:

THE GOOD AUSTRALIAN MIGRANT



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Australia wants, and will welcome, new healthy citizens who are determined to become good Australians by adoption.¹

Arthur Calwell, 2 August 1945

On 18 March 2002, Federal Immigration Minister Phillip Ruddock welcomed Ms Cristina Jurado, a 29 year old woman from the Philippines, at Sydney International Airport.² Jurado was Australia's six-millionth post-WWII migrant, and along with her husband and young children, had arrived in Australia under the skilled migration program. That the Immigration Minister had taken the time to personally welcome Jurado, and that this welcome was captured by the media, was not unique. Jurado was merely the newest face in a long line of 'milestone' immigrants, the welcome of which was a tradition as old as Australia's post-war immigration program itself.

Despite the years and circumstances separating them, each milestone arrival was contrived to reflect the aspirations of Australia's immigration program: the British tradesmen arriving to rebuild post-war Australia;³ the little girls reassuring Australians that these migrants were not a threat nor too different from Australians, but who guaranteed the future of the nation;⁴ the young English bride here to fulfil her destiny as an Australian housewife and mother;⁵ the compassionate nation welcoming families burdened by physical disability;⁶ the reunion of Vietnamese husband and wife ripped apart by war, but also a symbol of Australia's evolution by its bicentenary year;⁷ and Jurado, the female, educated, English-speaking, professional from southeast Asia with her young family, emblematic of 21st century Australia. At the heart of each arrival was a two-way reflection on Australia's immigration program; a moment of national self-congratulation on achievements past, and a gaze cast towards Australia's future.

¹ Australia, House of Representatives, *Parliamentary Debates*, No.HR.13, 1945, 4912.

² S. Morris, 'In Immigration, Cristina's One in 6 million', *The Australian*, 19 March 2002, 3.

³ '200 British Tradesmen Here To Make New Life', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 9 January 1947, 1

⁴ 'Calwell kisses migrant', *Sunday Herald*, 14 August 1949, 1

'Kiss for 100,000th British Migrant', *The Age*, 26 August 1949, 2

⁵ S. Wills, 'When Good Neighbours Become Good Friends: The Australian Embrace of Its Millionth Migrant', *Australian Historical Studies*, 36(124), 2004, 332-354

⁶ 'Quarter-millionth refugee arrives', *Good Neighbour*, 1 July 1960, 1, 3.

⁷ NAA: A12111, 2/1988/20A/1

From Arthur Calwell to Phillip Ruddock, Federal Immigration Ministers have acted as the nation's proxy, modelling the 'national embrace' expected of Australians as good hosts. This embrace found institutional expression through the Immigration Department and its various campaigns and publications. Local, religious, and social organisations were enlisted to encourage migrants to mix with their local community, while communities were encouraged to extend a local embrace. The national embrace of migrants was reinvigorated with the end of the White Australia Policy and the introduction of multiculturalism by the Whitlam Government. This change not only recognised the social and cultural changes wrought by immigration, but celebrated them as an intrinsically Australian quality.

It is this congratulatory national embrace that has come to define Australia's understanding of its post-war immigration program; a politically, economically, and socially successful 'bold experiment'⁸ in humanitarianism, acceptance, and cohesion, executed without conflict or violence, which radically and rapidly changed the face of the nation and resulted in the most multicultural yet peaceful country in the world. Though much of the program was indeed successful, Australia's post-war immigration history is also a contested one, neither as simple, congratulatory, nor as harmonious as its supporters assert. Even the oft-repeated and somewhat intuitive claim that Australia has become the most multicultural society in the world as a result of its post-war immigration program does not stand up to scrutiny - as at the 2011 census, the United Kingdom was the top country of birth outside of Australia, while the four largest ancestry groups were English (36.1% of the total population), Australian (35.4%), Irish (10.4%), and Scottish (8.9%).⁹

⁸ Lack and Templeton, *Bold Experiment*.

⁹ Australian Bureau of Statistics, *Reflecting a Nation: Stories from the 2011 Census*, cat. no. 2071.0, ABS, Canberra, 2012–2013, <http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Lookup/2071.0Main+Features552012%E2%80%932013?OpenDocument>, accessed 23 October 2015.

Jupp further points out that Australia is still one of the most British societies outside the United Kingdom, where its 'social, intellectual, business and political elites are still overwhelmingly of British origin; three-quarters of its people speak only English; and a similar proportion subscribe, however nominally, to Christian denominations.' See: Jupp, *From White Australia to Woomera*, 6–7.

The narrative of the national embrace cannot be sustained by history as the grand arch of post-war immigration, or even as a dominant component of that history. Rather than an exercise in humanitarianism, the Australian government used immigration as a tool of social engineering, with policy ‘influenced by ideologies: imperialism, racism, utilitarianism, economic rationalism and humanitarianism,’¹⁰ in order to create or maintain the vision of what Australia *ought* to be - not necessarily what it *was* or *could* be. This vision was not determined solely on developments within the domestic sphere and in consideration of Australia’s own intrinsic needs, but also in response to international developments and Australia’s position relative to the rest of the world. As Jupp notes, the success of Australian immigration has largely been due to deliberate planning, and though bureaucrats and politicians are assumed to have superior wisdom in determining public policy, the implementation of a vision of what Australia ought to be was not a value-free process.¹¹

If the embrace extended by the Immigration Minister was a reflection of how the hosts ought to receive migrants into the community, the individual at the centre of the campaign was a reflection of who the migrant ought to be. Though the arrival campaigns presented the extension of the national embrace as unconditional, the reality of migrant life in Australia proved that this too was an aspirational ought, rather than a reflection of the relationship between migrant and host. Extending the national embrace was a provisional act, and rested on a particular caveat - that the migrant had to become a ‘Good Australian’ as quickly as possible.¹² This too was not a value-free process and included constructing a vision of how a migrant ought to behave.

This chapter will argue that these expectations of oughts – of what Australia ought to be, of how Australians ought to behave, and of who migrants ought to be and how they ought to behave – are embodied in the aspirational figure of the ‘Good Australian Migrant’. This figure is a post-war construction, defined and

¹⁰ *ibid.*, 7.

¹¹ *ibid.*

¹² Kunz, *Displaced Persons*, 166.

refined by successive governments in order to convince a population accustomed to an insular, limited, and restrictive immigration policy to accept not just a significantly higher inflow of migrants, but an ethnically diverse one.¹³ The three broad functions of the Immigration Department – selection and entry, settlement, and citizenship – ascribed certain characteristics and expectations which demarcated the social space migrants were to occupy, and therefore provide the structure for this chapter. Section 2.1 demonstrates how the selection and entry requirements of Australia’s first major migrant recruitment campaign – the DP scheme – defined who the Good Australian Migrant ought to be. Section 2.2 explains how settlement policy, particularly assimilation, defined expectations of how the Good Australian Migrant ought to behave. Finally, Section 2.3 explores the intersection between immigration and citizenship. That the Department regulated the entire immigration process from selection through to citizenship meant that it was ‘both the custodian of prevailing concepts about who should be regarded as having the ‘privileges’ and duties of Australian citizenship, and was also in a position to influence their change.’¹⁴ It is precisely in this nexus between the construction of political acceptability and the mediation of citizenship that the Good Australian Migrant finds its genesis.

Though the characteristics of these expectations have evolved as historical, political, social, and cultural changes have exerted their influence, the expectations themselves have not, and still cast significant shadows on the ways in which migrants are perceived, understood, and ultimately judged. In building the figure of the Good Australian Migrant, this chapter gives shape to something historians have long tacitly acknowledged but have not explicitly defined – that

¹³ That immigration was central to Australia’s post-war reconstruction, and the need to turn to non-British migration to fulfil these aspirations, remain well-versed estimations of the genesis of the post-war immigration program, despite significant disagreement in the nature and reasons for both, such as whether the program was a deliberate and planned exercise, or a series of ad-hoc, reactive decisions. See: ‘Australians Post-war Immigration Experience’ in J. Collins, *Migrant Hands in a Distant Land: Australia’s Post-War Immigration*, 2nd ed. (Leichhardt: Pluto Press Australia, 1991), 19–46.

‘Decision Born of Danger’ in Kunz, *Displaced Persons*, 11–20.

‘The Policy and Programme’ in Lack and Templeton, *Bold Experiment*, 1–72.

Markus, ‘Labour and Immigration: Policy Formation 1943-5.’

Zubrzycki, *Arthur Calwell and the Origin of Post-War Immigration*.

¹⁴ Jordens, *Redefining Australians*, 5.

the migrant is a constructed identity, imbued with a set of expectations and conditions which mediate the relationship between Australia and its migrant Other. Like the previous chapter, this one also covers some broad and at times seemingly extraneous ground in order to provide the foundations needed to reimagine the historical narrative of Croatian political activism in the post-war period. The expectations associated with the Good Australian Migrant help explain how Croatian activism has been misunderstood, and also how this misunderstanding can be manipulated in the name of political expediency. Put simply, when Croatians do not meet this checklist, they are read as 'bad'.

The Good Australian Migrant has become one of the many versions of 'being Australian' that comprise the pantheon of figures within Australia's national identity. It sits alongside other recognisable figures such as the Bushman, the larrikin, the digger, or the lifesaver.¹⁵ It is an aspirational figure and does not encompass the entire range of migrants or migrant experiences in this country, in the same way Ward's construction of the 'Australian character' did not reflect the lived experience of most Australians.¹⁶ As Nail explains,

A figure is not a fixed identity or specific person but a mobile social position. One becomes a figure when one occupies this position. One may occupy this position to different degrees, at different times, and in different circumstances. But there is nothing essential about a person that makes the person this figure.¹⁷

Therefore, the Good Australian Migrant captures the figure of the migrant in Australia's national imagination, and the attributes against which the actions of those who may occupy this position are understood and evaluated; against who we believe migrants *ought* to be, rather than who they actually *are* or *could* be.

¹⁵ For an example of this pantheon as constructed by the Australian Government, refer to: Digital Transformation Agency, *About Australia – Australian Stories – Australian Identity*, Canberra, <http://www.australia.gov.au/about-australia/australian-stories/australian-identity>, accessed 4 February 2016.

¹⁶ R. Ward, *The Australian Legend* (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1958).

¹⁷ T. Nail, *The Figure of the Migrant* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2015), 16.

2.1. SELECTION AND ENTRY

*Reading through the [Immigration Officer] manuals of 1969 to 1972, one gets a very definite idea of what Australian policy-makers expected an immigrant to be. Young, white, able bodied, and male emerge as the attributes of the intended model immigrant.*¹⁸

2.1.1. THE GOOD AUSTRALIAN MIGRANT AS LABOUR

Chifley and Calwell argued that the only way to ensure the success of Australia's post-war reconstruction was through a significant and rapid increase in Australia's population and labour supply, and that the fastest way to achieve this was through mass immigration. That the labour capacity of migrants was the foremost motivation for selection was proven in the initial intakes of the DP scheme; of the migrants recruited, 93% were available for job placement.¹⁹ However, in order to ensure that these migrants could in fact find employment and work alongside Australians without disrupting industrial relations, Calwell needed the support of the trade unions that mediated industrial relations, and of the labour force that would be expected to work alongside migrants.

In order to appease trade unions, historically opposed to immigration for fear of disrupting Australia's 'Workingman's Paradise', Calwell included a number of caveats that served as pre-conditions to immigration; that no migrant would enter Australia until he or she was tied to continuous employment, that proper housing and other social amenities could be established to allow for ease of settlement, that the demobilisation, rehabilitation and re-employment of ex-servicemen and women would be resolved as a priority, and that adequate shipping could be secured for their transportation.²⁰ Unlike customary surplus forces that are repatriated once the labour need dissipates, Calwell justified the permanency of these migrants through Australia's need to populate 'for reasons

¹⁸ R. Fincher, L. Foster, and R. Wilmot, *Gender Equity and Australian Immigration Policy* (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1994), 25.

¹⁹ Kunz, *Displaced Persons*, 46.

²⁰ Australia, House of Representatives, *Parliamentary Debates*, No.HR.13, 1945, 4912.

of defence and for the fullest expansion of our economy.’²¹ In outlining these conditions of immigration, Calwell effectively delineated the social space migrants would occupy as one of non-competition – migrants would not compete with Australians in employment, housing, or transportation, and thus would not disrupt the status quo presently enjoyed by Australians. This tenet of non-competition, Calwell believed, was essential in preventing the growth of opposition to the migration policy in general, and the long-term benefits to both the nation and the migrant would justify the initial costs.²²

Non-competition in employment was formally expressed in the 1-2 year work contracts DP migrants were required to sign in return for their assisted passages. This *carte blanche*, as Kunz describes it,²³ ensured that the type and location of work during the migrant’s initial years in Australia was completely at the discretion of the Immigration Department, without any regard for the wishes of the migrants, their individual circumstance, or any education completed prior to arrival. Migrants were made to understand in the interview process that they could not choose where or in what capacity they were to work during this time, and that they were unable to change that employment without the consent of the Department. Thus, the occupations of migrants were simply categorised as ‘labourer’ for males, and ‘domestic’ for females, and it was not guaranteed that members of a family would be sent to the same place during the contract’s duration. The contract system signified to both migrants and the Australian public that the economic contribution of migrants was to be first and foremost in the interest of the nation, and not the individual or their personal prosperity.

Though the function of the migrant as economic has not changed over the years, the nature of the economic contribution and its manifestation in selection criteria has. Until the election of the Whitlam government in 1972, post-war immigration policy followed a ‘Populate or Perish’ model, characterised by an open and supply-driven ethos. This model focused on the number of migrants

²¹ Australia, House of Representatives, *Parliamentary Debates*, No.HR.13, 1945, 4911.

²² Kunz, *Displaced Persons*, 145.

²³ *ibid.*, 40.

arriving and operated under the assumption that immigration was an economic stimulant, making high-level immigration and economic growth mutually reinforcing pursuits. In the face of precarious economic conditions in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and in particular rising unemployment, proponents of reducing immigration argued that high-level immigration was a hindrance rather than a help to the economic wellbeing of Australia. Using the rationale that prevailing economic conditions warranted only a small immigration intake of those migrants with skills in areas of severe and urgent labour shortages, the Whitlam government reduced immigration to some of the lowest levels on record.²⁴ Despite this sharp and almost overnight change in immigration policy, the logic behind the change remained thoroughly economic.

This change in immigration policy was reflective of wider developments in economic and political circumstance and thought which saw economic rationalism gain prominence as the dominant philosophy within government ministries and departments.²⁵ In 1979, the Fraser Government institutionalised economic rationalism in immigration policy with the introduction of NUMAS. If the 'Populate-or-Perish model' of immigration focused on the quantity of migration, the model underpinning NUMAS focused on the quality of migration, i.e., the human capital of migrants. This model of immigration was demand-driven, based on an allocation of points that allowed entry only to those with the employment, education, and language capabilities needed to meet particular occupational or educational shortages or surpluses. Thus, where the Populate-or-Perish model emphasised an economic contribution, the introduction of NUMAS emphasised a very particular type of economic contribution, designed to only allow entry to those migrants deemed economically viable, with the point allocation system flexible enough to adapt quickly to changes in the economic

²⁴ D. Cox, *Migration and Welfare: An Australian Perspective* (Sydney: Prentice Hall, 1987), 185–86. Collins, however, argues that Whitlam's change in policy was more philosophical than economic. See: Collins, *Migrant Hands in a Distant Land*, 25–27.

²⁵ Jupp, *Immigration*, 163–71.

For a detailed analysis of the rise of economic rationalism in Australian public policy, the effect of this on the relationship between the economy, the state, and society, and the social significance of this change, see: M. Pusey, *Economic Rationalism in Canberra: A Nation-Building State Changes Its Mind* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

environment. Though it has been altered to suit needs as they arise, this model of immigration remains the foundation of the current system of skilled migration to Australia.²⁶

The reduction of the Good Australian Migrant to his or her economic utility contradicts Australia's popular understanding of its immigration history as one guided by benevolence and humanitarianism. This is particularly true of Calwell's DP scheme, which is often held up as a hallmark of Australian humanitarianism, but is also from which the economic primacy of the Good Australian Migrant originates.²⁷ While national histories often present a romanticised understanding of the past, in the case of Australia's post-war immigration history, the pragmatism of successive Australian governments was especially 'obscured by Labor legendeering, and by the air of self-congratulation in which Menzies' Liberals enveloped [immigration] by the mid-1950s.'²⁸ This was only reinforced with the introduction of multiculturalism, which tied the pragmatism of previous governments to principles of assimilation and legacies of the White Australia Policy, and not to the economic essentialism of immigration policy itself. As Collins explains,

The prime reason for immigration has been the need to provide adequate labour reserves for the expansion of Australian capitalism. The precise way this reserve

²⁶ For a simple overview of Australia's current system, see:

K. Hoang, 'Explainer: what is Australia's 'points system' for immigration?', *The Conversation*, 22 June 2016, <https://theconversation.com/explainer-what-is-australias-points-system-for-immigration-26065>, accessed 23 June 2016

²⁷ Historians differ in their estimation of the Displaced Persons Scheme. For example, Stats argues that 'despite the wide acclaim both then and since, Australia's Displaced Persons Scheme was designed explicitly to meet national rather than humanitarian interests.' Kelly reiterates this sentiment, even if allowing for the possibility of humanitarian motive, arguing that 'the nation's immigration policy began as a quality control exercise. Calwell and Chifley were not just humanitarians. They were engaged in a determined nation-building exercise.' Lack and Templeton, however, are most scathing, describing Australia's post-war immigration policy as 'calculatingly and selfishly opportunist' and 'plagued, even compromised, by deep internal inconsistencies.' Kunz, like Kelly, suggests that perhaps humanitarianism and pragmatism were not necessarily mutually exclusive pursuits, arguing that 'Australian insularity and xenophobia made it almost inevitable that to continue the program, charity had to be served up as utilitarian gain, and calculated gain as charity.' See:

K. Stats, "'Characteristically Generous'? Australian Responses to Refugees Prior to 1951', *Australian Journal of Politics & History*, 60(2), 2014, 187.

Kelly, *100 Years*, 67.

Lack and Templeton, *Bold Experiment*, 2.

Kunz, *Displaced Persons*, 256.

²⁸ Lack and Templeton, *Bold Experiment*, 3.

army is tapped – numbers, skills, country of origin and so on – does reflect immigration lobbies and ‘demand side’ issues but this does not negate the primacy of the labour supply function of immigrants.²⁹

Thus the grand arch of post-war immigration is far better framed by economic considerations, particularly the supply of labour, with political, social, and humanitarian considerations secondary.³⁰

As Cox highlights, this has important implications in understanding the function of immigration policy. If the logic of immigration policy stems from economic considerations, then ‘immigration cannot be perceived as a solution to international situations unless the economic needs of the country of immigration happen to coincide with the set needs in question.’³¹ This implies that in order for an immigration program to be perceived as desirable and successful, the economic considerations of the host country must coincide with the humanitarian considerations of a refugee or surplus population. This may explain why the post-war immigration program is remembered as successful, while those thereafter are not remembered as optimistically; Europe’s need to resettle its refugee population coincided with Australia’s post-war reconstruction efforts and this mutual benefit is the core of the program’s genesis and perceived success.

By extension, the Good Australian Migrant is first and foremost an economic entity, and any political, social, and humanitarian aspects are secondary and subservient to the labour capacity of a migrant. This gives rise to a second implication - if the economic contribution of migrants is the motivation for an immigration program, then that program will not be geared to the well-being of the migrant. Rather it will consist of only those measures essential to ensure that contribution, and ‘only when other concerns are converted into political pressure

²⁹ J. Collins, ‘Immigration and Class: The Australian Experience’, in G. Bottomley and M. de Lepervanche (eds.), *Ethnicity, Class and Gender in Australia* (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), 5.

³⁰ Cox points out one exception to this rule, which is immigration under the Hawke government. The reduction of labour immigration streams, while family reunion and refugee streams were maintained at existing levels, indicates that, however fleetingly, immigration as a humanitarian policy displaced immigration as an economic policy. However, the economic justification of immigration remained, as the ‘overall economic effect was still seen for the most part as beneficial, [though] the immediate motivation for the actual intake was more humanitarian than economic.’

See: Cox, *Migration and Welfare*, 186.

³¹ *ibid.*, 189.

will a comprehensive set of welfare provisions be introduced.’³² This in part explains the persistence of assimilation policy and the marginalisation of migrants in semi- and un-skilled employment well after inherent social disadvantages were recognised; it is not until sufficient political pressure is developed, such as the establishment of an ‘ethnic lobby’,³³ that it became politically expedient for the Government and its authorities to place migrant welfare on the agenda.

Just as the justification for immigration has been couched principally in the rhetoric and logic of economics, the primary function of the Good Australian Migrant is also economic, measured by labour capacity, often determined by their ability to close shortfalls in industries and occupations. This means that the Good Australian Migrant serves to secure the economic prosperity of the nation, but without entering into direct competition with Australian workers. The Good Australian Migrant must also contribute significantly to the nation’s bottom line before they earn the right to receive its spoils, particularly in the form of welfare. However, in return for bearing these costs, the Good Australian Migrant receives the opportunity to provide a better and more secure life for themselves and their family, one not possible in their country of origin. This better life is attributed to Australia’s economic and political stability, with its system of fair wages and safe working conditions designed to lead to the financial independence of anyone willing to work hard enough for their lot. Even though settlement outcomes are improving as skilled migration increases, particularly of those with tertiary qualifications and strong English-language skills, the expectation that migrants must take up the work that is available to them, rather than the work they want or are qualified for, still remains. As Collins recently lamented, ‘the cliché of highly educated immigrants driving cabs for a living or getting jobs as unskilled labourers is sadly still very true today.’³⁴

³² *ibid.*

³³ J. Jupp, ‘The Ethnic Lobby and Immigration Policy’, in J. Jupp and M. Kabala (eds.), *The Politics of Australian Immigration* (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1993), 204-221.

³⁴ I. Ting, ‘Tide turns for skilled migrants’, *Sun Herald*, 24 July 2016, 12.

2.1.2. THE GOOD AUSTRALIAN MIGRANT AS MALE

The Good Australian Migrant is almost invariably a 'he'. This is mostly due to historical circumstance – the national infrastructure and building works at the heart of Calwell's post-war reconstruction required 'manpower', and as the term suggests, manual labour was exclusively the province of men. The official press release of the International Refugee Organisation (IRO) cemented the maleness of the migrant by emphasising the need for 'horny-handed sons of toil.'³⁵ That Australia's post-war immigration program was built around importing this manpower is reflected in the early intakes of the DP scheme; seven males were recruited to every two females.³⁶ This gender imbalance in selection and recruitment, coupled with the economic imperative of labour, meant that in the initial years of the program, 'migrant' became synonymous with 'worker' and more specifically a 'male worker in a manual job.'³⁷

The maleness of the Good Australian Migrant was reiterated in immigration publicity such as the 'There's a man's job for you in Australia' poster campaign and the promotional film *Men Wanted*, both of which 'reinforced the muscular vision of Australia as a strong nation of youth and opportunity.'³⁸ General recruitment campaigns depicted Australia as a place of 'industry and sunshine', where displaced migrants could replace the gloom and misery of their current situation in Europe with a stable home, good health, and economic prosperity in Australia.³⁹ These campaigns drew on the symbols of family and suburbia that characterised the social rhetoric of 1950s Australia. Though this symbolism depended on the presence of women as wives, mothers, and daughters, the procurement of the house in which the family makes a home, and the economic

³⁵ J. Persian, 'Chifley Liked Them Blond': DP Immigrants for Australia,' *History Australia*, 12(2), 2015, 92.

³⁶ Kunz, *Displaced Persons*, 46.

³⁷ Z. Simic, 'Bachelors of Misery and Proxy Brides: Marriage, Migration and Assimilation, 1947–1973', *History Australia*, 11(1), 153.

³⁸ R. Balint, 'Industry and Sunshine: Australia as Home in the Displaced Persons' Camps of Postwar Europe', *History Australia*, 11(1), 2014, 114.

³⁹ For a detailed exploration of these recruitment campaigns, see:

Balint, 'Industry and Sunshine'

J. Greenwood, 'The Migrant Follows the Tourist: Australian immigration publicity after the Second World War', *History Australia*, 11(3), 2014, 74-96.

prosperity of that family was (and arguably still is) coded as a male pursuit, one the Australian male provided for his female counterpart.

Publicity and educational campaigns in Australia focused overwhelmingly on the male migrant, either in equipping him with the information necessary to be a productive worker, or in selling his virtues as a worker to the Australian public.⁴⁰ These campaigns were built on stories that celebrated the successful assimilation of male migrants, which repeated a similar pattern – first the Good Australian Migrant learned the language and customs of his new home, then through work and play learned the ways of the Australian male, completing his process of assimilation via marriage with an Australian girl. The most famous example of this assimilation pattern can be found in *They're a Weird Mob*, published in 1957 by John O'Grady under the pseudonym Nino Culotta.⁴¹ This 'male migrant/female Australian' trope was also codified in the *Australian Women's Weekly*, in which migrants were presented almost exclusively as male, the 'typical' Australian woman was assumed to be Anglo-Australian and Australian-born, and stories focused either on the male migrant assimilating successfully through work or marriage to an Australian girl, or in etiquette pages advising how Australian women should behave towards migrant men.⁴²

The happy ending promised by assimilation stories, however, did not translate so easily to reality, as intermarriage between migrants and Australians remained significantly low. Coupled with the gender imbalance of the early intakes, this soon precipitated a number of social consequences that threatened

⁴⁰ A. Haebich, *Spinning the Dream: Assimilation in Australia 1950-1970* (North Fremantle: Fremantle Press, 2008), 118–36.

E. Richards, *Destination Australia: Migration to Australia since 1901* (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2008), 204–43.

⁴¹ Such was its popularity that the book was reprinted every year for 38 years after its initial publication, and adapted to film in 1966 which also achieved commercial success. For more information, see:

J. Hoorn, 'Michael Powell's *They're a Weird Mob*: Dissolving the 'Undigested Fragments' in the Australian Body Politic', *Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies*, 17(2), 2003, 159-176.

B. Maddison, 'The Australian Legend, Russel Ward and the Parallel Universe of Nino Culotta', *Journal of Australian Colonial History*, 20(2), 2008, 139-154.

D. Carter, 'O'Grady, John See 'Culotta, Nino': Popular Authorship, Duplicity and Celebrity', *Australian Literary Studies*, 21(4), 2004, 56-73.

⁴² S. Sheridan, 'The 'Australian Woman' and Her Migrant Others in the Postwar Australian Women's Weekly', *Continuum: Journal of Media & Cultural Studies*, 14(2), 2000, 121-32.

the success of the publicity campaigns, and in turn, support for the immigration program itself. The most publicised of these were 'bachelors of misery'⁴³ - single male migrants unable to make a marriage, and as such plagued by loneliness, alcoholism, mental breakdown, and suicide. The cause of this misery was often reduced to the 'imbalance of the sexes' in migrant selection. Government, media, and sometimes the migrants themselves, therefore argued that the simple solution to this problem lay in the increased intake of single migrant women.⁴⁴

The construction and conflation of the migrant as male in the initial years of the immigration program, and particularly under the DP scheme, had two important consequences. On the one hand, it resulted in the masculinisation of the immigrant population, while on the other it marginalised migrant women and their experiences in immigration discourse.⁴⁵ Much like their Australian counterparts in the 1950s, the role of migrant women in Australian society was confined to the domestic sphere, where they were expected to fulfil their duty as Australian wife and mother. However, Kunek argues that this role too served a covert economic imperative; migrant women were to 'act as a stimulus to consumer demand through the formation of families which would effect[sic] workforce expansion and create employment.'⁴⁶ This characterisation of migrant women as "immigrant wives", 'breeders for Australia', and 'unskilled dependents'⁴⁷ obscured the fact that migrant women were more likely to undertake paid work outside of the home than Australian-born women in the post-war period.⁴⁸ Thus migrant women became both 'factory and marriage fodder,'⁴⁹ marginalised in both the public and private spheres, and 'simply did not

⁴³ V.L. Borin, 'Australian Bachelors of Misery', *Quadrant*, 5(3), 1961, 3-7.

⁴⁴ See: Simic, 'Bachelors of Misery and Proxy Brides', 157-65.

S. Kunek, 'Brides, Wives, and Single Women: Gender and immigration', *Lilith: A Feminist History Journal*, (8), 97-99.

Lack and Templeton, *Bold Experiment*, 11, 49-50.

⁴⁵ Fincher, Foster, and Wilmot, *Gender Equity and Australian Immigration Policy*, 24.

⁴⁶ Kunek, 'Brides, Wives, and Single Women', 101.

⁴⁷ Fincher, Foster, and Wilmot, *Gender Equity and Australian Immigration Policy*, 9.

⁴⁸ Simic, 'Bachelors of Misery and Proxy Brides', 100-101.

⁴⁹ J. Matthews, *Good and Mad Women: The Historical Construction of Femininity in Twentieth-Century Australia* (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), 40.

exist on the dominant social agenda with needs and legitimate aspirations in their own right.⁵⁰

The implications of this marginalisation and invisibility magnifies when we consider that, contrary to the historical narrative, ‘there was a more or less balanced intake, with only slightly fewer women,’ in total immigration from the beginning of post-war immigration through to the early 1970s.⁵¹ The early construction and conflation of the migrant as male in the initial years of the immigration program, the rhetoric of the ‘imbalance of the sexes’ and ‘bachelors of misery’, and the ushering of Australian women out of employment and into the home all conspired to reinforce the centrality and predominance of the male migrant at the expense of the female migrant. In the same way migrant welfare was not an issue until sufficient political pressure could be applied, it would take the social and cultural revolutions of the 1960s and the rise of women’s rights in the 1970s to challenge the marginalisation of migrant women.⁵²

Though the Good Australian Migrant as male can be easily explained by historical circumstance, the perseverance of it in the face of social changes and

⁵⁰ A. Jakubowicz, M. Morrissey, and J. Palser, *Ethnicity, Class and Social Policy in Australia* (Kensington, NSW: Social Welfare Research Centre, University of New South Wales, 1984), 28.

⁵¹ Fincher, Foster, and Wilmot, *Gender Equity and Australian Immigration Policy*, 20.

Simic, however, adds a significant caveat to this observation:

‘Total figures disguise the extent to which family migration was more common for British migrants who had the most consistent access to government assisted migration. A bird’s eye view obscures an observable imbalance of the sexes at particular times and in particular ethnic groups or migrant intakes, such as among the migrants who arrived under the Displaced Persons Program (DPP) and also among Italians, who were the largest group of non-British migrants into the 1960s.’

See: Simic, ‘Bachelors of Misery and Proxy Brides’, 153–54.

⁵² Mirroring wider debates in Australia from 1970s-1980s, employment conditions - including employee rights such as access to childcare and workplace harassment/discrimination, access to health/welfare services, and the ‘double burden’ of paid and domestic labour became the main sites of activism for migrant women. The disadvantages faced by migrant women, particularly those from Southern Europe, became a feature of the platforms and rhetoric of a number of women’s, multicultural/ethnic, and union organisations. It also became the subject of many studies, reports, and publications, such as the Jackson Report in 1975, which outlined the formidable disadvantages faced by migrant women in the manufacturing industry in which they were heavily employed.

For more comprehensive information regarding migrant women in Australia, See:

G. Bottomley and M. de Lepervanche (eds.), *Ethnicity, Class and Gender in Australia* (North Sydney, NSW: George Allen & Unwin, 1984).

Matthews, *Good and Mad Women*.

Fincher, Foster, and Wilmot, *Gender Equity and Australian Immigration Policy*, 81–113.

Collins, *Migrant Hands in a Distant Land*, 179–86.

political pressures is more difficult to explain. Yet as much as the social changes and activism of the 1970s and onwards challenged the position and associated gender norms of women in Australian society, they did not displace the hegemony of male identities in the national imagination, nor the construction of Australian identity as male in general.⁵³ The enduring maleness of the Good Australian Migrant is certainly not unique, but true of most figures in the national pantheon. As Elder asserts,

Iconic images of the quintessential or typical Australian are not of bush folk, but bush *men*; they are not of participants of war, but male diggers; they are not of volunteers at the local nursing home, but of male volunteer lifesavers who patrol the beach.⁵⁴

The bushman, the digger, and the lifesaver are all identities which are male by default and female on second thought. Even mateship – that all-Australian term – is a masculine ideal, representing a relationship and a behaviour that in its purest form only occurs between men, even if it can be loaned to relationships between men and women, or between women. Though six-millionth migrant Jurado demonstrated how far the Australian migrant had come, as highly educated, English-speaking, cosmopolitan, Asian, and as female, the fact that her reasons for migration were tied up in notions of family, home, and motherhood demonstrates that the more things change, the more they stay the same.⁵⁵

2.1.3. THE GOOD AUSTRALIAN MIGRANT AS HEALTHY

The Good Australian Migrant must be healthy and able-bodied in order to fulfil his expectation of gainful employment upon arrival. This means that he is also young, as youth and health often go hand in hand, or at least young enough to contribute his fair share in labour and taxes before he becomes reliant on the

⁵³ For a more detailed analysis of the construction of Australian identity as male/masculine, see: C. Elder, *Being Australian: Narratives of National Identity* (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2007), 65–92. White, *Inventing Australia*, 63–84.

⁵⁴ Elder, *Being Australian*, 65.

⁵⁵ For example, Jurado's decision to migrate is framed by her role as a mother – 'Australia is a better country. The economy is healthy, and the future for my children is better.' Morris, 'In Immigration, Cristina's One in 6 million.' *The Australian*, 19 March 2002, 3.

state in his old age. In the same way initial intakes of the DP scheme favoured males over females, it also favoured those in the 20-29yr old age bracket. As Kunz highlights,

The predominance of young age groups among Australia's DP's probably reflects not only the drive for young people, but also Australia's stringent health criteria to which mainly older refugees fell victim.⁵⁶

The stringency was such that even those working within the scheme recognised its overzealous nature - one senior IRO official described some of the criteria as 'a bit absurd' because it did not always reflect accepted medical guidance,⁵⁷ while an Australian doctor later recounted that 'many of the earlier applicants, refugees and immigrants, were excluded from coming to Australia really without a good reason. They were simply rejected because they had old scarring.'⁵⁸

As with gender, the youth and health demanded of migrants was closely tied to their economic function in Australia's post-war reconstruction efforts. The male labour that was necessary for the industrial and agricultural work migrants were to complete in service of the nation was physically demanding, both in strength and endurance, and Calwell wanted 'the best that is in the field.'⁵⁹ For female migrants, youth and health were also necessary in order to fulfil their role as 'prospective breeders', and officers were ingenuously instructed that 'women of child-bearing age should be capable of bearing children.'⁶⁰ This narrow selection of the young, healthy, and able-bodied quickly found Australia accused of 'skimming the cream'. However, as Persian pointedly notes, the cream was always

⁵⁶ Kunz, *Displaced Persons*, 47

⁵⁷ As cited in *ibid.*, 48.

⁵⁸ H. Martin, *Angels and Arrogant Gods* (Canberra: AGPS Press, 1989), 40.

For examples of the health criteria and examination process, see:

Kunz, *Displaced Persons*, 46-48.

K. Neumann, *Across the Seas: Australia's Response to Refugees - A History* (Collingwood: Black Inc., 2015), 111.

J. Persian, 'Displaced Persons (1947-1952) : Representations, Memory and Commemoration' (Doctoral Thesis, University of Sydney, 2011), 101-3.

⁵⁹ Persian, 'Chifley Liked Them Blond', 99.

⁶⁰ *ibid.*

the objective, as 'the Australian government plan was to import a workforce, not give succour to refugee dependants.'⁶¹

The association between migrant health and employability was reinforced by another premise; that the migrant should contribute to, rather than burden, the public purse. The economic relationship between the migrant and the host society was and remains a one-way street, at least until the migrant has earned his keep. As one selection officer rationalised, 'we did not want people to come to Australia and then end up in public hospitals.'⁶² Australian selection teams were also instructed to reject those presenting with minor complaints out of a concern that the DPs would 'utilise these disabilities to claim unfitness for work in particular localities or particular jobs.'⁶³ That is, lest they used these disabilities to game the contract scheme before their time was up.

As early as late 1948, however, the government itself was forced to relax some health and age criteria as 'the best in the field' became increasingly scarce. The principle of 'net gain' began to guide the selection process, allowing for the entry of those deemed less desirable on the assumption that these initial 'inadequacies' in the short-term would be offset by gains in the long-term.⁶⁴ As the bias favouring the 20-29 year old age bracket slowly diminished, and despite the moderation of health criteria, the expectation that migrants should contribute to, rather than burden, the public purse conspired to keep migrants relatively young, and health an important criteria in the selection process.⁶⁵ There were only a handful of instances where this expectation was vetoed, and only after pressure from both within and outside Australia, such as the compassionate intakes of 1949 which saw sick parents or close relatives accepted,⁶⁶ and the compassionate

⁶¹ *ibid.*, 98–99.

⁶² Martin, *Angels and Arrogant Gods*, 22.

⁶³ As cited in K. Neumann, *Refuge Australia: Australia's Humanitarian Record* (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2004), 33.

⁶⁴ Persian, 'Chifley Liked Them Blond', 99.

⁶⁵ Kunz, *Displaced Persons*, 47.

⁶⁶ Persian, 'Displaced Persons (1947-1952)', 99–100.

intake prompted by the World Refugee Year in 1959-1960, which saw refugee families with a physically handicapped member accepted.⁶⁷

These compassionate intakes, however, have been few and far between, and the frequency of rejections based on disabilities that may 'cost the taxpayer' attest to the economic utilitarianism, rather than humanitarianism, inherent in immigration policy. As recently as 24 February 2017, the family of a 16 year-old girl with autism was denied permanent residency based on her disability. The rhetoric of economic utility permeates the reasoning behind the decision – immigration health checks found that the girl would 'result in significant cost to Australian taxpayers,' and the Assistant Immigration Minister refused to intervene as it was 'not in the public interest.' Even advocates for the girl remaining in Australia coded their arguments in the rhetoric of economic utility, albeit of her mother - her employment as a doctor in two medical practices was emphasised and described as 'of immense public interest', and she was described as someone who has 'done nothing but contribute to our country.'⁶⁸

Australia's preoccupation with health, however, has a long history of priority in immigration selection and control that pre-dates the Good Australian Migrant. As Bashford argues, health has been a historically important site of inclusion and exclusion in attempts to secure Australia territorially and culturally, and has formed part of the legal and technical constitution of prohibited foreigners.⁶⁹ Though employability did drive the post-war justification for health and medical selection criteria, it was also a legacy of a much longer history which positioned health as an important signifier of un/desirable migrants. This has persevered in immigration selection criteria in both skilled and humanitarian intakes,

⁶⁷ Neumann, *Refuge Australia*, 37–41.

⁶⁸ I. Ting, 'Daughter's autism may force doctor to depart', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 24 February 2017, 2.

⁶⁹ Bashford argues that there are three reasons for this relationship between health and immigration selection and control. First, the formation of the Australian nation occurred at a time when governments in western nations were assuming increasing responsibility for health and welfare. Second, there was an overlap between an imagined white Australia and governmental discourse regarding hygiene, cleanliness and purity. Finally the island-status of Australia easily lent itself to frame health in the imagery of contagion and quarantine, providing a 'natural' border for disease. See: A. Bashford, 'At the Border Contagion, Immigration, Natiom', *Australian Historical Studies*, 33(120), 2002, 344-358.

exemplified in the September 2015 announcement that Australia would be resettling 12,000 Syrian refugees in a special humanitarian intake.⁷⁰ In addressing concerns over this intake, Immigration Minister Peter Dutton emphasised the rigour of the selection process, in particular the ‘health and security’ checks involved,⁷¹ and that even after selection, refugees would have to submit to a ‘final’ health check.⁷² That health was held up as important as security and character checks, particularly in the face of current fears over terrorism demonstrates the strength of the legacy of health as a signifier of un/desirable migrants.

2.1.4. THE GOOD AUSTRALIAN MIGRANT AND ‘COLOUR’

For its first two decades, post-war immigration operated in the shadow of the White Australia Policy, and entailed an explicit, if not institutionalised, racial component to selection criteria which posited the Good Australian Migrant on a sliding scale of ‘whiteness’.⁷³ A conscious effort was made to ensure migrants would look sufficiently enough ‘like us’ so as to assure the Australian public that, by virtue of this fact, the New Australian would become the ‘disappearing migrant’; that is, instantly assimilated.⁷⁴ Calwell was acutely aware of the political capital questions of race held in determining long-term support for his immigration program. This was, in effect, the genesis of the ‘Beautiful Balts’ campaign; Calwell was adamant that the first shipload of migrants to Australia were to be a purposeful sample of ‘ideal types’ to act as the scheme’s young,

⁷⁰ Department of Immigration and Border Protection, *Australia’s response to the Syrian and Iraqi humanitarian crisis*, DIBP, Canberra, <https://www.border.gov.au/Trav/Refu/response-syrian-humanitarian-crisis>, accessed 17 August 2016

⁷¹ S. Martin, ‘Refugees Face Character, Crime Checks’, *The Australian*, 10 September 2015, 7. Australia, House of Representatives, *Parliamentary Debates*, No.HR.18, 2015, 13260-1.

⁷² A. Henderson and C. Uhlmann, ‘Asylum Seeker Intake Explained: Who Will Come to Australia under the Government’s Plan?’, *ABC News*, 9 September 2015, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-09-09/refugee-intake-plan-who-will-come-to-australia/6762278>, accessed 17 October 2015

⁷³ For further information on ‘whiteness’ and race relations in early Australia, see: M. Lake and H. Reynolds, *Drawing the Global Colour Line: White Men’s Countries and the Question of Racial Equality* (Carlton: Melbourne University Publishing, 2008).

A. Markus, *Australian Race Relations, 1788-1993* (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1994). White, *Inventing Australia*, 68-72

⁷⁴ Haebich, *Spinning the Dream*, 123.

single, healthy, educated, preferably male, fair-haired, fair-skinned, and blue-eyed ‘Trojan Horse’.⁷⁵

The positive reception of these Beautiful Balts, coupled with the quickly diminishing numbers of ideal types, emboldened Calwell and Australian officials to widen the limitation of nationality in order to continue ‘creaming off’ the single and healthy.⁷⁶ There continued, however, a hierarchy of preference based on representation of race and perceived cultural affinity. This was reflected in degree of effort devoted to recruitment and in the progression of eligibility; in 1947, Ukrainians and Slovenes had become acceptable candidates for the program, with Czechs, Poles and Yugoslavs soon thereafter. By the end of 1949, all ‘European races’ became acceptable.⁷⁷ Calwell continued to refer to the DPs and ‘Balts or ‘Baltic People’ well after the limitation on nationalities had been lifted. Kunz describes this as ‘a typical Calwell touch... for years all non-British, non-Mediterranean immigrants were by unsuspecting Australians referred to as ‘Balts’.’⁷⁸

The racial composition of migrants slowly decreased in importance as it became increasingly incompatible with foreign policy objectives, as Australians became increasingly comfortable with the migrant presence, and as migrants began to advocate for their needs and rights. The dismantling of the White Australia Policy, the introduction of multiculturalism, and the advent of non-European migration contested the expectation that migrants must look ‘like us’. Nonetheless, the legacy of the White Australia Policy continues to cast a significant racial shadow. Though the Good Australian Migrant is no longer posited on an overt sliding scale of whiteness, there remains a marked difference in the treatment of those that look Anglo-Celtic or northern European, and those that do not. As academic and media presenter Waleed Aly has written, Australia

⁷⁵ Persian, ‘Displaced Persons (1947-1952)’, 94–95.

⁷⁶ Lack and Templeton, *Bold Experiment*, 11.

⁷⁷Kunz, *Displaced Persons*, 43.

Markus, ‘Labour and Immigration 1946-9: The Displaced Persons Program’, 80.

Persian, ‘Chifley Liked Them Blond’, 91–101.

⁷⁸ Kunz, *Displaced Persons*, 42.

may not be an overtly racist country anymore, but it does have high levels of low-level racism, 'the subterranean racism that goes largely unremarked upon and that we seem unable even to detect.'⁷⁹

Nonetheless, as the ethnic composition of migrants diversified, the introduction of NUMAS and the 'human capital' model to immigration policy standardised other demographic traits, such as levels of education, profession, and language capability. The net effect of these changes across employment, gender, health and 'colour' amount to one of an ethnically and gender diverse Good Australian Migrant, but one who is now more likely to be English-speaking, highly skilled or specialised, and of a targeted profession where a shortage exists. This has served to reinforce rather than diminish the expectation that a migrant will contribute, rather than be a burden, on the public purse, particularly as the concern over population growth that once underpinned the principle of net gain has become less relevant, and by some quarters, rejected. Though women are more likely to migrate and enter employment than ever before, and are no longer 'invisible' or classified as dependent migrants, the default gender of the Good Australian Migrant remains male, as do the expectations of health and relative youth.

⁷⁹ W. Aly, 'Curse of Australia's Silent Pervasive Racism', *The Age*, 5 April 2013, 22.

2.2. SETTLEMENT

*I could see him all the time and he would look at me sort of pleadingly.
But this fellow really was a very dark gypsy with crinkly black hair, and although
I was sympathetic towards him, I visualised him walking down Martin Place and as
such he would have been a 'stare object'... He was muscular, he looked a hardworking type and
just the pleading look about him, 'please, can't I go?' I often think, 'Well, why didn't I take a punt?'
But for his sake as well as Australia's, I rejected him.⁸⁰*

2.2.1. THE GOOD AUSTRALIAN MIGRANT AS 'LIKE US'

The expectation that migrants would look 'like us' was only one in a number of measures designed to reassure the Australian public that the intention of post-war immigration was to strengthen the nation, not to change it. The logical extension of looking 'like us' was that migrants would also learn to behave 'like us', and this expectation was coded in the rhetoric of assimilation. Exactly what assimilation meant or how it should be implemented, however, was contested from the outset. Opinions ranged from an enforced and immediate assimilation that restricted any outward expression of cultural difference, to a gradual process of cultural attainment over generations.⁸¹ By 1954, Wilfred D. Borrie had observed that

As popularly used in Australia the word [assimilation] implies a variable and a constant; a minority being made like a majority; immigrants conforming to and accepting the habits and customs, the lore and culture of the Australian-born population.⁸²

Assimilation conflated the physical appearance and cultural behaviour of migrants, with the process deemed complete when the migrant was no longer able to be distinguished from the Australian-born by either appearance, speech, or behaviour.⁸³ Much like a sliding scale of whiteness informed the selection process, assimilation posited the Good Australian Migrant on a sliding scale of

⁸⁰ Tom Stratton, Immigration Selection Officer, as quoted in Martin, *Angels and Arrogant Gods*, 35.

⁸¹ A. Markus and M. Taft, 'Postwar Immigration and Assimilation: A Reconceptualisation', *Australian Historical Studies*, 46(2), 2015, 237–40.

⁸² W. D. Borrie, *Italians and Germans in Australia: A Study of Assimilation* (Melbourne: Australian National University, 1954), xi.

⁸³ Jupp, *From White Australia to Woomera*, 20.

'Britishness' based on 'prejudicial judgements about which ethnic groups were most desirable in terms of perceived cultural affinity or assimilability.'⁸⁴ This cultural hierarchy of preference guided the establishment of migrant reception and training centres run by the Immigration Department, the largest of which was at Bonegilla.⁸⁵ Though their purpose in the first instance was to provide accommodation and allow for the processing and allocation of employment under the terms of the two-year work contract, these reception centres also sought to aid in the entry of the migrant into their local communities.⁸⁶ In effect, these centres helped jump-start the process of assimilation by deconstructing the DP migrant, and reconstructing him or her as the more palatable Good Australian Migrant ready for introduction to the Australian community.

Though assimilation was a national objective, it was to be achieved at the local level. Employment organisations, churches, and schools were enlisted as 'agencies of assimilation' as these were the sites where the process of assimilation (or lack thereof) was most tangible.⁸⁷ The institutional face of assimilation at both the national and local levels was the Good Neighbour Council, whose principle objectives were

To assist the settlement and assimilation of migrants into the 'Australian Way of Life', to educate Australians to accept and welcome migrants, and to encourage a greater appreciation amongst all Australians of the privileges and benefits of citizenship.⁸⁸

Launched in January 1950, the Good Neighbour network of committees and branches quickly expanded to comprise of 300 local branches and 10,000

⁸⁴ J. Murphy, *Imagining the Fifties: Private Sentiment and Political Culture in Menzies' Australia* (Sydney: Pluto Press Australia, 2000), 155.

⁸⁵ For further information on Bonegilla, see:

G. Sluga, *Bonegilla, 'A Place of No Hope'* (Parkville: University of Melbourne, Department of History, 1988).

B. Pennay, "'But No One Can Say He Was Hungry': Memories and Representations of Bonegilla Reception and Training Centre', *History Australia*, 9(1), 2012, 43-63.

J. Persian, 'Bonegilla: A Failed Narrative', *History Australia*, 9(1), 2012, 64-83.

⁸⁶ Kunz, *Displaced Persons*, 139-41.

⁸⁷ B. Murphy, *The Other Australia: Experiences of Migration* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 140-48.

⁸⁸ G. Tavan, "'Good Neighbours': Community Organisations, Migrant Assimilation and Australian Society and Culture, 1950-1961', *Australian Historical Studies*, 27(109), 1997, 78.

volunteer members.⁸⁹ Intellectual and political reinforcement of assimilation came in the form of the Australian Citizenship Conventions held between 1950 and 1970. These forums served an important symbolic function as ‘positive proof of the broad consensus supporting the immigration program.’⁹⁰

If these were the agencies of assimilation, Haebich argues that the process itself had four overlapping phases that were intended to prevent the growth of ethnic enclaves, keep government expenditure to a minimum, utilise migrant workers for national projects, and calm any public anxieties about their presence.⁹¹ The first phase was that of ‘Australianisation’, including those basic services of English-language and outreach teaching that were provided by reception centres and agencies of assimilation at the local level. The second phase lay in joining the workforce, which was for the government a vital stage in the assimilation process as it ensured the cultural and financial well-being of the migrant. Living in the community was the third phase and addressed the social well-being of migrants, who were expected to join local groups in order to immerse themselves in the social landscape of their community. They were directed to seek assistance in medical and welfare needs from the relevant state and federal departments like all other Australians, while children were to be immersed in their local schools. The final phase of the assimilation process was naturalisation, with Australian citizenship tangible proof that assimilation was complete.⁹² Through this process, the ‘disappearing migrant’ who looked ‘like us’ during selection, would turn into the ‘invisible migrant’, indistinguishable from other Australians in both image and conduct.⁹³

⁸⁹ For more information on the Good Neighbour Council, see:

Haebich, *Spinning the Dream*, 178-182.

Jordens, *Redefining Australians*, 82-87.

Tavan, ‘Good Neighbours’, 77-89.

⁹⁰ Tavan, ‘Good Neighbours’, 79.

For more information on the Australian Citizenship Conventions, see:

Haebich, *Spinning the Dream*, 136-37.

Jordens, *Redefining Australians*, 79-81.

⁹¹ Haebich, *Spinning the Dream*, 171.

⁹² *ibid.*, 170-78.

⁹³ *ibid.*, 123.

The rhetoric of assimilation related to a wider set of ‘symbols of persuasion’ deployed by the government as part of its post-war social reconstruction agenda.⁹⁴ As Haebich explains, these symbols were the ‘imagined ideals of a lifestyle to strive for and codes of behaviours to emulate’, and ‘brands used to promote the nation, suggest its history, unify the people and sell its resources and products.’⁹⁵ The first of these was the ideal of an ‘Australian way of life’, which was ‘a prescription for behaviour which covered all social relationships, including language, living habits, work and industrial relations.’⁹⁶ This way of life revolved heavily on the rhythms of the ‘Australian Family’ – Dad as breadwinner going to and from work, Mum as homemaker tending to the needs of house and home, and 2 or 3 children growing up, attending school, and eventually forming an ‘Australian Family’ of their own. Finally, the ‘Australian Suburbs’ were the site where these national symbols came together – the home and garden in which the family unit practiced the Australian way of life. Successfully living this ‘Australian way of life’ as an ‘Australian family’ in the ‘Australian Suburbs’ was closely tied to consumerism. As White explains,

The familiar picture of suburban family life, with its focus on home and garden, and on a catalogue of family possessions such as refrigerators, washing machines, radiogrammes, television sets, and of course, the family car, was the basis of post-war affluence and the vast new consumer economy which the manufacturers and governments encouraged.⁹⁷

In this way, an ‘Australian way of life’ was a far more tangible and less controversial way of measuring ‘being Australian’ than the national or typical Australian ‘type’ that had preceded it since the early nineteenth century.⁹⁸

Distilling the essence of being Australian through a ‘way of life’, rather than a national ‘type’, also served the intellectual needs of the times. As White explains,

⁹⁴ *ibid.*, 92–102.

⁹⁵ *ibid.*, 92.

⁹⁶ Murphy, *The Other Australia*, 135.

⁹⁷ White, *Inventing Australia*, 164.

⁹⁸ As White explains, ‘The idea that it was possible to isolate national ‘types’ was the most important intellectual pillar supporting the complex structure of ideas about national character which developed in the nineteenth century. The national type was given not only physical and racial characteristics, but also a moral, social and psychological identity.’

ibid., 64.

'the idea of a 'way of life' fulfilled both general Western needs and more specific Australian ones.'⁹⁹ The anxieties produced by Cold War ideology, which framed the rise of communism in the East as a burgeoning clash of civilisation with the democratic West, meant that nothing less than a 'way of life' was at stake. The anxieties produced by Australia's post-war immigration program also threatened a 'way of life', a culturally British one which was perceived as threatened by non-British immigration. Therefore, an 'Australian way of life'

Provided a mental bulwark against communism, against change, against cultural diversity; it could call forth a common emotional response to the Cold War and to immigration, in defence of stability and homogeneity.¹⁰⁰

The social uniformity and stability the 'Australian way of life' promised was framed as both the best defence against these threats, and a much-needed respite in the midst of such global and domestic insecurity both in the aftermath of WWII, and in the burgeoning Cold War that followed.

Despite its widespread use, exactly what the Australian way of life was, which lifestyle to aspire to, or which codes of behaviours to emulate, was contested from the beginning. As Lack and Templeton highlight,

Chifley and Calwell, as aggressive Australian nationalists, expected 'New Australians' to adopt an Australian culture; Menzies and Holt upheld the notion of British civilisation under the Southern Cross. Labor expected migrants to 'learn to speak Australian'; Liberals hoped they might acquire the King's English.¹⁰¹

If it was difficult for the Australian-born to find consensus on what the Australian way of life was, it was particularly difficult for migrants to discern, let alone learn and live by. Moreover, the ideals and standards of the rhetoric did not always match the lived reality of Australians. This is captured in the oft-cited example from journalist Elizabeth Webb, quoting one of Calwell's New Australians as exclaiming,

⁹⁹ White, *Inventing Australia*, 158.

¹⁰⁰ *ibid.*, 161.

¹⁰¹ Lack and Templeton, *Bold Experiment*, 13

Tavan also points to the ideological and political differences in the modernity and consumerism inherent in Menzies's 'Unlimited Australia' compared to Australia as the Christian stronghold imagined by religious institutions. see: Tavan, 'Good Neighbours', 83.

What is this Way of Life? No one yet tells me what this is! Yet always they tell me I must adopt it! I lead a quiet life; I break none of your laws – what more must I do? The man who makes his money gambling is honoured by your Government – he pays no income tax. So perhaps I give up my honest livelihood here and go always to the races? Or perhaps I begin to behave like you behave in pubs. I drink beer until I am stupid. Or learn to ‘put in the boot’ and bash the other fellow with a bottle, always an empty bottle, when he disagrees with me? Is this the way of life I must learn? Thank you. No. I stay a bloody Reffo!’¹⁰²

It is precisely in this ambiguity, however, that White recognises the conceptual strength of an ‘Australian way of life’;

Since it was never defined, and often was simply a formula for expressing a general prejudice against outsiders and a distaste for non-conformity, all migrants could be criticised for failing to adopt ‘the Australian way of life’.¹⁰³

Thus, the political capital of the Australian way of life, and of assimilation in general, lay not so much in defining what it was, but in defining what it was not – an exercise in which the Australian-born could assume moral authority.

Further adding to this ambiguity was that although assimilation was central to ensuring support for the immigration program, there was a ‘disjunction between assimilation as ideology and assimilation as practice.’¹⁰⁴ As rhetoric, assimilation was an oft-deployed means of calming anxieties, expressing a vision for the nation, policing migrant behaviour, and stressed as central to the success of the immigration program. However, the implementation of assimilation policy did not match the rhetoric, and was instead ‘left to poorly briefed, poorly resourced and understaffed government agencies, aided by a voluntary system run by amateurs.’¹⁰⁵ Though this disjunction has important implications for the study of Australia’s post-war immigration program, particularly with questions of how it was implemented, in building the Good Australian Migrant it is the rhetoric that defined expectations, rather than the lived reality of post-war immigration. The Good Australian Migrant is, after all, a vision of what the migrant *ought* to be, not what he actually was, is, or could be. Therefore, it is the rhetoric of assimilation and the associated symbols of persuasion that defined the

¹⁰² ‘Are we as bad as others see us?’ in E. Betts, *Stet* (Brisbane: W.R. Smith & Paterson, 1950), 49.

¹⁰³ White, *Inventing Australia*, 160.

¹⁰⁴ Markus and Taft, ‘Postwar Immigration and Assimilation’, 235.

¹⁰⁵ *ibid.*, 250.

social, cultural, and geographic expectations of the Good Australian Migrant as one who should adopt Australian values, be 'family-oriented', and live in the suburbs, rather than in the city or rural Australia.

Though evolved, these expectations still inform much of how Australians perceive themselves and the Good Australian Migrant today. The Australian suburbs are still thought of as the geographic heart of the Australian nation, while the nuclear Australian Family is the heart of Australian society, as reflected in state structures which either assume or advantage the suburban nuclear family.¹⁰⁶ The enduring gender wage gap, discrepancy between maternity and paternity leaves, and lack of comprehensive and accessible childcare continue to reaffirm a pattern of family life with Dad as breadwinner and Mum as caregiver, even if the expectation of Mum remaining 'at home' has diminished. Discourses regarding marriage equality, reproductive rights, divorce, custody arrangements, and even asylum seekers all invoke the sanctity and protection of the 'Australian family', while politicians regularly appeal to the 'working family' as a voting bloc.

Though the 'Australian way of life' has changed in meaning from a British dualism or homogeneity to a multicultural diversity and heterogeneity, the expectation that the Good Australian Migrant must adopt Australian values, however they may be coded, remains. Though the word assimilation is no longer used, Haebich argues that the ideals of assimilation still exert influence in current debates about national identity, citizenship, and immigration. She terms this 'retro-assimilation', which

...mixes 1950s dreams of an assimilated nation with current ideas of nationhood using today's spin to create an imagined world based on shared values, visions and agreements where all citizens will be treated equally and the same and share fully in the benefits of Australian society, once they agree to cast off their differences and *become* the same.¹⁰⁷

Retro-assimilation therefore draws on a grab-bag of clichés from the past to explain the present, without any critical interrogation of this past, or of the

¹⁰⁶ For example, see: N. Khadem, 'Singles on their own with unfair tax system', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 27 January 2015, 19.

¹⁰⁷ Haebich, *Spinning the Dream*, 8.

original meanings and significance of them.¹⁰⁸ The notion that there are self-evident and shared 'Australian' values is an example of such a cliché, and ignores the fact that even in the seemingly homogenous 1950s, there were different ways of being Australian and little consensus on which values were to be promoted. Like the New Australian of the 1950s that did not know whether to adopt the family-man rhetoric or pub-culture reality of the Australian way of life, the migrant of today may well ask precisely which 'Australian values' should be emulated – the rhetoric of tolerance, pluralism, and acceptance preached by our political and intellectual elite, or the xenophobia, islamophobia, and homophobia that is increasingly permeating both realpolitik and the lived reality of Australians?

More recently, the pejorative 'unAustralian' has become common in articulating ways of being Australian, defining it by what it is not, rather than the more problematic what it is. This mimics the change in 1950 from a national 'type' to a 'way of life' in responding to critiques of the Australian way of life raised by the increasing diversity of Australian society. In the same way defining an Australian way of life retained moral authority with the Australian-born, the use of 'unAustralian' as a pejorative does the same, but with a latitude that does not require a consensus on or definition of what being Australian actually means; we can differ in our ways of being Australian, but agree on what constitutes being unAustralian, drawing boundaries of exclusion rather than inclusion. Nonetheless, much like the ambiguity of the Australian Way of Life in the 1950s, labelling someone or something as unAustralian can be an arbitrary expression of general prejudice or distaste for non-conformity, often reflecting existing political and ideological divisions, which can place competing expectations on the present-day Good Australian Migrant.

¹⁰⁸ A. Haebich, 'Retro-Assimilation', *Griffith Review*, 15(Divided Nation), 2007, 245-255.

2.2.2. THE GOOD AUSTRALIAN MIGRANT AS GRATEFUL

The expectation that the Good Australian Migrant would become ‘like us’ was justified in the language of gratitude. As Murphy explains,

The presumed magnetism of Australianism was always there and if sometimes it did not seem to work, then the belief that the country was doing ‘these people’ a favour in rescuing them from poverty in Europe was that they should respond by being ‘like us’.¹⁰⁹

This expectation of gratitude essentially framed assimilation as a *quid pro quo* – Australia would allow migrants into the country, offering security and prosperity, and all that was asked in return was that they would become ‘like us’ out of gratitude. The positive attributes of an Australian way of life meant that migrants would naturally recognise the advantages of becoming ‘like us’ in the first instance. If migrants could not recognise these benefits, or disagreed with it, the expectation of gratitude meant that they should do it anyway.

The expectation of gratitude not only ensured cultural homogeneity and stability by obliging the Good Australian Migrant to become ‘like us’, but also deflected any criticism of this way of life. As Kunz explains,

The dogma that newcomers are ‘lucky to be here’ absolved the community from the responsibility to help the New Australian’s in any meaningful way. Indeed, it put the onus of contented gratefulness on the immigrant, and ensured that any criticism from them be rejected as ingratitude.¹¹⁰

This ensured that any changes to the Australian way of life could not come from migrants, and further cemented the moral authority of the Australian-born in determining the limits of the nation. This, Kunz argues, served to frame criticism as an exception; ‘if an immigrant had any complaint, he must have been exceptional: an ungrateful person, badly selected.’¹¹¹ Thus not only was it expected that the Good Australian Migrant would become like us, but that he would also to keep any opinions he had about becoming like us to himself.

¹⁰⁹ Murphy, *The Other Australia*, 135.

¹¹⁰ Kunz, *Displaced Persons*, 257.

¹¹¹ *ibid.*, 256.

The expectation of gratitude operated in much the same way as the expectation of health. If physical health was an important signifier of un/desirable migrants in selection, gratitude was a measure of moral health, and an important signifier of un/desirable migrant behaviour upon settlement. However, ingratitude was both a transgression of Good Australian Migrant behaviour and an explanation of the immorality of transgressions in general. This introduced yet another conditionality that framed any criticism as an exception – if a migrant could not appreciate the good being bestowed upon them, then they were always free to ‘go back’ to where they came from. The language of gratitude was therefore used to police migrant behaviour first by reducing the actions of migrants to displays of ingratitude, and secondly in denouncing them as superfluous as there was always the simple alternative of leaving.

Though social, political, and cultural developments since the 1950s have changed when and how gratitude is deployed, it is still undeniably a feature of Australia’s relationship with its migrant ‘Other’. Particularly in this era of unprecedented global mobility, the reproach of going ‘back to where you came from’ in policing migrant behaviour and dismissing their criticism, has added gravitas due to the unprecedented ease and relative low cost of travel. However, the expectation of gratitude is no longer confined to migrants only, but extends to their descendants as well. This is exemplified in Dawn Fraser’s comment during the 2015 Wimbledon tournament that young tennis stars Nick Kyrgios and Bernard Tomic should ‘go back to where their parents came from’ if they want to continue with their perceived poor conduct both on and off the court.¹¹² The logic behind Fraser’s comment, Attard surmises, is that ‘Kyrgios is like he is because he's not one of us and if he doesn't want to be like us, he should go back

¹¹² See: ‘Fraser apologises for ‘racist’ comments’, *SBS News*, 7 July 2015, <http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2015/07/07/fraser-apologises-racist-comments>, accessed 9 July 2015.

D. Adair, ‘Double fault: Nick Kyrgios, Dawn Fraser and reputations under the spotlight’, *The Conversation*, 8 July 2015, <https://theconversation.com/double-fault-nick-kyrgios-dawn-fraser-and-reputations-under-the-spotlight-44409>, accessed 9 July 2015.

to where his parents came from.’¹¹³ Kyrgios’s bad behaviour, in other words, is a product of his otherness in name, appearance, and lineage, despite being Australian-born. That his (and Tomic’s) perceived bad behaviour could stem from his Australian upbringing – especially in Australia’s culture of hypermasculinity and sport – is not even entertained by Fraser.

The persistence of the expectation of gratitude is closely tied with the exaggeration of Australian humanitarianism in immigration history. If Australia’s post-war immigration program was the exercise in humanitarianism it is so often held up to be, then perhaps an expectation of gratitude was not so unreasonable. However, Australia’s post-war immigration program was first and foremost about Australia and its requirements of population and labour, and not about rescuing migrants from their countries of origin. As Markus explains,

The idea that immigration was of great national value never came to occupy a central place in public rhetoric; Australians have found it difficult to move beyond the understanding that they were conferring a great favour by allowing immigrants to enter the best country in the world.¹¹⁴

Gratitude, therefore, can be argued to be a misplaced expectation, and one which should be at the very least reciprocal. Though it is undeniable that Australia has provided security, opportunity, and prosperity to generations of migrants searching for a better future for which they may be grateful for, the economic, social and cultural contributions migrants have made to the development of the Australian nation means that we too should be grateful for the security, opportunity, and prosperity it has afforded us. In fact, it can be argued that a greater expectation of gratitude should fall on the Australian-born given the disproportionate gains host societies enjoy from immigration in comparison to migrants.

¹¹³ M. Attard, ‘Dawn Fraser’s use of the race card against Nick Kyrgios is frightening’, *ABC News*, 8 July 2015, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-07-08/attard-using-the-race-card-against-nick-kyrgios-is-frightening/6601600>, accessed 9 July 2015.

¹¹⁴ Markus, ‘Of Continuities and Discontinuities’, 184.

2.2.3. THE GOOD AUSTRALIAN MIGRANT AS A BLANK CANVAS

The expectation of assimilation, Tavan argues, rested on ‘a view of immigrants as people devoid of history or subjectivity, whose identity could be created in accordance with the needs and desires of the Australian community.’¹¹⁵ The most effective way for the Good Australian Migrant to ensure successful assimilation, therefore, was to cast away all vestiges of their past self. Like the economic *carte blanche* DP migrants were once expected to sign, the Good Australian Migrant was expected to sign away his previous identity, memory, education, and history, and become a walking blank canvas upon which Australia could project its expectations and aspirations. Who the migrant was, is, or wanted to be became secondary to who and what Australia wanted him to be, and was simply part of the price to be gratefully paid by the migrant in the quest to become like us.

Damoussi reiterates this view, arguing that the suppression of individual and collective memory was one of the ideological bases along which assimilation was formed, and as such, ‘migrants were expected to construct a future without a past. It was only the future that would shape them as citizens.’¹¹⁶ This echoes Haebich’s ‘celluloid migrant’; ‘the stock figure in promotional films who stood for all imagined newcomers and who, denied any sense of self-determination or individualism, submitted passively to the process of assimilation.’¹¹⁷ If the ‘disappearing migrant’ embodied the expectation that migrants would look ‘like us’, and the ‘invisible migrant’ embodied the expectation that migrants would behave like us, then the ‘celluloid migrant’ was the one that embodied the expectation of the Good Australian Migrant as a blank canvas.

For some migrants, particularly those in the immediate post-war period, the ability to leave their old life behind and start anew proved desirable, and may have even acted as an incentive for migration to Australia. The ability to forget

¹¹⁵ Tavan, ‘Good Neighbours’, 81.

¹¹⁶ J. Damoussi, ‘“We Are Human Beings, and Have a Past”: The ‘Adjustment’ of Migrants and the Australian Assimilation Policies of the 1950s’, *Australian Journal of Politics & History*, 59(4), 2013, 509.

¹¹⁷ Haebich, *Spinning the Dream*, 123.

the past was certainly a feature of DP migration, with Kunz describing the introduction of IRO Identity cards as a source of 'joyful relief' as they 'certified a politically blameless past, safeguarded the holder from repatriation, guaranteed continued minimum maintenance and opened the door to possible emigration.'¹¹⁸ Bosworth has also recognised that some migrants have proven reluctant in giving a voice to their individual and collective pasts. This was either out of a perception that simple-minded and cultureless Australians lacked the sophistication needed to understand the context from which they had emigrated, a more sinister or overtly political need to distance themselves from their past - particularly with questions of wartime allegiances, or simply because the trauma of their experience was so great that they welcomed the opportunity to indulge in total denial in a country perceived to be at the ends of the earth. Thus, he explains, 'for many a European migrant the aptest of aphorisms is that which advises 'happy is the man (and nation) who has no history.'¹¹⁹

Nonetheless, whether out of obligation or a wilful forgetting, a significant characteristic of becoming this blank canvas included becoming apolitical, or at most as sympathetic to the government agenda as any average voter. Though the expectation of political apathy is tied to the expectation of gratitude and its implication of accepting the Australian way of life without criticism, the allowance for some political sympathy can be traced back to Menzian politics, its emblematic anti-communism, and Australia's troubled history with WWII war criminals. On 22 March 1961, Sir Garfield Barwick on behalf of the Government offered the following explanation of the 'two deep seated human interests' central to the issue of the potential existence of war criminals in Australia as a result of the immigration program:

On the one hand, there is the utter abhorrence felt by Australians for those offences against humanity to which we give the generic name of war crimes. On the other hand, there is the right of this nation, by receiving people into this country, to enable men to turn their backs on past bitternesses and to make a new life for themselves and for their families in a happier community. This has

¹¹⁸ Kunz, *Displaced Persons*, 31.

¹¹⁹ Bosworth and Wilton, 'A Lost History?', 230.

formed a precious part of the heritage of the West, in which Australia has an honorable share.

In a given case the choice between these two human interests may present a government with a difficult decision. In the present instance, however, the Government came to the clear conclusion that, all questions of legal obligation apart, if such a choice had been necessary to resolve the matter, its right of asylum must have prevailed. Australia has established a thorough, though of course not infallible, system for sifting and screening the hundreds of thousands of migrants who have enriched our national life since the World War. In default of a binding obligation requiring Australia at this point of time to do otherwise, these, who have been allowed to make their homes here, must be able to live, in security, new lives under the rule of law.¹²⁰

It has not escaped the attention of many scholars that the very people who could have 'slipped through the system' were the same people who would be sympathetic to the Menzian conservative agenda.¹²¹ Barwick's defence of the migrant right to a new life did not arise from a noble sense of social responsibility or a defence of the rights of naturalised citizens. Rather, Barwick simply was not interested in who the migrants were prior to their arrival, providing they worked hard for Australia. The economic contribution migrants were expected to make was of a far greater importance in the early years of immigration, and as long as the 'bad' individual became a Good Australian Migrant, their past indiscretions were irrelevant.

The expectation that a migrant would become a blank canvas under assimilation 'disavowed a multi-dimensional identity - one in which stories and identities from the past remained intact but which could be integrated with new experiences.'¹²² The social changes of the 1960s and the advent of multiculturalism in the 1970s challenged this wholesale disavowal, allowing migrants a multi-dimensional identity which could integrate the old self with new experiences. However, it seems as though a limit persists on which past narratives are able to co-exist with the migrant's Australian identity. Narratives of culture, dance, song, food, hobbies, and faith are not only accepted but

¹²⁰ Australia, Senate, *Parliamentary Debates*, No. S.12, 1961, 451-452.

¹²¹ For example, see:

M. Aarons, *Sanctuary: Nazi Fugitives in Australia* (Port Melbourne, Vic.: William Heinemann, 1989).

S. Rutland, 'Sanctuary for Whom? Jewish Victims and Nazi Perpetrators in Post-War Australian Migrant Camps', *Australian Jewish Historical Society Journal*, 19(3), 2009, 382-404.

¹²² Damousi, 'We Are Human Beings, and Have a Past', 403.

encouraged, framed as the threads of the multicultural fabric of the Australian nation. Political pasts, however, are still routinely spurned, particularly those that involve conflict. The directives to ‘leave your problems over there’ or to ‘stop bringing your problems over here’ are perhaps the most illustrative of this, often levelled whenever migrant groups clash between each other, particularly at sporting events, or when a ‘problematic’ community engages in protest or criticism.

2.2.4. THE GOOD AUSTRALIAN MIGRANT AS CULTURAL CAPITAL

The introduction of multiculturalism as official government policy in the 1970s was a watershed in the relationship between Australia and its migrant other. It radically changed the way Australian institutions responded to the migrant presence, identifying and catering to needs and issues specific to migrants and migrant communities that had hitherto been ignored. The expression of cultural difference that had been discouraged under assimilation was now central to multiculturalism, and not only was it tolerated, but encouraged as an intrinsically Australian quality. Whereas the walking blank canvas the migrant was expected to be under assimilation included casting away ones culture, language, and everyday customs in order to become ‘like us’, multiculturalism celebrated cultural diversity *as* ‘us’ and the ‘real’ Australian way of life. Though ostensibly accepting migrants as part of the Australian social fabric, multiculturalism did not eliminate the expectations levelled at the Good Australian Migrant; it simply changed the way they manifested in everyday life, and placed an additional expectation of the contribution of cultural capital to Australia’s newfound multicultural identity.

Early critiques, particularly from the Left, argued that multiculturalism only valued the superficial aspects of cultural identity while doing very little to address the social inequality inherent in the migrant experience.¹²³ Furthermore, the

¹²³ For example, See:

cultural capital expected of migrants was limited to that deemed acceptable to the sensitivities of the Australian-born - palatable little morsels fit for (white) Australian consumption. In the same way migrant labour was acceptable only when it was tied to the needs of the national economy and the tenets of non-competition, the cultural capital of migrants was limited to the narrow and non-threatening activities that Jupp terms 'Pasta and Polka' activities, or which I call the three F's - Faith, Folklore, and Football. Migrants were free to practice their own religions, indulge in the folkloric traditions of their cultures in the forms of food, dance, music, language, art, and crafts, and participate in the sports and leisure activities that coloured their memories of the 'old life', with football (soccer) becoming the most recognised face of this, and also the best example of the limits placed on these activities.¹²⁴

This limited cultural capital, however, was not new or unique to multiculturalism. As Jupp explains, from the very beginning of Australia's post-war immigration program 'public displays of exotic culture were welcomed and officially encouraged.'¹²⁵ Kunz even argues that the cultural capital of migrants was exploited by the architects of the immigration program, portraying migrants as 'happy New Australians who were perennially smiling into cameras and ever ready to change into national costumes after a hard day's labour to entertain their benefactors with charming dances.'¹²⁶ These activities, Jupp argues, were acceptable under assimilation because they were limited to those activities that 'made life more interesting without challenging Anglo-Australian hegemony.'¹²⁷ While the freedom of cultural expression and easier access to services under multiculturalism resulted in an undeniable and tangible improvement to the lives of Australian migrants, the enduring social and political inequality inherent in

A. Jakubowicz, 'State and Ethnicity: Multi-Culturalism as Ideology', in Jupp (ed.), *Ethnic Politics in Australia* (Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1984), 14–28.

M. de Lepervanche, 'From Race to Ethnicity', *Journal of Sociology*, 16(1), 24-37, 1980.

¹²⁴ This will be explored in more detail in Section 5.2.3.

¹²⁵ Jupp, *From White Australia to Woomera*, 24.

¹²⁶ Kunz, *Displaced Persons*, 256.

¹²⁷ Jupp, *From White Australia to Woomera*, 24.

the migrant experience has led some historians to increasingly argue that multiculturalism was less the watershed it is often thought to be, and more a re-institutionalisation of Anglo-Australian hegemony under an internationally and domestically acceptable guise.¹²⁸

¹²⁸ For example, Galligan, Boese and Phillips argue that Australia's national character is not a multicultural one, but rather 'a pluralistic liberal democracy with distinctive national characteristics that has developed, in part, through contributions of the diverse people who make Australia their home.' Jupp argues that 'Australian multiculturalism at the national level has had very little to do with culture and a great deal to do with immigrant settlement... In practice, 'multicultural' in Australia has meant 'multilingual.' Brawley argues that the liberalisation of policies in the 1960-70s was more about the maintenance of the White Australia Policy rather than its dismantling, because 'ultimately the only way to save the White Australia policy was to end it and put in its place a device that maintained white supremacy and alleviated international pressure – multiculturalism. Wills situates the need for multiculturalism more domestically and practically, arguing that 'the official policy of multiculturalism, while an accession to the reality of a diversifying population, was also a way of controlling that diversity in order to render it subservient to the already constituted nationalist imagery. See:

B. Galligan, M. Boese, and M. Phillips, *Becoming Australian* (Carlton: Melbourne University Publishing, 2014), 4, 173–83.

J. Jupp, 'The Politics of Immigration, Settlement and Multiculturalism', in A. Markus, P. McDonald, and J. Jupp (eds.), *Australia's Immigration Revolution* (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2009), 95–96.

S. Brawley, 'Legacies: The White Australia Policy and Foreign Relations since 1973', in L. Jayasuriya, D. Walker, and J. Gothard (eds.), *Legacies of White Australia: Race, Culture, and Nation* (Crawley: University of Western Australia Press, 2003), 101.

S. Wills, 'Un-stitching the Lips of a Migrant Nation', *Australian Historical Studies*, 33(118), 2002, 72.

2.3. CITIZENSHIP

*Becoming an Australian citizen is not the same as becoming an Australian.*¹²⁹

2.3.1. THE GOOD AUSTRALIAN MIGRANT AS CITIZEN

At the 1956 Australian Citizenship Convention in Canberra, Minister for Immigration Harold Holt delivered an address titled *Building for a Better Australia*. In explaining the importance of taking out Australian citizenship for migrants, Holt reasoned

We want our foreign-born migrants to become naturalized Australian citizens since that is the final proof of their acceptance of Australia and of Australia's acceptance of them.¹³⁰

Citizenship - or naturalisation as it was then termed for non-British migrants - was considered the natural end-point of migrant settlement and assimilation. If successful assimilation was achieved when it was impossible to tell the 'immigrant' from the 'national', citizenship was the proof of achieving invisibility for the migrant, and the measure of the success of assimilation policy in general. Citizenship was in effect the confirmation of the status of a migrant as a Good Australian Migrant.

This confirmation was based on the intricate connection between, and usually conflation of, issues of citizenship and issues of immigration in Australian history. As Davidson points out, with the exception of Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders, the population of Australia is entirely made up of migrants and their descendants, and as such 'the citizen voice can be controlled by the control of migrants.'¹³¹ For a country of migration such as Australia, exclusion from citizenship begins with physical exclusion at the border, and 'the rules governing the state's relations with outsiders and then immigrants establish real rules of

¹²⁹ Galligan, Boese, and Phillips, *Becoming Australian*, 171.

¹³⁰ As cited in *ibid.*, 151.

¹³¹ A. Davidson, *From Subject to Citizen: Australian Citizenship in the Twentieth Century* (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 150.

exclusion from the body politic.¹³² This control was at the heart of the White Australia Policy – by excluding the migration of non-Europeans, and minimising the migration of the non-British, the citizenry of Australia was preserved culturally and ethnically British.

Prior to the creation of the *Nationality and Citizenship Act 1948*, there was no such thing as an Australian citizen, only British subjects. Australian identity was defined relative to its similarities and differences with its British counterpart, rather than on its own terms. The concept of citizen rights was shaped by the history of Australia's colonies as penal colonies, and in their pursuit of British rights for its inhabitants equal to those back in Britain. After federation, both Australian identity and citizen rights were defined relative to the aim of becoming an economically, socially and politically 'better' version of Britain that was 'more British than the British.'¹³³ However, developments in the post-war period challenged these narratives of being Australian, both in terms of Australian citizenship generally, and in the conferral of it to non-British migrants specifically.

The formulation and definition of Australian citizenship was prompted by Canada's creation of the *Canadian Citizenship Act 1946*, the first to create a citizenship separate from that of a British subject within the Commonwealth, rather than any significant pressure to assert an Australian identity as separate from British. This was given further political impetus with the establishment of the post-war immigration program, which demanded an articulation of Australian citizenship vis-à-vis non-British immigrants.¹³⁴ However, as Jordens points out,

¹³² *ibid.*

¹³³ *ibid.*, 144.

¹³⁴ Jordens, *Redefining Australians*, 6.

No Australians... had any conception of what being an Australian citizen as distinct from a British subject actually meant. This was because citizenship was conceptualised in relation to British culture and ethnicity, not in terms of the rights and responsibilities of the citizens of an autonomous state.¹³⁵

Therefore the *Nationality and Citizenship Act 1948* only served to institutionalise the understanding of Australians citizenship as defined by British culture and ethnicity. The Act defined an alien as someone who was neither a British subject, Irish citizen, nor a protected person. Therefore, 'the image of Australians enshrined in Australian citizenship legislation was that of an Anglo-Celtic people.'¹³⁶

Because of this enduring conception of Australian citizenship based on British culture and ethnicity, the emphasis of the *Nationality and Citizenship Act 1948* was 'on proving and affirming that you 'belonged' and then on acquiring not *active* rights as equal citizens but *passive* rights to consume benefits and privileges.'¹³⁷ For non-British migrants, becoming culturally Australian and affirming belonging was as important, if not more, than attaining the legal status and rights of Australian citizenship. In the same way Australia's status as a country of migration meant that citizenship included the physical exclusion of migrants, 'the requirement that citizenship depends on *belonging* beforehand to an existing, structured *national family* has effectively functioned to exclude great numbers of people from citizenship here throughout Australian history.'¹³⁸ The most obvious of these exclusions was racial, as until 1967 the White Australia Policy explicitly excluded non-European migration due to their perceived inability to assimilate. However, as already argued throughout this chapter, selection criteria and settlement policies also contributed to the exclusion of certain people and attributes from the body politic regardless of their physical presence on Australian territory, in an attempt to maintain the citizen voice as culturally British as possible. This is the exclusion in operation which gave

¹³⁵ A. Jordens, *Alien to Citizen: Settling Migrants in Australia, 1945-75* (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin in association with the Australian Archives, 1997), 171.

¹³⁶ Jordens, *Redefining Australians*, 1.

¹³⁷ Davidson, *From Subject to Citizen*, 91.

¹³⁸ *ibid.*, 146.

preference to Calwell's 'Beautiful Balts' who looked similar to the Anglo-Celtic people enshrined in citizenship legislation, in the expectation of assimilation that sought to suppress any difference in favour of the Australian way of life, in the health criteria which kept the body politic physically able, and in the bias towards male migrants that favoured male labour, but also a masculine body politic. The focus on privileges and benefits of Australian citizenship further marginalised migrants because 'the newcomers were not seen as having any intrinsic social and political qualities and values which might enrich Australia.'¹³⁹

Jordens suggests thinking of the mediation between immigration and citizenship as a 'citizenship bargain'. This is 'a metaphor for the set of mutual expectations governing how actors affected by a government program involving rights and responsibilities normally associated with citizenship should interact with one another.'¹⁴⁰ Until 1973, she argues, 'alien and British migrants were offered very different citizenship bargains.'¹⁴¹ British migrants were able to exercise all the civil, social and political rights and responsibilities normally associated with citizenship while aliens only received a 'partial' package of limited participation in public life until full citizenship was granted. This not only entrenched a perceived inequality between British and non-British migrants, but also an inequality between citizenship through birthright, and citizenship through naturalisation.

Changes in the citizenship bargain, Jordan explains, are usually prompted either through non-compliance with the bargain agreed upon, or when the bargaining resources of the parties change.¹⁴² Despite significant monitoring and marketing of citizenship to migrants, take-up rates during the 1950s and 1960s remained low. Some explained this low take-up as either the product of 'migrant ignorance and apathy' and accused migrants of '[wanting] the privileges but not

¹³⁹ *ibid.*, 92.

¹⁴⁰ A. Jordens, 'Integrating Alien Workers: The Role of the Department of Immigration in Constructing a 'Citizenship Bargain' 1945-56', *Australian Journal of Politics & History*, 40(2), 1994, 177.

¹⁴¹ Jordens, *Alien to Citizen*, 189.

¹⁴² Jordens, 'Integrating Alien Workers', 177.

the responsibilities of citizenship.¹⁴³ There were, however, real barriers to selling Australian citizenship to both British and non-British migrants. Those within the Immigration Department responsible for the promotion of citizenship uptake found that some forms of non-compliance were due to practical barriers posed by laws and regulations which prevented a path to citizenship for some. Conceptual barriers to citizenship, however, were primarily the result of the discrimination between British and non-British migrants entrenched in legislation and society that resulted in unequal citizenship bargains. Put simply, 'for many, the costs of relinquishing their former citizenship were obvious, and the benefits of attaining Australian citizenship remained obscure.'¹⁴⁴

Immigration department bureaucrats were therefore amongst the first to identify and agitate for change, either in reducing practical barriers to citizenship by simplifying requirements or making it less costly to comply with, or in reducing intangible barriers by advocating for the removal of discriminatory practices, as evidenced by the amendments to and revisions of citizenship acts.¹⁴⁵ Though the non-compliance of migrants challenged the citizenship bargain, it was the change in bargaining resources that the advent of the Whitlam government heralded that significantly changed the nature of Australian citizenship. First, the three decades of an increasingly diverse migrant intake had the unintended consequence of a slow but certain abandonment of a British-Australian nationalism in favour of a new Australian nationalism based on cultural pluralism. Thus in 1973, alongside the introduction of multiculturalism which affirmed this new vision of Australian belonging, the Whitlam Government also equalised citizenship requirements between British and non-British migrants. Second, under this new nationalism, the bargaining position of migrants, who previously had few resources, no political power, nor the vote due to the delay between arrival in Australia and conferral of citizenship, was strengthened. Finally, the development of an understanding of citizenship based on an equality of rights rather than British culture or ethnicity was assisted by

¹⁴³ Haebich, *Spinning the Dream*, 178.

¹⁴⁴ Jordens, *Alien to Citizen*, 174.

¹⁴⁵ *ibid.*, 6–8.

Whitlam Government ratification of a number of United Nation covenants on civil, political, cultural, economic and women's rights.¹⁴⁶

Despite these moves towards a rights-based and less exclusionary vision of Australian citizenship, two constants have remained. The first is the concept of a single national identity, which seemed to lose currency under the governments of Whitlam, Fraser, and Hawke, but which was resuscitated in the late 1980s with bicentenary debates regarding Australian identity, and immigration debates regarding Asian immigration. These debates also prompted what Davidson describes as a retrograde retreat to a communitarian 'family' model of citizenship.¹⁴⁷ This produced the second constant in Australian citizenship – the primacy of the nation as a 'family' to which a migrant must demonstrate belonging. Thus, Australian citizenship remains a cultural citizenship through which citizens consume as privileges and benefits, but one whose privileges and benefits are now informed by notions of rights and responsibilities. The Good Australian Migrant is still expected to demonstrate their belonging, albeit to an Australian national identity based on a multicultural diversity and heterogeneity rather than a British dualism or homogeneity, but which nonetheless entails adopting an apparently self-evident and agreed upon set of 'Australian values'.

Therefore the Good Australian Migrant is still expected to become both Australian *and* an Australian citizen. This expectation continues to exclude those who are perceived as unable or refusing to 'belong' from the body politic. Contemporary debates about asylum seekers and Muslim immigration are an example *par excellence*, in which Australian Senator Pauline Hanson can declare to the Parliament that 'we are in danger of being swamped by Muslims who bear a culture and ideology that is incompatible with our own,'¹⁴⁸ despite the

¹⁴⁶ *ibid.*, 244–45.

¹⁴⁷ Davidson, *From Subject to Citizen*, 145–46.

¹⁴⁸ Australia, Senate, *Parliamentary Debates*, No. S.3, 2016, 938.

fact that Muslims make up only 2.2% of the Australian population,¹⁴⁹ nor the long history of Muslims in Australia, some of which pre-dates European settlement.¹⁵⁰

2.3.2. THE 'GOOD AUSTRALIAN' IN THE GOOD AUSTRALIAN MIGRANT

Just as it is not enough for the migrant to become an Australian citizen, it is also not enough for the migrant to simply become Australian. The Good Australian Migrant, as the name suggests, is expected to become a *Good Australian*. Although this may seem a reasonable request to make of migrants, exactly what constitutes this *Good Australian*, and more importantly, who defines it, has important consequences in the mediation of the relationship between Australia and its migrant Other. As Murphy notes, 'there was always the suggestion about the term that newcomers had to be 'good Australians' while the native-born could get away with just being Australians.'¹⁵¹ This produces a conditionality to citizenship which differentiates those that are citizens through birth from those that are citizens through migration. This echoes the unequal citizenship bargains of the 1950-60s under assimilation, and just like the 'Australian way of life', the ambiguous *Good Australian* is an aspirational vision which the Australian-born are rarely expected to meet themselves.

The concept of a *Good Australian* was not unique to the post-war period, nor was it only applied to post-war migrants. In the inter-war years, parliamentarians often claimed to speak as 'Good Australians' when arguing a particular position, most frequently in debates regarding protectionism and trade unionism. In the 1920s some, such as South Australian Senator Albert Alfred Hoare, used the term to argue against immigration from Southern Europe, arguing that Southern Europeans could not make *Good Australian* citizens due to their cultural or racial

¹⁴⁹ Australian Bureau of Statistics, *Reflecting a Nation: Stories from the 2011 Census*, cat. no. 2071.0, ABS, Canberra, 2012–2013, <http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Lookup/2071.0Main+Features552012%E2%80%932013?OpenDocument>, accessed 15 September 2016.

¹⁵⁰ For example, see: N. Kabir, *Muslims in Australia: Immigration, Race Relations and Cultural History* (London: Kegan Paul, 2005).

¹⁵¹ Murphy, *The Other Australia*, 257, footnote 1.

incompatibility.¹⁵² The concept re-emerged in the late 1930s with the issue of Jewish refugee immigration and in debates relating to the 1940 amendment of the Immigration Act. Objecting to the proposal to reduce the period of residence required before naturalisation to one year, NSW Senator Macartney Abbott argued,

In my opinion, the law ought to be amended to provide for closer supervision of the conduct of immigrants and of their habits of life, so that the authorities might be better able to judge of the qualifications of aliens to become good Australians.¹⁵³

In the post-war period, the ability of certain migrants to become *Good* Australians was frequently deployed in discussions of naturalisation, in particular in debates relating to proposed amendments and revisions of citizenship acts.

Because the acceptance of migrants into the body politic is conditional on their status as *Good* Australians, the behaviour of migrants, both public and private, is policed in ways the Australian-born simply are not. This extends to community groups, and it is from here that the sins of a small migrant minority can become representative of entire communities. All migrants of a particular community must be *Good* Australians, and when transgressions occur, the majority can and will be held accountable, with the transgression framed as a product of a particular cultural trait that stems from their migrant Otherness. This is why the Federal Immigration Minister Peter Dutton suggested in November 2016 that because second- and third-generation Lebanese-Muslims made up a sizeable proportion of people arrested on terrorist-related offences, the Lebanese-Muslim migration intakes of the 1970s were a mistake.¹⁵⁴ Like Dawn Fraser and her Kyrgios/Tomic comments, Dutton situates the misconduct of these individuals in their 'migrantness', rather than in any shortcomings in their

¹⁵² For example, see:

Australia, Senate, *Parliamentary Debates*, No. S.21, 1926, 2343.

Australia, Senate, *Parliamentary Debates*, No. S.47, 1927, 1817.

¹⁵³ Australia, Senate, *Parliamentary Debates*, No. S.20, 1940, 977.

¹⁵⁴ S. Anderson, 'Peter Dutton suggests Fraser government made mistake by resettling Lebanese refugees', *ABC News*, 22 November 2016, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-11-21/peter-dutton-fraser-made-mistake-resettling-lebanese-refugees/8043624>, accessed 23 November 2016.

Australian upbringing. The transgressions of the Australian-born, on the other hand, are cast as exceptions to the rule, with the transgression attributed to an inherent personal quality, such as the mental health of the individual, rather than an inherent cultural trait.¹⁵⁵ Therefore, whereas migrants exist in the absolutes – Good/Bad, All/None, the Australian-born are allowed to exist in the shades of grey, where the actions of one are not indicative of the whole.

In much the same way being Australian is most easily defined by what it was not, one way of policing *Good* Australian behaviour is through the naming and shaming of *bad* migrant behaviour. Often, this bad behaviour becomes over-exaggerated, particularly when criminal activity is involved, and the crimes of one or a handful of perpetrators are identified as endemic to entire communities. This in turn is used to justify actions taken against particular communities in the name of maintaining Australian law and order. This is demonstrated by the 2015 amendment to the *Australian Citizenship Act 2007* which gave the Australian Government the ability to strip dual citizens charged with ‘terrorism-related conduct’ of their Australian citizenship, and in the February 2016 leaked Liberal cabinet document which included a proposal that would see refugees admitted under Australia’s humanitarian program monitored even after they receive citizenship. In both instances, the Government was accused of creating a two-tiered system of Australian citizenship that differentiated between citizenship by birth and citizenship by grant.¹⁵⁶ Perhaps the only non-migrant group to experience this kind of over-exaggeration and conditionality to citizenship were Australian communists in the 1950s and 1960s. The degree of scrutiny, both historical and contemporary, that this has spurred, including denunciations that

¹⁵⁵ A prominent example of this is in the way domestic violence in Australia is framed by the media. See: J. Hill, ‘Media must rise to the challenge of reporting domestic violence’, *Daily Life*, 30 March 2016, <http://www.dailylife.com.au/news-and-views/dl-opinion/media-must-rise-to-the-challenge-of-reporting-domestic-violence-20160329-gntlha.html>, accessed 31 March 2016.

¹⁵⁶ D. Lipson, ‘Leaked Government document outlines tougher migration program, increased monitoring of refugees’, *ABC News*, 5 February 2016, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2016-02-04/leaked-document-outlines-changes-to-migration/7140952>, accessed 7 February 2016.

the actions of the government constituted the abuse of citizen rights, speaks volumes.¹⁵⁷

2.3.3. WERE CROATIANS GOOD AUSTRALIAN MIGRANTS?

On first impression, it seems that Croatians were both the best of migrants and the worst of migrants, oftentimes simultaneously. This is perhaps most readily noticed in the shorthand history of the community, which identifies the characteristics that adhered to the expectations of the Good Australian Migrant as ‘positive’ contributions, while those that contravened expectations are portrayed as negative qualifiers. As is the case with many other post-war migrant communities, the economic contributions of Croatians are often framed as that which helped ‘build the nation’. Particular distinction is given to the involvement of Croatians in the construction of major, labour-intensive public infrastructure projects, and their employment in key post-war industries, such as steel and manufacturing. That histories highlight these particular economic contributions is neither incidental nor accidental. Rather, they demonstrate key expectations of the Good Australian Migrant – the provision of male, able-bodied labour, and most importantly, labour which was *to the benefit of the nation*.

The cultural contributions of Croatians are limited in the same way, with historical interest concentrated on the Three F’s deemed acceptable for the Good Australian Migrant – faith, folklore, and football. Moreover, each of these cultural contributions emphasised traits Croatians shared with their Australian counterparts. The Catholicism of Croatians demonstrated both their shared heritage with Irish Australians, and the cultural difference between Croatians and other Yugoslavs, particularly of Orthodox or Muslim religions. Though Folklore focused on cultural difference, that Croatians participated in local, regional, and national events demonstrated a shared engagement with Australian civic life and a visible involvement in Australia’s cultural scene. The considerable contribution


¹⁵⁷ For a detailed analysis of the various legal conditions placed on the migrant citizenship process, see ‘Discourses of Exclusion, Silencing the Migrant Voice’, in Davidson, *From Subject to Citizen*, 149–87.

of Croatians to football in Australia is perhaps the one most readily associated with the community, and how better to demonstrate Australianness than through the love of sport, particularly one that is worshipped by the British? Each of these cultural contributions in some way bumped Croatians a little higher up the sliding scale of 'Britishness', amplifying the perceived cultural affinity and assimilability of Croatians.

While the trajectory of post-war Croatian settlement has mimicked that of most post-war migrant communities, the Croatian community has also had a distinctive characteristic in its very visible, at times extremely divisive, political activism. This activism violated the expectation of the Good Australian Migrant in many ways. The community dared to be more than just labour and cultural entertainment, and was neither ahistorical nor apolitical. This was inevitably coded as ungrateful behaviour that was in no way 'like us', and therefore did not demonstrate a willingness to belong to the national family. During the 1960s and 1970s, allegations of political violence and terrorism exponentially amplified these perceptions, launching the community into the national spotlight, and marking Croatians with a reputation for extremism that still haunts the community.

However this history of the post-war Croatian community is far more complicated than a simple balance sheet of positive and negative characteristics based on the expectations of the Good Australian Migrant. Instead there is a complex interplay of varying contexts, causes, and characters that have left this general impression of the community in public memory. The following three chapters will explore this complicated history in greater detail, and demonstrate how each particular period, with the contexts, causes, and characters specific to each, exerted their influence on both the political activism of the community, and on Australian responses to it, both then and now.

CHAPTER 3: THE ENEMY OF MY ENEMY IS MY FRIEND 1947-1971



Lovoković, Hrvatske Zajednice u Australiji

It is understandable that some Yugoslav migrants of Croatian origin should continue to hope for the establishment of an independent Croatia and within a democracy like Australia they have a right to advocate their views so long as they do so by legitimate means.¹

Sir Robert Menzies, 27 August 1964

On 27 August 1964, Menzies delivered a Ministerial Statement on Yugoslav immigrant organisations to ‘make some observations to the House about the Government’s general policy in relation to migrant organisations and about immigration from Yugoslavia.’² He believed it necessary to address concerns raised both in and outside the Parliament about the activities of Yugoslav organisations. In particular, he provided responses to the 38 questions that Dr James (Jim) F. Cairns had placed on notice earlier, ranging from the general – such as the broad history of the Ustaša movement, to the specific – such as how a group of Croatian men came to be photographed standing on an Australian army tank.³ However, the title of the Ministerial Statement was somewhat of a misnomer; it was Croatian and not Yugoslav organisations causing Cairns and others concern. Inherent in these concerns was the suggestion that Croats were a problematic migrant group, and that the government was not doing enough to address their activism, whether out of ignorance or out of political expediency.

Menzies’ response was two-fold. In a departure from the accepted rhetoric of the 1950s, he argued that migrant organisations in and of themselves were no longer viewed by his government as problematic. Rather, they aided migrant integration, functioning much like any other agency of assimilation. Migrant organisations were only problematic when they engaged in activities ‘which tend to frustrate integration.’⁴ Menzies dismissed the suggestion that migrant organisations were any more or less problematic than other organisations, and considered the governmental responses some advocated as unwarranted. While he conceded that the possibility of illegal activity always existed, he also noted that Australian authorities were capable of investigating, and if necessary, prosecuting either migrant organisations or individuals within them, just as with any other individual or organisation.

¹ Australia, House of Representatives, *Parliamentary Debates*, No.HR.35, 1964, 679. Refer to Appendix 1A for a copy of the full Ministerial Statement.

² Australia, House of Representatives, *Parliamentary Debates*, No.HR.35, 1964, 678.

³ Croatian Liberation Movement (Question No. 73), Australia, House of Representatives, *Parliamentary Debates*, No.HR.35, 1964, 764-6.

⁴ Australia, House of Representatives, *Parliamentary Debates*, No.HR.35, 1964, 679.

On the question of Yugoslav migrants, Menzies cautioned that ‘to understand the attitudes of these migrants it is necessary to remind ourselves that this part of Europe has an exceedingly complex and troubled history.’⁵ The establishment of a communist Yugoslav state at the end of WWII, coupled with the ‘deep differences of religious, cultural and historical kinds’ between the peoples of Yugoslavia, resulted in a number of Yugoslav migrant communities throughout the world establishing organisations in opposition to the communist government. Croatians in Australia were therefore no different to others elsewhere in advocating the establishment of an independent Croatian state. Furthermore, Menzies reasoned that in a democracy like Australia, Croatians had ‘a right to advocate their views so long as they do so by legitimate means.’⁶ That there may be individuals prepared to do so by illegitimate means was a proven possibility. He explained that though isolated acts of violence had occurred within the Yugoslav community, the suggestion that there was an organised or systemic series of attacks associated with Croatians or their activism was unsubstantiated. Reiterating his previous position, Menzies argued that existing Australian authorities were capable of investigating and prosecuting such instances without any further involvement by the government. In concluding his Ministerial Statement, Menzies remarked:

So I make the Government’s position quite clear: This Government will not interfere with freedom of opinion. Equally, it will not tolerate any activities which constitute a breach of the law.’⁷

Menzies’ Ministerial Statement was met with immediate criticism. The NSW state executive of the ALP accused him of ‘notable omissions’ and his government of a ‘complete evasion of its responsibilities to maintain law and order among all sections of the community.’⁸ Some 30 years later, David McKnight echoed these same sentiments, bluntly characterising it as ‘a masterpiece of evasion, legalism and special pleading’ and ‘the most benign statement that could possibly be

⁵ Australia, House of Representatives, *Parliamentary Debates*, No.HR.35, 1964, 679.

⁶ *ibid.*

⁷ Australia, House of Representatives, *Parliamentary Debates*, No.HR.35, 1964, 680.

⁸ ‘Menzies Accused of evading issue’, *Canberra Times*, 29 August 1964, 21.

made.⁹ Though these observations have some merit, they are based on a limited snapshot of the complex domestic and international contexts and historical legacies that not only led Menzies to deliver his Statement, but compelled Croatians to engage in political activism, provoked Cairns to raise questions, and even help to explain McKnight's observations so many years later. Rather than a masterpiece of evasion, it is more accurate to argue that Menzies believed some opinions were freer than others, and some breaches of the law were more perilous than others, the distinction of which can be reduced to the Cold War adage that the enemy of my enemy is my friend.

This chapter seeks to explain these contexts and legacies, and in conjunction with the foundations laid in earlier chapters, reimagine the historical narrative of Croatian political activism in this period as more than the Cold War political football it is often reduced to. Section 3.1 will contextualise the first wave of post-war Croatian emigration and the centrality of organisational life to these communities. Croatian migrants, like many others of this period, were influenced by their wartime experiences, and their organisations quickly developed political undertones which sought to establish a Croatian identity as separate from Yugoslav, framed in the advocacy for an independent Croatian state. Section 3.2 will outline Australian responses to these organisations and their activism. They were problematic because migrant organisations were objectionable under assimilation policy generally, the political activism of Croatian organisations contravened the expectations of the Good Australian Migrant specifically, and advocacy for an independent Croatian state was problematic in and of itself. However, Australian responses to Croatian political activism were tempered by the Cold War myopia of Australian politics. Section 3.3 demonstrates how these paradigms were disrupted by the changes of the 1960's in international and domestic contexts, as well as changes within the Croatian community itself.

⁹ McKnight, *Australian Spies and Their Secrets*, 176.

3.1. THE FIRST WAVE OF POST-WAR CROATIAN EMIGRATION

Before ethnic and multicultural initiatives received financial aid – that is, before Australia embraced multiculturalism in the 1970s – Croats displayed a remarkable degree of flexibility, initiative and determination in setting up a range of structures to meet their social, cultural and welfare needs and did so without material or moral assistance from governmental agencies, either Australian or Yugoslav.¹⁰

Croatians comprised the majority of the more than 26,000 Yugoslavs who settled in Australia from 1947-1954 under the DP Scheme, and the further 20-30,000 who migrated to Australia up until the early 1960s.¹¹ These Croatians were either refugees displaced by WWII, or political migrants escaping the oppressive post-war climate of Yugoslavia. Most had illegally crossed Yugoslavia's borders, initially escaping to countries such as France, Germany or Switzerland, or to DP camps in Austria and Italy.¹² Unlike their predecessors who were overwhelmingly from the Croatian coast and following established patterns of chain migration, post-war Croatians hailed from diverse regions across Yugoslavia and different social and occupational backgrounds. Though men still out-numbered women at approximately 1.7:1, and unmarried young males continued to comprise a high proportion of the intake,¹³ the first wave of post-war Croatian migration was both numerically larger and more demographically diverse than the pre-war and inter-war intakes.

The post-war Croatian community came to be characterised by a high level of organisation, establishing associations, organisations, and social groups to help

¹⁰ V. Drapac, 'Active Citizenship in Multicultural Australia: The Croatian Experience', in Jupp (ed.), *The Australian People* [2nd Edn.], 64.

¹¹ Though it is not known exactly how many of these migrants were Croatian, Kunz found that of a sample of 19,500 Yugoslav DP migrants, approximately 10 500 were Croatian, 5800 Serbian, 1800 Slovene and 1400 of other ethnic origin, indicating that perhaps just over a half of all Yugoslav migrants were Croatian. See: Kunz, *Displaced Persons*, 121.

For migration statistics 1947-1976 by Country, see:

Table, 'Net Migration to Australia 1947-76', in Lack and Templeton, *Bold Experiment*, 76.

¹² Budak, 'Post-War Croatian Settlement', 342.

¹³ Kunz, *Displaced Persons*, 122.

with navigating the pressing issues of accommodation, work, and language, while providing venues for social activities in order to mitigate the feelings of displacement and loneliness migration had caused, particularly within the paradigms of the three F's – faith, folklore, and football. However, the vigour of this community in establishing organisations was driven by more than just their social and welfare needs. Post-war Croatians purposefully rejected the Yugoslav organisations that had served the community during the inter-war years. To have escaped the clutches of Tito's Yugoslavia, only to find themselves classified as Yugoslavs in Australia and directed towards Yugoslav organisations was an 'insult of great proportions.'¹⁴

Therefore, alongside the high level of organisation the post-war Croatian community also came to be characterised by a high level of politicisation. These migrants believed that it was their duty to maintain the struggle for Croatian independence now that they had access to a democracy and its resources of free speech, protest, and political advocacy, free of the consequences such actions back home could bring. When considering the wartime and post-war experiences of the Croatians migrating during this period, it is altogether understandable that the issue of Croatian identity and independence would become central to organisational life. The high level of organisation and high level of politicisation established in this period continued to define the community and its activism over the next five decades, abating only when Croatian independence was achieved in the 1990s.

3.1.1. THE CENTRALITY OF ORGANISATIONAL LIFE

Organisations established by the first wave of post-war Croatian migrants served two broad purposes. In the absence of government-led services, Croatians primarily established organisations to meet the social and welfare needs of migrants upon settlement. This included navigating the pressing issues of

¹⁴ Tkalčević, *Povijest Hrvata U Australiji*, 61.

accommodation, work, and language, and providing venues for social activities that mitigated feelings of displacement and loneliness. The second purpose of Croatian organisations lay in their symbolic currency; Croatian organisations were a tangible representation of the cultural and political identity of post-war Croatian migrants. Their very establishment was an inherently political act that sought to differentiate and disassociate their members from a 'Yugoslav' identity and community. Organisations therefore became both the arbiter of social access and space and the arbiter of the collective cultural and political identity of the post-war Croatian community. The power of each came to mutually reinforce the other, making organisations and their leaders central to the definition of the community and its boundaries.

In addressing the social and welfare needs of migrants, Croatian organisations were no different to those of other DP groups. Australia's post-war immigration program had created a number of overt and covert social issues which were unanticipated, ignored, or held little interest to policy makers.¹⁵ These were exacerbated by an assimilation policy that viewed government assistance as a hindrance rather than help to migrant settlement. Migrant-specific services, it was argued, would only delay assimilation and even encourage the formation of segregated communities. Instead, the fastest way to ensure assimilation was to push migrants into existing social structures and services in English. In the face of such an approach, 'immigrants resorted to mutual help to solve collectively experienced problems,'¹⁶ and the very policy which purported

¹⁵ Early critics of assimilation included Walter Lippmann, David Cox, Jerzy Zubrzycki, and Jean Martin, who would all become significant voices in immigration debates in the 1960s and 1970s. Of these, Jean I. Martin (nee Craig) was particularly influential, who became widely regarded as an expert even before the completion of her doctoral thesis in 1954. Examples of her early work include:

'The social impact of New Australians (1953)', as printed in Lack and Templeton, *Bold Experiment*, 92–97.

'The Assimilation of European Immigrations' (Doctoral Thesis, Australian National University, 1954). *Refugee Settlers: A Study of Displaced Persons in Australia* (Canberra: Australian National University, 1965).

Community and Identity: Refugee Groups in Adelaide (Canberra: Australian National University, 1972). It would not be until the election of Whitlam Government in 1972 that the social and welfare needs of migrants would be comprehensively addressed by the Australian Government.

¹⁶ Lalich, 'Developing Voluntary Community Spaces', 215.

to avoid the segregation of migrants created the conditions necessitating the establishment of migrant organisations.

Most post-war migrant communities developed following a similar pattern. Initially, informal groups formed wherever a concentration of migrants of the same nationality could be found – at hostels, lodgings, workplaces, or simply in geographic proximity. The exchange of information and assistance that occurred between members of these informal groups developed into a valuable reserve of social capital, and access to these networks of information and opportunity proved integral to successful migrant settlement in the initial years of settlement.¹⁷ As social capital accumulated, informal groups formalised, often led by those that had previously held leading roles either in their homelands (such as army officers or ex-politicians) or in the refugee camps of Europe,¹⁸ and ‘most started from scratch with cultural and language activities, entertainment, mutual assistance, and a language newspaper.’¹⁹ As migrants accumulated wealth through employment, and organisations in turn accumulated financial resources through their members, organisations rented, bought, or built facilities ‘where the atmosphere and tastes of the old country could be recreated, and the new generation taught traditional ways and values.’²⁰ Within a few years of their arrival, almost all migrant groups had established a national body comprised of delegates from various local organisations.²¹ These national bodies in turn affiliated with diasporas in other countries, and co-operated with other national groups in Australia when common goals presented themselves, such as with anti-communist activism or in campaigning for migrant access to services.

Though the initiative and enterprise displayed by migrants in their establishment of organisations is extraordinary, particularly when considering the lack of government assistance, limited capital, and relatively low levels of socioeconomic status, English language proficiency, and education, it is also not

¹⁷ *ibid.*

¹⁸ Kunz, *Displaced Persons*, 210.

¹⁹ Haebich, *Spinning the Dream*, 175.

²⁰ Kunz, *Displaced Persons*, 211.

²¹ *ibid.*, 212.

surprising. As Persian explains, migrants arriving in Australia were already experienced in community building through their time in the DP camps of Europe, which had developed into 'training grounds for community leaders and modeled [sic] a community building process to be used after resettlement.'²² DP migrants simply replicated those same processes in Australia, made even easier with the greater resources at their disposal. For those from Southern Europe, and especially from its rural regions, this was amplified by a long tradition of relying on family, religious, and community networks for support and information rather than state-provided services.²³

Post-war Croatians replicated this pattern of community development. Initially, informal groups formed wherever Croatians found themselves, whether at Bonegilla, one of the many migrant hostels across the country, or in the private homes of individuals.²⁴ These groups quickly formalised, with the first post-war Croatian Club established in Adelaide as early as 1950. In Sydney, the Australian Croatian Association (*Australsko-Hrvatsko Društvo – AHD*) was established in 1951, and the first welfare association, Croatian Caritas, in 1952.²⁵ Catholic congregations developed alongside local Australian parishes and priests in the early 1950s, and a number of Croatian priests and nuns migrated to provide pastoral care.²⁶ Croatian-language publications were also quick to develop, with *Društveni Viestnik* and *Hrvat* the first bulletins to be published in 1951 and 1952 respectively.²⁷ In 1957 *Spremnost* was established, and from 1958 began printing the first national Croatian-language weekly newspaper, published uninterrupted until its closure in 2007.²⁸ By 1958, the first Croatian national umbrella

²² Persian, 'Displaced Persons and the Politics of International Categorisation(s)', 488.

²³ Jordens, *Alien to Citizen*, 6.

²⁴ For example, see: Lovoković, *Hrvatske Zajednice U Australiji*, 9–15, 17–75, 445-447-502, 525–31, 543–45, 557–58, 583–84.

²⁵ Budak, 'Post-War Croatian Settlement', 342.

²⁶ Lovoković, *Hrvatske Zajednice U Australiji*, 627–60.

²⁷ *ibid.*, 601–2.

Tkalčević, *Povijest Hrvata U Australiji*, 64.

²⁸ Lovoković, *Hrvatske Zajednice U Australiji*, 602–3.

Tkalčević, *Povijest Hrvata U Australiji*, 94–95.

organisation, the Central Council of Croatian Associations (*Središnji Odbor Hrvatskih Društava Australije – SOHDA*), was formed in Sydney.²⁹

Post-war migrants were unique to the Australian experience of immigration as they 'brought a specific type of past with them which was hitherto unknown in Australia - that is, a wartime experience.'³⁰ This distinct experience of violence, dispossession, and poverty influenced both the individual and collective identities of post-war migrants, colouring relationships within migrant communities and outside of them. As Damousi explains, 'one of the ways in which this [wartime] experience was transposed to Australia was through a continued connection to and interest in politics.'³¹ Though this included an interest in Australian politics and the broad international political environment, most often this concentrated on the post-war political contexts of migrant homelands, particularly when it intersected with Australian anti-communism. This focus on homeland politics, Kunz argues, can be explained by

an almost obsessive feeling of historical responsibility which permeates the thinking of refugees who, on reaching safety and freedom feel they must carry on the fight and spread the message which the oppressed at home cannot proclaim.³²

For reasons ranging from the simple – such as language barriers, to the more complex – such as the discouragement of their political involvement, migrants were limited in their access to Australian institutions, and instead turned to the structures of their organisations to channel their political activism.

Some organisations were openly political, 'created to advance, through political means, the day of return to the homeland.'³³ These organisations were usually led by those with former ties to political organisations of the homeland, or those with more politically extremist views. Although leadership and community building experience, whether in the homeland or the DP camps of

²⁹ Budak, 'Post-War Croatian Settlement', 342.

Lovoković, *Hrvatske Zajednice U Australiji*, 293–303.

³⁰ Damousi, 'We Are Human Beings, and Have a Past', 501.

³¹ *ibid.*, 516.

³² Kunz, *Displaced Persons*, 210.

³³ *ibid.*

Europe, explains much of how these individuals (overwhelmingly men) came to assume leadership positions in Australia, Kunz also highlights that assimilation policy, hostile towards the establishment of migrant organisations, 'tended to discourage any but extremists from seeking leadership roles.'³⁴ Those organisations that were not ostensibly political, such as social and sporting clubs, welfare associations, and cultural groups, still held a political undercurrent, whether through the composition of its members, tacit or explicit support offered to various actions, activisms and causes, or simply through their affiliation with other organisations.

As time passed and the likeliness of return to the homeland waned, political causes gradually lost credibility, their influence diminishing in favour of more pressing concerns. Migrant organisations increasingly centred their activities on the social and welfare needs of migrants, either in filling the socio-emotional void of life in an assimilationist Australia, or in the preservation of culture for future generations. The drift away from the political concerns of the homeland towards the social concerns of life in Australia prompted changes in community leadership, either through the rise of new leaders within existing organisations, or in the establishment of new organisations that displaced the influence of older ones. These new leaders in turn reinforced the shift in focus by prioritising social concerns over political ones.

Even with this shift, most organisations retained at least nominal support for the political concerns that preoccupied the initial post-war years. The reason for this was two-fold; in practical terms, the social and financial capital that had defined early community life continued to be held (however superficially) by those still invested in political causes, and retaining access to that capital meant maintaining, at the very least, the pretence of support. Second, while the feasibility of achieving political aims may have diminished, the symbolism in its rhetoric remained a powerful force in community building and identity-making. The political past of a migrant community provided a useful site of myth-making

³⁴ *ibid.*

from which a community could pinpoint its origins, and therefore purpose, in Australia.

For Croatians, political and social activism was more closely related than for other comparable migrant groups; while Poles were free to be Polish, the Greek free to be Greek and Estonians free to be Estonian despite their Soviet citizenship, Croatians were not free to be Croatian. Instead, Croatians were officially considered Yugoslavs in both citizenship and nationality, and Croatian political activism was more than a politically-oriented advocacy for an independent state in the face of communist domination. More accurately, it was an advocacy for the very existence of their national and cultural identity, for which political independence was the logical end-point. Croatian activists needed to first convince Australians that they were a national group separate from Yugoslavs, with their own identity, culture, institutions, and history that entitled them to self-determination, and then on the basis of that self-determination could they advocate for an independent non-communist state.

Because of this, the establishment of Croatian rather than Yugoslav organisations was an inherently political act, whether it was a large organisation, such as the *AHD*, or as small as the local soccer team. To participate in local sporting competitions or to engage in advocacy for the provision of services as Croatians rather than Yugoslavs was just as political an act as to directly advocate for an independent Croatian state. Conversely, the establishment of political organisations and advocacy for an independent Croatian state was just as social an act, as these organisations and activism provided a venue through which key aspects of individual and collective identities could be performed, validated, and rationalised. The obsessive feeling of historical responsibility earlier described by Kunz manifested in the first wave of Croatian migrants and their organisations in a very clearly defined *raison d'être*. As Skrbiš explains,

This internally complex grouping of political migrants nurtured a specific kind of ideology, politics and world-view, centring on the re-establishment of the independent Croatian state and the question of Croatian ethno-national survival amid the perceived threat from Serbia.³⁵

Organisations and their leaders assumed a central role in this symbolic economy, acting as the self-appointed leaders and representatives of the community. More importantly however, they thought of themselves as the 'legitimate bearers of the Croatian democratic tradition and Croatian culture in general.'³⁶ According to this view, the homeland was besieged by a communist government resolved to eradicate it, and therefore the responsibility of preserving and passing on this tradition and culture rested with the diaspora. This political *raison d'être* defined by the first wave of Croatian migrants prevailed throughout subsequent generations, for as long as Croatia remained under Yugoslavia, the *raison d'être* remained unchanged, even if the way it was expressed and advocated for did.

The dual aims inherent to all Croatian organisations in greater or lesser degrees – the socio-emotional and the politico-cultural – entrenched the centrality of organisations and their leaders to the community and in the daily life of Croatians. Organisations became the arbiter of social access and space through the physical infrastructure they owned, the material wealth they accumulated, and the social capital they engendered. These were the physical places where Croatians could meet other Croatians, the social networks that helped individuals find accommodation and employment, the friends that provided emotional support, and the place where committees with access to resources could organise events that filled the social calendars, fundraise for those in need, and provide solutions to problems experienced by many but which were difficult to surmount individually. The importance of access to these spaces in the everyday lives of Croatians was magnified by an assimilationist Australia

³⁵ Skrbiš, *Long-Distance Nationalism*, 37.

³⁶ Z. Skrbiš, 'The Distant Observers? Towards the Politics of Diasporic Identification', *Nationalities Papers: The Journal of Nationalism and Ethnicity*, 25(3), 1997, 603.

which both blatantly and subtly isolated migrants from participation in wider society.³⁷

Because they were Croatian rather than Yugoslav, these organisations were also the arbiters of collective identity. This was primarily achieved via three abilities - to extend or deny membership to individuals based on their political allegiance, personal histories, or particular world view; to organise and participate in certain activities, or boycott and demonstrate against others; and to speak publically on behalf of the community as a whole due to the generally higher English-language proficiency of their leadership. Allowing oneself to be subjected to the scrutiny imposed by organisations and their leaders was, Skrbis explains, the test of one's dedication to diasporic Croatianism.³⁸ It was not enough to simply *be* Croatian; one had to *prove* their Croatianness. Failure to do so resulted in isolation from the community and the denial of social access and space, often with the shorthand accusation that the individual was a closeted Yugoslav. As such, the power of each purpose came to mutually reinforce the other; the more control over social access and space an organisation had, the easier it was to enforce support (however nominal) for a particular political agenda. Conversely, the stronger the support for the political agenda of an organisation, the easier it was to accumulate social and financial capital from which social access and space could be created.

3.1.2. EARLY POLITICAL ACTIVISM

The *raison d'être* of the early post-war Croatian community manifested in its political activism via two core arguments – that Yugoslavia was an illegitimate state that did not represent Croatia, Croatians and their interests either at home or abroad, and that the concept of Yugoslavism as a whole was a false premise

³⁷ Observing the perseverance of 'Australian coldness' towards migrants, Martin wrote in 1972: 'it was one thing freely to enjoy the companionship of one's fellow-countrymen, another to feel that one had in fact no alternative.'

Martin, *Community and Identity*, 30

³⁸ Skrbis, *Long-Distance Nationalism*, 100–101.

that denied the identity, history, and sovereignty of the Croatian nation and its people. These were further distilled to one very simple message; Croatians were neither communist nor Yugoslav. The first wave of post-war Croatians placed a heavy emphasis on the reestablishment of an independent Croatian state, and consequently its activism centred on making this political dream a reality.

The first reason for this was the chronological proximity to the events of WWII. As explained in Section 1.3, most Croatians in Australia had either fought in the armies of the *NDH*, or were driven out by Tito's Yugoslavia, and therefore subscribed to the notion that Croatia was a conquered homeland. These Croatians believed that with sufficient political and/or military pressure, the fledgling Yugoslav state could be toppled and Croatia granted its independence once more. Second, the rhetoric of a conquered homeland neatly intersected with the anti-communism that defined Australian political life, giving the community an entry to domestic political conversations. Third, this rhetoric of Croatian independence and anti-communism was explicitly linked to the political right, which aligned with the political agenda of the elected government, bestowing upon post-war Croatians a moral authority over their inter-war predecessors.

Thus, it should not be surprising to find that political activism in this period was influenced by the legacies of Ustashism. As Skrbiš explains,

The fact that Croatia existed as an independent political entity between 1941-45 ought to be seen as an important factor which influenced the formation of the political consciousness of the diaspora. The entire post-Second World War Croatian diaspora discourse was based on the transformation of this historical fact into a source of inspiration. The re-establishment of the Croatian state was considered an ultimate goal.³⁹

The state of the *NDH*, for all of its faults, was idealised and mythologised as a watershed for Croatian independence. The *NDH* had been singularly governed by the Ustaša, a regime that had also portrayed itself as the next iteration and rightful custodian of Croatian nationalism. Those who migrated to Australia had either served in the armies of this glorified state, or were at least politically sympathetic to the regime's independence agenda.

³⁹ *ibid.*, 33.

Some political organisations held explicit ties to Ustashism, such as the Croatian Liberation Movement (*Hrvatski Oslobodilački Pokret - HOP*) or Croatian National Resistance (*Hrvatski Narodni Otpor - HNO*), while others borrowed from its iconography and vocabulary to legitimise either their organisation or agenda. In Croatian halls one could find a picture of Pavelić hanging on its walls, usually alongside other figures from Croatia's history. Celebrations of events specific to the *NDH* were held, the most prevalent being the '10. Travanj' events celebrating the establishment of the *NDH* on 10 April. To be linked to Ustashism, however tenuous, served not only to demonstrate that one was devoted to the reestablishment of an independent state, but also as a shorthand, at least within the community if not outside of it, that proved one was truly Croatian; that is, not Yugoslav and not Communist.

Just as communism was able to cross ethnic lines in the inter-war years, anti-communism was able to do so in the post-war years. Anti-communism was a characteristic common across most DP migrant groups, and Croatians were able to draw similarities between their activism and that of other diasporas, particularly those under the yoke of the Soviet Union. Anti-communism was also able to bridge the gap between the old world and the new by echoing the DP experience of migrants and Australia's immigration policy in post-war settlement. As Persian explains, after June 1948, the IRO's focus in determining DP eligibility changed from the 'genuine' victims of Nazism to anti-communist 'dissidents', and from group to individual eligibility. DP migrants had to therefore 'prove' their individual persecution in order to be identified as political refugees. This led to a tradition of 'new theatricality' and storytelling which emphasised the anti-communist credentials of an individual against the Cold War ideologies of the West.⁴⁰ This theatricality and storytelling was easily transposed to the activism of migrant communities, as the repetition of individual stories with similar characteristics merged into a group identity.

⁴⁰ Persian, 'Displaced Persons and the Politics of International Categorisation(s)', 491–92.

Anti-communism also provided Croatians with a mode of participation in Australian political life and a means to articulate its activism in a language that was familiar to Australia's political environment. Croatians enacted their activism through participation in anti-communist events such as Captive Nations Week, seeking membership to groups such as the Anti-Bolshevik Bloc of Nations, and participating in government initiatives such as the Australian Citizenship Conventions. Protests, such as that in front of the Elizabethan Theatre in Newtown on 12 October 1959 framed Croatian political activism within Cold War and anti-communist paradigms,⁴¹ as did pamphlets and publications, particularly those in English. As early as 1952, Croatian organisations began petitioning parliamentarians, objecting to their identification as Yugoslavs.⁴²

Anti-communism was not only an effective way to distance the post-war Croatian community from the Yugoslav state, but also from the inter-war Croatian community. The communist legacy of the inter-war community contributed to the zeal with which post-war Croatians posited their anti-communism, and the motivation for this differentiation was both internal and external to the community. Internally, communism and Yugoslavism were anathema to post-war Croatians – anyone that subscribed to a communist or Yugoslav vision for Croatia's future, however nominally, was nothing less than morally bankrupt and a traitor to the nation, either to be distrusted or openly reviled. Externally, the Australian political climate was more accepting of the political agenda of the post-war community, and therefore bestowed upon them a moral authority in determining the boundaries of Croatian identity in Australia. The more entrenched this moral authority became, the less those with alternative versions of being Croatian were able to exert their influence. This in turn homogenised the definition of Croatian identity, narrowing the boundaries of the community and, coupled with the numerical imbalance between inter- and post-war Croatians (particularly after the repatriations of 1948 and 1949), perpetuated the cycle. The characterisation of the Croatian community in Australia as both

⁴¹ Lovoković, *Hrvatske Zajednice U Australiji*, 74.

⁴² *ibid.*, 735–36.

not-Yugoslav and not-communist became so entrenched that the fastest way to cast aspersions upon someone within the community is to brand them as a Yugoslav or a communist, even to this day.

Though Croatian political activism was superficially concerned with the political rhetoric of self-determination and anti-communism, the practical application of it was more aligned with questions of ethnicity and identity. This can be explained as a legacy of the Croatian National Revival of the 1800s, whereby political activism was inextricably tied to questions of cultural identity, language, and the history of nationhood. Like the Austro-Hungarians and the Serbian monarchy before them, Yugoslavs and Yugoslavism were posited as a political and cultural threat that denied both the political sovereignty and cultural identity of the Croatian nation and its people. It was also an advantageous intersection between old world ideas and the new Australian environment. The social space carved out for migrants by Australia's post-war immigration program allowed, and even encouraged, migrants to practice their cultural traditions, albeit mostly within the confines of the three F's most available to them – faith, folklore, and football. This neatly intersected with the cultural dimension of Croatian political activism and consequently, Croatians and their activism were most visible when engaging with these pre-existing structures.

The Catholic Church was perhaps the most public of platforms from which Croatians could practice their activism, and 'of all the local institutions it was perhaps the church that Croatians have found most sympathetic and accepting.'⁴³ Familiar with its structures and practices, Croatians were able to express their cultural identity and political grievances simply through their participation in common church activities such as mass, street processions, and Marian or Eucharistic congresses as Croatians. This was reinforced by the shared anti-communist stance between the church and community, and particularly highlighted in their shared interest in the persecution and imprisonment of

⁴³ Drapac, 'Croatian Australians Today', 248.

Zagreb's Cardinal Alojzije Stepinac, both a symbol of Croatian nationhood and the communist persecution of the catholic clergy worldwide. Publications of the church, particularly the *Catholic Weekly* in Sydney, often included articles regarding the plight of Stepinac, Catholics in Yugoslavia, or Croatian migrants in Australia.⁴⁴ This shared activism was best demonstrated in the 1955 mass held at St Patrick's Cathedral in Melbourne dedicated to the tenth anniversary of the imprisonment of Stepinac. Presided by Archbishop Daniel Mannix, approximately 3000 attendees, predominantly Croatian, prayed for Stepinac's release.⁴⁵

Though the cultural expression of migrants is more readily associated with the multicultural policy of the 1970-80s, it was also a feature of migrant life under the assimilation policy of the 1950-60s. In fact, Kunz argues that the cultural capital of migrants was not only welcomed, but exploited by the architects of the immigration program, with the entertaining and 'exotic' traditions, dances, costumes and cuisine of migrants framed as a positive by-product of immigration for Australians to enjoy.⁴⁶ Croatians for their part were keenly aware of Australian fascination with the folkloric traditions of migrants and used it to their advantage; 'the knowledge that Australians found European folk costumes to add a 'colourful' dimension to public events led many Croatians to don such attire where possible and appropriate.'⁴⁷ Any opportunity where the community could showcase their traditions as Croatians, rather than Yugoslavs, were seized upon and exploited as an act of political defiance. Events such as Australia Day celebrations,⁴⁸ immigration weeks and festivals, and trade or exhibition shows

⁴⁴ For example, see:

'Truth About Tito', *Catholic Weekly*, 24 May 1945, 4

'Dramatic scenes at the trial of Archbishop Stepinac', *Catholic Weekly*, 24 October 1946, 1

'Priests, Shrines, Pilgrims are targets for Tito', *Catholic Weekly*, 29 December 1949, 1

⁴⁵ St Patrick's Cathedral in Melbourne, along with the Archbishop of Melbourne, have continued to play central role in Croatian political and religious life. In 1991 a mass was held for peace in Croatia and Slovenia by Archbishop Thomas Little in response to the outbreak of war. In 2001, echoing 1955, Archbishop George Pell celebrated a mass and unveiled a statue of Stepinac with approximately 4000 Catholics, predominantly Croatian, in attendance.

See: Šutalo, *Croatians in Australia*, 219-22.

⁴⁶ Kunz, *Displaced Persons*, 256.

⁴⁷ Drapac, 'Croatian Australians Today', 248.

⁴⁸ 'A City Celebrates', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 27 January 1959, 5.

often featured a Croatian stand that showcased traditional crafts, a group of young people in folk costumes, often singing or dancing, or plates of Croatian food against the backdrop of Croatian flags, emblems, images or maps.⁴⁹

Nowhere was the twin purpose of Croatian political activism more intertwined than at the soccer club, perhaps the easiest structure for Croatians to appropriate. Compared to other forms of activism, it was relatively easy to pull together at least 11 men, enter a team under a Croatian name, pop on a version of the tricolour or Croat *Šahovnica*, and travel to various local, state, and national destinations to spread their message of defiance against the Yugoslav state. This was made even easier as a tradition of Croatian soccer clubs in Australia already existed, with the first, Zora, established in 1931 in Sydney. The Adelaide Raiders (Adelaide Croatia), Melbourne Knights (Melbourne Croatia), and Sydney United 58 (Sydney Croatia), established in 1952, 1953 and 1958 respectively, would develop into the foremost of Croatian clubs in Australia, participating in various local, state and national competitions, and affiliated with some of the largest names in the sport.

With little power or position in politics, the workplace or church, the soccer club came to occupy a unique position in post-war migrant communities. As Mosely explains,

Within soccer the immigrant's qualifications were recognised and admired. A lack of the English language was not serious. There was freedom to compete on equal terms with anyone, and win in both the literal and metaphorical sense. The game provided the European immigrant with the rare opportunity for expressing himself. He could stake out an area in society in which his voice bore weight and in which he had the chance to dominate. As such, there was freedom to release pent-up emotions, be they ambition, passion, frustration or aggression.⁵⁰

Along with the ease of establishment, the freedom Croatians found within soccer meant it also became a significant channel for their activism. As Hay notes, this

⁴⁹ 'Migrants to show crafts', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 28 March 1957, 25

'Blacktown Electric Train Extension', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 22 February 1955, 9

⁵⁰ P. Mosely, 'European Immigrants and Soccer Violence in New South Wales 1949–59', *Journal of Australian Studies*, 18(40), 1994, 20.

quickly branded Croatian clubs with a reputation of hostility, clannishness, and over-politicisation, reduced to the epithet of 'those bloody Croatians.'⁵¹

If the re-establishment of an independent state and the rhetoric of anti-communism defined the theoretical foundation and ideological framework of Croatian political activism, its practice, and arguably true purpose, was steeped in reasons of ethno-national survival. As Drapac explains, the basic premise of most overtly Croatian activism in the post-war period was that

Communist Yugoslavia was stifling Croatian identity. All association was therefore directed at maintaining and shoring up Croatian identity in the face of this perceived threat to its very existence. The error onlookers made, however, was to assume that most of this activity was generated by a backward looking right wing politics. Had it truly been the case that Croats yearned nostalgically for the establishment of a revived Ustasha state, then Croatian activism would have had only limited potential for growth and change.⁵²

The reestablishment of an independent Croatian state and the great return to the homeland were the means to achieving the goals of ethno-national survival, the myths that justified the activism and not the end itself.

⁵¹ R. Hay, 'Those Bloody Croatians': Croatian Soccer Teams, Ethnicity and Violence in Australia, 1950-99', in G. Armstrong and R. Giulianotti (eds.), *Fear and Loathing in World Football* (Oxford: Berg Publishers, 2001), 77.

⁵² V. Drapač, 'Perceptions of Post-WWII Croatian Immigrants: The South Australian Case', *Croatian Studies Review*, 3-4(1), 2004, 31-32.

3.2. AUSTRALIAN RESPONSES IN THE MENZIAN AGE

What amazes me is that nobody blames Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Hungarians, Poles or dozens of other nationalities for their talk and work for freedom of their ex-country, although most of them were unfortunate to tolerate and co-operate with the brutal Germans during the last world war.⁵³

The responses of Australia's political, legal, and media authorities to Croatian political activism in this period can be described as controlled. On the one hand, Croatian political activism was problematic in the eyes of these authorities because Croatian organisations were deemed incompatible with the aims of assimilation generally, Croatian political activism contravened the expectations of the Good Australian Migrant specifically, and advocacy for an independent Croatian state was problematic in and of itself. On the other hand, the anti-communist, right-leaning, and conservative nature of Croatian political activism played right into the Cold War political agenda of Menzies and the Coalition Government that would hold power for 23 consecutive years.

Further complicating the situation was the relationship of the West with Yugoslavia. On the one hand, communism was considered a direct threat to the security and stability of the Western world and its democratic traditions, and Yugoslavia was a communist state. On the other hand, a communist alternative to Soviet hegemony, particularly after the Tito-Stalin split of 1948, was considered to be strategically important for the West, particularly if that communist state was open to relations with the West, as Yugoslavia proved itself to be. Furthermore, the disintegration of Yugoslavia was undesirable, as it was believed that it would either create a territorial vacuum the Soviet Union could capitalise on to expand its territory, or it could become a catalyst for another bloody conflict that had the potential to escalate into World War III.

Croatian political activism therefore raised suspicions, not least because Croatian activism was not a new phenomenon to Australian authorities.

⁵³ A.A Tomasic, 'Croatian Fascists', *Catholic Worker*, May 1963, 15

However, an increasing frequency of violent incidents amongst Yugoslavs, coupled with a military incursion into Yugoslavia in 1963 that involved nine Croatians from Australia, legitimised concerns many had raised about Croatian political activism. Nonetheless, these incidents were deemed as belonging to an overwhelmingly small minority, rather than indicative of Croatian political activism as a whole. In light of the general hostility towards migrant political activism at the time, that the Coalition granted this benefit of the doubt owed more to the conservative, right-leaning, and anti-communist characteristics Croatian political activism shared with the Coalition political agenda than it did a particular concern for the civil liberties of Croatians.

3.2.1. PROBLEMATIC ASPECTS OF ACTIVISM

Croatian organisations attracted the attention of Australian legal authorities before their activism began in earnest. ASIO held a particular interest, and commenced surveillance and information operations on the premises and members of organisations from their very establishment.⁵⁴ Croatian organisations were deemed problematic from the outset because migrant organisations in general were 'regarded as contrary to assimilationist goals and the national interest, and therefore a danger to be avoided.'⁵⁵ Throughout the 1950s, ethnic

⁵⁴ In 1952/3 files were opened on the Croatian Clubs in Brisbane, Tasmania and Adelaide, the Croatian Cultural Association in Sydney, the Croatian Cultural Society in WA, the Croatian Welfare Association (Caritas), the Australian Croatian Association, and the Croatian Liberation Movement. ASIO officers reported on their investigations, detailing the number and make-up of members, the nature of the organisation, national and international affiliations, character assessments and known information about individual members (particularly of those in leadership positions), developments within the organisation, and copies of publications originating from or distributed by them or their members. See:

NAA: A6122, 305

NAA: A6122, 307

NAA: A6122, 310

NAA: A6122, 308

NAA: A6122, 309

NAA: A6122, 311

NAA: A6122, 312

NAA: A6122, 313

⁵⁵ M. Lopez, *The Origins of Multiculturalism in Australian Politics 1945-1975* (Carlton South: Melbourne University Press, 2000), 48.

communities and their organisations were referred to as ‘national groups’, a term which

reflected mainstream fears that migrants would remain isolated from Australian society in ethnic enclaves, and that their organisations would perpetuate the political and social problems of their homeland in Australia.⁵⁶

If the goal of assimilation was to make migrants ‘like us’, migrant organisations - and especially ethnic-specific ones - were a tangible barrier to assimilation. They were believed to discourage engagement with Australian institutions and communities and English-language learning, and heightened the visibility of migrants rather than serving to make them invisible or indistinguishable from the Australian-born.

Moreover, the surveillance of Croatians and Croatian organisations was not a new phenomenon in Australia. During WWI, Croatians, particularly those organised around the Croatian-Slavonic Society, were placed under surveillance due to their status as enemy aliens.⁵⁷ In the inter-war years, the Yugoslav organisations Croatians were organised around attracted the attention of legal authorities due to their involvement in trade unionism, and political ties with communism and international socialism. Such was the political activism of the *Savez* that from January 1937, the CIB began surveillance operations on its members which continued for almost two decades.⁵⁸ Particular attention was paid to publications emanating from the community,⁵⁹ and from 1940-1942 the

⁵⁶ Jordens, *Alien to Citizen*, 148.

⁵⁷ See for example:

NAA: PP14/1, 1/10/108

NAA: PP14/1, 1/10/123

NAA: PP14/1, 2/1/57

NAA: PP14/1, 4/3/127

NAA: PP14/1, 4/7/128

⁵⁸ See for example:

NAA: A6122, 181

NAA: A6122, 182

NAA: A6122, 184

⁵⁹ See for example:

NAA: A367, C1822/21

NAA: A367, C1822/23

NAA: A367, C1822/24

NAA: B741, V/11728

Australian Government banned *Napredak*, the official newspaper of the *Savez* from circulation due to its communist sympathies.

If the mere existence of Croatian organisations or communities was problematic enough to warrant the interest of legal authorities, that they were openly political and engaged in activism was even more so. Not only were Croatian organisations contrary to assimilationist goals, but the fact that they were Croatian rather than Yugoslav organisations meant that they were inherently doing the very thing that was feared most - perpetuating the political and social problems of Yugoslavia. By disputing their identification as Yugoslavs, Croatsians were resisting who and what Australia wanted them to be and were anything but the blank canvas they were expected to become. Not only did they hold on to their past self, cultural identity, and histories, but actively promoted and advocated for them. That Croatian political activism was considered a direct challenge to the expectations of the Good Australian Migrant is encapsulated in the following question to the Senate from NSW ALP Senator James Ormonde in 1963:

I ask him [Minister assisting the Minister for External Affairs John Gorton] whether any attempt is made to tell intending migrants, whether they be Croatsians or otherwise, that when they come to Australia they **must leave many of their national habits behind them** and that they are going to a country where private armies have not any standing and where the type of organization that they are interested in and have been brought up to respect **is not an object of respect in Australia...** I point out that at naturalization ceremonies new Australians are told that they are expected to be **good Australian citizens** and are **expected to observe Australian standards and ideals...** They are a minority group organized to **keep alive** **hates** they were not prepared to leave behind in their own country.⁶⁰ [own emphasis]

Thus Croatsians were perceived as resisting the expectation to become 'like us' – a resistance experienced as a rejection of the presumed magnetism and superiority of the Australian way of life.

Croatsians earned themselves the reputation of being 'too political' not only by engaging in political activism (a contravention of the expectation of being apolitical), but also in placing conditions on their contribution of cultural capital.

⁶⁰ Australia, Senate, *Parliamentary Debates*, No. S.42, 1963, 1242-3.

Croatians were happy to make cultural contributions through faith, football, and folklore, but they demanded their right to political expression in return. By incorporating their political activism with their cultural contributions, Croatians were resisting the passive exploitation of their cultural capital and making demands the standards of the Good Australian Migrant dictated they were not entitled to make. These transgressions attested to the fact that Croatians were definitely not demonstrating their gratefulness at the opportunities life in Australia afforded them.

In direct contrast, however, Croatians viewed their activism precisely as that - as a tangible expression of their gratefulness. The high naturalisation rates of Croatians attests to the importance they attached to Australian citizenship,⁶¹ and as Drapac explains, Croatian organisational life and its political activism

was a means by which individuals who had little education, poor English language skills and limited economic and professional opportunities exhibited an attachment to and an understanding of democratic processes and values in the pluralist society they had embraced as their own.⁶²

Rather than taking them for granted, Croatians believed it their moral duty to exercise their newfound rights as Australian citizens and mobilise their organisations to make use of the democratic resources of free speech, protest, and political advocacy. In doing so, Croatians were able to 'experience the fullness of Australian civil society' and engage in an active citizenship.⁶³

Croatians understood and enacted their citizenship based on a wholehearted acceptance of the rhetoric of Australian citizenship as the equality of rights, rather than the reality of Australian citizenship as privileges and benefits based on norms of British culture and ethnicity.⁶⁴ They were engaging in an active citizenship, whereas the expectations of the Good Australian Migrant only sanctioned a passive or minimalist citizenship that kept the migrant invisible but

⁶¹ Jordens, *Alien to Citizen*, 186.

⁶² V. Drapac, 'Active Citizenship in Multicultural Australia: The Croatian Experience', *Humanities Research*, 15(1), 2009, 59.

⁶³ *ibid.*, 61.

⁶⁴ For more on the distinction between the two, refer to Section 2.3

answerable to Australian civic responsibility. Therein lies one of the biggest paradoxes in the history of Croatian political activism in Australia – Croats were problematic not because they rejected Australian citizenship, but because they actually enacted it.

If Australian authorities were generally concerned with migrant organisations, they were especially concerned with Croatian organisations because Croatian political activism was problematic in and of itself. Advocacy for an independent Croatian state was in direct competition with the political desirability of a Yugoslav state within Cold War paradigms. As Drapac explains, ‘there was a degree of inevitability to this process’ as it ‘coincided with two features of intellectual and political life in Australia and abroad.’⁶⁵ The first was the international standing of Yugoslavia within the Cold War context. It was in the interest of both the East and West to support a united Yugoslavia, not least because it provided a buffer zone between the two camps. For the West, ‘Yugoslav unity was intrinsically good and politically beneficial.’⁶⁶ After the Tito-Stalin split of 1948, Yugoslavia was touted as a communist alternative to Soviet hegemony. It became ‘the acceptable, indeed the attractive and humane face, of the new communism’ and attracted the positive attention of the New Left in Europe and abroad.⁶⁷ More importantly, Yugoslavia was of strategic importance to the United States. As Lees explains, Yugoslavia was a crucial to America’s “wedge” strategy to create divisions between the Soviet Union and other communist states;

Although developed for use in both Europe and Asia, the wedge received its most sustained application in U.S. policy toward Yugoslavia, where it also revealed its greatest strengths and weaknesses.⁶⁸

This strategic importance only rose as Yugoslavia built and promoted its policy of Non-Alignment and relative openness to the West.

⁶⁵ Drapac, ‘Croatian Australians Today’, 32.

⁶⁶ A. Čuvalo, *The Croatian National Movement: 1966-72* (Boulder, New York: Columbia University Press, 1990), 193.

⁶⁷ Drapač, ‘Perceptions of Post-WWII Croatian Immigrants’, 32.

⁶⁸ L. Lees, *Keeping Tito Afloat: The United States, Yugoslavia, and the Cold War* (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), xiii.

The disintegration of Yugoslavia was also feared, so much so that from the 1948 Tito-Stalin split, 'Yugoslavia's continued existence depended upon aid received from the West.'⁶⁹ The prospect of Yugoslav disintegration had only two foreseeable outcomes – it would either create a territorial vacuum an expansionist Soviet Union could capitalise on,⁷⁰ or become a catalyst for another bloody conflict that had the potential to escalate into World War III. For the Soviet Union, separatist movements, even if based on the principles of national communism, were perilous. The events of the Poznan Protests and the Hungarian Uprising in 1956 justified these fears, and any Croatian separatist aspirations were branded as 'ideologically and geo-politically dangerous.'⁷¹ This fear of disintegration, Drapac explains, ensured that both the United States and the Soviet Union provided Yugoslavia with the material and moral support it needed at different times.⁷²

The second feature of intellectual and political life that made Croatian activism problematic was the international scholarship of fascism and the Second World War and the rhetoric which followed from it. Yugoslav scholarship in particular linked Croatian activism with Ustashism, and 'official Yugoslav historiography did not make any distinction between the Ustaša movement and Croatian patriotism or between the regime in Croatia from 1941 to 1945 and the state itself.'⁷³ This contrasted markedly with the way Serbian collaboration was portrayed. As Drapac explains, even though both Croatian and Serb forces collaborated with the Nazi regime during WWII, Yugoslav scholarship treated Ustaša collaboration as a 'generalized phenomenon' that applied to all Croatians, and Serb collaboration as representing the acts of a small group of traitors or

⁶⁹ Drapac, *Constructing Yugoslavia*, 198.

See also: Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History*, 257–60.

⁷⁰ Čuvalo argues that Tito actively promoted the idea that 'if federalization [sic] would go too far, the Soviets might move in to save socialism in Yugoslavia. Thus it was better to have Yugoslav centralism than Soviet occupation... For internal, as well as external reasons, the Soviet threat to Yugoslavia was blown out of proportion whenever needed, even though there had been no clear signs that the Soviets intended to march into the country.'

See: Čuvalo, *The Croatian National Movement*, 74.

⁷¹ *ibid.*, 193.

⁷² Drapac, *Constructing Yugoslavia*, 201.

⁷³ Čuvalo, *The Croatian National Movement*, 121.

individuals.’⁷⁴ This resulted in placing a collective guilt on the Croatian nation for the war crimes perpetrated by the 1941-45 regime, and discredited any aspirations for independence as inevitably linked to the chauvinism and brutality of the Ustaša regime.⁷⁵

Croatians were not alone in their anti-Yugoslav activism. Serbians, Macedonians and Slovenians also advocated against Yugoslavia, Tito, and communism.⁷⁶ However, Croatians became the face of anti-Yugoslav activism for the very simple reason that Croatians were the most numerous, both in Australia and as a proportion of Yugoslav emigrants in general. This was reinforced by the vested interest of the Yugoslav Government generally and Tito personally in portraying Yugoslav separatism as a Croatian affair. Croatian emigrants and their activism were viewed as the largest threat to Yugoslav unity and state legitimacy. The historical reality of the *NDH* proved that Croatian separatism could theoretically, if not realistically, result in the disintegration of the Yugoslav state. Separatism was therefore actively discredited first by portraying it as a Croatian pursuit, and then by emphasising the ideological links between Croatian activism and Ustashism. This effectively denounced any Croatian political activism as a fascist pursuit in resurrecting the brutality of the Ustaša regime.

Aside from the obvious power the Yugoslav Government wielded in promoting this particular narrative of Ustashism, it was also perpetuated by the limited paradigms of Ustaša scholarship both within and outside of Yugoslavia. As summarised by Bartulin, between 1945-1990 the literature predominantly fell into one of three models. The most ubiquitous was the Marxist-Yugoslav model

⁷⁴ Drapac, *Constructing Yugoslavia*, 161–62.

⁷⁵ Writing about the conflation of the adoption of the *Šahovnica* as a national emblem (the Croatian red and white check) with support for fascism and racism during British coverage of the 1998 World Cup, Bellamy found that, ‘media reports on Croatia follow Yugoslav historiography in attaching collective guilt to the Croatian nation, not only for the crimes of the Second World War, but also for more recent crimes.....The attempt to reclaim the *Šahovnica*, is not therefore an attempt to offer an apologetic for Croatian fascists and racists, it is instead an attempt to steal their clothes and point foreign observers towards a more sophisticated understanding of Croatia’s history and contemporary situation.’

See: A. J. Bellamy, ‘Reclaiming the Croatian Flag’, *Rethinking History*, 3(3), 1999, 325.

⁷⁶ For example, See:

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perpetuated by Yugoslav scholarship. Within this model, the *NDH* was defined exclusively as a Nazi/Fascist puppet state and Croatian separatism framed as a fascistic or extremist movement. Closely related was the Catholic or clerico-fascist model, which defined the *NDH* through the paradigm of political Catholicism and Ustashism as a Catholic-Croatian type of fascism. The third model developed in response to these first two models. Emerging from émigré circles, and articulated by anti-Yugoslav Croat intellectuals in the émigré journal *Hrvatska revija* (Croatian Review), the Nostalgic-Apologetic model defined the *NDH* as a simple realisation of independent Croatian statehood. Under this model, the mass crimes of the Ustaša regime were either downplayed or ignored, collaboration with the Nazi regime explained variably as inevitable, opportunistic, or Croatians simply making the most of a terrible situation.⁷⁷

There still remain deficiencies in Ustaša scholarship, some of which relate directly to Croatian political activism. As Drapac points out, exactly what Ustaša support signified is not clear;

Generalisations about Ustaša support have not to date provided the nuanced profiles we have for collaborators elsewhere. Nor do we have studies that relate to the ideological lineage of the *NDH* and the reception of propaganda policies to the way in which the regime developed and then imploded... Normally analyses of European collaboration discuss motivation and intention when assessing people's behaviour. Opportunity, geographical location, careerism, self-interest, disillusionment, racially-derived ideological commitment, the process of 'barbarization' resulting from total war and people's simple strategies for survival from day to day led to different kinds of behaviour and had different consequences.⁷⁸

Like in all wars, the reasons for enlisting are varied, ranging from the intimately personal to the highly idealistic, and applies to those who found themselves fighting for the *NDH* under its many guises. While it is true that some wholeheartedly supported the Ustaša program in all of its brutality, for others the choice may have been more pragmatic, or not a choice at all. Some may have joined out of a desire to protect or avenge their families and villages against those they perceived would take away their freedoms, whether culturally or religiously.

⁷⁷ Bartulin, *The Racial Idea in the Independent State of Croatia*, 1–5.

⁷⁸ Drapac, *Constructing Yugoslavia*, 164–66.

For others, being an Ustaša may have simply been an expression of Croatian nationalism and the yearning for a state not subordinated to foreign rule. Others still may have simply joined the militia instead of the *Domobrani* because the former was better supported and equipped, and a means of escaping the dire poverty the war had unleashed across the region. Finally, war hysteria and the lure of adventure may have been enough for some, and joining the Ustaša was more a coincidence than a considered choice.

The lack of academic interest in the motives for enlistment is compounded by a lack of academic interest in the various armies themselves, especially regarding the Ustaša militia. The reasons for this, as outlined by Tomasevich, are numerous;

Because these forces were under German or Italian operational command during most of the war; because many accusations of terrorist and unlawful actions were levelled against them, especially the militia, both during and after the war; because they belonged to a defeated puppet state that disappeared at the end of the war; and finally, because after their defeat and surrender they were to a large extent destroyed by the victorious Partisans, very few studies have been written about them.⁷⁹

Korb also highlights that ‘empirical analyses of the collective violence committed in Yugoslavia during the Second World War are still rare.’⁸⁰ This has led to a deficient scholarship steeped in Balkanist rhetoric. Acts of violence are depicted within a “genocide narrative,” and do not require explanation as they are either the result of repulsive barbarians or heinous outside control. This mirrors Drapac’s argument that WWII in Yugoslavia is mistakenly perceived as an ‘exceptional’ war - ‘It was exceptionally brutal and racist. It was exceptionally complex and tragic.’⁸¹ This Balkanist discourse in literature concerning WWII in the region, Korb argues, often neglects what happened on the ground.⁸²

Australian authorities in Australia operated and continue to operate within these paradigms in their estimation of Croatian organisations and political

⁷⁹ Tomasevich, *War and Revolution in Yugoslavia*, 416.

⁸⁰ Korb, ‘Understanding Ustaša Violence’, 3.

⁸¹ Drapac, *Constructing Yugoslavia*, 152.

⁸² Korb, ‘Understanding Ustaša Violence’, 5.

activism. Links to Ustashism were a cause for concern and were one of the predominant reasons for the early surveillance of Croatian organisations and individuals. The reason why support for the establishment of an Independent Croatia could be equated with support for the politics of wartime collaboration and the Ustaša was, as Drapač points out, fairly straightforward

In Croatian club rooms around the country hung pictures of Ante Pavelic... Why would one not associate the activities taking place within those clubrooms with the Ustasha, or at least with a tacit acceptance of the nature of the Ustasha regime?⁸³

That Croatia existed as an independent political entity between 1941-45 was an important factor in shaping the political activism of émigré communities, and the mythology of the *NDH* and Ustashism exerted a significant influence amongst first wave Croatian migrants. However, as Skrbiš explains,

to make the myth functional, the possibly embarrassing historical facts, such as collaboration with Nazis and Fascists had to be dismissed as lies or 'explained' in terms of historical inevitability.⁸⁴

This nostalgic-apologetic model of Ustaša history allowed individuals and organisations to freely and openly associate themselves with Ustashism as it simply symbolised the struggle for an Independent State of Croatia, rather than support for the wartime collaboration of the Ustaša regime during World War II.

Ustashism was also a point of contention within the Croatian community, and controversies over 'the picture of Pavelic' became increasingly common when the second wave Croatians began emigrating in the 1960s:

What others outside Croatian club culture could not immediately perceive was the extent to which the presence of images of Ante Pavelic in Croatian clubs was a source of considerable tension among its members.⁸⁵

As Skrbiš documents, images of Pavelić (along with Ustashism as a whole) were deemed outrageously offensive, unnecessary and outdated, or simply a historical

⁸³ Drapač, 'Perceptions of Post-WWII Croatian Immigrants', 31.

⁸⁴ Škrbiš, *Long-Distance Nationalism*, 33.

⁸⁵ Drapač, 'Perceptions of Post-World War II Croatian Immigrants', 31.

truth.⁸⁶ Why Ustashism was able to endure as an acceptable symbol of Croatian activism, however, lay in the lobbying power and influence the first wave of post-war migrants were able to retain. This particular cohort of Croatian migrants, through their leadership positions, were the arbiters of social access and space and the collective cultural and political identity of the post-war community in the period before government support was available under multiculturalism. The community was essentially forced to 'fall in line' with Ustaša mythology in order to retain the access to social capital and space those organisations provided. However, even after their withdrawal from leadership, this cohort was sufficiently loud and held enough clout to make demands upon the generations that followed. As one of Skrbiš' respondents succinctly explained - 'to keep the peace you keep the picture.'⁸⁷

These qualifications are not intended as an *apologia* for Ustashism. Rather they are an explanation of what it symbolised to a particular cohort of Croatians at a particular point in time, and how this symbolism informed their understanding of the world and their activism. The use of an 'idyllic' time in a nation's history is not a new political tool. For Croatians in Australia, the mythology of the NDH and Ustashism was understood as an 'idyllic time' when Croatia was independent and nationalism was ripe. To make this myth functional, the harsh realities of the *NDH* had to be explained away or denied. The endurance of this mythology is attributable more to isolation than extremism. As the context in Croatia changed, first under Yugoslav rule, and later as an independent nation, Croatians in Australia found themselves cultural refugees lost in a sea of time. Unable to relate to their homeland, nor find acceptance in their new environment, Croatians clung onto these myths as lifeboats which justified their existence in Australia.

⁸⁶ Skrbiš, *Long-Distance Nationalism*, 111–12.

⁸⁷ *ibid.*, 112.

3.2.2. PROOF?

Assimilation policy, the expectations of the Good Australian Migrant, the political desirability of a Yugoslav state, and links with Ustashism rendered Croatian political activism ideologically problematic in different ways. These ideological concerns, however, were legitimised by incidents of violence and unlawfulness that increasingly posed a genuine concern for Australian authorities. It cannot be claimed that Croatian political activism was unequivocally problem-free. As is true for all activism, there are always those prepared to resort to extralegal, illegal, and violent means to further their cause, and Croatian political activism was no different.

That antagonisms and hostilities existed between 'Yugoslavs' was not unfamiliar to Australian authorities, in a large part owing to the activism of Croats. These incidents were widely regarded as isolated and individual instances of issues, frustrations, and in some cases, simplistic tit-for-tat violence, borne of the WWII hangover still nursed by the community. It was mostly the hostilities that erupted on the football field that caught media attention in the first decade of post-war settlement. The hostility between Croatian, Serbian, and Yugoslav teams was, according to Mosely, the most publicised example of conflict between ethnic clubs in NSW competitions between 1949-1959.⁸⁸

However, these isolated incidents took on a more sinister significance when news broke on 5 September 1963 that nine Croats travelling on Australian documents (two of them with Australian passports) had been arrested by Yugoslav authorities in July after attempting an ill-fated military incursion into Yugoslavia.⁸⁹ That the men had travelled from Australia to carry out this incursion was of a nominal concern to Australian authorities, as the dual citizenships of the individuals meant that the government viewed it as a matter between Yugoslavian citizens and the Yugoslavian Government. More pertinent, however, were allegations by the Yugoslav Government that the incursion was

⁸⁸ Mosely, 'European Immigrants and Soccer Violence', 21.

⁸⁹ 'Terrorism Plans 'Admitted'', *Canberra Times*, 6 September 1963, 5.

'Yugoslav Police Arrest Nine Emigrants on Terrorist Charges', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 6 Sept 1963, 3.

orchestrated by an underground Ustaša organisations called the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood (*Hrvatsko Revolucionarno Bratstvo - HRB*), that was recruiting and training Croatian terrorists in Australia.⁹⁰

In light of the ideological concerns raised by Croatian political activism, the 1963 incursion was perceived as the smoke to the fire (and for some the actual fire) that Croatian political activism could potentially be. News of the incursion resulted in unprecedented attention from Australian authorities, parliamentarians, and the media into the nature and intentions of Croatian organisations and their activism. In September and October 1963, questions were raised in both houses of Parliament which drew on the ideological problems of Croatian political activism to question the Government's response to the incursion and the *HRB*.⁹¹ Leading the charge was Cairns in the House of Representatives and Ormonde in the Senate. Their questions – mainly regarding alleged links between Croatian activism and Ustashism - over the next year would come to occupy the bulk of responses provided alongside Menzies' Ministerial Statement in August 1964.

Aside from general reporting on developments in Yugoslavia and in the Australian parliament, newspapers increasingly reported on the Croatian community and its activism, calling on leaders (and leaders calling on newspapers) to provide responses to events on behalf of the community.⁹²

⁹⁰ Established in 1961, the *HRB* first came to police attention after 1963 incursion. Consequent police pressure, surveillance and pursuit of the *HRB*, its members, and its activities led to the decline of the *HRB*, and by 1968 the organisation was considered to have become defunct.

For more information on this organisation see:

NAA: A432, 1964/2357 PART 6, '*Croatian Extremist Activities – Preliminary Assessment, August 1972, Department of Immigration*'

B. Vukušić, *Hrvatsko revolucionarno bratstvo – Rat prije rata* (Zagreb: Klub Hrvatskih Povratnika iz Iseljeništva, 2010).

S. Koschade, 'The internal Dynamics of Terrorist Cells: A Social Network Analysis of Terrorist Cells in an Australian Context' (Doctoral Thesis, Queensland University of Technology, 2007)

⁹¹ For example, see the series of questions posed by opposition Senators O'Byrne, Cormack, Cohen, Murphy, and Cavanagh on 10 October 1963, to which Senator Gorton, as the assistant to the minister of External Affairs, responded with: 'This has been a most extraordinary series of questions. Am I to understand that those who have asked them take the view that people have no right to express opinions in a legal way in Australia?'

Australia, Senate, *Parliamentary Debates*, No.S.41, 1963, 1026-1029

⁹² 'No Terror Training In Australia', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 6 September 1963, 1,3

Naturally, this resulted in a greater public presence of the community and a larger platform from which to publicise their views and activism.⁹³ This newfound media interest, however, also came at a cost as newspapers increasingly framed Croatian political activism as a problematic phenomenon.⁹⁴ More than anything, Croatian political activism was problematic because it defied the expectation that migrants become ahistorical and apolitical upon their arrival, as demonstrated by the editorial from *The Age* following news of the incursion -

Australians generally know little about, and want to have no part in, the Croatian-Yugoslav dispute. Their one concern with the matter is that migrants from that part of the world should leave their differences behind when they come to this country to make a new home... Australia has amply proved that a genuine welcome awaits the migrant seeking a new life and new opportunity here. That welcome does not extend to political trouble-makers.⁹⁵

News of the *HRB* and the 1963 incursion somewhat blindsided Australian authorities, particularly ASIO, as very little was known about the group at the time.⁹⁶ The initial response of Australian authorities was one of increased attention to Croatian organisations and Croatian political activism, but limited by existing paradigms. For the Commonwealth Police Force (CPF), the organisational charters of Australia's various police forces and their jurisdictions tempered any expansion of investigation capabilities. Though the CPF instituted a policy of interviewing all male Yugoslavs applying for travel documentation in the hopes of preventing further incursions, 'most areas in which the CPF might have taken an interest were covered by state laws and state police jurisdictions'.⁹⁷ ASIO on the other hand, was tempered by both its organisational charter and culture. Spry was adamant that ASIO officers only engaged in matters of security

'Croats 'Sad But Proud'', *Canberra Times*, 19 September 1963, 7

⁹³ 'N. Queensland Croats Hold Protest Meeting', *Canberra Times*, 23 September 1963, 3

⁹⁴ For example, see:

'Croat Beaten Up By 2 Countrymen', *The Age*, 9 September 1963, 3

'Yugoslav Vanishes: Phone Threat to Doctor in Assault Case', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 3 October 1963, 7

⁹⁵ 'Old quarrels should be left at home', *The Age*, 9 September 1963, 2

⁹⁶ Blaxland, *The Protest Years*, 121.

⁹⁷ *ibid.*, 127.

interest, and wanted to 'ensure that there was no blurring of the line between ASIO's investigative function and the CPF's executive function.'⁹⁸

Thus on 28 October 1963, Spry presented a summary of ASIO's 'extensive investigations' into the *HRB* to Immigration Minister Alick Downer. While ASIO could confirm the existence of *HRB* and its recruitment of young single men, it could not substantiate claims that terrorist or sabotage training had taken place – only 'some form of elementary training... on a small scale without efficient co-ordination or control.' The report concluded that as a group, Yugoslavs 'cannot be singled out as constituting any special security threat to Australia', while the *HRB* was 'insignificant as far as the security of the Commonwealth is concerned and should be regarded as an extreme manifestation of a more widely felt desire for an independent Croatia.'⁹⁹ Spry generally characterised Croatians as good anti-communists, not hostile to Australia's democratic government, and a comparatively well-settled migrant group. Though some may interpret these assessments as evidence of ASIO's left-leaning bias, even Blaxland admits that 'in the main, Spry was right, except for a very small group.'¹⁰⁰

On 25 November, an interdepartmental meeting between senior officers of the Departments of Prime Minister, Immigration, External Affairs, Attorney-General, and ASIO had been scheduled in order to discuss the *HRB*. The meeting served to highlight the differing priorities and assessments of each of the departments. While ASIO emphasised the broader political context of Croatian activism and the case of the *HRB*, the Prime Minister's Department was narrower in outlook, focusing on the particulars of Croatian nationalism and the optics of the situation. In contrast, the Attorney-General's Department focused on the particulars of prosecution, particularly in the relative difficulties in prosecuting organisations as opposed to individuals. As would be expected, External Affairs was concerned with the potential for diplomatic embarrassment, while the

⁹⁸ *ibid.*, 127.

⁹⁹ NAA: A6980, S360693, 'Corro, DG of ASIO to Immi Minster, 28 October 1963'

¹⁰⁰ Blaxland, *The Protest Years*, 126.

Immigration department was concerned with how this activism compromised assimilation. What they could all agree on, however, was that

applicants for migration should be warned at the selection interview that they would be expected to forget their national feuds on going to Australia and that activities such as those of the [HRB] are not encouraged here.¹⁰¹

Despite their differences, the one thing common between all departments was the notion that Croatian political activism was problematic because it discouraged Croatians from becoming Good Australian Migrants upon their arrival.

With Menzies calling an early election for November 30, domestic political concerns took priority and Croatian political activism faded from the national spotlight. The issue of the 1963 incursion returned with the trial in Yugoslavia of the nine men in April 1964.¹⁰² However, it was the explosion of a bomb in Sydney on 7 May that firmly placed the Croatian community and its activism back in the spotlight. While the incursion and subsequent trial were abstract events that occurred well away from Australia, the bombing was a tangible act of violence, the aftermath of which was laid out for all of those opening their weekend newspapers. The only victim of the blast, 35-year old Croatian Tomislav Lesic, accused Communist agents for the attack, warning other Croatians that they could be next. Others alleged that Lesic was a known 'extremist' who in all probability had built the bomb himself and suffered the misfortune of having it detonate too early. These allegations and counter-allegations prompted fears that a 'Croat war' in Sydney was imminent.¹⁰³

As both houses of Parliament debated the bombing and the circumstances surrounding it, Croatian political activism turned into a *bona fide* political

¹⁰¹ NAA, A6980 S250694, 'Meeting at the Department of Immigration on the 25th November, 1963 Concerning Activities of Croatian Migrants.'

¹⁰² 'Terrorist Oath Taken in Aust.', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 14 April 1964, 1

'Croatian Migrants Tell of their Training in Australia', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 16 April 1964, 3.

¹⁰³ 'Sydney Bombing: Croat Migrant Terribly Injured', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 8 May 1964, 1

'Parcel Bomb Blast', *Canberra Times*, 8 May 1964, 1

'Mutilated Croat Blames Bomb on Communist', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 9 May 1964, 1

'Threat to Kill Priest in Church: Croat 'war' in Sydney', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 10 May 1964, 3.

'Croatian Priest 'Flees' Death Letter', *Canberra Times*, 11 May 1964, 4

football, deployed by both sides of Government to justify their political agendas.¹⁰⁴ Like before, this political football was mostly kicked by Ormonde in the Senate, but the most volatile player was Cairns. Both inside and out of parliament, Cairns argued that Croatian organisations, and the Croatian Liberation Movement in particular, were 'Nazi-type Ustasha' organisations, their aims synonymous with fascism and Ustashism, and that the government was deliberately protecting and shielding them.¹⁰⁵ Such was Cairns' condemnation that it resulted in two highly publicised political stoushes. The first was between Cairns and A-G Snedden, over Cairns' patronage of the Yugoslav Settlers' Association and alleged communist links, which escalated to the point of a no-confidence motion against Snedden on 20 May.¹⁰⁶ The second came between Cairns and Wentworth, who first clashed during a television appearance discussing the situation in the Yugoslav community in May,¹⁰⁷ and would cause uproar in the House debating the same issues in September later that year.¹⁰⁸

As would be expected, newspapers across Australia reported on the debates in parliament, repeating claims made by both sides of government. Newspaper editorials for the most part emphasised two points – that the debates in parliament were more partisan than of substance, and that the far greater issue at hand was the importation of historical feuds from abroad which was unbecoming of Good Australian Migrants.¹⁰⁹ Despite qualifications by parliamentarians and newspapers alike that these incidents of violence were the actions of a minority, what these debates in fact served to do was, in true Good Australian Migrant fashion, hold the majority of Croatians accountable for the transgressions of an

¹⁰⁴ 'Minister Warns 'Strong-Arm' Migrant Groups', *Canberra Times*, 14 May 1964, 3.

'Opposition "Vilified" Over Yugoslavs, Labour M.P. Claims', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 14 May 1964, 8.

¹⁰⁵ 'Consulate Bomb Query: Storm in House on Yugoslavs', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 14 May 1964, 1.

¹⁰⁶ Australia, House of Representatives, *Parliamentary Debates*, No.HR.21, 1964, 2121-2135.

'Paper Thrown In Cairns-Snedden Storm in House', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 21 May 1964, 1.

'Snedden Survives No Confidence Move 63-44', *Canberra Times*, 21 May 1964, 1.

¹⁰⁷ 'Cairns, Wentworth in TV Clash on Yugoslav Groups', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 22 May 1964, 9.

¹⁰⁸ 'Uproar in House', *Canberra Times*, 18 September 1964, 1.

¹⁰⁹ For example, see:

'No place here for National Feuds', *The Age*, 11 May 1964, 2.

'Imported Hatreds in Parliament', *The Age*, 12 May 1964, 2.

'Transplanted European Feuds', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 12 May 1964, 2.

overwhelming minority, and delegitimise Croatian political activism as a whole.¹¹⁰

Croatians responded to the incursion, bombing, and debates that followed in much the same way as Australian authorities. Mirroring their qualifications, Croatians denied allegations of the existence of terrorist-training organisations, but conceded that the potential for extremist elements within the community existed, particularly amongst young single men. They stressed that any incidence of violence was the work of a minority, and that the overwhelming majority of Croatians were law-abiding, their activism committed only to advancing Croatian independence through democratic and nonviolent means.¹¹¹ Croatians took umbrage to their characterisation as Fascists or Nazis, and also made counter-allegations that these incidents of violence and the 1963 incursion were the work of Yugoslav *agents provocateur*, aimed at discrediting Croatian political activism in general, and *HOP* specifically. For their part, the leaders of *HOP* - the main target of Cairns' accusations - sought a deputation before Immigration Minister Hubert Opperman in a bid to clear the misrepresentation of their organisation and Croatian activism in general.¹¹²

Though 1964 saw an increase in the frequency of disturbances between Yugoslavs, various authorities and police forces reported that they had been unable to substantiate claims of wider organisation and co-ordination of violent acts by any Croatian individual or organisation.¹¹³ The CPF argued that though there was some evidence that an organisation was still in existence possibly recruiting individuals to undertake incursions, it could only be the *HRB*, as all

¹¹⁰ Such was the minority of individuals that in 1965, it was reported that from 1 January 1949-30 June 1965, a total of forty persons of Yugoslav nationality were refused naturalisation on security grounds. While it is unknown how many of these persons were Croatian (as statistics did not discriminate between the various Yugoslav groups), even if all 40 were Croatian, it would still represent a statistically insignificant number. See: Australia, Senate, *Parliamentary Debates*, No.S.39, 1965, 655.

¹¹¹ For example, see: 'No Terror Training in Australia', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 6 Sept 1963, 1, 3.

¹¹² NAA: A6980, S250693, 'Deputation from the Croatian Liberation Movement, Thursday 21st May, 1964'

¹¹³ 'Croats: No 'problem'', *Canberra Times*, 11 August 1964, 11.

NAA: A432, 1965/2271, 'Yugoslav Activities in Australia - Index'.

other Croatian organisations were moderate and non-violent in outlook.¹¹⁴ The NSW Police located the catalyst for the disturbances in NSW, SA, and WA in the increased allegations of Fascist sympathies amongst Croatians from pro-Communist organisations, which intensified the anti-Communist campaign by Croatians in response. Moreover, it argued that it was the very ‘airing of ethnical[sic], political, and religious hatreds’, made worse by their discussion in Federal Parliament, that had led to this escalation.¹¹⁵

It was in this context of allegations and counter-allegations, politicking and electioneering, explanations and qualifications that Menzies gave his Ministerial Statement. In many ways, these events served to prove both sides of the debate ‘right’. On the one hand, that the *HRB* existed, the 1963 incursion occurred, and that violence between Yugoslavs was escalating meant that there were some problematic aspects to Croatian political activism, and that perhaps insufficient attention was being paid to these by Australian authorities. On the other hand, the alleged equivocation by Menzies that these incidents were not indicative of all Croatians, that they were not of great import to national security, and that they did not warrant the extreme responses as advocated by those such as Cairns, proved itself on the right side of history, as did the argument that the transgressions of a minority should not impinge on the civil liberties of the majority of Croatians and their right to political activism. However, that Menzies and his Coalition government held Croatian civil liberties in such a high regard was the result of a conspiracy of contexts that afforded Croatians latitude in their activism seldom afforded to others.

¹¹⁴ NAA: A1209, 164/6415 ATTACHMENT 1

¹¹⁵ NAA: A6980, S250695, ‘NSW Police Assessment - July 1964’.

3.2.3. AUSTRALIAN COLD WAR MYOPIA

The identification of Croatian political activism as an anti-communist, conservative, and democratic advocacy of the right of the Croatian nation to self-determination and political independence played into the wider Cold War myopia that not only defined Australian political life, but worldwide. As Manne argues, Australia's post-war acceptance of migrants and refugees was in part guided by the ideological setting of the Cold War – those escaping communism were supported by the political right, the Catholic Church, and anti-communist intelligentsia, while those fleeing right-wing regimes were supported by the political left, the trade union movement, and left-wing intelligentsia.¹¹⁶ Brawley echoes this sentiment, arguing that 'refugees in this post-war era were important pawns. Every refugee accepted by the West was yet another indictment of the Communist system.'¹¹⁷ In this ideological framework, every Croatian accepted by Australia and every time Croatsians were politically active and visible was an indictment of communist Yugoslavia and of Titoism.

This ideological legitimacy also had practical applications. The electoral advantage gained by opposition to communism was in part responsible for the Coalition's ability to govern for 23 consecutive years. Menzies' failed 1951 referendum to ban the CPA was a victory for H.V. Evatt and the ALP, however, 'though Evatt had won this battle, the fallout was so costly that it was Menzies who won the war.'¹¹⁸ Fractures within the ALP as a result of the referendum, as well as the perception that members were communist sympathisers, conspired to keep the ALP out of office.¹¹⁹ On the other hand, the Petrov affair, the Korean War, and Australia's proximity to South-East Asia coupled with the popularity of

¹¹⁶ R. Manne, 'The Road to Tampa' in Jayasuriya, Walker and Gothard, *Legacies of White Australia*, 167.

¹¹⁷ Brawley, 'Legacies', 106.

¹¹⁸ M. Peel and C. Twomey, *A History of Australia* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 220.

¹¹⁹ For more on these fractures, see:

R. Murray, *The Split: Australian Labor in the Fifties* (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1970).

B. Costar, P. Love, and P. Strangio (eds.), *The Great Labor Schism: A Retrospective* (Carlton North: Scribe Publications, 2005).

the Domino theory, conspired to keep the Coalition in office and sustained the political currency of Menzies' 'reds under the beds' moral panic.¹²⁰

Opposition to communism also fed into wider schisms in Australian political life. For the trade union movement, the post-war period saw the CPA, the Catholic Social Studies Movement (the 'Movement'), and the ALP in a three-way struggle for control.¹²¹ Within this, Croatians were a welcome 'numbers boost' on behalf of the Movement and the ALP, particularly in the face of the CPAs fractured relationship with the Yugoslav community after the Tito-Stalin split.¹²² Croatians were also drawn into the sectarian division between the Protestant and Catholic churches. In the same way Menzies saw in Croatians a pool of potential anti-communist voters, the Catholic Church saw in Croatians a pool of potential parishioners. As already explained, the shared anti-communism and common interest in the case of Stepinac led to the public embrace of Croatians and their activism by the Australian church, and it certainly helped that the Archbishop of Adelaide, Matthew Beovich, was the son of a Croatian migrant.

The anti-communism of Croatian political activism held one other, less-evident practical application. The fact that Croatian political activism attracted the attention of Yugoslav authorities, and that ASIO knew that Yugoslav secret agents were monitoring them, gave Australian authorities an opportunity too great to pass up;

¹²⁰ For more on the role of communism in post-war Australian politics, see:

J. Brett, *Robert Menzies' Forgotten People* (Chippendale: Macmillan Australia, 1992).

D. Lowe, *Menzies and The 'great World Struggle' : Australia's Cold War 1948-1954* (Sydney: UNSW Press Ltd., 1999).

'A war-haunted world' in Murphy, *Imagining the Fifties*, 91–104.

'Security: 1949-1963' in Peel and Twomey, *A History of Australia*, 216–30.

¹²¹ B. Bowden, 'The Rise and Decline of Australian Unionism', *Labour History*, (100), 2011, 65.

¹²² D. Jordan, *Conflict in the Unions: The Communist Party of Australia, politics and the Trade Union Movement, 1945-1960* (Ultimo, N.S.W: Resistance Books, 2013), 153–55.

See also: L. Richards, 'Displaced Politics: Refugee Migrants in the Australian Political Context', in Jupp (ed.), *Ethnic Politics in Australia*, 149-161

In the Byzantine world of the security services, low-level violence, mostly directed against foreigners, paled beside an opportunity to garner information against rival spies.¹²³

The more public the Croatian activism, the more likely the Yugoslav Government was to initiate intelligence operations in Australia. In return, ASIO could initiate counter-intelligence operations, and collect invaluable information about the techniques of a communist intelligence service. The problematic few engaging in violence was a small price to pay for such an intelligence coup, especially when that price was being paid by the Croatian community.

That Croatians were also proving themselves Good Australian Migrants helped to mitigate adverse views on their activism. Croatians excelled in fulfilling their expectation of labour and contributing to the economic prosperity of the nation. They were often associated with the construction of major, labour-intensive public infrastructure projects, the most notable being the Snowy Mountains River Hydro-Electric Scheme,¹²⁴ and employed in large numbers in key post-war industries, such as steel, manufacturing, building and construction, and agriculture. Croatians were highly interactive with their local communities, mainly through the local church and football competitions, but also through their participation in local community events, happy to contribute their cultural capital. Perhaps most important of all, the comparatively high naturalisation rates of Croatians was proof of their status as Good Australian Migrants. Not only did naturalisation demonstrate their acceptance of Australia, but also indicated that arguably, Croatians were more invested in Australia than other migrant groups.

The gradual move from assimilation to integration policy also tempered responses to Croatian political activism. Criticism of assimilation came early in the 1950s from those that were involved in the provision of services to migrants, such as teachers, health workers and employers, and who experienced first-hand the inequalities assimilation policy produced. Over the next decade, the research

¹²³ J. Sparrow, 'ASIO's Weird, Incompetent Little Cold War', *Crikey*, 28 May 2008, <http://www.crikey.com.au/2008/05/28/asios-weird-incompetent-little-cold-war/>, accessed 3 July 2015.

¹²⁴ See: Šaravanja, *The Snowy and Croatians*.

of academics, such as Jean Martin, Jerzy Zubrzycki, and James Jupp, also began to reflect the failure of assimilation, and demographers Wilfred D. Borrie and Charles A. Price became particularly influential change agents due to their positions as principle academic advisers to the Immigration Department.¹²⁵ By 1964, the department had officially abandoned the term 'assimilation' for 'integration', the negatively connoted 'national groups' for 'ethnic communities' and 'ethnic organisations', and as a whole had 'developed a less fearful attitude towards the existence of ethnic minorities and their organisations.'¹²⁶ In this context, Croatian organisations found a legitimate role and space in Australian society that was simply not the case under the more hard-line assimilation policy of earlier years, and which removed at least some suspicion over their establishment.¹²⁷

As 1964 drew to a close, Croatian political activism subsided as an issue in parliament. Though this might have been inadvertent as issues of governance took precedence - such as budgeting and legislating - it could also be interpreted as an admission on behalf of the ALP that perhaps this issue was doing more electoral harm than good. The fallout from the Cairns fiasco which occupied much of 1964 proved detrimental, contributing to the perception that the ALP was sympathetic towards communism at a time when the 'red scare' still held political currency. The 1963 and 1966 elections bookended this period, and the overwhelming victory of the Coalition in 1966 with the 'Play it Safe' slogan indicated that anti-communism was an important electoral issue. Though Senator Tony Mulvihill would take up the mantle of Cairns and Ormonde and regularly raise the issue in the Senate throughout the rest of the 1960s, Croatian political activism would not be resurrected in proper until 1970.

¹²⁵ Lopez, *The Origins of Multiculturalism*, 60–61.

¹²⁶ Jordens, *Alien to Citizen*, 148.

¹²⁷ For more information on the institutional move from assimilation to integration, see:

'From assimilation to integration' in *ibid.*, 147–70.

'Assimilationism, Integrationism and Anti-assimilationism: 1945-1965' in Lopez, *The Origins of Multiculturalism*, 43–67.

3.3. THE PARADIGMS SHIFT

The perception of a high degree of politicisation within Croatian clubs became a source of some consternation by Australian authorities as close diplomatic ties were being forged with Yugoslavia from 1966.¹²⁸

The decade of 1963-1972 saw an escalation of violence within the Yugoslav community, including 14 bombings, 11 documented threats of violence, six incidents of vandalism, four incidents of violence involving weapons, four arrests, two murders, and a second incursion into Yugoslavia in June 1972, this time involving six Australian citizens and a further three who had previously lived in Australia.¹²⁹ Though some of this escalation in violence can be explained by the increased public attention of 1963/4 which escalated hostilities between Yugoslav migrants, it is also attributable as simply a statistical phenomenon. The opening up of Yugoslavia's borders from the early 1960s increased Yugoslav migration to unparalleled rates, and particularly of non-Croatian Yugoslav migrants.

The increased effort of Australian authorities to forge closer diplomatic ties with Yugoslavia culminated in a bilateral agreement between Yugoslavia and Australia on 21 July 1970. This included an assisted passage scheme that would result in 53,363 arrivals in 1970 and 1971 alone. 1970 was also the year Croatian political activism resurfaced as an issue in parliament. This was partly because of the shadow Croatian activism increasingly cast over the emerging diplomatic relationship between Australia and Yugoslavia, but also because the paradigms within which Croatian political activism was perceived and understood had undergone profound shifts that placed Croatian political activism increasingly at odds with Australia's social, political, and cultural environment.

¹²⁸ Drapac, 'Croatian Australians Today', 248.

¹²⁹ NAA: AA1975/387, 1/3, 'Incidents with connotations of Violence within the Yugoslav Community, 1963-1972'

3.3.1. THE SECOND WAVE OF CROATIAN EMIGRATION

Though the Tito-Stalin split of 1948 afforded Tito the space needed to introduce an alternative model of communism, it also left an ideological vacuum in exactly how this ‘Yugoslav Way’ would translate into practical forms of governance. Thus, the 1950s were defined by a number of internal divisions within the Communist leadership in regards to the substance and form the ‘Yugoslav Way’ would take, none more pronounced than the failure of agricultural collectivisation and the ensuing Milovan Djilas affair.¹³⁰ As the economic woes of Yugoslavia steadily worsened, liberal and conservative factions began to emerge around two dominant issues; centralism vs decentralism of the state, and liberalisation vs protectionism of economic policy.¹³¹

By 1961, Belgrade was beginning to acquiesce to pressures from party liberals, and introduced three reform measures to temper increasing internal divisions and Yugoslavia’s economic woes; the relaxation of wage controls, the reorganisation of financial markets, and the opening of the Yugoslav economy to world markets. It is this last reform that was to have a significant impact on Croatian migration, as it brought the illegal migration that had characterised the decade earlier out of condemnation and into tolerance as an economic consequence. However as inflation quickened and economic problems continued to grow, the reforms of 1961 were found to be insufficient, and compelled the federal government to enact a series of sweeping economic reforms in 1965. As

¹³⁰ Milovan Djilas was one of Tito’s closest associates, reaching the height of his power in 1953 when, as deputy chair of the Federal Executive Council, he was considered to be the Party’s leading ideologue and a possible successor to Tito. In October, and with Tito’s encouragement, he began publishing a series of articles in the Belgrade-based *Borba*, the official newspaper of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY), on the need for party and state development and reform. However he became increasingly critical of the situation in Yugoslavia, particularly of the leadership of the LCY. Seeing this as a threat to their leadership, Tito and other leading communists expelled Djilas from the Central Committee of the party in January 1954, and dismissed him from all political functions, along with 23 others, and a further 20 who were disciplined for their connection with Djilas. Djilas continued to publish his criticisms, denouncing the Yugoslav regime as totalitarian, repressive, and self-serving, earning a total of nine years in prison and a reputation as the best-known Yugoslav and communist dissident figures. For more information, see:

Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias*, 190–95.

Drapac, *Constructing Yugoslavia*, 217–21.

¹³¹ Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias*, 212.

See also: Brunnbauer, *Globalizing Southeastern Europe*, 290.

Zimmerman explains, not only did these reforms institutionalise the demands of reformist communists, but they also elevated

the notion of open borders to the level of state policy. Rather than a stance of tolerance or resignation, the open borders policy had come to be identified in official utterances as one of the key defining features, along with market socialism and self-management, of what was distinct and positive in the Yugoslav socialist variant and an element that set off Yugoslavia from the Soviet model.¹³²

With migration accepted and even encouraged by the state, the decision to emigrate became available to a much wider demographic.

Yugoslav migration to Australia increased to numbers unparalleled either before or after. Between 1961-1969, the average rate of migration increased from approximately 3000 arrivals per year to over 12000 in 1969. The bilateral agreement between Yugoslavia and Australia in 1970 legally reinforced this emigration, and the two year period between 1970 and 1971 alone saw approximately 53,363 arrivals. Between 1961 and 1976, the number of 'Yugoslav-Born' people in Australia increased from 49,776 to 143,591 – almost a threefold expansion in only 15 years, not including those born in Australia.¹³³

It is difficult to know the proportion of Croatians within these numbers as Australia did not officially distinguish between the various Yugoslav groups. Though Yugoslav migration in the post-war period had been predominantly Croatian,¹³⁴ the opening of the borders in the 1960s and the bilateral agreement of 1970 led to the increased migration of non-Croatian Yugoslavs to Australia. The numeric expansion of the community, coupled with the new diversity in ethnic make-up, led to a diversity of views in matters of Yugoslav affairs that diminished the dominance Croatians enjoyed in the 1950s. As can be expected, with this greater diversity, a greater degree of disagreement and hostility between the various groups followed. The greater size and diversity of the community also

¹³² Zimmerman, *Open Borders*, 76.

¹³³ Paric, 'Croatian Migration since 1970', 243.

¹³⁴ By 1971, Croatians made up slightly more than one-fifth of the total Yugoslav population, yet accounted for 39% of Yugoslavs abroad. Croatian migration from Bosnia-Herzegovina highlighted this trend more emphatically; although only one-fifth of the republic declared itself Croatian, more than 42% of its migrants were Croatian. See: Zimmerman, *Open Borders*, 84–85.

meant that, if for no other reason, incidents of violence would statistically become more frequent.

Despite their comparative decline, Croatians continued to constitute the largest proportion of Yugoslav migration, and the period between 1960-1972 was characterised by an exceptionally rapid expansion of the community. Officially classed as economic migrants, these were the first Croatians to come to Australia as documented immigrants. The social profile of second wave migrants was even more diverse than the first, with an unparalleled diversity across class, education, gender, age, and place of origin. This diversity also included political orientation and views, and as Tkalčević explains, many of these second wave Croatians argued that the identification of émigré Croatians exclusively with right-wing ideologies was false. For these Croatians, particularly those arriving after 1971, the political platform as outlined by the first wave and their organisations did not always fully coincide with their views, and some even established their own organisations to reflect this.¹³⁵

The 1960s also prompted the community to become more focused on life in Australia. The lack of government assistance in the face of this influx of Croatians meant that organisations were occupied with meeting the more straightforward demands the settlement of newcomers required. The social and cultural life of Croatians in Australia boomed as memberships swelled, interests expanded, and resources accumulated. Attention also turned to the preservation of language, culture, and tradition across generations. Not only were a greater number of children migrating to Australia, but a generation of Australian-born Croatians were being raised that had no experience of Croatia, and were growing up in an English-speaking world. Thus, the practice of establishing a local *Hrvatska škola* - 'Croatian School' came into being, with the first schools opened in Adelaide in 1961 and Sydney in 1963. *Hrvatska škola* would become a mainstay throughout most communities and rite of passage for Croatian children, even to this day.

¹³⁵ Tkalčević, *Povijest Hrvata U Australiji*, 72.

As more Croatians poured into the community and political views became more diverse, social and cultural clubs increasingly formed the nexus of the community. Whereas the organisations of the first wave were clearly politically defined, the political orientation of second wave organisations was less-defined, instead placing priority on the social concerns of everyday life in Australia. This did not eliminate the political concerns or activism of the community, but instead resulted in a shift from an emphasis on political rhetoric to one of ethno-national survival. Though Croatians were increasingly at odds as to how or when or what type of an independent Croatian state should be established, the one thing they could all agree on was that they were not ethnically, culturally, nor linguistically Yugoslav.

It was often argued, both at the time and afterwards, that despite their official demarcation as economic migrants, second wave Croatians were also political migrants, even if their politics differed from their predecessors. Though they were not escaping the overt persecution of the late 1940s and 1950s, the socio-political reality of Yugoslavia meant that Croatians, particularly those with dissenting views to the Yugoslav federal government, used the structures of economic migration to escape the Yugoslav totalitarian regime, either out of a fear of direct persecution, or in general protest to the economic, ethnic, and political discrimination faced by Croatians at the hands of Yugoslav officials.

Despite the correlation between these economic and political reasons, it can be problematic to conflate the two, or argue the primacy of political reasons for migration. The absence of archival records or comprehensive oral histories about the reasons for migration of this wave means that it is difficult to estimate the extent to which political considerations informed the decision to migrate. Zimmerman and Brunnbauer both argue that the greater determinant of migration seems to lie in entrenched patterns of chain migration.¹³⁶ Yugoslav migrants were more likely to originate from areas where there existed a cultural memory of migration, particularly as a well-established method of managing

¹³⁶ Zimmerman, *Open Borders*, 97–98.
Brunnbauer, *Globalizing Southeastern Europe*, 260-62.

adverse economic conditions. It is easier to decide to emigrate for a person whose father or grandfather has already done so, where there is a relative or friend already abroad who could help facilitate the move, or where there are existing ties to a community in the diaspora, even if the connection is as tenuous as a friend of a friend or someone from the same village. As demonstrated in Chapter 1, Croatians, particularly those from the Dalmatian region, had a well-entrenched tradition of emigration, particularly to Australia. This cultural memory could therefore account for the higher proportion of Croatians emigrating in the 1960s – put simply, Croatians migrated because they already had somewhere to go and had a tradition of going.

The pre-eminence of economic imperatives to migration in the 1960s, rather than political persecution, is perhaps best understood by looking to the fall in rates of migration in the 1970s. Just as Croatian nationalism was reaching its zenith in 1971, the relative proportion of Croatians in Yugoslav migration was already diminishing, and by the 1980s had significantly reduced.¹³⁷ If migration was of a political nature, it could reasonably be expected that the relative proportion of Croatians would stay steady, or even increase in the wake of the 1971 Croatian Spring and its purges.¹³⁸ However as Goldstein argues, the 1970s was a period of economic prosperity in Croatia – the standard of living was at its highest levels, and the average Croatian worker could expect to live a ‘Good Life’ full of consumer goods, Western fashions, German cars, and weekend trips away.¹³⁹ This economic prosperity did not extend to the poorer republics of Yugoslavia, and migrants from these republics formed a growing proportion of both intra-Yugoslav migration, as well as Yugoslav outmigration. If the economic boom of the 1970s led to a decreased rate of Croatian migration despite a climate

¹³⁷ Zimmerman, *Open Borders*, 95–105.

¹³⁸ The Croatian Spring will be covered in section 4.1.1

¹³⁹ For example, the first freeway in Croatia opened in 1972, while construction on the Ljubljana-Zagreb-Belgrade freeway was underway, and a number of smaller roads, tunnels, and bridges completed a new road network which connected the country both within and outside its borders. Tourism was booming, particularly on the Dalmatian coast, and from 1970, large luxurious hotels began appearing. Three new universities were opened in Rijeka, Split, and Osijek, and some industries began to gain international recognition, particularly in construction, shipbuilding, oil, pharmaceutical, chemical, and metal industries. See: Goldstein, *Croatia: A History*, 185–86.

of increased political persecution, the 1960s can be understood in the reverse – an increased rate of migration due to the economic bust of the late 1950s/early 1960s despite a climate of comparative political freedom that favoured liberalist/decentralist policy, even if it was within a communist paradigm.¹⁴⁰

Furthermore, it is difficult to know whether individuals emigrated actively and purposefully for political reasons, or whether their emigration was economic and became politicised upon their arrival into a community that had already constructed migration as political. Part of the reason why remembering this wave of migration as political has remained unchallenged is because the conflation of the economic with the political formed a large part of the way the community in Australia has rationalised the cognitive dissonance generated by the act of migration with its political activism. If one is as patriotic a Croatian as is often asserted, the act of voluntary migration can be perceived as a cowardly or traitorous act, or simply the easy way out - all accusations levelled at Croats in the diaspora to this day. However, if one is 'forced' to leave their homeland, as was the case with the first wave of Croats, this dissonance can be resolved and their activism understood as long-distance nationalism. This goes some way to explaining why Croats in Australia were politically active to the degree they were; because of the dissonance caused by the act of migration, it was not enough to simply be Croatian in Australia, you needed to prove yourself the right *kind* of Croatian. This demonstration was often encapsulated in the popular label of an individual as a *Veliki Hrvat* – a 'big' Croatian.

¹⁴⁰ Patterson has undertaken an interesting and comprehensive exploration of the relationship between economic conditions and the legitimacy of the Yugoslav state. He argues: 'Did this country's consumer culture matter? Did it play a part in the life and death of Yugoslavia? The record demonstrates that it did. Because the ideal of consumer abundance was so eagerly bought and so successfully sold, and because that ideal became the basis of a vibrant popular culture when it was given life in the everyday desires, thoughts, and values that were shared by ordinary people, Yugoslavia first flourished when times were good, then faltered when it became clear that ever increasing abundance could not prove sustainable. Because the culture of plenty and pleasure had been so much of what made the country a success and held it together, the undoing of that culture in the 1980s was felt all the more acutely when Yugoslavia at last fragmented and fell to pieces.' See: P. Patterson, *Bought & Sold: Living and Losing the Good Life in Socialist Yugoslavia* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2011), 17.

3.3.2. THE END OF THE MENZIAN AGE

Though historians bookend the period of the ‘Sixties’ at different times with different events and in different places, all agree that significant social, political, and cultural changes occurred in Australia somewhere between the late 1950s through to the mid-1970s. Anti-Vietnam protests, student activism, indigenous civil rights activism, LGBT activism, women’s liberation, the sexual revolution, environmentalism, counter-culture, and youth revolts are all hallmarks of this period of social upheaval. Though the various movements were distinctive and divergent, Piccini argues that there was a significant enough interrelation and interconnection between the movements, both domestically and internationally, that can characterise the 1960s as a transnational ‘movement of movements.’¹⁴¹

It is important to remember, however, that the 1960s as they are shaped in cultural memory are also distorted and limited. Historians now generally accept two important qualifications to the historiography of the period. The first is that though politics and protest were important and influential features, only a minority of the population was ever really involved. As Robinson and Ustinoff point out,

the reality is that the vast majority of Australians were neither hippies nor dope-smokers; involvement in youth protest movements was, in the main, an experience for middle-class university students; and sexual liberation was a hotly contested debate.¹⁴²

Second, the question of whether and how these broad upheavals impacted the daily life of Australians remains ambiguous. Some, such as O’Hanlon and Luckins, have found that there are very real reflections of the ‘new values’ of the 1960s in the everyday life of Australians, while others, such as Smaal, argue that perhaps the rhetoric did not always match the lived experience of people.¹⁴³

¹⁴¹ J. Piccini, *Transnational Protest, Australia and the 1960s* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 9–10.

¹⁴² S. Robinson and J. Ustinoff (eds.), *The 1960s in Australia: People, Power and Politics* (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2012), xii.

¹⁴³ S. O’Hanlon, “The Reign of the ‘Six-Pack’: Flats and Flat-Life in Australia in the 1960s”, in Robinson and Ustinoff (eds.), *The 1960s in Australia*, 33-50.

Y. Smaal, ‘Sex in the Sixties’, in Robinson and Ustinoff (eds.), *The 1960s in Australia*, 69-96.

Nonetheless, the social transformations of the 1960s had an important impact on Australia's political environment. Elected leader of the ALP in 1967, Whitlam recognised that these upheavals, along with demographic and economic changes of the post-war period, had created new political constituencies the ALP could exploit to win office. Burgeoning migrant communities desperate for government assistance; an expanding white collar middle-class more likely to respond to an aspirational, values-based political program than the working-class solidarity and union strength platform Labor had traditionally relied on; and new cultures less focused on class, religion, or anti-communism as the basis of political identification and more on the ideals of equality, rights, and community all delivered a political platform from which an election campaign could be formulated.¹⁴⁴ At the same time, those agitating for change 'ultimately arrived at the same conclusion as older challengers to the established order. It would require legislative change – action by the state – for marginalised groups to achieve equality.'¹⁴⁵ Thus, Piccini explains,

the election of Labor's Gough Whitlam in December of 1972 is often pictured as the radical wave [of the 1960s] finally making landfall, while that government's inglorious dismissal three years later captures the tide's quick retreat.¹⁴⁶

One of the crowning achievements of the Whitlam government was its official policy of multiculturalism, which introduced the formal government assistance migrant communities had so desperately wanted and needed. Not only did this policy accept the cultural differences of migrants that had been discouraged under assimilation and integration, but encouraged these differences as an intrinsically Australian quality. Multiculturalism afforded a wealth of opportunity for Croatian migrants and their activism. The emphasis it placed on cultural expression, coupled with the inter-relatedness of the cultural and political in Croatian activism, provided Croatians with the ability to engage in activism across many platforms not previously available to them. That multiculturalism stressed ethnicity over nationality meant that Croatians were

¹⁴⁴ Peel and Twomey, *A History of Australia*, 233–37.

¹⁴⁵ *ibid.*, 237.

¹⁴⁶ Piccini, *Transnational Protest*, 8.

able to legitimately advocate for their causes as Croats and bypass issues raised by their Yugoslav citizenship. Furthermore, Croatian political activism was able to resume its traditional patterns in advocating for identity recognition through campaigns for access to services, including that most Croats of proxy battlegrounds, language recognition.

Just as multiculturalism was one of the outcomes of the transformations of the 1960s, so too was a purposeful repudiation of the anti-communist position that had defined the 1950s and the 23 years of Coalition government rule. As Whitlam enacted a number of changes in order to establish Australia's newfound neutral stance in international affairs, the pivot away from anti-communism as a political ideal represented an end to the latitude Croatian political activism enjoyed. The loss of this political currency, coupled with the political diversity of the second wave of Croatian migration led to a shift in Croatian political activism. Whereas emphasis once lay on the 'not-communist' message of Croatian activism, the focus now lay on the 'not-Yugoslav' message. However, changes in the international political environment limited the political currency of the 'not-Yugoslav' message as well.

3.3.3. THE COLD WAR THAW

The events of WWII made legitimising a new Yugoslav state between fiercely nationalistic groups, scarred by an unending series of hostility and brutality against one another, a difficult feat to achieve. In order to do this, the Tito regime invoked what Ramet has termed the 'legitimizing triad' of Tito's Yugoslavia - 'Brotherhood and Unity', Self-management, and Non-alignment. 'Brotherhood and Unity' (*Bratstvo i Jedinstvo*) served as the moral pillar upon which Yugoslav state legitimacy was built. It invoked the mythology of WWII and Partisan victory as a triumph of anti-fascist resistance and a symbol of inter-ethnic cooperation between the Yugoslav peoples under communism. The 1948 Tito-Stalin split required an articulation of Yugoslav communism that distinguished its political

and economic formula from that of the Soviet Union.¹⁴⁷ This was to be achieved through the concept of self-management, which was deployed as both an economic and political pillar.

The final pillar, Non-Alignment, combined the principles of brotherhood and unity and self-management and applied them to the world stage by promoting a ‘third way’ in international politics. This meant Yugoslavia could stand in solidarity with others to create a foreign policy movement that was independent of the Soviet bloc or the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), while demonstrating its progressiveness relative to both. Though non-alignment as a concept was introduced to the international political lexicon in the early 1950s, it was not until 1961 that the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) was institutionalised, with Tito convening the first *Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries* in Belgrade.

As Brotherhood and Unity distinguished Tito’s Yugoslavia from the bloodshed of WWII, and the principle of self-management distinguished between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, Non-Alignment served to distinguish Yugoslav foreign policy from both other communist countries and the Western world. Tito’s leadership of NAM from 1961-4, coupled with the liberal/decentralist reforms enacted in Yugoslavia during the 1960s bolstered Yugoslavia’s desirability and strategic importance in the West;

Taken in sum, these programmatic components struck many observers as amounting to a new vision of politics, a new dream; and at the height of the Titoist experiment, delegations from all over the world would visit Yugoslavia to study self-management and see what might be applicable in their own countries.¹⁴⁸

Self-management became the topic *du jour* for economists and politicians worldwide, either as a possible solution to internal criticisms of the communist

¹⁴⁷ Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias*, 185–86.

¹⁴⁸ Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias*, 186.

system, a possible conflict resolution tool within companies, or simply because of its unique combination of socialist and market economy principles.¹⁴⁹

Yugoslavia's standing as a communist alternative to the Soviet Union was bolstered as revelations about the excesses and horrors of Stalinism came to light and 'made it difficult for all but the most fanatical of Europe's Left to idealize the Soviet Union and favour it over Yugoslavia.'¹⁵⁰ This was augmented by Yugoslavia's growth in geopolitical importance as the Cold War moved from the brink of the Cuban missile crisis in 1962 to official *détente* in 1969. Though this importance was symbolic rather than practical, 'leadership of the non-aligned nations brought Tito a certain stature on the global stage.'¹⁵¹ As the West became increasingly enamoured with Yugoslavia and charmed by Tito, proclaiming oneself not-Yugoslav, anti-Yugoslav, or anti-Tito did not carry the same clout as it did in the previous decade. As Western countries, including Australia scrambled to establish political and diplomatic ties with this symbolic powerhouse of the 'Third Way', Croatians and their activism became increasingly problematic.


The net effect of these changes in paradigms was that even though the Croatian community was at its most diverse demographically and politically, the social transformations of the 1960s and the introduction of multiculturalism shifted the emphasis of Croatian activism from the political goals of the reestablishment of an independent state, to questions of ethno-national survival and Croatian identity in Australia. However, the Cold War thaw, and Australia's reorientation in foreign policy meant that even though Croatians were more and more able to engage in their activism across different platforms, it was less and less politically acceptable to do so. This divergence would come to define the period of 1972-1979.

¹⁴⁹ H. Klasić, *Jugoslavija I Svijet 1968* (Zagreb: Naklada Ljevak, 2012), 351.

¹⁵⁰ Drapac, *Constructing Yugoslavia*, 212.

¹⁵¹ *ibid.*, 223.

CHAPTER 4: NOT REDS UNDER BEDS, BUT CROATS IN THE BUSH! 1972-1979



The Age, 28 March 1973, 9

Overnight, the Croats went from fellow travellers of the right and a bastion of anti-communism, to being former fascists and terrorists against a friendly socialist Yugoslavian government.¹

Roy Hay

On 27 March 1973, Murphy rose to deliver his Ministerial Statement on Croatian Terrorism.² Though less than a decade separated Murphy's Statement from that of Menzies, their positions regarding Croatian organisations and their activism could not be more different. Murphy's Statement took almost an hour to deliver, and included the tabling of 62 documents, amounting to more than 2000 pages, drawn from police, ASIO, and departmental files. The purpose of his Statement was twofold – to expose the evidence and existence of Croatian terrorism in Australia, and to demonstrate the persistent denial of this threat by previous governments, particularly the former Attorney-General, Liberal Senator Ivor J. Greenwood. Murphy's Statement consisted of six main themes; that there was evidence of Croatian terrorism in Australia, that there was evidence of Croatian terrorist organisations in Australia; that there was evidence of Croatian terrorists residing in Australia; that Croatian terrorism was able to develop in Australia due to the indifference and bias of previous governments; that Greenwood was particularly culpable of inaction through his tenure as Attorney-General; and that Murphy and the Whitlam Government were determined to enact changes.³

Like Menzies' Statement in 1964, Murphy's Statement was met with immediate criticism. However, this criticism was more than a disagreement with Murphy's position or his allegations of Croatian terrorism. As Senator Reginald Withers remarked:

Rather than spend some 60 minutes in this place trying to destroy his predecessor in office as Attorney-General it would have been far better for Senator Murphy to justify his own actions over the last 12 days, which have put the total security of this nation at risk.⁴

These actions were the events of Friday 16 March 1973, when at 7:40am, 27 Commonwealth Police officers entered the headquarters of ASIO in Melbourne. Acting on the orders of Murphy, officers sealed all safes, cabinets, and containers

¹ Hay, 'Those Bloody Croatians,' 84.

² See Appendix 1B for a copy of the full Ministerial Statement.

³ Kalfic, 'Knock Knock', 16–37.

⁴ Australia, Senate, *Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. S.13, 1973, 547.

on the premises, and held guard until Murphy's arrival at 9:45am. After addressing and thanking staff in the auditorium for their 'co-operation', Murphy held a conference with ASIO's Director-General, Peter Barbour, and officers from both ASIO and the Commonwealth Police, during which he 'inspected certain files'.⁵ Approximately three hours later, Murphy left ASIO, phoned Whitlam to advise him of the day's events, and caught a late afternoon flight for his home in Sydney. Thus, Murphy's 'Raid' on ASIO was born.

This was an unprecedented event in Australian political history. Never before had Australia seen a minister, much less the first Law Officer of the country, raid the department for which they were responsible. In the 11 days between the and his Ministerial Statement, Murphy maintained that the reason for his 'visit' to ASIO's headquarters was to gather information to ensure security arrangements were adequate for the visit of the Yugoslav Prime Minister, Džemal Bijedić, from 20-22 March. 'The most stringent security measures are necessary for the Prime Minister's safety,' Murphy explained, 'because of the existence in our midst of Croatian revolutionary terrorist organisations. These were tolerated by the previous Government which even denied their existence.'⁶ Murphy had in fact indicated as early as 1 March that he would be delivering a statement based on his investigations into Croatian terrorist organisations that would 'show quite a different picture from that painted by the previous Attorney-General.'⁷ However, his Raid on ASIO raised the expectations of his statement, which now needed to provide an explanation and justification for his actions on 16 March.⁸

⁵ 'Statement by Murphy', *Canberra Times*, 17 March 1973, 1.

⁶ *ibid.*

⁷ Australia, Senate, *Parliamentary Debates*, Vol. S.13, 1973, 88.

⁸ For example, see the following editorials from the *Sydney Morning Herald* and *The Age*:

'It is hard to believe that ASIO would not provide information if it was vital to the distinguished visitor's safety, or (for this must be the suspicion) that it has been shielding Ustasha terrorists. Senator Murphy will therefore be required to tell Parliament just what information he sought from the ASIO files, whether he found it, and whether it contributed to Mr Bijedić's safety while here. He will have to put a convincing case, or many more very awkward questions will be asked.'

'ASIO on trial', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 19 March 1973, 6.

'Today the onus is on Senator Murphy to justify his tactics, to document his case on Ustashi terrorism in Australia and to explain just what the relationship between the Government and ASIO is to be.... Australia does not want a repeat of the drama-cum-melodrama of the past week or so. It does not want the lingering stigma of allegedly playing host to a fanatical and violent minority of Croatian migrants.'

This much-awaited explanation, however, was nowhere to be found in Murphy's Statement, save for a fleeting mention at the end which ostensibly linked the Raid with the issue of Croatian terrorism;

I should like to add a word about events of last week. I am advised that terrorists came to Canberra last week with the intention of killing the Yugoslav Prime Minister... In this situation, I make no apology for any steps which I took last week to ensure that the intentions of violent terrorists were thwarted.⁹

It was only at the insistence of the Opposition in Question Time following the statement that Murphy directly addressed the Raid, explaining;

The reason for my action in seeing to it that certain safes and containers were sealed was that I wanted certain information preserved. The reason for my visit was to ascertain certain information.¹⁰

Even though Murphy faced an almost daily barrage of questions both inside and out of the Parliament for nearly two months after the Raid, he refused to elaborate on his motives, even when 'he was so driven into a corner that he simply refused to answer further questions – a humiliating failure for any minister'.¹¹ Hostility in the Senate came thick and fast, and 'the ferocity of the subsequent parliamentary debates was equalled only by their frequency.'¹² On 5 April, the Senate seemed to be close to boiling point,¹³ and passed a motion of no-confidence in Murphy – 'the first time a censure motion had been carried against a minister in the Australian Senate.'¹⁴

What it does want is a full and frank explanation from Senator Murphy of the whole Ustasha-ASIO-Government affair.'

'The senator and the spies', *The Age*, 27 March 1973, 9.

⁹ Australia, Senate, *Parliamentary Debates*, No. S.13, 1973, 538

¹⁰ Australia, Senate, *Parliamentary Debates*, No. S.13, 1973, 562

¹¹ M. Sexton, *Illusions of Power: The fate of a reform government*, (Nth Sydney: George Allen & Unwin, 1979), 79.

¹² G. Illardi, 'The Whitlam Government's 1973 Clash', *International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence*, 14(1), 2001, 73.

¹³ Senator Reginald Turnbull had this to say of the atmosphere on 5 April 1973: 'What disturbs me is the smell of death in this chamber, of people waiting to kill. One can sort of smell this atmosphere of hate which is pervading this chamber and emanating from certain members on the Opposition benches.... You can notice it; you can see the venom drooling out of their mouths as they wait for the kill.' Australia, Senate, *Parliamentary Debates*, No.S.14, 1973, 915-6.

¹⁴ Blaxland, *The Protest Years*, 341.

The sheer spectacle of the Raid, coupled with the high drama that ensued in its aftermath, has meant that the search for an explanation of Murphy's actions has taken precedence, both at the time and in subsequent studies of the Raid. However, in this quest to find answers to what was not in his Ministerial Statement – why Murphy raided ASIO – many have failed to ask an equally important, though less glamorous question – why did Murphy deliver this particular Ministerial Statement? It is this question that Section 4.1 seeks to answer. Much like Menzies' statement of 1964, there are a number of complex domestic and international contexts and historical legacies that led Murphy to deliver this particular statement. In the same way Croats and their activism were deployed as a Cold War political football, the political environment of 1972/3 constructed the 'Croat problem' as a proxy battle for wider political debates, a short-hand for the positioning of political parties against one another. Like the debates of 1963/4, the debates of 1972/3 dissipated as domestic political concerns took over.

Section 4.2 examines the response of Croats to Murphy's allegations of violence, extremism, and terrorism. Like their 1950s-60s counterparts, Croats modified their activism as circumstances arose, deploying resources available to them to explain, defend, or speak back to these allegations. Just as Croats in the previous period framed their activism in the rhetoric of anti-communism, Croats in the 1970s framed their activism in the rhetoric of rights – both to their identity as Croats, and to their rights of protest and activism as Australian citizens. The introduction of multicultural policy also influenced Croatian responses, as it provided Croats with the ability to engage in activism across platforms not previously available to them. This activism within the frameworks of rights and responsibilities, multiculturalism and identity recognition, coupled with the scars of Murphy's Ministerial Statement led to the establishment of the Croatian 'Embassy' in 1977. This was a considered and coordinated attempt to address and redress the reputation of extremism, violence and terrorism Murphy had branded the community and its activism with.

Finally, Section 4.3 will explore the case of the Croatian Six. The arrest of six Croatian men on terror-related charges seemed to vindicate Murphy's Ministerial Statement, and threatened to undermine the efforts of Croatians in repudiating the allegations levelled at them. However, responses were mitigated by paradigm shifts under way in the late 1970s, such as the advent of non-European immigration. In the same way the paradigm shifts of the 1960s resulted in the responses of the Whitlam government era, these changes in international and domestic contexts would define responses to Croatian activism in the 1980s. If the previous period was defined by the Cold War adage that the enemy of my enemy is my friend, this period was defined by the moral panic and the movement from Menzies' 'Reds under the beds' to Murphy's 'Croats in the bush', and from Murphy's 'Croats in the bush' to a rebooted 'Yellow Peril'.

4.1. MURPHY'S FURPHY

*In contrast to the last Government's policy of trying to sweep this problem under the rug, we propose to bring it into the full light of day... These documents establish beyond doubt that Croatian terrorist organisations have existed and do exist in Australia today.*¹⁵

I have argued elsewhere that the reason for Murphy's Raid on ASIO lay less in any overt threat of Croatian terrorism and more in the covert contextual considerations surrounding the Raid. These included the foreign policy benefits the Whitlam Government could gain by the appearance of 'dealing with' the Croatian problem, Murphy's deep suspicions of ASIO and the generally strained relationship between ASIO and the ALP, Murphy's personal hubris, including his adversarial and impulsive character, and bitter rivalries with Greenwood, the political right, and to a lesser degree, Whitlam himself.¹⁶ This section instead focuses on the question of why Murphy singled out 'Croatian terrorism' as his explanation for the Raid. Though there is necessarily some overlap with reasons for the Raid itself, there are unique reasons why Murphy's statement targeted 'Croatian terrorism', instead of right-wing extremism, politically-motivated violence, or even Ustaša terrorism.

In the lead up to the 1972 election, Croatian activism was gaining momentum in Australia, due to the increase in Yugoslav migration to Australia as a result of the 1970 agreement, and developments in Croatian activism both worldwide and in Croatia itself. This increased activism was accompanied by an increase in politically-motivated violence, and responses to Croatian activism and these incidents became a symbolic point of difference between the Liberal Party and the ALP. Once elected, both Whitlam and Murphy concerned themselves with bringing the issue of Croatian activism under control, but for different reasons – for Murphy, the issue was one of law and order, or more precisely lawlessness and disorder, while for Whitlam, Croatian activism and the increased targeting of

¹⁵ Lionel Murphy, Australia, Senate, *Parliamentary Debates*, No.S.13, 1973, 530.

¹⁶ Kalfic, 'Knock Knock', 75-101

Yugoslav diplomatic missions was a foreign policy issue. Whether intentionally or inadvertently, the actions of the Whitlam government resulted in what is best described as a moral panic.

4.1.1. DEVELOPMENTS IN CROATIAN POLITICAL ACTIVISM

As explained in Section 3.3, the decade spanning 1963-1972 saw an escalation of violence within the Yugoslav community in both frequency and severity, which increasingly targeted Yugoslav diplomatic missions. Murphy attributed this escalation to the 'curious defeatism and lack of initiative in successive Liberal governments' reaction to these outrages.¹⁷ Though the latitude afforded Croatian activism by previous governments may have emboldened some to act in ways they might not have otherwise, there are more nuanced explanations for this escalation in violence which take into account important contextual considerations. The growing momentum of Croatian activism, the increase in non-Croatian Yugoslav migrants with political agendas of their own, and the international phenomenon of politically motivated violence beginning in the late 1960s far better explain these developments than the simplistic reason offered by Murphy.

Croatian activism was gaining momentum in Australia during this period for three primary reasons. The first was the statistical growth of the community from 1966 covered in Section 3.3.1. This made Croatian political activism larger and more visible in the public sphere. For example, whereas an anti-Yugoslav demonstration in Sydney's Double Bay in 1968 attracted approximately 600 protestors, an anti-Yugoslav demonstration in the very same place just 3 years later attracted almost 3000 protestors.¹⁸ The second reason for this momentum lay in developments in government policy which afforded migrants increasing freedom to advocate their views and express their identity. Lopez describes the

¹⁷ Australia, Senate, *Parliamentary Debates*, No. S.13, 1973, 529.

¹⁸ 'Flag Burnt at Consulate', *Sun Herald*, 1 December 1968, 7.

'Croats protest against Tito', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 29 December 1971, 9.

period from 1966-1970 as 'Proto-Multiculturalism' and argues that this period of ideological development coincided with the 'high-water mark of integrationsim in migrant settlement and welfare policy.'¹⁹ Though not as promising as the multiculturalism that would come after it, this period nonetheless provided Croatians a far greater legitimacy to organise and advocate than had been extended under assimilation.

The third and most important reason for this increased momentum, however, lay in the developments in Croatia itself known as the Croatian Spring (*Hrvatsko proljeće*, or *masovni pokret - MASPOK*). This nationalist reawakening began as a reform movement within the League of Communists of Croatia (LCC), and ended as a mass cultural and political movement. It developed around the notion that Croatia and Croatians were being economically, culturally, and politically disenfranchised by a process of 'Serbianisation' within the Yugoslav government and its institutions. The LCC, the *Matica Hrvatska*, and the University of Zagreb were the main institutions around which this movement organised. As with the national revival of the 19th century, the Croatian Spring would be led by intellectuals, and the activities of the *Matica Hrvatska* would be central in reinvigorating nationalist sentiment. The issue of language acted as a proxy issue representing all facets of the dispute, and became the foremost example of this 'Serbianisation', just as it had during the Illyrian movement and in the inter-war years.

Though there were many antecedents, the catalyst for the Croatian Spring proper came with the 1967 'Declaration concerning the Name and Position of the Croatian literary language,' which Čuvalo describes as the 'first open manifestation of nationalism by Croatian intellectuals.'²⁰ The declaration was a response to the publication of the first two volumes of the Serbo-Croatian/Croato-Serbian dictionary, which presented Serbian expressions as the standard, and either omitted Croatian expressions altogether, or classed them as local dialects. Published in the Zagreb weekly *Telegram* on 17 March, the

¹⁹ Lopez, *The Origins of Multiculturalism*, 91.

²⁰ Čuvalo, *The Croatian National Movement*, 60.

declaration was signed by over 140 Croatian intellectuals, at least 18 Croatian cultural institutions, and most controversially, internationally renowned writer Miroslav Krleža. It renounced the 1954 Novi Sad Agreement, which had established the Serbo-Croatian/Croato-Serbian language, and instead argued that Croats had a constitutional right to their own language. Continual efforts to unify the Croatian and Serbian languages, the declaration continued, had essentially downgraded Croatian to a local dialect, and therefore eroded this right. Because of the scope of its signatories, the declaration was perceived as the most direct and overt attack on the Belgrade Government and its language policy to date, and resulted in the forced removal of some from public life. Thus, the language issue 'became one of the most heavily politicised and nationalised subjects in Yugoslav Croatia.'²¹

The *Matica Hrvatska* was perhaps the most vociferous of all Croatian Spring participants. After falling into relative obscurity after WWII, an energetic new membership revived it in the 1960s, including Većeslav Holjevac, the popular former Mayor of Zagreb, Franjo Tuđman, a former general turned historian who would become Croatia's first democratically elected president in 1990, Marko Veselica, Vlado Gotovac, and Šime Đodan. Under their stewardship, the *Matica* was transformed into 'a vibrant powerhouse of popular nationalist agitation.'²² It publicised its views namely through print, most notably its journal, *Kritika*, which 'caricatured Belgrade as a metaphor for the ruthless, bourgeois, backward Serbs who were oppressing the more advanced Croats';²³ its bi-monthly literary magazine *Kolo*; and a vast number of pamphlets and booklets 'which popularised their ideas about the renewal of Croatia's nationhood, culture and economics.'²⁴

However its weekly, the *Hrvatski Tjednik*, became a phenomenon in its own right. First published in April 1971, the paper quickly skyrocketed to mass-circulation, out-performing its competitors almost instantaneously, and created a public, nationwide profile for the intellectuals operating out of the *Matica*.

²¹ Bellamy, *The Formation of Croatian National Identity*, 139.

²² Tanner, *Croatia*, 194.

²³ Bellamy, *The Formation of Croatian National Identity*, 55.

²⁴ Tanner, *Croatia*, 194.

Alongside its sister publication devoted to economic issues, *Hrvatski Gospodarski Glasnik*, a wide variety of issues were covered, from Croatia's economic exploitation and decline, demographic change, and the status of Croats in Bosnia, through to the designs on postage stamps and lack of Croatian words on railway timetables. Its regular column distinguishing correct Croatian from common Serbian expressions became one of its most emblematic features.

The Yugoslav-wide debates about centralism vs. decentralism of the state, and liberalisation vs. protectionism in economic policy featured heavily in the debates of the LCC throughout the 1960's, and communist conservatives such as Vladimir Bakarić, Milutin Balić, and Jakov Blažević found themselves increasingly losing power to a democratic and nationally-oriented faction of younger communists that had grown up under Tito, who claimed that the centralist and protectionist policies of the central Yugoslav government was resulting in the economic disenfranchisement of Croatia. Headed by Savka Dabčević-Kučar, this liberally oriented leadership included prominent members such as Miko Tripalo, once President of the League of Communist Youth of Yugoslavia, who rose through the ranks to occupy a variety of important positions within both the Croatian republic and federal communist party systems, Pero Pirker, the mayor of Zagreb from 1963-1967, and Dragutin Haramija, the Prime Minister of Croatia. The furore over the 1967 Declaration only encouraged the reformers, and in 1968 Dabčević-Kučar was appointed the Head of Party in Croatia, while Tripalo became the Yugoslav Presidency member for Croatia. The complaints of the reformers, Tanner explains, 'boiled down to two principle points: that there were too many Serbs in the army, the police and the Party in Croatia, and that too much money, especially hard currency, was being exported to Belgrade.'²⁵

The first confrontation between the two factions came at the Tenth Plenum of the Croatian Central Committee in January 1970. The session was convened in response to a campaign by Miloš Žanko in the later months of 1969 aimed at discrediting Dabčević-Kučar's leadership via a series of articles published in

²⁵ *ibid.*, 191.

Borba that attempted to portray her leadership as a fascist revival. The majority of the committee strongly backed Dabčević-Kučar, and though her victory was 'less significant than it appeared... The public perception in Croatia was that Dabčević-Kučar had won her fight and the result of the Tenth Session caused a tremendous stir.'²⁶ She was seen to have made the Croatian Communist Party's independent vision for Croatia public and outside of central party organs, and from this point on 'drew steadily closer to the ideology of *Matica Hrvatska* and the nationalists.'²⁷ It is also from this point that the Croatian Spring left the confines of the communist party and the walls of the *Matica*, and moved into the streets as a mass movement. Rallies were held in favour of Dabčević-Kučar's leadership where the Croatian *Šahovnica* flag, rather than the Yugoslav red star, predominated, patriotic songs of the Croatian homeland were revived, often played in restaurants across Croatia, and Croats began to reclaim their history, reviving nationalist heroes such as Stjepan Radić, founder of the Croatian Peasant Party, Petar Krešimir IV the Great, the 11th century Croatian King under whom the Croatian realm reached its territorial peak, and Josip Jelačić, the 19th century *Ban* of Croatia.²⁸

The University of Zagreb was another prominent institution of the Croatian Spring, which in 1969 was set to celebrate the 300th anniversary of its establishment. Preparations for the celebration 'gave the reformers a platform to spread their views,'²⁹ which was reinforced by the election of Ivan Čičak (an outsider and avowed liberal) to the post of university pro-rector. The university also distinguished itself when its students formed the first independent students organisation in Yugoslavia, the Croatian League of Students, with Dražen Budiša at its head. Following patterns in Europe and the United States, the student movement in Croatia became one of the most politically aware and active of social groups. This student movement would become the most radical and

²⁶ *ibid.*, 193–94.

²⁷ Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias*, 236.

²⁸ *ibid.*, 236–38.

²⁹ Tanner, *Croatia*, 194.

enduring symbol of the Croatian Spring, with Čičak and Budiša later emerging as influential political figures.

Student advocacy culminated on 22 November 1971, when 3000 members of the Croatian Students Union gathered in Zagreb, and unanimously voted to begin a strike at 9am the following day. Their demands were ‘a synthesis of the immediate and strategic goals of the Croatian Spring,’³⁰ including the various linguistic, economic, military, and political demands raised in the preceding years. By 25 November, similar student actions supporting those in Zagreb formed in Split, Rijeka and Dubrovnik, and ‘within a matter of days, at least 30,000 university students across Croatia were on strike.’³¹ At the insistence of Dabčević-Kučar herself, the protest ended peacefully after a few days, but was not without consequences.

The problem of increasing Croatian dissidence across political, economic and cultural grounds was exactly what Tito feared would destabilise and delegitimise his administration, particularly in light of the Hungarian crisis in 1954 and the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. However, Tito’s reaction to these developments in Croatia

followed a pattern repeated several times in the era of the Croatian spring: Tito would arrive from Belgrade, incandescent with rage and full of ideas that had been put into his head by the Serb generals, the secret police and the Party officials in Serbia. After seeing matters for himself, he would go away mollified and apparently convinced that matters were less serious than he had first thought.³²

The onset of mass student protests, however, both enraged and embarrassed Tito, who was in the United States on a state visit at the time.³³ Disappointed his attempt to appease Croatian demands for liberalisation and decentralisation had only served to feed the beast he saw as Croatian nationalism and separatism, he became convinced of the need for swift action.

³⁰ Goldstein, *Croatia*, 182.

³¹ Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias*, 257.

³² Tanner, *Croatia*, 197.

³³ *ibid.*, 199.

On 1 December 1971, Tito convened the Yugoslav Presidency in Karadjordjevo, and harshly reprimanded Croatian Communists for allowing nationalism to grow unfettered. The leaders of the Croatian Spring, including Dabčević-Kučar, Tripalo and their closest associates, were removed from all offices and banned from public life, and replaced with loyal ultra-conservatives. Rank and file members were expelled by the hundreds, which caused an even greater imbalance in the proportion of Serbs within the party. As spontaneous demonstrations broke out in response to the forced resignations of the popular leadership and expulsion of Croatian party members, police repression was swift and heavy-handed, and thousands were 'detained, harassed in various ways or forced into the sidelines of public life.'³⁴ The *Matica Hrvatska* was closed down, and figures from the *Matica*, editors of the *Hrvatski Tjednik*, and student leaders were put to trial and jailed for their activities during the Croatian Spring.

The aftermath of the Croatian Spring had important ramifications for Croatia and its diaspora communities. Tito's purges effectively suppressed every form of political opposition in Croatia until the democratic elections of 1990, rendering it the 'silent republic.'³⁵ With the removal of governmental, institutional, and grass-roots avenues of political activism, the Croatian body politic descended into an apathy from which it did not emerge for almost two decades. For Ramet, this apathy was the product of nationalist Croatians simply 'dropping out' of political activism, as the aftermath of the Croatian Spring left them 'deprived of any input into the politics of the society'³⁶ Goldstein, on the other hand, believes that this apathy may have been in part the result of the economic progress in the 1970s, which 'right up till 1978-9, was the period when the standard of living was at its highest.'³⁷ Regardless of its cause, the apathy of the homeland shifted the onus of the advocacy for Croatian independence to the diaspora, and in the wake of the Croatian Spring, the activities of Croatians abroad intensified. The Croatian

³⁴ Goldstein, *Croatia*, 183.

³⁵ Bellamy, *The Formation of Croatian National Identity*, 55.

³⁶ Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias*, 308.

³⁷ Goldstein, *Croatia*, 185–86.

diaspora, including the community in Australia, was no longer an outpost of the Croatian independence movement - it was now the crucible of it.

As Croatian political activism was gaining momentum in Australia, the community was experiencing a comparative decline as a proportion of total Yugoslav migration. The opening of Yugoslavia's borders in 1966 and the bilateral agreement between Yugoslavia and Australia in 1970 led to the increased migration of non-Croatian Yugoslavs and a diversity of views in matters of Yugoslav affairs. This included non-Croatians who were pro-Yugoslav, non-Croatians who were anti-Yugoslav, and even some Croatians who were either pro-Yugoslav or at least not anti-communist. If the Croatian Spring had proved anything, it was that advocacy for Croatian independence was not exclusively the province of the right. As can be expected, with this greater diversity in views both within the Croatian community and with other Yugoslav communities, a greater degree of disagreement and hostility between the various groups followed.

In the same way Croatian activism was gaining momentum due to the increased size of the community, so too was the activism of other anti-Yugoslav communities, including Macedonian, Slovenian, and even Serbian communities. Evidence suggests that the activism of these communities may have also included the types of violence usually attributed to Croatians.³⁸ However, as argued in Section 3.2.1, because anti-Yugoslav activism was both intentionally and inadvertently portrayed as a Croatian affair, some acts of violence may have been misattributed to Croatians. This was exacerbated by the limited understanding of Australia's political and legal authorities in the complexities of the Yugoslav community, whose predominantly Anglo-Saxon personnel lacked the necessary historical, cultural and language resources, knowledge, and capabilities needed to interpret and contextualise these developments.³⁹ For these personnel, issues in the Yugoslav community often boiled down to a separatist Croatian element,

³⁸ See for example NAA: A1838. 1500/1/24/2/2 PART 11, 'Yugoslav Consulate General, Melbourne – Yugoslav Consulate Perth – Malicious Damage' and 'Incidents at Yugoslav Premises in Australia'.

³⁹ 'Terror comes (however briefly) to Sydney', *The Bulletin*, 30 September 1972, 16

whose irrational political agenda, steeped in the right-wing dogmas of WWII, antagonised an otherwise peaceful migrant community.

Though these contexts help to explain why Croatian activism became more visible, and why there was cause for greater disagreement within the Yugoslav community itself, neither necessarily account for the escalation in violence. This is better explained by the phenomenon of politically-motivated violence, which had increasingly become a feature of various movements and their activism worldwide.⁴⁰ Political violence was a common feature in the struggle for civil rights in America, apartheid in South Africa, and the Troubles in Ireland. 1968 was a hallmark year for this violence, with the events of March in Poland, May in France, the Prague Spring, the assassinations of Martin Luther King Jr and Robert F. Kennedy in America, the Chicago Riots, and a number of anti-Vietnam protests around the world.⁴¹ July 1968 even saw the first mass protest in Yugoslavia since WWII, when students in Belgrade, Zagreb, Ljubljana, and Sarajevo went on strike to protest student conditions and the wider economic issues stemming from the 1964 reforms.⁴² These various movements worldwide all involved individuals that believed violence was sometimes necessary for social change, particularly when democratic modes of protest failed to yield results. Therefore, though political violence was illegal, it was not an altogether illegitimate means of protest during this period.

Croatian political activism was not immune to these developments. Croatian political violence was significantly greater in Western Europe and America

⁴⁰ The reasons for this worldwide phenomenon vary. For example Vanhala argues that this type of violence was encouraged by the introduction of live global television coverage that meant local struggles could be writ on a global stage faster and more dramatically than ever before. Chalk on the other hand, believes that this phenomenon was facilitated factors such as 'the proliferation of militant New Left ideologies in Western Europe and the US, the rise of Palestinian extremism abroad, ethno-nationalist and religious imperatives that became gradually more fanatical in nature and increasingly frequent state sponsorship.' See:

H. Vanhala, *The Depiction of Terrorists in Blockbuster Hollywood films, 1980-2001: An Analytical Study* (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, 2011), 28.

P. Chalk, 'The Evolving Dynamic of Terrorism in the 1990s,' *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 53(2), 1999, 151.

⁴¹ G. Arrighi, T. Hopkins, and I. Wallerstein, '1968: The Great Rehearsal,' in T. Boswell (ed.), *Revolutions in the World-System* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1989), 19–32.

⁴² '1968 i Studenti: 'Budimo Realni - Trazimo Nemoguće'' in Klasić, *Jugoslavija I Svijet 1968*, 77–274.

compared to Australia, both in the frequency and in the intensity of violence. As Pluchinsky highlights, from 1962 to 1977, 60% of all Croatian attacks took place in Western Europe, primarily West Germany, Sweden, France, Austria, Norway and Belgium. Of these, over 67% occurred in West Germany and Sweden alone.⁴³ The most dramatic of these incidents happened in Sweden, when in 1971, the Yugoslav ambassador to Sweden, Vladimir Rolovic, was assassinated by members of the Croatian National Resistance (*Hrvatski Narodni Otpor – HNO*), and in 1972, when a Swedish aeroplane was hijacked by three Croatians. The issue, however, was most pressing in West Germany, where violence occurred most frequently and over the longest period. Despite this, a West German Governmental report in 1972 clearly stated that ‘the vast majority of Croats in the Federal Republic are docile. [The problem of terrorism was] a matter of only a tiny, virulent minority.’⁴⁴ Much like the Australian authorities, the West German authorities were ‘no more effective in bringing to trial the perpetrators of these acts of violence, that appear to be politically motivated, than has been the case in Australia.’⁴⁵

To give Murphy and his Ministerial Statement credit, violence and extremism was increasingly becoming an issue within Croatian political activism. However, his insinuation that this was an inherent phenomenon to Croatian activism, or explanation that the government had failed to keep it in check, was at best far too simplistic, and at worst deliberately misleading. Instead, the aftermath of the Croatian Spring and the added onus of responsibility it placed on diaspora communities lent Croatian activism in Australia a new sense of purpose, importance, and urgency. The increasing rate of Croatian migration to Australia only added to this momentum and resulted in a larger and more noticeable activism. As the Yugoslav community expanded and diversified in origin and

⁴³ D. Pluchinsky, ‘Political Terrorism in Western Europe: Some Themes and Variations’, in Y. Alexander and K. Myers, *Terrorism in Europe* (London: Croom Helm, 1982), 59–60.

⁴⁴ PAAA, Bestand B42, Band 1475: Dok.5 Mai 1972 ‘Besprechung mit dem Beauftragten für das Konsularwesen der jugoslawischen Regierung, E.Kljun, am 19.4.1972 um 10.30 Uhr über Aktivitäten kroatischer Emigrantenorganisationen’, as quoted in M.N. Tokić, ‘Landscapes of Conflict: Unity and Disunity in post-Second World War Croatian émigré separatism’, *European Review of History: revue européenne d’histoire*, 16(5), 2009, 748.

⁴⁵ NAA: A432, 1964/2357 PART 7, ‘Croats and the West German Government’

political opinion, activism increasingly came into conflict with one another. This conflict sometimes became violent as individuals took cues from the worldwide phenomenon of politically-motivated violence and the belief that political violence was a legitimate, and even necessary, means of protest and social change.

4.1.2. OLD FRUSTRATIONS, NEW PARADIGMS

An explanation for why Murphy framed the issue of Croatian political activism in the way he did can be found in Australia's political environment between the 1969 and 1972 federal elections, where the 'Croat problem' became a proxy battle in a wider struggle to define a new set of Australian values and way of life within the paradigms created by the social and political changes of the 1960s. Whereas the Liberals were conservative, staunchly anti-communist, and the party of Cold War ideologies that persecuted innocent Australians for their left-leaning politics, the ALP fashioned itself as the party of change and progressiveness, eager to usher in the post-Cold War era, and concerned with those who posed a real threat to the security of Australia.

The issue of Croatian political activism was only one in a wider debate regarding protest, violence, and government responses. Anti-Vietnam war activism, student activism, indigenous civil rights activism, LGBT activism, women's liberation, environmental activism, and various other left-oriented movements all involved clashes with police and resistance from the Coalition Government. As with Croatian activism, individuals within these movements engaged in political violence as a means of protest and social change. Whitlam and Cairns, two of the leading voices on the issue of Croatian activism in the 1960s, as well as other ALP Ministers, became advocates for some of these protest movements, at least in aim if not in method. Cairns was, in fact, the chairman of the Vietnam Moratorium Campaign in Victoria, a passionate advocate for the anti-war movement both in- and outside the parliament, and was even amongst

the first leading the 100,000 strong Moratorium march in Melbourne on 8 May 1971.⁴⁶ For Cairns and many others, the heavy-handedness with which the Government addressed these protest movements stood in complete contradiction and hypocrisy to the leniency afforded Croatians and their activism.⁴⁷ In the same way support for the protest movements of the late 1960s/early 1970s became a symbolic point of difference between the ALP and the Coalition, so too did their position regarding Croatians.

This ideological battle was situated in a narrower struggle within the political left over how to define itself, as various ideological splits had resulted in competing strains of left-wing politics. Communist factions developed along the varying ideologies of Maoism, Trotskyism, Stalinism, Marxism, and Leninism, and after the Tito-Stalin Split of 1948, Khrushchev's 'Secret Speech' in 1956, and the Prague Spring in 1968, varying degrees of pro- and anti-Soviet sentiment. These fractures in turn filtered into the trade union movement.⁴⁸ For the most part the protest movements of the late 1960s/early 1970s that were the cause of so much social and civil unrest also originated from the left. Like their worldwide counterparts, these various movements all fractured along violent and non-violent lines, which only exacerbated the fact that political violence was historically more closely associated with left-wing movements in Australia, and particularly with trade unionism. Not surprisingly, the left faction of the ALP itself fractured as various members navigated these fissions.⁴⁹

Croatian activism was therefore an attractive target for this proxy battle for three reasons - it was a right-oriented activism with which ALP members had

⁴⁶ 'A symbol of participatory democracy, 1968-1970' in P. Strangio, *Keeper of the Faith: A Biography of Jim Cairns* (Carlton South: Melbourne University Press, 2002), 171-214.

⁴⁷ *ibid.*, 238.

McKnight, *Australian Spies and Their Secrets*, 250-51.

For more on the anti-war movement, see:

M. Saunders, 'Law and Order' and the Anti-Vietnam War Movement', *Australian Journal of Politics & History*, 28(3), 1982, 367-379.

⁴⁸ For example, see: G. Mitchell, *On Strong Foundations: The BWIU and Industrial Relations in the Australian Construction Industry, 1942-1992* (Marrickville: Harcourt Brace, 1996).

⁴⁹ R. McMullin, *The Light on the Hill: The Australian Labor Party, 1891-1991* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 315-37.

little history of affiliation, but with whom the Liberals were allegedly intertwined;⁵⁰ the political violence that was typically the source of denunciation for left-oriented activism was becoming an increasing problem within Croatian activism; and it was an easy target because it emanated from a community of the migrant 'Other' that sat uncomfortably within the paradigms of the Good Australian Migrant. Problematising Croatian activism allowed those inside the political system to articulate a vision for Australia that maintained the values and ideals the Left represented, but which also distanced them from the associated political violence that was both unbecoming and unelectable of a politician. It is no surprise then, to find that the Senators most vocal about the 'Croat problem' – Murphy, Mulvihill, Arthur Gietzelt, Douglas McClelland, and Justin O'Byrne – were those from the ALP Left with affiliations to trade unionism or various protest movements. This made them easy political targets for accusations of radicalism and denunciations as communist.

The results of the 1969 election, where the ALP came within four seats of winning, affirmed Whitlam's leadership of the party and the new vision it was offering to Australians. Perhaps emboldened by this result, the ALP increasingly raised the issue of Croatian activism and its associated violence in parliament from 1970. In the Senate, Mulvihill upheld the mantle that had passed from Cairns to him in the late 1960s as the ideological crusader against Croatian activism. Much like Cairns did in the 1963/4 debates, Mulvihill framed his questions within the ideological problems that had defined Croatian activism in the previous period – namely the links to Ustashism, Fascism and Nazi Germany, and the political undesirability of the disintegration of Yugoslavia.⁵¹ Interestingly, Murphy for the most part was silent on Croatian activism, only rising to speak on

⁵⁰ Not surprisingly, the newspaper of the CPA, the *Tribune*, was the leading voice of these allegations, for examples, see:

'Fear and Violence From Ustasha Extortion Campaign', *Tribune*, 15 January 1969, 2.

'NSW Premier Backs Croat Nazi Outfit', *Tribune*, 7 May 1969, 3.

'Croat Fascists Hail Lib. Minister As Ustasha "Friend"', *Tribune*, 25 February, 1970, 4.

'Ustasha Lib Links Denounced', *Tribune*, 27 March 1973, 5.

⁵¹ For example see: (examples of mulvihill talking about ustashism and yugo)

the issue within the rhetoric of law and order to question the competence of Attorney-General Greenwood.⁵²

The House of Representatives did not have an ideological crusader such as Mulvihill. Cairns, who had served this purpose in the 1963/4 debates, was now preoccupied with his role in the anti-war movement. Whitlam, however, repeatedly raised the issue as one negatively effecting Australia's diplomatic obligations. As he explained during the debate regarding the *Public Order (Protection of Persons and Property) Bill 1971*;

There can be no doubt that one of the alarming trends in the world today is for citizens to insult, to harass, to molest, to kidnap and to kill diplomats or consuls. It is a trend which every civilised nation must condemn. If there is to be any hope of good relations in the world and peace between nations then the official representatives of nations are entitled to respect... The violence in this community against missions has come from the right wing. It has come from the Ustashi, from migrants to this country who supported Hitler and Mussolini in the break-up of Yugoslavia...⁵³

For Whitlam, the problem of Croatian activism lay less in its ideological concerns and more in the practical impediments to diplomacy and government it posed. The precariousness of Australia's diplomatic position was only exacerbated by the ideological origins of Croatian activism. By 1972, there had been three bombings of the Yugoslav Consulate-General in Sydney (January 1967, November 1968, and June 1969), a bombing of the Yugoslav Consulate-General in Melbourne (October 1970), and an attack on the Yugoslav Embassy in Canberra (November 1969). As Whitlam explained, these not only jeopardised Australia's reputation and capabilities within the diplomatic world, but repairs and funding Commonwealth Police to manage the issue also came at a 'not inconsiderable' cost to Australian taxpayers.⁵⁴

These contexts culminated in two events that cemented Croatians and their activism as both problematic and politically symbolic, which mirrored those that had initiated debates in 1963/4. The first came on 5 July 1972 when news broke

⁵² Australia, Senate, *Parliamentary Debates*, No. S.15, 1972, 992-3.

⁵³ Australia, House of Representatives, *Parliamentary Debates*, No.HR.14, 1971, 1577.

⁵⁴ Australia, House of Representatives, *Parliamentary Debates*, No.HR.16, 1971, 1870.

that Croatians from Australia may have comprised the 19 men involved in a second incursion into Yugoslavia.⁵⁵ The second event came on 16 September 1972, when close to midday, two bombs targeting Yugoslav premises exploded on Sydney's George Street. Like the 1963 incursion and the 1964 Lesić bombing, these events appeared to confirm the long-held ALP allegation that in their unsubstantiated zeal to persecute left-wing activism, Coalition governments had abrogated their responsibility to control and curb the real threat to Australians - right-wing extremists.

On 16 August 1972 the Yugoslav Government presented an Aide-Memoire to the Australian Government that confirmed the involvement of six Australian citizens in the incursion, and a further three who had previously resided in Australia. More disturbingly for Australian authorities, however, were the series of allegations regarding Australia's implication in the incursion, which included that the headquarters of this group were located in Australia, that the Australian Government was providing shelter to the ringleaders, and that the HRB, thought to have become defunct by Australian authorities since 1967 had been reorganised in early 1972 as the Croatian Illegal Revolutionary Organisation (*HIRO*).⁵⁶ ASIO, Commonwealth Police, and various governmental departments were tasked with investigating the claims of the aide-memoire, which even resulted in the dawn raids of Croatian homes in NSW and Victoria by Commonwealth and State police.⁵⁷ However, initial media and political responses were somewhat muted, whether out of distraction, - the last budget of the McMahon government was released on 15 August and election speculation was gaining momentum - or out of detachment - as with the 1963 incursion, this was an abstract event that had happened well away from Australia.

The George Street bombing, on the other hand, happened in the heart of Sydney, and though it did not result in casualties, 16 individuals were wounded

⁵⁵ 'Terrorists 'trained in Aust'', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 5 July 1972, 8.

'Raiders 'trained in Australia'', *Canberra Times*, 5 July 1972, 4.

'Ustasha - Greenwood to act', *The Age*, 5 July 1972, 1.

⁵⁶ NAA, A6122, 2171

⁵⁷ 'Croats protest to McMahon' *Sydney Morning Herald*, 26 August 1972, 3.

by the blasts, both premises suffered extensive damage, and both bombings were accompanied by threats of further violence.⁵⁸ Like the 1964 Lesić bombing, this tangible act of violence had a more profound effect on politicising the issue of Croatian activism than did the incursion. They were immediately ascribed to Croatian terrorists, with Cairns, the Yugoslav Ambassador to Australia Uroš Vidović, and prominent Yugoslav community member Marijan Jurjević, declaring them a confirmation of organised Croatian terrorism in Australia.⁵⁹ Newspaper editorials echoed these sentiments in varying degrees,⁶⁰ with the *Canberra Times* going so far as call for an immediate suspension of all Yugoslav migration to Australia;

Since enough terrorists have slipped through the net to create a crisis in this country and since police action to stop their activities have been of no avail the next logical step is to close the pipelines.⁶¹

On 19 September, both houses of Parliament debated the bombing, with the Government facing heavy questioning throughout question time. In the House of Representatives, Whitlam described it as the ‘biggest mass crime in Australia,’ and moved a motion calling on the Government to set up specialist intelligence and police organisations to address overseas terrorist movements in Australia.⁶² In the Senate, the ferocity and frequency of questioning was such that the President at one point exclaimed

Honourable senators have asked 43 questions in an hour and 10 minutes... I think honourable senators might consider whether we should go on with the business of the Senate.⁶³

Murphy too moved a motion to refer the matter of alleged Croatian terrorism to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence for urgent inquiry and

⁵⁸ ‘Terror in Sydney’, *Sun-Herald*, 17 September 1972, 1-3, 17.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 17.

‘Warning of more bombings’, *The Age*, 18 September 1972, 1.

‘Yugoslavia to protest on bombings’, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 18 September 1972, 1.

⁶⁰ ‘Terrorism hits here’, *The Age*, 18 September 1972, 9.

‘Terror’, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 18 September 1972, 6.

⁶¹ ‘Terrorists in Australia’, *Canberra Times*, 19 September 1972, 2.

⁶² Australia, House of Representatives, *Parliamentary Debates*, No.HR.38, 1972, 1572

⁶³ Australia, Senate, *Parliamentary Debates*, No. S.38, 1972, 905.

report, which prompted a lengthy debate.⁶⁴ Though both motions from Whitlam and Murphy failed, the status of Croatian activism as a political football became firmly entrenched.

In the face of these escalating allegations, Croatians remained steadfast in their activism and responses. Like the 1963 incursion, the 1972 incursion was explained as the actions of a naïve and foolish minority, while the community in Sydney in particular vehemently objected to the claim that the bombings were the work of Croatian terrorists. As in 1963/4, counter-allegations were raised that the escalating acts of violence were the work of Yugoslav *agents provocateur*, aimed at discrediting Croatian political activism abroad, particularly in light of the events of the Croatian Spring.⁶⁵ However, on 10 October Prime Minister Billy McMahon called the federal election for December 2nd, and as the attention of both parties turned to campaigning, debates about Croatian activism subsided, even if Mulvihill remained relentless in his prosecution of the ALP case on Croatians.

4.1.3. FOREIGN POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

This interplay of domestic political forces both in Croatia and Australia becomes even more complex when we consider the foreign policy aspirations of both Tito's Yugoslavia and the Whitlam Government. Yugoslav foreign policy was an important factor in the legitimisation of Tito's regime and personal rule in the face of ideological and economic challenges throughout the 1960s. The more pronounced these challenges became, the more important success in foreign policy became to Tito and his Government. In Australia, Whitlam's reorientation of foreign policy away from the Cold War divide and closer to the principles of non-alignment was also tied to questions of legitimacy, proven by Whitlam's

⁶⁴ Australia, Senate, *Parliamentary Debates*, No. S.38, 1972, 918-976.

⁶⁵ 'Croatian leaders deny bomb plot,' *Sydney Morning Herald*, 18 September 1972, 8.

For copy of press release issued on 18 September 1972 by the Central Council of the Croatian Association in Australia which denounces the bombings and the fear that the bombings are part of the 'Communist conspiracy', See: F. Lovoković, *Hrvatske Zajednice u Australiji*, 740.

establishment of the 'Duumvirate' immediately after his election from which he enacted as much foreign policy change as possible. Tito and Whitlam therefore found natural allies in each other, and the intersection of the foreign policy aspirations of these two governments had profound consequences for the Croatian community in Australia.

As was the case with the rest of the world, the 1960s in Yugoslavia were characterised by political, social, and economic upheaval. These resulted in two significant threats to the legitimacy of Tito and his regime – increasing ideological dissent internal to Yugoslavia's communist paradigms, and a rapidly growing diaspora throughout the world that was increasingly able to articulate alternate visions for Yugoslavia's future. This political threat was made even more precarious by the worsening economic situation in Yugoslavia during the 1960s, including growing unemployment, inflationary pressure, perennial balance-of-payments deficits, unused capacities, and rising inventories of unwanted goods.⁶⁶ Thus, as Neibuhr explains, 'the more Tito's state failed to deliver on its domestic promises, the more leaders needed success in some other area.'⁶⁷ Foreign policy was to provide the arena for this success.

The first threat to Tito's legitimacy – internal dissent – originated from Tito himself. The Tito-Stalin split of 1948 and Tito's continued advocacy for policy creation independent of the USSR inadvertently raised the same question for the republics of Yugoslavia; if Titoism argued that Yugoslavia was entitled to create policy independent of the USSR based on the prevailing conditions of the Yugoslav country, then the logical extension of this argument was that the republics of Yugoslavia should be entitled to create policy independent of Yugoslavia based on *their* prevailing conditions. The introduction of self-management as policy only exacerbated this logical disconnect, for 'once it was conceded that individual enterprises had a right to run their own affairs, the

⁶⁶ Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias*, 212.

⁶⁷ R. Niebuhr, 'Nonalignment as Yugoslavia's Answer to Bloc Politics', *Journal of Cold War Studies*, 13(1), 2011, 159.

republics naturally demanded the same rights at state level.’⁶⁸ Thus, the republics found themselves in the curious position of being denied the right to autonomous decision-making, while it was simultaneously extended to the state as a whole above them, and to individual enterprises below them.

As the economic woes of Yugoslavia steadily worsened, liberal and conservative emerged around two dominant issues; centralism vs decentralism of the state, and liberalisation vs protectionism of economic policy. The more economically developed republics of Croatia and Slovenia were keeping the entire Yugoslav state afloat, financing the less developed regions such as Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia to their own detriment. The increasingly centralist policies of Belgrade however, meant that these very same republics had decreasing political power and autonomy, with less and less say in where the surpluses they generated went, and left them feeling exploited. This internal debate about the practical application of the ‘Yugoslav way’ invariably resulted in animated political debates, reforms, and dissident scandals. In the 1960s, the increasing momentum of liberal factions from Slovenia and Croatia was reinforced by the economic reforms of 1961 and 1965, and the fall of Aleksandar Rankovic, hardline centralist and *UDBa* chief, in 1966. These events precipitated the spread liberalism across all of Yugoslavia’s republics, and led to a number of social and political movements, of which the Croatian Spring remained the foremost example.

The second threat came as a result of the 1961 and 1965 economic reforms that opened Yugoslav borders to organised migration. As Zimmerman explains,

The trickle of the 1950s became by the mid-1960s a rivulet... With the economic reforms, the rivulet became a flood – a flood which abated only with the stagflation and recession that followed the 1973 jump in global oil prices.⁶⁹

The sheer size and rate of Yugoslav emigration meant that Yugoslav political and academic attention turned to the issues of those abroad. By 1970, total outmigration from Yugoslavia amounted to roughly a million workers, which

⁶⁸ Tanner, *Croatia*, 185.

⁶⁹ Zimmerman, *Open Borders*, 81.

constituted approximately one-fifth of the Yugoslav workforce and was twice the population of Montenegro at the time. These relative figures, Zimmerman argues, made Yugoslavs abroad a ‘seventh republic’ of the Yugoslav state that Tito and his Government felt needed governing.⁷⁰

Size, however, was not the only reason for this – the overly Croatian demography of the seventh republic was also a cause for concern.⁷¹ The loss of control over citizens that accompanied migration posed significant ideological challenges to the Yugoslav government;

[The seventh republic was] a place where the major media were independent of Yugoslav authorities, where the mores of modern Western industrial capitalism and “bourgeois” democracy prevailed, and where there existed and operated groups fundamentally opposed to the Yugoslav idea, to communism, or to both.⁷²

Tito perceived post-war Croatian communities throughout the world as a threat to his legitimacy from the very outset of his leadership after WWII. As long as Yugoslavia’s borders remained closed, and emigration was defined as an act akin to treason, the threat from the seventh republic was relatively contained and easily denounced. The legitimisation and institutionalisation of migration with the reforms of the 1960s, however, exponentially increased this threat, not only in the ability of anti-Yugoslav sentiment to spread abroad due to the increasing size of communities, but also in its ability to filter back into Yugoslavia, either through the movement of temporary workers, or through holiday-making permanent migrants.

Yugoslav foreign policy, therefore, sought to counter the threat of increasing internal dissent and the rapid development of a sizeable, predominantly Croatian, diaspora by way of three principal methods. First, it attempted to boost Tito’s legitimacy domestically through his reputation and successes with nonalignment on the world stage. Second, it attempted to retain a measure of control over Yugoslavs abroad by leveraging Yugoslavia’s reputation and position in international relations to negotiate its diplomatic relationship with host

⁷⁰ *ibid.*, 106–31.

⁷¹ For a comprehensive discussion of the changing demography of Yugoslavs abroad, see *ibid.*, 83–89.

⁷² *ibid.*, 106.

countries of sizeable Croatian diaspora. Finally, Yugoslavia used the channels of these first two methods to ideologically delegitimise Croatian dissent both domestically and abroad.

The symbolic status of Yugoslavian nonalignment legitimised Tito's government in three important ways. First, it reinforced Tito's leadership and authority as the elder statesman of Yugoslav politics. Though the political and social unrest of Yugoslavia in the late 1960s may have weakened the cohesive strength of Yugoslavia, it had strengthened the authority and influence of Tito himself. Tito's charisma and achievements through NAM only reinforced his reputation domestically - as Niebuhr summarises, 'If [Tito] could solve the world's problems, why would he not be able to solve those facing Yugoslavia?'⁷³ Second, involvement in NAM earned popular support for the regime, not only due to the impression of credibility, capability, and influence, but because it aligned the regime with 'progressive' movements throughout the world, particularly the decolonisation movements of various countries. Finally, as the reputation of Tito and his regime strengthened internationally, the easier it became to marginalise and delegitimise opposition groups or detractors both at home and abroad. It is here that Niebuhr situates the real power of nonalignment - 'its ability to secure "international legitimacy" for national liberation movements (presumably including Tito's) because of gains in international affairs.'⁷⁴ The symbolic status of nonalignment domestically, therefore, far outstripped any practical clout internationally, and this held as true for any other country as it did for Yugoslavia.

The international standing Yugoslavia was able to accumulate through its nonalignment, its strategic importance as a communist alternative to Soviet hegemony, and the academic and political curiosity in its principle of self-management all acted as positive leverage in Yugoslavia's ability to negotiate diplomatic relations with the host countries of sizeable Croatian diaspora. Zimmerman argues that there was a perceptible shift in the way the Yugoslav

⁷³ Niebuhr, 'Nonalignment as Yugoslavia's Answer to Bloc Politics', 172.

⁷⁴ *ibid.*, 150.

government approached managing the seventh republic. From 1965-1972, the general picture of Yugoslav management was

one of Yugoslav authorities governing the workers *prior* to their departure and negotiating with the Western European states and Australia about the ways *those states* would govern the workers during their stay abroad [authors emphasis].⁷⁵

However, growing internal dissent, such as that of the 1968 Belgrade student demonstrations and the Croatian Spring in 1971, the rapid growth of the seventh republic as a result of migration reforms, and broader events, such as the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, meant that from the early 1970s,

Yugoslav decisionmakers[sic] acted increasingly as though they had to treat the workers, while abroad, as nearly as possible as a matter of domestic politics. The Yugoslav government began to implement measures to govern the migrants - to control, to inform, to socialize, etc. - while they were abroad, rather than limiting itself to measures prior to departure, or to negotiations [about how those states would govern].⁷⁶

The Croatian demographics of the seventh republic, only added a political impetus to this change.

As discussed in section 4.1.1, the increasing rate of migration of non-Croatian Yugoslavs resulted in a diversity of views in matters of Yugoslav affairs. This complicated the managing of the seventh republic as it was no longer viable to simply dismiss it in its entirety as a hostile enemy of the state. The Yugoslav government now had to find a way to manage pro- and anti-Yugoslav communities, both in relation to the Yugoslav state and in relation to each other. By 1976, this division of the diaspora was officially entrenched in the Yugoslav government lexicon as the *positive diaspora* and *hostile/enemy emigrant groups*,⁷⁷ and resulted in two broad approaches to managing the seventh republic.

For pro-Yugoslav groups, the Yugoslav government actively sought to retain or ensure the loyalties of their citizens upon emigration, and from 1970,

⁷⁵ Zimmerman, *Open Borders*, 110.

⁷⁶ *ibid.*, 112.

⁷⁷ Lj. Antić, 'Neki Pogledi Jugoslavenskih Vlasti Na Hrvatsko Iseljništvo Sredinom 70-Ih Godina,' in V. Šakić, J. Jurčević, and M. Sopta (eds.), *Budućnost Iseljene Hrvatske* (Zagreb: Institut Društvenih Znanosti Ivo Pilar, 1998), 61.

turned their attention to providing services intended to retain the Yugoslav workers' identity with the homeland and with the "right" values, as well as to provide for the political socialization[sic] – what in the old days used to be termed "civic training" – of Yugoslav youths abroad.⁷⁸

This included producing and disseminating Yugoslav print and media targeted at those abroad, the provision of material for children's education abroad, and the ability to access social welfare benefits.⁷⁹ For anti-Yugoslav groups, the police state was increasingly used to control dissidence through intimidation. Though this was primarily exercised upon the return of migrants to Yugoslavia, Vukusic argues that from 1966, the relaxation of repression in Yugoslavia as a result of the fall of Ranković was correlated with a sharp increase in the intensity of *UDBa* activity against Yugoslav emigrants abroad. This particularly targeted Croatians, and from 1966-1971 alone, he argues that the *UDBa* executed 23 Croatian emigrants, with a further 5 unsuccessful assassination attempts.⁸⁰

In light of the worldwide growth of Croatian communities, and in the face of numerous liberation and decolonisation movements, an important goal for Yugoslav foreign policy became to prevent Croatian activism from reaching the status of a national or liberation movement. Though the delegitimation of Croatian dissent was not a phenomenon unique to the 1970s (see sections 1.3.2 and 3.2.1), the Yugoslav government framed their denunciations in particular ways so that they would carry greater salience. The first was its portrayal of Croatian activism as a terrorist pursuit. Given the international condemnation of

⁷⁸ Zimmerman, *Open Borders*, 118.

⁷⁹ *ibid.*, 116–24.

⁸⁰ B. Vukušić, 'Rat UDBA-e protiv Hrvatske Emigracije', in V. Šakić, J. Jurčević, and M. Sopta, *Budućnost Iseljene Hrvatske*, 401–2.

Many have raised this prospect throughout the years. For example, in 1982, Pluchinsky argued that: 'Yugoslavia, which has been the target of over 80 anti-Yugoslav terrorist attacks by Croatian and Serbian émigrés has apparently conducted a retaliatory terrorist campaign against these two ethnic groups. According to one report, 38 Croatians have been killed in West Germany alone since 1967. Some of these deaths can be attributed to criminal elements and intra-Croatian rivalries. However, 17 of these were carried out with the same type of weapon – a 7.65 mm pistol. Of these 17, ten involved a silencer. Of these ten. The same silencer was used in seven cases.'

See: Pluchinsky, 'Political Terrorism in Western Europe', 63.

In 1987, Zimmerman reiterated this sentiment, suggesting that:

'It is very likely that the Yugoslav secret police operate outside the de jure boundaries of Yugoslavia and engage in a kind of governance of the seventh republic in this manner.'

See: Zimmerman, *Open Borders*, 115.

terrorism and political violence in the period from 1968, this was the most effective way to undermine the actions of Croatian diaspora worldwide. The second drew on the history of Yugoslav delegitimisation and portrayed this terrorism as an extension and evolution of the fascist ideology from which Croatian political emigration and activism emerged. Finally, the Yugoslav government drew on its perceived strategic importance to portray Croatian activism as dependent on, and a tool of, Soviet expansionist aspirations to destabilise Yugoslavia.⁸¹

It is therefore not difficult to imagine a connection between the increasing violence attributed to Croatians in Australia with Tito's foreign policy aspirations and need to legitimise his regime domestically - the community has steadfastly maintained as much. These allegations and counter-allegations are not, however, mutually exclusive events - both Croatian extremists and Yugoslav *agents provocateurs* may have been responsible for the escalating violence of the late 1960s/early 1970s, and evidence to date seems to suggest this was the case. By 1973, ASIO was convinced that Yugoslav intelligence agents were operating in Australia, drawing on sympathisers to act on their behalf, or penetrating extremist Croatian organisations through *agents provocateur*.⁸²

In the same way non-alignment afforded Tito and his government a moral platform from which to marginalise internal dissent, so too did its delegitimisation of Croatian activism and dissent abroad. Internal criticism, particularly that emanating from Croatia, was often dismissed as 'nationally inspired', and as Drapac explains,

this obsession with nationalist deviations cleared the way for still more inflated analyses of Yugoslav 'successes' and militated against pluralism. It also ensured the old argument, that there was nothing wrong with Yugoslavia, but that its people were troublesome, could never subside.⁸³

Constructing dissent as an external rather than internal phenomenon, and further linking it to the separatism/nationalism of an extremist diaspora,

⁸¹ Antić, 'Neki Pogledi Jugoslavenskih Vlasti', 57-63.

⁸² Blaxland, *The Protest Years*, 328-29.

⁸³ Drapac, *Constructing Yugoslavia*, 234.

delegitimised any grassroots movement within Croatia and the other republics. It is not surprising, therefore, that Tito would describe the student demonstrations of the Croatian Spring as a 'long and carefully prepared counter-revolutionary activity *initiated from abroad* [own emphasis],'⁸⁴ even if the catalysts for the movement were internal to Yugoslav politics. This approach justified both Tito's internal policies on dissidence (in the name of protection from an external threat), and his external policy on Croatians abroad, and impressed 'upon the world that the Yugoslav state was not made more precarious by dictatorship, but by the pre-existing nationalist evil.'⁸⁵

Just as foreign policy was central to Tito's legitimacy, so too was it to Whitlam's. At the opening of Parliament on 27 February 1973, the Governor-General's speech identified the 'recognition of new and momentous directions in the pattern of international relations' as one of the four principle grounds upon which the Whitlam government was elected to rule.⁸⁶ However, such was the importance of foreign policy to Whitlam that on 5 December 1972, only three days after the election, Whitlam had the Governor-General swear himself and Lance Barnard in as Prime Minister and deputy Prime Minister respectively, rather than allow McMahon to remain caretaker Prime Minister until a full cabinet could be determined. The purpose of this 'Duumvirate' was so that Whitlam could fulfil the campaign promises that did not require legislation. This including enacting foreign policy changes that would symbolise Australia's new direction in international affairs; on 8 December Whitlam ordered the closure of the Rhodesian Information Centre in Sydney; on 21 December, Australia formally recognised the People's Republic of China; and on 22 December, Whitlam announced the establishment of diplomatic relations with East Germany.

This purposeful repudiation of the anti-communist position of the previous government was intended to steer Australia towards closer relations with non-aligned countries. It is possible that Yugoslavia saw an opportunity to exploit

⁸⁴ Goldstein, *Croatia: A History*, 183.

⁸⁵ Drapac, *Constructing Yugoslavia*, 233.

⁸⁶ Australia, House of Representatives, *Parliamentary Debates*, No.HR.9, 1973, 11-12.

Whitlam's foreign policy objectives to further its own objectives, particularly in the management of the seventh republic. As Strangman explains, because Tito had been a founding member of NAM,

Yugoslav support would be important for Australian acceptance in this group. It is likely that Yugoslav diplomats were pressing for something to be done about the alleged Croatian terrorists in Australia, before extending the olive branch to Australia in the foreign affairs field.⁸⁷

More specifically, a NAM summit meeting was to be held in Algeria from 5-9 September 1973, and it was hinted that '... Australia would like to attend such a meeting, or at least have the right to be there in an observer role.'⁸⁸ For the sake of his foreign policy, it was in Whitlam's best interest to be seen as dealing with the issue of Croatian activism in Australia, and Bijedić's pending visit to Australia from 20-22 March 1973 provided Whitlam with the perfect opportunity to shore up Yugoslav support.

With the foreign policy stakes so high, it is no surprise to find both Whitlam and Murphy concerning themselves with the issue of Croatian activism immediately after their election. Whitlam, acting as the Attorney-General under the Duumvirate, conveyed his dissatisfaction with ASIO's handling of the issue to Director-General Peter Barbour, explaining that he thought ASIO should be doing more to 'control' Croatian terrorist groups.⁸⁹ On 12 December, before his appointment as Attorney-General, Murphy requested to view Attorney-General Department files on Croatian extremists. Once sworn in, Whitlam tasked Murphy with preparing and ensuring security arrangements for the Bijedić visit were adequate, who in turn instructed ASIO, Commonwealth Police, and various governmental departments to investigate and prepare risk assessments that would inform security arrangements. Murphy emphasised the 'great importance

⁸⁷ D. Strangman, 'The ASIO Croatian Affair of 1973', in L. Shaw (ed.), *The Shape of the Labor Regime*, (Canberra: Harp Books, 1974), 61.

⁸⁸ A. Reid, *The Whitlam Venture* (Melbourne: Hill of Content, 1976), 74.

⁸⁹ Blaxland, *The Protest Years*, 320.

he [attached] to ensuring that no harm comes to the Yugoslav Prime Minister during his visit to Australia.⁹⁰

These investigations would set off the chain of events leading to the Raid on ASIO, including the establishment of task forces, inter-departmental committees, and in the case of ASIO, 'Operation Amber', which brought together ASIO officers from around the country with knowledge of Croatian affairs to monitor Croatian extremists in relation to the Bijedić Visit;⁹¹ repeated instances of the rivalry between ASIO and Commonwealth Police interfering with preparations; a former Commonwealth Police officer with a deep suspicion of ASIO acting as an advisor to Murphy who both exacerbated and distorted this rivalry; a leaked ASIO report that was understood to suggest ASIO was concealing information regarding Croatian terrorist activities in Australia; a midnight visit to the ASIO office in Canberra; and an agitated Murphy, who needed to ensure the Bijedić visit passed without incident, the Yugoslav delegation was impressed with the 'handling' of Croatians in Australia, and that his statement to parliament would deliver on his promises.

It was in this context that Whitlam 'welcomed Mr Bijedić as the first leader of the Yugoslav Government to visit Australia and outlined the new orientation of Australia's foreign policy.'⁹² The visit proved to be free of any incident and somewhat of an anti-climax.⁹³ For its part, the Croatian community had organised a three-hour demonstration at Parliament House prior to the Bijedić visit on 18 March, attended by over 3000 people.⁹⁴ Although another demonstration had been planned for the day of Bijedić's arrival, it was cancelled by community leaders 'because of the hysterical atmosphere that has been

⁹⁰ NAA: A6122, 2147, 'ASIO Minute Paper – Visit of Yugoslav Prime Minister (8 March 1973)'

⁹¹ Blaxland, *The Protest Years*, 326.

⁹² 'PM promises action against terrorists', *Canberra Times*, 21 March 1973, 1.

⁹³ There were two inconsequential incidents – a bomb scare at Parliament House regarding two parcels, inside which only letters were found, and a builder detained under the Commonwealth Bridge after gelignite was found in his car, but for which he had a legitimate purpose. See:

D. Wilson, 'We won't tolerate terrorists: Whitlam', *The Age*, 21 March 1973, 1.

'Whitlam pledges firm line', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 21 March 1973, 1.

⁹⁴ 'Police praise restraint of demonstrators', *Canberra Times*, 19 March 1973, 1.

'ASIO raid illegal: claim', *The Age*, 19 March 1973, 1.

'3000 Croatians protest outside Prlt House', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 19 March 1973, 3.

created... Any persons who did attempt to demonstrate would be regarded by the community as *agents provocateur*.⁹⁵

The symbolism of a communist head of state visiting so early in Whitlam's prime ministership, and the publicity that it would generate, would be a powerful legitimisation of Whitlam's foreign policy aspirations. More practically, the NAM summit in Algeria was looming, and Australia needed a sponsor – who better than one of the founding constituents to provide this sponsorship. For Yugoslavia, the visit presented a unique opportunity to exploit the change of government in order to further its own foreign policy objectives in managing Croats abroad. As Strangman explains, similar diplomatic pressure had been applied to both Austria and America in 1972, but with little success. Was the Yugoslav Government's achievement with the Bijedić visit to Australia, Strangman asks, 'the culmination of a diplomatic strategy pursued by the Yugoslavs since 1972?'⁹⁶ Just over a month after the events of the Raid, the Bijedić visit, and Murphy's Ministerial Statement, the answer, at least according to Peter Samuel, seemed to be yes;

The sole beneficiaries of the Croatian liberation activity are the authorities in Belgrade. What Murphy has overlooked is the fact that the threat to Belgrade comes not from anti-Communist nationalists or reactionaries but from ethnic and factional rivalries within the ruling Communist Party in Yugoslavia and from the Russians. The people in power in Belgrade find it very helpful to have foreign based 'fascists' and 'counter-revolutionaries' being seen to make incursions. It creates in Yugoslavia a diversion, an atmosphere in which to call for unity, and an outside evil with which internal dissidents can be associated in propaganda, prosecutions and suppression. That is why Yugoslav Government agents are involved in what is ostensibly anti-Yugoslav activity in Australia.⁹⁷

4.1.4. 'CROATIAN' TERRORISM?

Stripped of its context, Murphy's Statement presented a troubling tale. However, in the context of these developments within Croatian activism, the three-year debate that deployed Croats and their activism as a political

⁹⁵ 'Police given list', *Canberra Times*, 20 March 1973, 1.

⁹⁶ Strangman, 'The ASIO Croatian Affair of 1973', 75.

⁹⁷ P. Samuel, 'The Lionel Murphy enigma', *Bulletin*, 5 May 1973, 14-17.

football, and the foreign policy considerations of both Yugoslavia and the Whitlam Government, the statement was, as Withers immediately recognised, merely a 'reiteration of statements about a reign of terror – most of which we [The Senate] have heard time and time again.'⁹⁸ Even though Murphy presented an overwhelming amount of documentation, he failed to connect a single terrorist act to any one terrorist, let alone uncover a coordinated, concerted effort by an entire organisation that would impugn Greenwood or the previous government. However, this was no mere oversight or happenstance. By the end of Greenwood's Shadow Ministerial Statement on 04 April 1973, it was clear that Murphy had presented a deliberately constructed statement, long on allegation and short of evidence, made in the knowledge that he would be protected by parliamentary privilege. Though Murphy was measured and calculated in his selections, simplifications, and silences, Greenwood had no trouble demonstrating just how easily Murphy's allegations could be dismantled. Each and every of his assertions could be, and was, contested.⁹⁹

The narrative of Croatian terrorism as put forward by Murphy was a deliberate construction of evidence, rather than a considered reflection supported by evidence. His allegations rested on a guilt-by-association approach. Croatian organisations were judged as terrorist simply because of their association with 'undesirable' principles such as Ustashism, by their 'revolutionary' or anti-Yugoslav aims, or because of their association with questionable individuals. Individuals were judged as terrorist simply because of their political beliefs, affiliations to Croatian organisations, or previous criminal offences, even if these offences were not of a terrorist nature. The history of conflict within the Yugoslav community was simplified to a narrative of fanatic Croatians terrorising peaceable Yugoslavs. Most incriminatingly, especially for the first officer of the law who prided himself on his civil rights record, incidents

⁹⁸ Australia, Senate, *Parliamentary Debates*, No. S.13, 1973, 547

⁹⁹ See Appendix 1C for a copy of Greenwood's full Ministerial Statement.

For a detailed deconstruction of Murphy's statement, see: 'Murphy's Masquerade' in Kalfic, 'Knock Knock', 38–74.

that were perpetrated against Yugoslavs were attributed to Croatians even when the perpetrators could not be found.

Perhaps Murphy sincerely believed while in opposition that there was credible evidence of organised Croatian terrorism in Australia that was being suppressed by either the Government or ASIO. However, after the Raid, Murphy understood that with the evidence he held, his case would not succeed in a court of law, but that it might be successful in influencing public opinion and the political agenda. Barbour had informed him as much in a letter sent to Murphy on 23 March, after the Raid but before the Ministerial Statement, which explicitly told Murphy,

The conclusion appears inescapable that a terrorist organisation existed in Australia until 1968. There is ample information to indicate that individuals and/or groups exist in Australia prepared to use violence in support of their objectives. However, sufficient evidence has hitherto been lacking to enable prosecutions and other executive Government action to be taken to control the problem in Australia.¹⁰⁰

Despite the Raid, and despite Murphy's insistence, ASIO's assessment of Croatian activism remained unchanged. Murphy knew this, but dismissed it in favour of his narrative. After all, his was the burden of persuasion, not of proof.

Knowing that he did not hold sufficient evidence for even one charge against a single Croatian that could be pursued in court, why did Murphy persist with this particular Ministerial Statement? Perhaps Murphy believed that it was only a matter of time before credible evidence, admissible in court, was found. Perhaps both he and Whitlam were so consumed with securing their legacies that they could not see the forest for the trees, and pressed on undeterred. Perhaps Murphy had backed himself into a political corner because he had promised a statement on Croatians that would refute the claims of his predecessor. To provide a statement that claimed anything less would be first, a humiliating admission that the last three years of ALP posturing on the issue were completely misguided, and second, a concession of defeat only weeks into Murphy's tenure as Attorney-General, made all the more spectacular due to his unprecedented

¹⁰⁰ NAA: A6122, 2147.

Raid on ASIO. The most likely answer, however, seems to be that Murphy sought to replicate the success of Menzies by creating a moral panic of the ALP's own, that served both domestic and international objectives.

Cohen defines a moral panic as a period when 'a condition, episode, person or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and interests.'¹⁰¹ Bratich makes a further distinction between moral panics and conspiracy panics,

Conspiracy panics help to define the normal modes of dissent. Politically it is predicated on a consensus 'us' over against a subversive and threatening 'them'... threat detection in a conspiracy panic is not focused on the visible (as in behavioural conduct), but on the *virtual* [signs of danger].¹⁰²

Murphy's Ministerial Statement, as well as his explanations in the Senate thereafter, displayed the characteristics of both. Cohen's 'Inventory'¹⁰³ needed to create a moral panic - Exaggeration, Distortion, Prediction and Symbolisation - all featured in Murphy's explanations. It was not the credible evidence of individual or organisational engagement with terrorist activities that made Croatians and Croatian organisations terrorist, but the *possibility* that they could, as exhibited by their political activism. Murphy's assurance that he would 'cut out the cancer of terrorism from our body politic',¹⁰⁴ not only demonstrated the consensus 'us' (Australians) against the subversive 'them' (Croatians), but also Murphy's strategy to 'problematise', rather than incorporate, Croatian dissent.¹⁰⁵

Moral panics are not just a method of identifying and labelling threats, but are also a potent political tool, and 'as conceptual devices they provide the

¹⁰¹ S. Cohen, *Folk Devils and Moral Panics: the Creation of the Mods and Rockers* (New Edition, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987), 9.

¹⁰² J. Bratich, *Conspiracy Panics: Political Rationality and Popular Culture* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2008), 11–12.

¹⁰³ Cohen, 'The Inventory', *Folk Devils and Moral Panics*, 27–48.

¹⁰⁴ Australia, Senate, *Parliamentary Debates*, No. S.13, 1973, 537.

¹⁰⁵ 'Problematization', Bratich explains, is a response to domestic dissent which 'strengthens the norm by incessantly positioning the dissenter as an alien, as not one of us. Rather than bringing the outsider back into the mainstream, this conceptual strategy seeks to turn the domestic dissenter *into* an outsider, and keep it at bay. Rather than making extremism disappear (via prohibition or absorption) it is made to appear incessantly as 'not-Us'. See: Bratich, *Conspiracy Panics*, 45.

underpinning for material practices.¹⁰⁶ Moral panics have been utilised many times to justify or legitimise a government and its policies, and Murphy had experienced first-hand the power a moral panic can wield. However, in order to be a credible panic, Murphy needed his subject to pose a large enough threat – real or imagined – to justify a change in government policy. ‘Ustasha’ violence or terrorism, as these acts were hitherto described, was a limited threat. The Ustaša label was only applicable to a handful of Croatian organisations, and an even smaller number of Croatians who held onto an early post-war vision of Croatian activism. This narrowness was in fact one of the reasons why Menzies could argue in 1964 that there was nothing unique about the minor minority of Croatians caught up in criminal acts that would justify a targeted or specialised action against Croatians in general.

On the other hand, to have made right-wing extremism or politically-motivated violence the subject of the statement would have made the threat too broad or too great for the government to surmount. If Murphy’s Statement had been about right-wing extremism in general, it could have been dismissed as just another perpetuation of the ideological war between the political left and right. This could have also alienated some of the centrist or right-leaning voters that had voted for the ALP precisely due to their disaffection with the prolonged cold war ideological battles of the preceding 23 years. Politically-motivated violence was not the monopoly of the right, and was in fact more closely associated with the political left from which Murphy hailed. To have attempted to manufacture a moral panic over politically-motivated violence would have left Murphy open to embarrassment and criticism due to his personal history and affiliations.

‘Croatian terrorism’, it seems, was the ideal political opportunity for Murphy. The Croatian community was large enough to ascribe a potential threat to – particularly with the surge of arrivals in 1970/1 – but small enough to seem a manageable task. More pragmatically, the only way to make a connection between those mentioned in his Statement was through their ‘Croatianess’.

¹⁰⁶ *ibid.*, p.10

Most importantly, however, Croatians were simply an easy target due to their status as an 'Other'. Within Australian paradigms, Croatians were a migrant 'Other' with an uncomfortable relationship to the expectations of the Good Australian Migrant. The fact that Croatians also originated from the Balkans only added to their 'Otherness' - as Skrbiš points out, 'the Balkans is the Other in the popular Western imagery.'¹⁰⁷ The baggage of the Balkan Brute and of the Good Australian Migrant made Croatians an inherently suspicious group, whose unrelenting activism made the *possibility* of a threat seem credible. That there were individuals within Croatian organisations prepared to engage in violence and criminal activity was sufficient proof that there was a problem with the whole - Good Australian Migrants, after all, exist in the absolutes. However, like the need for a moral panic to seem a manageable threat, the group being targeted also needs to seem redeemable. The economic and cultural contributions of the Croatian community, as well as its Catholicism and relatively 'Western' identity compared to the rest of the Balkans, demonstrated that there was sufficient 'good' associated with Croatians to provide enough hope for change.

By making the subject 'terrorism', rather than violence or extremism, Murphy sought to exploit the political advantages the label of terrorism resulted in. As Hocking explains, the ability to determine when and how the label of terrorism is deployed is a potent political weapon, not only in labelling enemies, but also in what it then allows a government to do in response;

The use of the ambiguous and problematic central term 'terrorism' in itself compounds the problems of an uncertain 'counter-terrorism' mandate ostensibly enacted in its name. In particular, it allows for the ready adoption of extreme measures that would otherwise be strongly resisted. The types of governmental response advocated in order to counter both terrorism and the threat of terrorism may in turn be disproportionate to the actual dangers presented by incidents of political violence in quite different political and social contexts.¹⁰⁸

Although the ALP had a majority in the House of Representatives, it did not have control of the Senate. By framing these issues as 'terrorism', Murphy not placed

¹⁰⁷ Skrbiš, 'The Distant Observers?', 601.

¹⁰⁸ J. Hocking, *Terror Laws: ASIO, Counter Terrorism and the Threat to Democracy* (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2004), 6.

counter-terrorism measures at the disposal of the Government, but also had in effect backed the Opposition into a political corner. If the Opposition opposed any measures, the Government was able to portray them as deliberately hampering Labor's reform agenda in order to protect terrorists. On the other hand, if the Opposition supported any measures, it would essentially be conceding Murphy's point that they neither could nor would deal with Croatian terrorism themselves when they were in power.

Without conclusive evidence, allegations of Croatian terrorism remain just that. A Croatian has never been found guilty of a terrorist offence in Australia, and the one exception, the case of the Croatian Six, seems to have been orchestrated by Yugoslav intelligence. Evidence of Yugoslav subversion is a little more forthcoming, however this too has been difficult to conclusively prove or disprove. Insofar as the Coalition can be accused of underestimating or avoiding the issue of Croatian extremism for the sake of their political agenda, so too can the ALP be accused of underestimating or avoiding the issue of Yugoslav subversion for theirs. The consequences of both shortcomings have been borne by the Croatian community alone - either beholden to the actions of a minor extremist minority of Croatians that the Australian Government under the Coalition could not or would not bring under their control, or beholden to an elaborate plan of Yugoslav espionage that the Australian Government under the ALP could not or would not bring under control. In either case, Croatians in Australia were nothing more than an expendable pawn in the political posturing and manoeuvring of the major parties in their search for power.

4.2. CROATIANS RESPOND

*If he has any proof, let him take it to the courts... Let him bring the case to justice.
But he has made these allegations without any proof.
That is shocking for an Attorney-General to do.¹⁰⁹*

*We are 13,000 miles away from Croatia.
Senator Murphy is 30,000 miles away from the facts.¹¹⁰*

The initial response of the Croatian community to Murphy's allegations was predictable. Community leaders unequivocally denied the existence of organised Croatian terrorism, while those individuals and organisations that Murphy had named in his Statement challenged him to take his allegations to the courts. Counter-allegations of Yugoslav espionage were asserted, and leaders urged the community not to react to the provocations.¹¹¹ As a show of strength and to demonstrate the nature of Croatians and their activism, on 8 April, a 5000-strong crowd packed the Hordern Pavilion in Sydney for 10. *Travanj* celebrations. Representatives from various ethnic communities, as well as NSW parliamentarian and founding President of the NSW Captive Nations Council, Douglas Darby, participated in this affirmation of Croatian identity, culture, and activism through word, song, and dance.¹¹²

Though the actions of Murphy tarnished the community with a reputation it is still yet to shake, it did provide Croatians their first opportunity to engage with Australian political processes in the form of the Senate Select Committee on the Civil Rights of Migrant Australians, established on 17 May 1973. Though the double dissolution in 1974 and Dismissal in 1975 prevented the committee from ever producing a final report, participation in this process had a profound effect on the nature and approach of Croatian political activism. It entrenched the

¹⁰⁹ 'Let him take it to the courts' *Sydney Morning Herald*, 28.March 1973, 14.

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹¹ B. Johns, 'Murphy lists 'terrorist' groups', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 28 March 1973, 1, 14.

'Biggest frame-up', *Canberra Times*, 28 March 1973, 1.

K. Childs, 'Srecko Rover argues, from his Ford LTD', *The Age*, 28 March 1973, 1.

¹¹² Lovoković, *Hrvatske Zajednice U Australiji*, 157–58.

'It's time for a free Croatia...', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 9 April 1973, 2.

change from political rhetoric to questions of ethno-national identity that had begun with the second wave of post-war Croatian migration in the 1960s by providing the community with a new framework of ideas and rhetoric through which to express their activism – the rhetoric of civil rights. This was reinforced with the introduction of multicultural policy, which stressed ethnicity over nationality, and allowed Croatians to advocate on the basis of their ethnic identity, rather than place of citizenship. Multiculturalism also influenced the practicalities of Croatian political activism. Not only did it provide a greater opportunity for Croatians to express their identity and activism, but also enabled the community to cultivate a reputation that countered the problematic one the Whitlam Government had assigned it. This newfound framework of rights and responsibilities, ethnic identity and multiculturalism converged in the establishment of the Croatian ‘Embassy’ in 1977, which actively sought to manipulate Australia’s legal and political processes in order to legitimise Croatian political activism.

4.2.1. THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF MIGRANT AUSTRALIANS

In the very early hours of 1 April, a mere four days after Murphy’s Ministerial Statement, a combined force of Commonwealth and State Police raided approximately 80 Croatian premises in Sydney and Wollongong, rousing unsuspecting men, women, and children from their sleep, and reportedly in some cases, failing to produce warrants.¹¹³ Though it was unclear whether these raids were as a result of Murphy’s Statement, the timing of them only added to the swirling discontent over Murphy’s handling of the ‘Croatian affair’. Though nine individuals were charged as a result of the raids, these were only for minor offences, and produced nothing more than would be expected from a random

¹¹³ R. Warneke, ‘50 seized in terrorist hunt’, *The Age*, 2 April 1973, 1.

‘Dawn raids on Yugoslavs’, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 2 April 1973, 1.

‘Raids in NSW lead to 10 being charged’, *Canberra Times*, 2 April 1973, 1.

sample of 80 households. Despite the large amount of confiscations, particularly of publications and documents, the raids did not yield any evidence to support Murphy's allegations of Croatian terrorism or help prosecute just one Croatian for a single terrorist act.¹¹⁴ On the very same day, approximately 300 Croatians gathered in Canberra to establish a Croatian Civil Rights Committee in order to gather funds for the legal defence of any Croatians who may face deportation as a result of Murphy's actions. Interestingly, this committee was initiated by a non-Croatian, Leslie (Les) Shaw, a regular book review contributor for *The Canberra Times* and CSIRO employee, who would become a prominent advocate and spokesperson for the Croatian community. In light of the news about the NSW police raids, the establishment of this committee proved a shrewd move. However the events that would transpire in the coming weeks would elevate the importance of the Committee to a national level.

On 3 April, Murphy disclosed to the Senate that one of the catalysts for his Raid on ASIO was the discovery of an Interdepartmental Committee meeting report, which he believed indicated that 'the decision reported to have been taken at that meeting was inconsistent with the democratic process and inconsistent with responsible government.'¹¹⁵ The report intimated, at least to Murphy, that public servants may have been withholding information from the Government about Croatian terrorism. This was eclipsed on 4 April, when Greenwood delivered his devastating Shadow Ministerial Statement. Such was Greenwood's success in dismantling Murphy's Statement, the *Sydney Morning Herald* remarked that

There must be many people beginning to conclude that the Attorney-General has been - not to put too fine a point on it - making fools of himself and his Government and misusing Parliament to try to fool the Australian people.¹¹⁶

On the 5 April, Murphy suffered an enormous blow to his reputation in both houses. In the Senate, debates reached fever pitch, and Murphy faced the humiliation of a no-confidence motion in him passing. Adding insult to injury, on

¹¹⁴ D. Darby, *Why Croatia?* (Cheltenham: Douglas Darby, 197-?), 41.

¹¹⁵ Australia, Senate, *Parliamentary Debates*, No.14, 1973, 740.

¹¹⁶ 'Case Answered', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 5 April 1973, 6.

the same day in the House of Representatives, Whitlam declared that after proper administrative enquiries into the report that allegedly vindicated Murphy's Raid, it was found to be an accidental 'wrong report of what was said.'¹¹⁷ This admission from Whitlam insinuated first, that Murphy had not undertaken 'proper' administrative enquires in response to the report, and second that the entire melodrama of the Raid could have been avoided if he had just taken this simple step.

On 10 April, the Opposition attempted to establish a judicial inquiry into the legality of Murphy's actions and the veracity of his allegations of Croatian terrorism. Not only did Whitlam's Government defeat this motion, but it effectively gagged debate on the issue in the House of Representatives.¹¹⁸ This triumph, however, was short-lived as only two days later on 12 April, Belgrade announced that three Australian citizens captured in the 1972 incursion had been executed by firing squad. This was carried out without any prior notification of the Australian Government, who had in fact been told at the time of the incursion that all nine Australian citizens involved had been killed.¹¹⁹ Even more disturbing was the fact that the men had reportedly been executed only three days before Bijedić's arrival. Bijedić did not mention this matter during his visit.¹²⁰

The ill-conceived execution of the 1 April raids, the comedy of errors that beleaguered Murphy in his attempt to vindicate his Raid on ASIO, the execution of three Australian citizens without the Government's knowledge by a supposed friendly government they had paraded around the country less than a month before, all steeped in an almost hysteria about possible deportations, abuses of parliamentary privilege, and potential ramifications for Australia's migrant communities, resulted in the perception that Murphy was over-reaching in his position, the Whitlam government was too inexperienced and undisciplined to

¹¹⁷ Australia, House of Representatives, *Parliamentary Debates*, No.HR.14, 1973, 1122.

¹¹⁸ Australia, House of Representatives, *Parliamentary Debates*, No.HR.15, 1973, 1228-48

¹¹⁹ 'PM protests on executions', *The Age*, 14 April 1973, 1.

¹²⁰ C. Edwards, *Labor Pains* (Melbourne: Hill of Content, 1974), 53.

govern, and that they were violating the rights of Croatians in the process.¹²¹ After a failed attempt in the previous week, on 17 May the Senate Select Committee on the Civil Rights of Migrant Australians was established. Comprising of seven Senators – three from the government, three from the opposition parties, and one independent, the committee was tasked to enquire and report on four matters; whether the civil rights of migrant Australians have been infringed; whether members of migrant communities have experienced intimidation or undue pressure from foreign governments and/or their secret police; the circumstances of Murphy's Raid on ASIO; and any issues created by the dual nationalities of migrants. Though these investigations were also to include other migrant communities, the Croatian community was to become the central focus of the committee.

The establishment of the Senate Select Committee, therefore, prompted the Croatian Civil Rights Committee established on 01 April to evolve into a national organisation. Renamed the National Croatian Civil Rights Committee (NCCRC), its main role now was to 'prepare a submission and represent the Croatian community at the [Senate Select Committee] as the official voice of the Croatian diaspora community in the media.'¹²² As though flexing its muscle memory and replicating the organisational skills of the first wave of post-war Croatian migrants, the NCCRC quickly established sub-branches in all major cities across Australia and began the onerous task of documenting incidents of discrimination and grievances perpetrated by both Australian and Yugoslav authorities, and the effect of Murphy's actions on the community.¹²³

The first hearing of the Senate Select Committee was held in Melbourne on 19 July, and continued until November, with hearings also held in Canberra and Sydney. Submissions were sought in regards to the four matters, and even Barbour himself testified before the Committee on 08 August, attracting

¹²¹ For example, see: 'Letters to the Editor', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 5 April 1973, 6, which includes a letter from the Honorary Secretary of the Council for Civil Liberties.

¹²² V. Batarelo, 'A Troubled Relationship; the Croatian Diaspora in Australia between 1963 and 1973,' *Croatian Studies Review*, 10, 2014, 77.

¹²³ NAA: A1291, entire series.

significant attention as it was the first time the head of ASIO had ever been called upon to publically answer questions.¹²⁴ One of the unforeseen consequences of Murphy's actions and allegations, however, was that it gave the community a common goal which helped overcome the factionalism that had characterised the community in the first two decades of post-war settlement;

It seems the more that Murphy, the police and the media attacked the Croatians, the more united they became and in the end the NCCRC had the full support of the Croatian community.¹²⁵

The NCCRC presented 'a homogenised view of the Croatian diaspora in defence of the community and presenting their facts to the [Senate Select Committee] and the Australian public.'¹²⁶ This was the first time the community had organised to actively engage in a dialogue with Australian political and media institutions as a community, rather than under the auspices of various organisations and their leaders, and would come to have an important impact on future community organisation.

As with the debates of 1963/4, Croatian political activism faded from the national spotlight as domestic political concerns took priority and curtailed debate. The practicalities of governance were always going to be an issue for the Whitlam Government as it had to contend with a hostile Senate controlled by a Coalition majority. By early 1974, the Senate had rejected nineteen government bills, including ten of them twice, and in early April, Whitlam attempted to politically manoeuvre an upcoming half-Senate election in his favour, resulting in the 'Gair Affair.' On 10 April 1974, these issues came to a head when Whitlam announced that the Governor-General had agreed to a double dissolution,¹²⁷ and on 11 April, parliament was dissolved.

¹²⁴ 'ASIO confirms existence of Croat groups', *Canberra Times*, 9 August 1973, 1.

'ASIO man steps into the light', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 9 August 1973, 1.

R. Goodwin, 'Murphy visit caused confusion: ASIO man', *The Age*, 9 August 1973, 1.

¹²⁵ Batarelo, 'A Troubled Relationship', 77.

¹²⁶ *ibid.*

¹²⁷ Australia, House of Representatives, *Parliamentary Debates*, No.HR.15, 1974, 1359.

The double dissolution effectively ended the Senate Select Committee before a final report could be produced. Two weeks before the 1974 election, however, a draft report was leaked and published by *The Bulletin*, which vindicated the Croatian community, condemned Murphy's Statement and actions as a violation of the civil rights of Croatsians, and inferred that the intimidation of the Croatian community seemed to be the real purpose for these events.¹²⁸ Though this meant that the work that had been put into the preparation of submissions by the NCCRC and the community did not result in the official recognition and redress it might have had a final report been presented to the Senate, the participation of the community in this process was to have a lasting influence on its activism.

First and foremost, the Senate Select Committee legitimised Croatian activism in a way that had not been previously forthcoming. That Croatsians were invited to contribute, rather than speaking of their own initiative, was important as it gave an amount of *gravitas* (however small) to the assertions of Croatsians. It also provided a legitimate public forum through which Croatsians could enter into the public record explanations of their activism and their grievances, both long-standing and as a result of Murphy's actions. Second, it provided an opportunity for the community to generate knowledge of and experience in the navigation of Australian political processes. This experience would come to help the community tailor their future activism. Third, it highlighted the advantage of professionalism and collaboration outside of the community in developing its activism – as Batarelo notes, without the professionalism of Shaw, it is 'questionable to what extent the Croatian diaspora could have been properly presented at the hearings.'¹²⁹

These three developments all culminated in the fourth, and most important, influence of the Senate Select Committee – the replacement of the outdated rhetoric of anti-communism and political self-determination that had defined activism in the previous period with the rhetoric of civil rights. This change had both internal and external implications. Though the abandonment of political

¹²⁸ A. Reid, 'Secret report blasts Murphy', *Bulletin*, 4 May 1974, 12-15.

¹²⁹ Batarelo, 'A Troubled Relationship', 78.

rhetoric had begun with the arrival of the second wave of post-war Croatian migrants, a consensus had not yet developed on what or how this rhetoric could or should be replaced. The rhetoric of rights encoded in the purpose of the Senate Select Committee provided a useful alternative, which allowed Croatians to sidestep the factionalism and antagonism that had resulted from the diversity of political views. That this rhetoric of rights was framed by their status as Australian citizens also helped unify the community through their common experience of life in Australia and negotiation of identity within Australian society.

This internal change made Croatian activism more understandable and accessible to a wider Australian audience that had become well-versed in this rhetoric, not least because the Whitlam government had fashioned itself as the party of civil rights and liberties. More importantly, however, this change made Croatian activism sit more easily with the framework of the Good Australian Migrant. First it depoliticised the activism itself by changing the focus from political statehood to identity recognition, reducing the perception that Croatians were 'too political'. Second, it framed Croatians as Australian citizens, rather than by their Yugoslav citizenship. Finally, it changed the focus of the activism from what was happening in Yugoslavia to what was happening in Australia, weakening the accusation that Croatians were importing their problems from 'over there.' The introduction of multicultural policy only reinforced this change, as it legitimised the migrant presence in general and relaxed the assimilationist expectations of the Good Australian Migrant.

4.2.2. CROATIAN POLITICAL ACTIVISM UNDER MULTICULTURALISM

Multiculturalism afforded a wealth of opportunity for Croatian migrants and their activism. That multiculturalism stressed ethnicity over nationality meant that Croatians were able to legitimately advocate based on their ethnic identity as Croatians while bypassing issues raised by their Yugoslav citizenship. The

emphasis multiculturalism placed on cultural expression provided Croatians with more frequent opportunities to express their identity, even if these opportunities remained relatively within the Good Australian Migrant confines of Faith, Folklore, and Football. Though multiculturalism seemed to depoliticise Croatian activism within Australian paradigms, the interrelatedness of the cultural and political in Croatian activism meant that rather than eliminating the role of the political, Croatians simply resumed the traditional patterns and practices of Croatian nationalism by advocating for identity recognition through campaigns for access to services and participating in cultural events as Croatians, rather than Yugoslavs. This included that most Croatian of proxy battlegrounds - language recognition. The legitimate space multiculturalism opened up for Croatian activism allowed the community to cultivate an image and reputation of Good Australian Migrant-ness that highlighted the economic and cultural contributions of the community, and also countered the problematic reputation the Whitlam Government had ascribed to it.

For the most part, Croatian activism in the 1970s simply replicated the general patterns of the previous two decades. Participation in the processions, congresses, and 'international' masses of the Catholic Church, in community events, festivals, and exhibitions, and through the local soccer club, constituted the main activities of the Croatian community. Where the change occurred, however, was in size, scope, and frequency - the community of the 1970s was larger, the scope of its public profile greater, and the activism more frequent through the proliferation of government initiatives and 'multicultural' activities at the local, state, and national levels. Though the political element of Croatian activism remained - such as the stalwarts of *10 Travanj* celebrations and 29 November Yugoslav Day demonstrations - the greater part of Croatian activism was geared towards the recognition of Croatian identity in Australia as separate from a Yugoslav identity.

This activism was bolstered by the development of the community itself. The numerical growth of the community caused a corresponding increase in the

demand for resources and physical space. Existing clubs and associations renovated, moved premises, or built new clubhouses to accommodate an expanding membership, while newer clubs sought out premises of their own. This process of redevelopment and renewal was made easier by increasing access to financial capital, whether from new members, earlier migrants who were financially well-established by the 1970s, or from government grants and funding flowing from multicultural policy. The need to co-ordinate the activities of clubs and associations saw the rise of intergroup associations – whether because of their growing number, easier access to multicultural initiatives, or out of a recognition stemming from the Senate Select Committee that more could be achieved through unification and coordination.¹³⁰

The proxy battle of language recognition was fought on a three-fold front – radio programming, ethnic language schools, and interpreter/translation services. Though all three were heralded as tangible expressions of inclusion under multicultural policy, each was an experience of marginalisation for the Croatian community. Even though the precursors to what would become SBS radio ostensibly included a ‘Croatian’ or ‘Serbo-Croat’ program, these were for the most part controlled by the Yugoslav community. Croatian ethnic schools were required to teach from a ‘Serbo-Croat’ syllabus set by the Yugoslav community if they were to be formally recognised or accredited, while interpreter/translation services were limited to either ‘Yugoslav’ or ‘Serbo-Croat’ interpreters, and accessing these services meant dealing with a non-Croatian translator, often at times of significant personal and private vulnerability. Activism therefore centred on the notion that Croats were an ethnic group separate from Yugoslavs, and was therefore entitled to access to services in its own language and from its own people, and to organise content and delivery based on its own culture and issues relevant to its community, not one set by a Yugoslav agenda. The official

¹³⁰ Many of these associations are still in operation. The Croatian Soccer Association of Australia – CSAA (*Hrvatski Nogometni Savez Australije*) was formed in 1974 and the first official CSAA tournament was held in 1975. The tournament is now the oldest, non-defunct ethnic football competition in Australia. The Central Council of Croatian Schools in New South Wales (*Središnji odbor hrvatskih etničkih škola u NSW – SOHEŠ*) formed in 1977, while the Association of Croatian Folkloric Groups was formed in 1978.

recognition of Croatian as a separate language by the Australian Government in 1979 was therefore a major milestone in the activism of the community, and one which had important social consequences. As Drapac explains,

The sense of inclusion this gave Croatians drew them into the social fabric, whereas previously official exclusion left many who were in need of these services outside the mainstream and without representation.¹³¹

Croatian political activism throughout the 1970s was also characterised by a level of self-awareness and attempt to 'manage' the perception of its activism that had not been as overt in the previous two decades. Croatians modified their activism as opportunities or difficulties arose, with a view to present the community in the best possible light and minimise the prospect of negative publicity. The experience of Croatians under the Whitlam Government made it clear to the community that the perception of its activism in Australian society could have serious consequences on the everyday life of Croatians, and therefore the importance of managing this perception.

Armed with a new political program arising from the ideas and rhetoric of the Croatian Spring and from their experience with the Senate Select Committee, the community was careful not to squander any goodwill that was extended towards it. For example, like the demonstration that was cancelled during the Bijedić visit in 1973, Croatians cancelled their Yugoslav National Day protests in Canberra in 1975 due to the politically fraught atmosphere that had pervaded due to Whitlam's Dismissal and the election campaign that followed. As Lovokovic writes, any protest or demonstration was cancelled 'so that opponents couldn't exploit the protest of Croatians for their own corrupt intentions.'¹³² Similarly, when Red Star Belgrade travelled to Australia in 1977 for an international friendly

¹³¹ Drapac, 'Croatian Australians Today', 248.

¹³² Lovoković, *Hrvatske Zajednice U Australiji*, 169.

Original quote: 'Kako su za kraj studenoga bile zakazane velike hrvatske demonstracije u Canberri, ispred Jugoslavenske ambasade, to je radi političke krize i nastalih nereda, sve ovo otkazano, kako protivnici ne bi mogli ovaj prosvjed Hrvata iskoristiti u svoje prljave svrhe.'

with the Australian side, a flyer was distributed throughout the community imploring Croatians to avoid attending any games.¹³³

Multiculturalism not only provided the community with more opportunities to disseminate their activism and demonstrate their ethnic identity, but also an avenue to build on any goodwill and cultivate a reputation of Good Australian Migrant-ness through their contributions of faith, folklore, and football. As Hay writes of his involvement with soccer in Geelong in the late 1970s,

[The] litany of criticism aimed at the Croatian club struck me as excessive and, increasingly, at variance with my experiences. Certainly Croatians played hard to win... Off the field the Croatians were marvellous company, friendly, passionate and interesting people, although the youngsters could be rude, offensive, chauvinistic, prepared to cheat and violent on occasion.¹³⁴

This 'personal experience' of Croatians and their activism through the paradigms of the Good Australian Migrant helped to counter the reputation for extremism and violence the Whitlam Government had ascribed to the community. Drapac summarises the importance of this turn to multiculturalism by Croatians,

The reality of the situation meant that the media and government-manufactured Croatian 'type' was no longer sustainable because it was not rooted in the lived experience of Croats in Australia, or indeed the lived experience of Australians who came into contact with Croatian people. Croats did not exist in a vacuum nor were they simply reactive. They were contesting a negative and one-dimensional interpretation of their identity and positing another in its place. At times, this led to a certain defensiveness on their part. On the whole, however, their reaction to the slurs against them led Croats (collectively) to be more outward looking: their behaviour was less 'conspiratorial' and 'nostalgic' than it was flexible, forward looking and adaptable.¹³⁵

Though initial attempts to manage the perception of the community and its activism may have been more an unintentional consequence of the internal changes within Croatian activism, an explicitly deliberate act of 'perception management' was to form the basis of one of the most memorable turns of Croatian activism in Australia – the Croatian 'Embassy' of 1977-1979

¹³³ *ibid.*, 173.

¹³⁴ Hay, 'Those Bloody Croatians,' 78.

¹³⁵ Drapac, 'Active Citizenship in Multicultural Australia', 67.

4.2.3. THE CROATIAN EMBASSY, 1977-79

On 5 April 1978, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Andrew Peacock, rose to deliver his Ministerial Statement on the 'Croatian Embassy' established in Canberra on 29 November 1977.¹³⁶ This was the third statement to the Australian Parliament involving Croats in the space of five years. However, the tone and reception of this Statement was markedly different from those that had come before it. The ideological and historical deliberations that had coloured previous statements were muted in favour of a focus on the practical, diplomatic implications the 'Embassy' posed for the Australian Government. Government concern was not with Croatian activism in general, but with the practice of using diplomatic language as a form of protest. For the Government, Peacock explained, the 'Embassy' was problematic because it '[impeded] the correct and orderly conduct of Australia's international relations.'¹³⁷ The Government was therefore

deeply concerned lest other minority groups may be inspired by the continued existence of the self-styled Croatian Embassy to believe that they, too, may similarly interfere in and jeopardise Australia's relations with sovereign states.

Because the Government had found that existing legislation could only impose a slight constraint to 'Embassy' operations, Peacock advised that new legislation would be introduced that would prevent the false representation of diplomatic, consular or other official missions.

Perhaps most uncharacteristically, the statement was met with bipartisan support, even if, as the Leader of the Opposition Bill Hayden remarked, 'it must be conceded that the action comes belatedly and grudgingly.'¹³⁸ The most obvious reason for this bipartisanship was the diplomatic embarrassment the technical legality of the 'Embassy' had caused the Australian Government, and the strained relationship that had developed between Australia and Yugoslavia as a result. The Yugoslav Government demanded nothing less than the immediate closure of the

¹³⁶ See Appendix 1D for a copy of the full Ministerial Statement.

¹³⁷ Australia, House of Representatives, *Parliamentary Debates*, No.HR.14, 1978, 994.

¹³⁸ *ibid.*, 995.

'Embassy'. Despite Australia's explanation that there were complex legal and political issues involved, the Australian Government was accused of a lack of 'political will to find a solution satisfactory to Yugoslavia.'¹³⁹ As one public servant explained, 'it is clear that [Yugoslavia's] concept of effective action and the speed with which it can be taken is much different from ours.'¹⁴⁰

The Croatian 'Embassy' was a unique moment in Australian history because it was the first embassy of its kind to be seen in Australia,¹⁴¹ the first Croatian activism of its type throughout the world, and because it resulted in the legislation that continues to shape Australia's diplomatic relations to the present day. The historical significance of the 'Embassy', however, lay more in its purpose than in its outcome. The establishment of the Croatian 'Embassy' can be understood as an expression of the knowledge and experience the Croatian community had accumulated through its activism. It was a considered and co-ordinated attempt by a group of Croatians to address and redress the 'Othering' of their community and the problematisation of its activism that had occurred under Murphy and the Whitlam Government. This was achieved through four key approaches – the use of a mode of dissent and protest familiar to the Australian political environment; the emphasis of the legality of the 'Embassy', as well as its basis on Australian citizenship; the framing of the 'Embassy' as a symbol of a unified Croatian 'voice'; and the presentation of Croatian activism through multicultural ideals in order to disassociate it from its political and problematic past.

The most obvious source of inspiration for the 'Embassy' can be found in the Aboriginal Tent Embassy.¹⁴² Dešpoja, who had been a senior research officer for

¹³⁹ NAA: A1838, 1490/5/51/1, PART 2, Inward Cablegram, 'Relations with Yugoslavia', 27 January 1978.

¹⁴⁰ NAA: A1838, 1490/5/51/1, PART 1, "Croatian Embassy – Possible Legal Action", 13 January 1978.

¹⁴¹ Though several governments, such as Taiwan, Rhodesia, and the Palestinians, have maintained a form of diplomatic representation in Australia, these did not directly use the title of Embassy in the same way Croatians did.

¹⁴² For more information, See:

G. Cowan, 'Collapsing Australian architecture: The Aboriginal Tent Embassy', *Journal of Australian Studies*, 25(67), 2001, 30-36.

H. Goodall, *Invasion to Embassy: Land in Aboriginal Politics in New South Wales, 1770-1972* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1996).

the Department of Aboriginal Affairs, and a friend of Charles Perkins, readily admitted that this was the inspiration for the 'Embassy'.¹⁴³ The 'Embassy' exploited the political language of diplomacy to portray the failure of the Yugoslav Government to represent Croatia, Croatians and their interests, in the same way the Aboriginal Tent Embassy drew on the political language of diplomacy to

cogently [portray] the failure of white governments to respond to Aboriginal demands. At its most basic, as one participant put it, the Embassy dramatised the truth that 'foreigners had more representation than us'.¹⁴⁴

The use of the title of 'embassy' was deliberate and intended to provoke, as was the opening date itself - 29 November was Yugoslavia's National Day. As Dešpoja reportedly claimed to a Commonwealth Police Officer on 6 December 1977, 'we are only interested in making some political gesture, something political against Yugoslavia... Who knows it's just to embarrass the opposition.'¹⁴⁵ In the case of both embassies, the symbolism of place and space had as much of a role to play in its activism as did language. For the Aboriginal Tent Embassy, its position on the lawns of Old Parliament House was both highly provocative and a stark political statement about the position of Indigenous people in Australian society;

K. Lothian, 'Moving Blackwards: Black Power and the Aboriginal Embassy', in I. Macfarlane & M. Hannah (eds.), *Transgressions: Critical Australian Indigenous Histories*, (Canberra: ANU E-Press & Aboriginal History Inc., 2007), 19-34.

R. McGregor, 'Another nation: Aboriginal activism in the late 1960s and early 1970s', *Australian Historical Studies*, 40(3), 2009, 343-360.

N. McLaren, 'Black Power, ASIO and media framing of the 1972 Aboriginal Tent Embassy: for film development', (MA Thesis, University of Wollongong, 2010).

S. Robinson, 'The Aboriginal Embassy: An account of the protests of 1972', *Aboriginal History*, 18(1), 1994, 49-63.

¹⁴³ P. Samuel, 'Rebel embassy remains thorn in diplomatic hide', *Bulletin*, 19 December 1978, 30.

¹⁴⁴ S. Scalmer, *Dissent Events: Protest, the Media, and the Political Gimmick in Australia* (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press 2002), 98.

¹⁴⁵NAA: A1838, 1490/5/51/1, PART 2, 'Subject: Croatian Activities – Enquiries Re: Premises at 34 Canberra Avenue, Forrest. A.C.T.', 2.

To stand on the road, with the big White building behind, and the small Black encampment in front, is to stand in a tense middle ground between two worlds of mutual incomprehension.¹⁴⁶

The address of the Croatian 'Embassy', 34 Canberra Ave, also had political symbolism. It was situated two kilometres from Parliament House (now Old Parliament House), a few hundred metres from the Soviet Embassy, whose alleged support of Croat separatism was a cause of worldwide concern, and in the suburb known to be the home of diplomats and legitimate embassies.

The Croatian 'Embassy' however, was not familiar to the Australian political environment simply because it emulated the Aboriginal Tent Embassy. Rather, Croatians were engaging in a form of activism that had heavily influenced the protest movements of the previous decade in Australia - that of 'disruptive staging' as proposed by Scalmer in his exploration of collective action in Australia.¹⁴⁷ Disruptive staging is a political performance, where activists create 'stages' out of public places (or make private places public) from which 'actors' can make claims on others. This staging is intended to be disruptive, either by involving a deliberate illegality, drawing a negative reaction from the state (usually police), or preventing the routine use of a particular space by other actors. Disruptive staging is also a performance of contestation, where claimants 'make their demands in the direct presence of their personal or institutional objects.'¹⁴⁸ Essential to this form of activism is the theatrical;

¹⁴⁶ Lothian, 'Moving Blackwards', 19.

¹⁴⁷ Scalmer, *Dissent Events*, 55.

¹⁴⁸ *ibid.*

[Activists] present themselves as if on stage, keen that we will comprehend not only their actions but their beliefs, motives, identities. We do not merely learn that they oppose the Vietnam War or support Aboriginal land rights, we also know why that may be so, and what may motivate them... Props and preparation are used in order to make the performance more convincing... There is, equally, a concern with symbolism...¹⁴⁹

Finally, media attention is important to the action of disruptive staging, as the target audience of the activism is not those that will physically bear witness, but those who will learn about it in the media.¹⁵⁰

In the case of the Croatian ‘Embassy’, the stage was a humble rental in a Canberra suburb, disrupting not only the routine use of that rental, but also the routine use of the political language of diplomacy and causing an international embarrassment for the state. The props of language, insignia, titles and flags were employed to make the performance more convincing, and through the actors ‘playing’ the *Charge d’Affaires* and Secretary, Australians learned why Croatians had been advocating for independence for so long. By setting up an embassy, instead of a community or information centre, the activists were creating a performance of contestation, mobilising a physical proxy to counter the Yugoslav Embassy (and by extension the Yugoslav Government) and contest its claim of representing the Croatian community. The ‘Embassy’ therefore existed as a sustained physical protest against the legitimacy of the Yugoslav state in a way which drew on the Australian experience of protest to provide a point of reference from which Croatian dissent could become familiarised and understood.

If the establishment of a quasi-embassy was a means to contextualise and familiarise Croatian activism within the Australian political environment, the emphasis on the legality of the ‘Embassy’ and its function as an expression of Australian citizenship was an attempt to redress Murphy’s problematisation of Croatian dissent. Indeed, the entire idea of the ‘Embassy’ was an almost

¹⁴⁹ *ibid.*, 32-33.

¹⁵⁰ *ibid.*, 41.

Machiavellian exercise in rebranding Croatian activism. As Čizmić states, from the outset the organisers were

playing the 'legal' card right until the end. They knew that the Embassy would eventually be closed, but they wanted to turn its closing into a 'Croatian win'. They wanted to show that Croatians were not terrorists, but that they obeyed Australia's laws, and if the appropriate courts rule for its closure, they need to be respected.¹⁵¹

This emphasis on legality and portrayal of Croatians as law-abiding citizens was closely related to the emphasis of the nonviolent nature of the 'Embassy', with Dešpoja frequently denouncing violent methods of protest as unacceptable.¹⁵²

Along with emphasising the legality of the 'Embassy' and the law-abidance of Croatians, 'Embassy' activists addressed the problematisation of Croatian dissent by emphasising that Croatians were simply exercising their right to protest just like any other group in Australia with a grievance;

[The embassy] is only possible because Australia is a free country. This is possible only because in Australia the fact that I am a Croat, and that I believe Croatia has the right to be free, and that I say so – even though to say so may embarrass someone – is not regarded as sufficient cause to gag me, or to tie me up, or to throw me into prison.¹⁵³

The 'Embassy' was therefore a performance of the Australian citizenship as much as it was a protest against Yugoslav citizenship. It was because they were Australian citizens, rather than despite it, that the community was able to advocate for their cause, even if for some, such as Senator O'Byrne, 'the Croat people are prostituting this great privilege.'¹⁵⁴

Emulating the successes of the NCCRC and the Aboriginal Tent Embassy, the Croatian 'Embassy' sought to control the representation of the community by establishing a focal voice that could speak on the community's behalf. It gave the fractured and ad-hoc nature of Croatian activism continuity and cohesiveness through its form as a sustained protest, not confined to any one community,

¹⁵¹ I. Čizmić, 'Croatian Embassy in Canberra – 1977-1978', *Društvena Istraživanja*, 8(1), 1999, 112.

¹⁵² See for example: 'Croatian 'embassy' will be closed: Peacock', *Canberra Times*, 6 April 1978, 1. 'Embassy link with Croat arrests denied', *Canberra Times*, 6 September 1978, 6.

¹⁵³ Dešpoja, M, 'Why a Croatian Embassy?', as published by, *Spremnost*, 7 March 1978, 2.

¹⁵⁴ Australia, Senate, Parliamentary Debates, No.S.14, 1973, 857.

organisation, or political creed. This conferred the 'Embassy' with a moral authority and ability to control which activisms, organisations, and associations were considered legitimate, and more importantly, which were not. In much the same way as post-war Croatian organisations, the 'Embassy' became an arbiter of the collective identity through its ability to bestow and withdraw 'official' support. The *Charge d'Affaires* was most prominent as a guest of honour at various functions within the community, the host of various meetings of heads of organisations, as well as the face of the community to the 'outside', mainly through newspaper and television reportage, but also as a guest speaker to non-Croatian functions.¹⁵⁵ The 'Embassy' itself also became a place of protest and demonstration.¹⁵⁶

Because of this status as the arbiter of collective identity, 'Embassy' activists attempted to disassociate Croatian activism from its highly politicised past, as much for the community itself as for those outside of it. Like the Senate Select Committee and activism under multiculturalism, the endorsements and proclamations of Dešpoja as the *Charge d'Affaires* helped entrench the change in Croatian activism from the rhetoric of direct action against Yugoslavia to a symbolic protest based on the socio-cultural identity of Croatians. The regular 'Embassy' column in *Spremnost* emphasised that the symbolic could be just as powerful, for example, reiterating that;

with one simple on-going protest... within the law – without risking any lives or damaging any government property – the embassy delivered a large political blow to Yugoslavia.¹⁵⁷

Dešpoja frequently asserted that the 'Embassy' did not support any particular political belief or system of government, and even went so far as to argue that

¹⁵⁵ For example, see: 'Address to the members of the Macquarie and Chifley Liberal Federal Electorate Conference', *Spremnost*, 13 March 1979, 8-9.

R. Frail, 'No Liberal platform for Croat 'envoy'', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 13 June 1979, 12.

¹⁵⁶ B. Juddery, 'Campaign of support for Croat 'embassy'', *Canberra Times*, 28 December 1977, 9.

¹⁵⁷ 'News from the Croatian Embassy', *Spremnost*, 30 May 1978, 2.

Croatians were not necessarily against the existence of Yugoslavia, just that ‘we don’t want our country to be a part of theirs.’¹⁵⁸

There was also recognition that Croatian nationalism needed to be rebranded in order to remove the stigma of it as the province of old men, nostalgic for a fascist state that could have been. This was best reflected in the choice of a *Charge d’Affaires*. From its very establishment, the organisers of the Croatian Embassy were

aware that [the *Charge d’Affaires*] needed to be an individual that spoke English fluently and had a good understanding of Australia’s socio-political environment... it is not desirable for the person to be someone who during the Second World War had anything to do with the political life of the Independent State of Croatia, as pro-Yugoslav migrants will use that relentlessly to discredit the Croatian embassy.¹⁵⁹

They found this person in Dešpoja, who was not only all of these things, but also a university-educated former public servant of the Australian Government, and a young 39 years old. Alongside age and education, gender was also an important tool used to diversify and ‘soften’ the image of Croatian nationalism. This was also embodied in the appointed secretary and aide to the *Charge d’Affaires*, 21yr old Dinka Sidić, who was depicted as the epitome of the young professional 1970s woman. In 1979, she was promoted to *Charge d’Affaires* in August 1979 when Dešpoja could no longer perform the role.¹⁶⁰ These markers of youth, education, and gender all referenced the ‘new nationalism’ and post-Cold War era the Whitlam Government was perceived as having ushered in.¹⁶¹

The ‘Embassy’ also capitalised on the opportunities multiculturalism had extended in order to rebrand Croatian activism. The precedence of ethnic identity over nationality was invoked to argue the case for Croatian ethnic

¹⁵⁸ H. Tyner, ‘An ‘embassy’ without a country’, *Chicago Tribune*, 14 January 1979, 20.

‘News from the Croatian Embassy’, *Spremnost*, 7 March 1978, 2.

¹⁵⁹ Čizmić, ‘Croatian Embassy’, 112.

¹⁶⁰ S. Balderstone, ‘Croat ‘embassy’ can fly the flag again’, *Canberra Times*, 16 August 1979, 13.

¹⁶¹ As White explains, this ‘new nationalism’ displaced the homogeneity inherent in earlier versions of the Australian way of life with one based on diversity and pluralism. It was closely tied to notions of pluralism, multiculturalism, tolerance, the arts and culture, and epitomised by the Whitlam Government. See: White, *Inventing Australia*, 166–71.

separateness, rather than the complicated history of the Balkans and Croatian statehood. The multicultural symbols of faith, folklore, and football continued to be the main sites of Croatian activism, in what can be described as an exercise in positive public relations. The involvement of the 'Embassy' in the promotion of the relatively unthreatening issue of Croatia's distinctive cultural and linguistic traditions through the proxy battles of radio programming, ethnic schooling, and translation services also gave the 'Embassy' tangible objectives, even if they were not directly articulated until it was faced with closure.¹⁶²

These attempts at re-branding Croatians and their activism were reflective of a wider recognition of the necessity to enter into a conversation with the Australian public, to explain why they undertook the activism that they did, in ways that made that activism familiar and easily understood. This deliberate attempt at 'perception management' resulted in what Dešpoja described as one of the earliest and biggest successes of the 'Embassy';

Croatians are this time the SUBJECT and not the OBJECT of discussions surrounding the Croatian question. Croatians started this debate. And the development and outcome of this unique dialogue relies heavily on them.¹⁶³

Through the 'Embassy', the Croatian community was finally being spoken *with*, rather than just *about*, an active participant, rather than a passive observer, in the Australian political environment.

¹⁶² The aims of the 'Embassy' were officially recorded in Hansard in a notice of motion by Bruce Goodluck on 5 June 1979. These aims included the formal recognition that the Croatian people are a distinctive ethnic group and not "Yugoslavs"; that the Croatian language was a distinct modern language; that this recognition enable the community to have their own ethnic broadcasts in the Croatian language; that Government departments and other institutions for interpreters, social and welfare workers, other liaison officers and other assistance be made available in the Croatian language and through Croatians; and to obtain Government support for the review of government and administrative discrimination in matters of citizenship, employment and passports; and the Government should recognise the genuine aims and grievances of the Croatian community.

See: Australia, House of Representatives, *Parliamentary Debates*, No.HR.23, 1979, 2885.

¹⁶³ 'News from the Embassy', *Spremnost*, 30 May 1978, 2.

4.3. PARADIGMS SHIFT AGAIN

This was the origin of the pungent epithet for Vietnamese refugees, Yellow Croats; in one phrase, the sum of all these fears.¹⁶⁴

Two events in the late 1970s threatened to undo much of the re-branding of Croatian activism that the ‘Embassy’, the NCCRC, and the community as a whole, had engaged in throughout the decade. On 02 September 1978, Commonwealth Police arrested 19 Croatian men after raiding what appeared to be a military training camp near Eden. Just five months later, on 09 February 1979, NSW police announced that it had arrested six Croatian men on charges of conspiracy to bomb various public buildings. These arrests reverberated throughout the Croatian community, not only out of fear the political atmosphere of the Whitlam Government would return, but also because the involvement of Yugoslav *agents provocateurs* were suspected. At least in the case of the ‘Croatian Six’, this would eventually be proven a well-founded fear.

Though both events seemed to vindicate Murphy’s original allegations of Croatian terrorism, there was little of the public or political outcry that had accompanied such news at the start of the decade. This may have been because both arrests were on the grounds of conspiracy, rather than after a crime had been perpetrated, and therefore were not as visceral or as tangible a crime as the bombings of the early 1970s had been. This nature also constrained any political or media commentary in the name of due process and the presumption of innocence. It may have also been an indication that Croatians had somewhat succeeded in disassociating their activism from extremism and terrorism. However the more likely reason can be found in Australia’s preoccupation with the humanitarian issues raised by the end of the Vietnam War and the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War that led to the institutionalisation of non-European immigration in 1979.

¹⁶⁴ Viviani, *The Long Journey*, 56.

4.3.1. MURPHY'S VINDICATION?

On 2 September 1978, Commonwealth Police arrested 19 Croatian men after raiding what appeared to be a military training camp in thick bushland outside of Eden. At the time of the arrests, the men were dressed in uniforms of jungle greens, black berets with a red-and-white checked badge, and net masks over their faces. A large cache of weapons and detonators were found, and curiously, several rolls of film which the men maintained proved they were simply making a film. Police, however, believed they had found one of the secret 'training camps' of an underground Croatian army that had been the subject of rumours since Croats first rose to national prominence in 1963. The day after, Commonwealth police searched a number of homes in Sydney and Canberra, seizing large quantities of documents that seemed to confirm the men had been preparing for another military incursion into Yugoslavia.¹⁶⁵ Almost two years later, eight men would be convicted of training others for the purpose of entering a foreign country with intent to engage in hostile activities, while another five were charged with allowing themselves to be trained.¹⁶⁶

Front page media coverage was limited to the initial days after the arrests, with follow-up articles relegated to cursory reporting of court proceedings, as would normally be the case. In Parliament, the matter was only raised twice - by Harry Jenkins in the House of Representatives and only in order to denunciate media reports of Macedonian involvement, and by Gietzelt in the Senate, who did attempt to link the arrests as vindication of Murphy's 1973 allegations, but whose question to the Government was dismissed as it would be 'totally improper and, indeed, deplorable, if I [Attorney-General Peter Durack] were to make any statements implicating or implying in any way the guilt of the people in those proceedings...'¹⁶⁷ However, before committal hearings for the Eden arrests could

¹⁶⁵ See: P. Quiddington, 'Police arrest 20 Croats' *Canberra Times*, 3 September 1978, 1.

W. Owens, 'Raid on 'Secret Army' in NSW, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 3 September 1978, 1,2.

S. Balderstone and L. Murdoch, 'Police raid homes of terror suspects', *The Age*, 4 September 1978, 1.

¹⁶⁶ '13 Croats for trial on bush camp charges', *Canberra Times*, 6 August 1980, 10.

¹⁶⁷ Australia, House of Representatives, *Parliamentary Debates*, No.HR.37, 1978, 1010-1011

Australia, Senate, *Parliamentary Debates*, No.S.37, 1978, 594.

even begin, the 'Croatian Six' (as they would become known) had been arrested.¹⁶⁸ Media coverage followed the same pattern as the Eden arrests, so that by the time the guilty verdict was handed down on 18 February 1981, the men were described as 'Yugoslavs' who were 'accused Croatian nationalists.'¹⁶⁹

For the Croatian community, both cases whiffed of Yugoslav intelligence. Croatian responses to the Eden arrests varied. Some alleged outright that the camp was a Yugoslav set up. Some asserted that even if they were not, these men were deluded in thinking they could liberate Croatia by mounting any sort of activity from Australia, particularly after the purges of the Croatian Spring in 1971. Others simply denounced any connection between these men and the wider community, while others still expressed incredulity at the circumstances. Few even repeated the claims of the men themselves that they were simply making a film.¹⁷⁰ The potential involvement of Yugoslav intelligence in the case of the Croatian Six was even recognised by ASIO at the time of the arrests. Blaxland reveals that ASIO had long held the suspicion that Yugoslav agents were active in Australia, had penetrated Croatian organisations, and were even believed it responsible for some of the violence attributed to Croatians.¹⁷¹ By 1978, ASIO had assessed that approximately one third of Yugoslav representatives in Australia were in some way connected to Yugoslav intelligence, and had appeared to have even prevented the assassination of a Croatian.¹⁷²

Suspicion centred on Vico Virkez, who had originally turned himself in to the Lithgow Police and 'confessed' about the bomb conspiracy. ASIO had long suspected Virkez of being an intelligence official working with the Yugoslav Consulate in Sydney. In fact, just mere hours before he walked into Lithgow Police Station on the 08 February, ASIO had intercepted a phone call from Virkez

¹⁶⁸ 'Bomb plot against Serbians alleged', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 10 February 1979, 1.

¹⁶⁹ 'Men planned bomb protests, court told', *Canberra Times*, 10 February 1979, 1.

¹⁶⁹ 'Six Yugoslavs jailed for 15 years', *Canberra Times*, 18 February 1981, 14.

¹⁷⁰ See: P. Quiddington, 'Police search Croat homes' *Canberra Times*, 3 September 1978, 1.

'Mixed reaction by Croats to police raid', *The Age*, 4 September 1978, 5.

P. Molloy, 'Croats just making film, says relative', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 4 September 1978, 1.

¹⁷¹ Blaxland, *The Protest Years*, 120–58, 416–17.

¹⁷² J. Blaxland and R. Crawley, *The Secret Cold War: The Official History of ASIO 1975-1989*, Vol. III (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2016), 141

to the Sydney Consulate about the very same allegations he was to make to the Lithgow Police.¹⁷³ Public suspicions were first raised when Virkez only received a sentence of 26 months, compared to the 15 years of the 'Croatian Six'. Even more suspicious was the fact that after 10 months of his sentence, Virkez was released, and upon his release he returned to Yugoslavia. However, it would not be until 1989, when *The Australian* published a series of articles by Barry Lowe, that Virkez's true identity, and the involvement of notorious Yugoslav agent Vinko Sindjic would be revealed. It was also uncovered that high-ranking public servants in the Department of Foreign Affairs, the Department of the Prime Minister and the Department of Defence were informants, possibly agents, for the Yugoslav secret service.¹⁷⁴ In 1991, *Four Corners* journalist Chris Masters not only interviewed the Croatian Six, who detailed their experiences of police corruption, missing evidence, and forced confessions, but also tracked down Virkez in Yugoslavia, who admitted that he was in fact an *agent provocateur* that had framed them.¹⁷⁵

Though the Croatian Six were released when it became clear that Virkez had fabricated his confession, applications for a judicial review of the original convictions have consistently been dismissed. The most recent call for a judicial review occurred in 2013 as a result of the 2012 reinvestigation of the case by Fairfax journalist Hamish McDonald. The release of his e-book *Framed*, and accompanying articles in the *Sydney Morning Herald* gave long-awaited credence to what many had been alleging since the first arrests in 1979 – that these men were the victims of a gross miscarriage of justice at the hands of the corrupt NSW policemen, framed by the Yugoslav intelligence hell-bent on discrediting

¹⁷³ *ibid.*, 138–39.

Whether this information was forwarded to the police is unclear as Blaxland & Crowley do not expand on this point. Instead, they argue that ASIO was not directly responsible for the wrongful conviction of the Croatian Six, and describe ASIO involvement (or lack thereof) as merely a 'misjudgement' and the result of an unfortunate 'lack of insight'.

¹⁷⁴ B. Lowe, 'Assassin set up our biggest frame', *The Weekend Australian*, 8-9 July 1989, 1, 8-9., 22-3 July 1989, 7., 19-20 August 1989, 6. *The Australian*, 10 July 1989, 3., 17 July 1989, 12.

¹⁷⁵ P. McGeough, 'Fall guy breaks silence over ASIO's terrorist trap', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 26 August 1991, 4.

S. Kirk, 'Croatian Six: police kept facts secret', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 28 August 1991, 3.

Croatian activism in Australia, and ultimately betrayed by every Australian Government since.¹⁷⁶

It is now known that the case of the Croatian Six was a deliberate attempt by Yugoslav intelligence to portray Croatians as extremists and terrorists, and some suggest that perhaps the Eden arrests were as well.¹⁷⁷ This indicates that Croatians, through the NCCRC, multiculturalism, and the 'Embassy' had succeeded in re-branding Croatian activism sufficiently enough in Australia to warrant Yugoslav interference. The Yugoslavs failed on this account, at least partly, because Croatian activism was no longer as tied to extremism and violence as it was perceived to be at the start of the decade, evidenced by the comparatively muted response from Australia's politicians and media. This response may also be a simple reflection of the fact that both the Eden and Croatian Six arrests were for conspiracy to commit a crime, rather than actually committing one – it is difficult to manufacture outrage or media attention for something that did not happen. However it seems that the most likely reason can be found in the fact that Croatian activism was no longer as politically symbolic as it was at the start of the decade. Murphy's moral panic over 'Croats in the bush' had, by the end of the decade, been superseded by the anxieties the onset of non-European immigration had caused.

4.3.2. NON-EUROPEAN IMMIGRATION

The late 1970s saw two major intakes of non-European refugees that challenged Australia's political and social environment. The end of the Vietnam War and the outbreak of the Lebanese Civil War, both in 1975, led to the arrival of Vietnamese and Lebanese refugees whose racial, religious, and cultural

¹⁷⁶ See: H. McDonald, *Framed*, eBook (Fairfax Media, 2012).

H. McDonald, 'Terror Six Claim It Was Fix', *Sun Herald*, 12 February 2012, 16.

H. McDonald, 'Bid for Review of Croatian Six Terrorist Convictions Again Fails', 11 February 2013, 4.

H. McDonald, 'Just Another Disgraceful Chapter in the Sorry Saga of the Croatian Six', 11 February 2013, 9.

¹⁷⁷ John Schindler, for example, claims that the group that ran the Eden military exercise, the HRB, was in effect directly under Yugoslav control. See: H. McDonald, 'Framed', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 11 February 2012, 14.

identities challenged the expectations of the Good Australian Migrant in ways Croatians simply did not. As such, these newer arrivals displaced Croatians as the pre-eminent migrant 'Other' in Australian society. The politics of their arrival and settlement in Australia would diminish the political currency of Croatian activism, as new divides between the major political parties emerged. Particularly with advent of Vietnamese boat arrivals in 1976-1977, the moral panic over 'Croats in the Bush' was slowly replaced with that most traditional of Australian moral panics – non-European immigration. Though this did not completely erase Croatians and their activism from the public sphere – no less because of the actions of the community itself in keeping itself visible – it certainly depoliticised its symbolism in the Australian political environment.

Australia's immigration policy since Federation had explicitly, and later implicitly, been informed by the desire to prevent non-European immigration to Australia. Though the Whitlam Government had formally abolished the White Australia Policy and introduced the *Racial Discrimination Act 1975*, race continued to cast a long shadow on the way Australians perceived themselves and the world around them. The sliding scales of 'whiteness' and 'Britishness' still exerted a significant influence in determining the figure of the Good Australian Migrant. Both the Lebanese and Indochinese refugees of the late 1970s challenged the racial, religious and cultural expectations of the Good Australian Migrant. Though Lebanese migration to Australia dated back to the 1880s, these waves predominantly consisted of Lebanese Christians who were generally considered to be a part of the White, European world. The intake of 1976-7, on the other hand, was predominantly of Lebanese Muslims, whose religious identity posited them further down the sliding scales informing the Good Australian Migrant. For the Indochinese refugees, there was no ambiguity in their non-European identity and non-Christian religious identity. This was further complicated by the 'boat arrivals' that became symbolic of the late 1970s – though a very small proportion of the total number of arrivals, their 'self-selection' revived Australia's deep-

seated anxiety and perceived vulnerability to the 'Yellow Peril'.¹⁷⁸ The cultural identities of both groups – Arab and Eastern – were also situated outside the Western world, making them seem more foreign and not 'like us' to Australian sensitivities.

The Arab, Muslim, and Middle Eastern identities of the Lebanese and the Asian, predominantly Buddhist, Eastern identities of the Indochinese thus challenged the Good Australian Migrant in ways Croatians simply did not. Though Croatians did carry the baggage of Balkanism and the legacies of Australia's relationship with Southern Europeans, they were still unequivocally European. The Catholic identity of Croatians was shared with a sizeable proportion of Australia's population, and Croatians were able to enter into a well-established Australian Catholic Church that exerted significant institutional power. Finally, Croatians were not only geographically part of the Western world (even if on the periphery), but their culture and history was steeped in Western tradition.

However, like Croatians, both the Lebanese and Indochinese refugees challenged the expectation that migrants would be apolitical, or at least no more political than the general population. As is the nature of refugee migration, both intakes were the result of conflicts. This made Australians uneasy about the prospect that, like Croatians and many of the other post-WWII intakes, these too might continue the political struggles of the homeland once settled in Australia. This fear was particularly pronounced in the case of the Indochinese refugees, whose potential liberation activism could cause problems of 'legal control, diplomatic headaches with the new government in Vietnam, and a backlash among Australians,'¹⁷⁹ not least because Whitlam had established diplomatic relations with North Vietnam in February 1973. Their anti-communism was another point of contention, at least for the ALP. Influential members within the party believed that Indochinese migration had the potential to distort the political balance of Australian domestic politics in the same way European anti-

¹⁷⁸ Viviani, *The Long Journey*, 54.

¹⁷⁹ *ibid.*, 56.

communist refugees did after WWII that was in part responsible for keeping the ALP out of office for 23 years.¹⁸⁰ Finally, Australia's involvement in the Vietnam War had caused deep divisions within Australia, and the issue of Indochinese refugees revived these divisions.

In spite of these racial and political fears, in 1979 the Fraser Government established the Orderly Departure Program, negotiated with Vietnam in attempt to control and manage the refugee flow. Though these refugees were the Fraser Government's greatest challenge at the time, its management of the crisis and implementation of the program also became its most distinguished legacy. Reminiscent of the assisted migration programs that had characterised the 1950-60s, this program institutionalised Asian immigration to Australia for the very first time, and heralded the end of immigration as a predominantly European affair. By the end of 1982, almost 70,000 Indochinese refugees had settled in the country, and by the late 1980s, Asia had become the main source of immigrants to Australia, displacing both the United Kingdom and Europe.¹⁸¹

Non-European immigrants, therefore, slowly displaced Croatians as the pre-eminent migrant 'Other' and diminished the political symbolism that had previously imbued Croatian activism. Backlash against Fraser's immigration policy was already beginning to grow before the decade closed, particularly against immigration from Southeast Asia. As Crowley summarises, some of this backlash was racially inspired and some of it was political. However, some was also the expression of a genuine concern - the social and economic consequences of a high level of Asian immigration at a time of high unemployment.¹⁸² These anxieties would coalesce in the 1980s and come to ask serious questions of multiculturalism in general - the answers of which would once again influence responses towards Croatian activism.


¹⁸⁰ According to Clyde Cameron, Whitlam declared at a Cabinet meeting in 1975 that he was 'not having hundreds of fucking Vietnamese Balts coming into the country.'

As cited in: P. Mares, *Borderline: Australia's Treatment of Refugees and Asylum Seekers* (Sydney: UNSW Press, 2001), 67.

¹⁸¹ Richards, *Destination Australia*, 282.

¹⁸² F. Crowley, *Tough Times: Australia in the Seventies* (Richmond: William Heinemann Australia, 1986), 241-42.

CHAPTER 5: HOPE AND HOOLIGANS 1980-1989



Sydney Morning Herald, 6 May 1980, 6.

To the working class, to the working people and citizens, to the people and nationalities of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – Comrade Tito is dead...!

*Central Committee of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia &
The Presidency of the SFRY, 4 May 1980*

With these words delivered on a lazy spring Sunday afternoon, Yugoslavia learned of the death of its charismatic and enigmatic leader. Though his death was anticipated due to his age and ailing health, the outpouring of grief in Yugoslavia was considerable, and many can still remember where they were when they heard Tito had died. As citizens lined the tracks to watch Tito's iconic Blue Train make its way from Ljubljana to Belgrade for the final time, leaders from around the world paid their tributes. Tito's funeral, held four days later, is still considered to be one of the largest state funerals ever held, with delegates from all over the world paying their respects to the pioneer of the 'Third Way'. It was the end of an era spanning 35 years, and as much as time stood still out of grief, it did too out of fear, for Tito had left behind 'a system in a state of paralysis, unable to cure itself.'²

Despite careful preparations for life after Tito, 'what legitimacy the state had enjoyed disappeared with Tito.'³ Such was the political currency of Tito that following his death, the collective leadership that succeeded him operated under the slogan 'After Tito – Tito!' However, this leadership only exacerbated Yugoslavia's pre-existing problems, inequalities, and resentments, with its rotating Presidency, changing political and economic structures, and an increasingly complicated decision-making process requiring consensus between parties that had less and less in common. As the central party began to lose its elder statesmen, and without any real successor or unifying figure to fill Tito's void, the political quagmire Tito had spent his lifetime averting slowly unravelled the Yugoslav state.⁴

However, not everyone met the news of Tito's death with sorrow. For some Croatians, especially those in the diaspora, Tito's death was the first moment of

¹ As cited in Tanner, *Croatia*, 203.

² Goldstein, *Croatia: A History*, 188.

³ Drapac, *Constructing Yugoslavia*, 247.

⁴ For detailed information on the political crisis following Tito's death, see:

Ramet, *The Three Yugoslavias*, 329–40.

Tanner, *Croatia*, 203–20.

Benson, *Yugoslavia*, 132–54.

hope for Croatian independence since the purges of the Croatian Spring a decade earlier. Spontaneous jubilations broke out as the news spread throughout Croatian clubhouses across Australia, and in Canberra, a celebratory demonstration was swiftly planned to coincide with the day of Tito's funeral.⁵ Though it would still take a decade for Yugoslavia to collapse, the sentiment of the moment - that Tito's death signalled the death of Yugoslavia - would prove prescient.

As Bongiorno writes, the 'Eighties' also represented a decade of hope in Australia, even if it began and ended in national pessimism and economic recession. Optimism, energy and excess fuelled this hope, while the reforms of Hawke-Keating government completely reconfigured the nation.⁶ For migrant communities, the implementation of the Galbally Report recommendations represented a decade of improved access to services, access to government grants and initiatives, and greater opportunities to participate in the social and cultural life of the nation. However, even in this spirit of hope and optimism, Croatians could not escape the expectations of the Good Australian Migrant, and found themselves once again rallying against a reputation of violence – albeit this time in the soccer stands. The disquiet over soccer violence, however, was reflective of a more general anxiety about multiculturalism that would cast long and dark shadows over the hope of the decade, culminating in the FitzGerald Immigration Policy Review of 1988.

Though this decade would come to a sombre end for Australia – replete with an economic recession, political scandal, anti-multiculturalism, and a crisis of national identity – for the Croatian community, the end of the decade would be one of triumph. The collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia's loss of geopolitical and strategic importance meant that Croatian political activism in Australia finally found the domestic and international legitimacy that had been denied it for four decades. Therefore, Section 5.1 will outline the nature of post-

⁵ F. Longhurst, 'Croats in Canberra hold Tito Demonstration', *Canberra Times*, 9 May 1980, 3.

⁶ F. Bongiorno, *The Eighties: The Decade That Transformed Australia* (Black Inc., 2015), ix–xiii.

Tito Croatian political activism in Australia. Though the greater part of this activism repeated the patterns of previous periods, Croatians also responded to the unique developments in Australia's political, legal, and social environments in order to articulate their vision for Croatia after Tito. Changes in the political, legal, and social environments of Yugoslavia also influenced Croatian political activism in this period, as a third wave of Croatian migrants prompted some change in the nature of the community and its activism. Section 5.2 explores Australian responses to this activism. Though Croatian activism was no longer as politically fraught a subject, the issue of soccer violence, itself a reflection of a growing anxiety over multiculturalism, threatened to define the majority by a minority once more. Section 5.3 demonstrates that Croatian political activism finally gained the legitimacy denied to it for over four decades as both the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia unravelled. In Australia, the moment this legitimacy was entrenched can be pinpointed to one precise moment - the shooting of a Croatian teenager by a Yugoslav consulate official.

5.1. CROATIAN ACTIVISM IN A POST-TITO WORLD

By the end of the twentieth century, Croatians in Australia had finally gained a credible and respectable identity, having clawed back ground lost in the media-driven offensive of the 1960s and 1970s. How far they were the architects of this rebirth and how far they benefitted from changed circumstances here and in Yugoslavia has yet to be determined.⁷

If the Whitlam Government ‘invented’ Australian multiculturalism, it was the Fraser Government that put it into practice, while the Hawke Government oversaw the highpoint of multicultural activity. In 1977, Fraser commissioned a review of migrant services and programs under the direction of Frank Galbally, QC. Endorsed by Fraser in 1978 and continued by Hawke, the recommendations of the ‘Migrant Services and programs: The Report of the Review of Post-Arrival Programs and Services to Migrants’ (more commonly referred to as the Galbally Report) would come to define the practical implementation of multiculturalism. The Adult Education programme, a variety of community grants-in-aid, Migrant Resource Centres, the Telephone Interpreter Service, the Australian Institute for Multicultural Affairs, and the Special Broadcasting Service (SBS) were just some of the services and organisations established directly as a result of the Galbally Report.

For Croatians, the implementation of the Galbally Report recommendations, coupled with Croatian language recognition in 1979, resulted in a decade of improved access to services, access to government grants and initiatives, and greater opportunities to participate in the social and cultural life of the nation. Though most of the activism in this period repeated the patterns of previous periods, Croatians did modify some of their activism in response to the changing environments of both Australia and Yugoslavia. Also influencing Croatian activism in this period was a third wave of Croatian migrants whose

⁷ Drapac, ‘Croatian Australians Today’, 249.

demographics and politics differed from those of the previous waves, and who reinforced some of the generational changes that were occurring within the community.

5.1.1 MULTICULTURAL EXPANSION

Spurred by the opportunities of these new initiatives, the development of Croatian communities that had begun in the 1970s simply gained momentum in the 1980s. The financial capital of organisations that had accumulated over the previous periods was now reinforced by access to grants, loan schemes, and other initiatives, and led to a building and redevelopment 'boom' within the community. New clubhouses and facilities continued to be established, as did the relocation or redevelopment of older ones.⁸ The largest projects in the community come in the construction of churches. In 1983, the Croatian Catholic Centre in Wollongong opened, the first in Australia to be built by and for Croatians. The church, hall, and priests' residence were constructed in a record one year. Similar projects began in Blacktown and St Johns Park in NSW, Springvale in Victoria, and Hobart in Tasmania. As the physical space of the community expanded, so too did the number of groups and associations that resided within them. Folkloric groups, soccer clubs, and various cultural groups reflecting the diverse interests of communities multiplied, both as the number of second- and third-generation children increased, and as generational differences resulted in different needs, and sometimes even disagreement.

Croatian activism in the post-Tito world, therefore, continued predominantly according to the same rhythms as before – through participation in faith, folklore and football, the annual *10 Travanj* celebrations and November Yugoslav Day demonstrations, and through the protest of and petitioning against events as they arise. The recognition of Croatian as a separate language in 1979 allowed

⁸ The Croatian Club in Punchbowl, which would become a backbone of the community, opened in 1983 after relocating from Marrickville.

Croatians to participate in new multicultural initiatives such as ethnic radio and television broadcasting, translation and interpreter services, and in producing government publications specific to the Croatian community. Croatian language recognition also led to the incorporation of the traditional *Hrvatska škola* into state education structures. Therefore from 1981, students in NSW are able to sit the Croatian language exam for their Higher School Certificate, and from 1983 enrol in the Croatian language program at Macquarie University. In 1984, the Croatian Studies Foundation was established, and by 1994, this and the language program would evolve into the Croatian Studies Centre that is still in operation at Macquarie University. Another tradition arose from these activities – that of the Croatian Summer School or *Ljetna škola*– which from 1984 would bring together Croatian language students from across Australia in the summer school holidays for an intensive course in language, history and culture.

From these endeavours, a new form of Croatian activism developed – that of youth/student activism. Though some youth and student groups had been established as early as the mid-seventies, it is not until the early 1980s that groups such as the Croatian Student associations in NSW and Victoria, the Croatian Catholic Youth groups of Victoria and Canberra, and the Croatian Youth groups of Adelaide and WA rise to prominence and begin to advocate in their own right. Fundraising for the Croatian language program at Macquarie University, organising student seminars and conferences, and participating at demonstrations and protests as the Croatian youth form the basis of this activism. In 1986, these groups combined under the auspices of the Federation of Croatian Students and Youth of Australia (FCSYA), who begin to co-ordinate activities at a national level, and who would play an important role in the wartime activism of the 1990s.

In the same way Croatian activism reflected the rhetoric of anti-communism from 1947-1971 and the rhetoric of rights from 1972-1979, Croatian activism in this period reflected the rhetoric of discrimination that had been enshrined with the *Racial Discrimination Act* in 1975, and that had gained momentum under various

state and federal acts. In 1977, the *Anti-Discrimination Act* passed through NSW Parliament, while in 1984, an *Equal Opportunity Act* passed through both the SA and WA Parliaments. These were reinforced by the passage of the *Sex Discrimination Act* through the Federal Parliament in 1984, and the establishment of the Australian Human Rights Commission in 1986, which became responsible for monitoring and investigating infringements of federal anti-discrimination legislation.

This shift to the rhetoric of discrimination was contemporaneous with another shift – that of a return to the rhetoric of political independence. Though this shift was reflective of the death of Tito and the hope this represented, it was also indicative of some of the success of Croatian activism on the question of Croatian identity in Australia. The recognition of Croatian as a separate language in effect recognised Croatians as not Yugoslavs. As the community could now access services as Croatians in their own right, they were able to freely conduct their business as a separate ethnic group. This shift in rhetoric was also reinforced by international geopolitical developments – as the political situations in the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia became increasingly precarious throughout the decade, the question of Croatian independence became less far-fetched than it had been in previous periods.

One of the manifestations of hope in the Post-Tito world was an attempt by the Croatian diaspora to foster better relations with its homeland. For the most part, this involved establishing communication with prominent individuals or groups within Croatia, and where possible organising visits to Australia. Sometimes, however, Australian groups also returned to Croatia, however not without controversy. In 1982, the folkloric group *Koleda* travelled to Croatia to participate in the International Folklore Festival of Zagreb, an event established in 1966 which continues to this day.⁹ *Koleda* was the most pre-eminent of Croatian folkloric groups in Australia, and had become the face of Croatian

⁹ International Folklore Festival Zagreb, accessed 2 February 2017, <http://www.msf.hr/Smotra/en/en-index.html>

culture and identity in Australian society through its participation at various multicultural festivals, exhibitions, and at the forefront of demonstrations and protests. When news of the tour became known, discontent and suspicion emerged. Some opposed the tour on the grounds that it seemed to be an official visit, rather than just a group of Croatians travelling to Croatia, and as such could only be of benefit to the Yugoslav state. Others were more direct in their scorn, accusing *Koleda* and the tour organisers of abandoning the Croatian cause and community in Australia.¹⁰

Neither were matters as straightforward when Croatian groups came to Australia, and it seems that the hopes and aspirations of the community were not exactly congruent with those of the homeland. As a flyer distributed in response to news of the *Koleda* tour commented;

All of our attempts at getting close to these sports clubs of ours from Croatia, have been without exaggerating, catastrophically disappointing. They did not want to come to our Croatian clubs, and told us that they were bothered by those pictures on the walls. We swallowed that, and tried to accommodate them by organising places where those images would not compromise them, yet the answer was the same: We cannot – the consul or the ambassador won't allow us.¹¹

More success seems to have been found in fostering connections between diaspora communities, rather than with the homeland. This was particularly the case with Croatian priests, and also included visits from those residing in Croatia. The freedom of these priests to visit Croatian communities compared to the 'catastrophically disappointing' sporting groups can be explained by their submission to and sponsorship by the Croatian Catholic Church, rather than the Yugoslav state; their purpose of religious ministry, rather than official representation of the state; and because the politics of the Croatian Catholic

¹⁰ Lovoković, *Hrvatske Zajednice U Australiji*, 219–20.

¹¹ As cited in *ibid*.

Original Text: 'svi naši pokušaji zblizavanja tim našim športskim klubovima iz Hrvatske, da ne pretjeravamo, bili su katastrofalno razočaravajući. Oni nisu htjeli doći u naše hrvatske klubove i rekli su nam da im smetaju one slike na zidovima. Progutali smo to, i pokušali udovoljiti što smo organizirali mjesto gdje ih slike ne će kompromitirati, a odgovor je bio isti: Ne možemo, konzul ili ambassador nam ne daje.'

Church was closer to that of the diaspora, particularly in their shared anti-communism.

5.1.2. THE THIRD WAVE OF POST-WAR CROATIAN EMIGRATION

After Tito's death, the precariousness of the collective leadership and state of Yugoslavia led to a resurgence in the repression of political dissent, and 'anyone who expressed heterodox opinions too noisily, or was brave enough to take a stand against injustice in public, ran the risk of persecution.'¹² Individuals were imprisoned once again for disseminating views deemed antagonistic to the state or to communism, the media was kept under intense scrutiny, student movements and universities were targeted, and the 'struggle against nationalism' reappeared as the principal goal of the LCC. Though the LCC still retained a limited monopoly over the police, army, legal system and state budget, it was increasingly unable to exert any real power in bringing political dissidents to account. This repression was gradually abandoned as state and party structures lost the strength and respect needed to impose their will on the people.¹³

The greatest threat to the new regime, however, was not political dissent but economic collapse. The economy had deteriorated to near-catastrophic levels in the last years of Tito's life, and it was only in late 1981 that a federal commission was established to examine the crisis. By this time, Yugoslavia's external debts had already ballooned to approximately \$US 20bn, and the new federal government found it could not service the debt. Yugoslavia was only kept intact throughout the decade because of the enduring political interest of the West in keeping it afloat. Though partial moratoriums were granted and international banking institutions continued to fund the state, Yugoslavia's debt continued to

¹² Benson, *Yugoslavia*, 140.

¹³ This was best exemplified in the release of the "White Book" in March 1984 under the auspices of the Information and Propaganda Centre of the Central Committee of the LCC. Though it listed an index of approximately 200 cultural figures deemed politically unsuitable, the Croatian Communists did not have the power to call to account any one of those listed, nor pass sentence on a single person. See: Goldstein, *Croatia*, 196–97.

place immense pressure on the economy. The inability to import sufficient oil reserves resulted in the shortage of petrol and oil derivatives in the same year of Tito's death, and by 1985, inflation reached a record 70%.¹⁴ Imported consumables such as coffee and washing powder all but disappeared from Yugoslav shelves, and shopping trips '*preko granice*' (over the border) became an altogether natural phenomenon. Unemployment doubled between 1984-1992, and those that were employed were often unpaid for months at a time. Even though workers began to strike more regularly, the more sinister threat of absenteeism and low productivity loomed large, and the newspaper *Komunist* estimated that in 1982 alone, almost 10% of Yugoslavia's workforce was absent every day, while working hours averaged less than 5 hours a day.¹⁵

The Croatian economy had its own additional difficulties. As money dried up across the state, so too did the public and private funding for the infrastructure projects Croatia's construction industry had relied on in the economic boom of the 1970s. Similarly, as economies across the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe contracted, so too did the once assured markets for Croatia's metal and machinery construction industries, and as confidence in the Yugoslav economy plummeted, Croatia's shipbuilding industry, once the third largest in the world, withered away.¹⁶ There were, however, two industries which provided Croatia with some economic reprieve. The transportation industry thrived thanks to Croatia's geographic position both in relation to Europe, and to other Yugoslav republics,¹⁷ while tourism boomed in the 1980s, reaching the record figure of 67,665,000 tourist nights in 1985.¹⁸

¹⁴ Tanner, *Croatia*, 207.

¹⁵ As cited in *ibid.*, 208.

¹⁶ As Goldstein outlines, in the mid-1980s, 42% of scheduled passenger air traffic, 74% of charter and cargo, and 76% of transit air traffic in Yugoslavia went through Croatia, while 70% of Yugoslav maritime and river traffic went through Croatian ports, with Rijeka playing an important role in this. See: Goldstein, *Croatia*, 189.

¹⁷ *ibid.*, 192.

¹⁸ It is important to note that the economic benefits from the tourism industry were limited as the industry was concentrated on the Adriatic Coast, and was a private enterprise operating largely outside of state control. See: *ibid.*, 191.

As debate over the roots of the economic problems grew, the political debate of the early 1960s resurfaced, again concentrating on the twin issues of conservative vs liberal economic policy and centralism vs decentralism. As before, those advocating for a liberal economic policy and market reform favoured further decentralism in order to grant each republic the ability to tailor economic solutions for their own conditions, while conservatives argued that this was precisely what had created this economic mess, and therefore the solution was to recentralise and reintroduce a system of social distribution to even out regional differences. Once again, the more developed republics were in favour of liberalisation and decentralisation (dubbed the ‘Slovenian model’), while underdeveloped republics favoured social distribution and recentralisation (the ‘Serbian Model’).¹⁹ This dichotomy made reaching a consensus on initiatives to improve the economic condition of Yugoslavia even harder to reach, as any initiative would meet resistance from an opposing faction, and even when consensus was found, everything that ‘was done was wrong or came too late.’²⁰

In the face of these economic and political hardships, some standards across Croatia saw improvement. The most significant of these was the Croatian ‘education boom’ of the 1970s, which resulted in the increase of general literacy and the numbers of individuals completing higher education. This produced a new class of professionals in Croatia engaged with both the interior life of Yugoslavia and that of the world outside. Autonomy increased in many fields, most notably in health, science, media, and university curricula, and the principle of ‘moral and political correctness,’ that is, alignment with Yugoslav Party principles, was replaced with criteria of professionalism. Life expectancy increased while infant mortality decreased, and the rapid urbanisation of the 1960s and 1970s meant that a larger proportion of Croatians were living in cities and large towns.²¹

¹⁹ H. Haug, *Creating a Socialist Yugoslavia : Tito, Communist Leadership and the National Question* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2012), 310–11.

²⁰ Goldstein, *Croatia*, 190.

²¹ *ibid.*, 191–94.

Despite efforts by the collective leadership to minimise the burgeoning economic and political crisis, 'a literate, urbanized population could hardly be kept in the dark about the growing crisis around them, especially as so many people had extensive contacts abroad.'²² Unlike the 1960s and 1970s, where those emigrating were mostly labourers and craftsmen of the working class, Croatian migration in the 1980s was mostly made up of professionals and academics who found they could not fulfil their social and professional aspirations within the Yugoslav context. They migrated to the West in search of a higher standard of living and opportunities for career progression. The Yugoslav 'brain drain' of the 1980s resulted in the migration of Croatians who were educated, upwardly mobile, and usually with some working knowledge of the English language.

However, unlike their predecessors, these migrants felt they 'fitted better into the Australian way of life than in their native environment' where the 'climate of irrationality' inadequately valued their skills.²³ Feeling out of place in Croatia, these Croatian migrants also felt out of place in the Croatian communities they found in Australia. The principal reason for this, Colic-Peisker explains, is that this wave of Croatian migrants

[perceived] the traditional ethno-national 'ethnic community' dominated by migrants from the previous working class wave as a straight jacket for their middle-class 'cosmopolitan' outlook and aspirations.²⁴

Whereas the two waves of migrants before them were made up of working-class migrants whose main axis of identification was their ascribed ethnicity, this new wave of Croatian migrants predominantly identified themselves according to their achieved professional status. Furthermore, while the previous waves tended to be more community-oriented, identified as Catholic, and tied to territorially defined communities, this new wave was more individualistic and secular in outlook, their professional identities resulting in a non-territorial and portable identity that was not as threatened or displaced through the process of

²² Benson, *Yugoslavia*, 140–41.

²³ Colic-Peisker, 'Two Waves of Croatian Migrants', 361–62.

²⁴ *ibid.*, 366.

migration.²⁵ Therefore, they instead looked to English-speaking and non-Croatian community structures to fulfil their identity needs and provide opportunities for socialisation.

Nonetheless, some of these migrants did join various Croatian community groups, and form in part an explanation for the perceptible reorientation of Croatian activism in the 1980s towards more intellectual pursuits and refined methods of activism. Thus, the organisation of public seminars, lectures, and conferences became more common throughout the 1980s, as did lecture tours by prominent academics, such as Professor Mirko Vidović in June 1983 and Professor Michael McAdams in May 1985. This was reinforced by the rise of an Australian-born generation to positions of leadership, who were both relatively well-educated and had grown up within Australian social and political paradigms, but whose only knowledge of the homeland was that found in the memories of their parents or in the textbooks of their classes. The establishment of Croatian studies at Macquarie University provided institutional support and *gravitas* to these pursuits, which culminated in the 1988 international conference/symposium titled 'Croatia and Croatians in 20th Century: Perceptions and Reality,' coinciding with Australia's Bicentennial celebrations. Over 30 highly regarded academics, writers, and intellectuals from all over the world participated in the conference, including four from Croatia itself - Stjepan Šešelj, Pero Budak, Ante Starčević, and Vlado Gotovac. As Škvorc writes,

It was the first time the relationship with homeland intellectuals was rehabilitated, and the first public appearance of figures from the so-called 'extremist emigration' with intellectuals from Croatia.²⁶

²⁵ Colic-Peisker, 'Ethnic' and 'Cosmopolitan' Transnationalism', 215–19.

²⁶ B. Škvorc, 'Hrvatski Studiji U Sydneyu,' in *Hrvatski Iseljenički Zbornik*, 2001, <http://www.matis.hr/images/zbornici/2001/Text/Text4-2.htm>., accessed 6 May 2013.

Original quote: 'Bilo je to po prvi put da je obnovljena veza s domovinskim intelektualcima i da su se na javnom mjestu zajedno našli uglednici tzv. "ekstremne emigracije" i intelektualci iz Hrvatske.'

5.2. AUSTRALIAN RESPONSES

I do not suppose that Mr Grassby or any other senior proponents of multiculturalism were in the stadium on this, the eve of Australia Day, but if they had been I think that they would have been interested in the degree of partisanship which the large (circa 7,000) crowd exhibited on behalf of the Yugoslavian visitors. Australia's three goals and feats were greeted with a gloomy silence but Zagreb's goals and feats were greeted with rapture. A visiting Martian would have supposed that the Australians were the visitors from foreign parts.²⁷

The 1980s saw two Yugoslav-born individuals in Federal Parliament for the first time – Liberal Senator Milivoj ‘Misha’ Lajovic was elected in 1975, while Lewis ‘Bata’ Kent became the ALP member for Hotham in 1980. Though both men periodically drew on their personal lives to politically position themselves within wider debates, Croatian activism as a subject of debate was relatively absent, particularly when compared to previous periods. Indeed, that there was no Ministerial Statement about Croats to begin this chapter indicates the extent of the change in Australia’s responses towards Croatian political activism. Ustashism, however, returned to parliamentary debate as the issue of potential WWII criminals in Australia, and their alleged ties to the Liberal Party, was revived. This was first raised by the case of Lyenko Urbanchich in 1979, and resulted in a decade-long debate that culminated in the *War Crimes Amendment Act 1988*. However, these debates for the most part avoided the 1970s trope that Ustashism was synonymous with Croatian activism, seeming to take objections with individuals rather than communities, and Croats were somewhat spared by the fact that the main targets of this debate in parliament, Urbanchich and at times Lajovic, were Slovenian and not Croatian.

Just as Asian immigration displaced Croats as the pre-eminent migrant ‘Other’, so too was the Labor-Liberal paradigm that had made Croatian activism politically symbolic displaced by the symbolism of economic reform. Croats were even displaced as the face of terrorism in Australia, as threats from different groups came to dominate the agenda. Nevertheless, Croats were not able to

²⁷ I. Warden, ‘Paspalum Place’, *Canberra Times*, 28 January 1981, 21.

completely escape the reputation for violence that had been ascribed to it, and as the issue of soccer violence became a proxy battle for the increasing anxiety over multiculturalism, once again found themselves in opposition to the expectations of the Good Australian Migrant.

5.2.1. DISRUPTIONS AND DIVERSIONS

As discussed in Section 4.3., the onset of Asian immigration in the late 1970s challenged the expectations of the Good Australian Migrant in ways Croatian immigration had not. These refugees, most commonly identified as Vietnamese though also including ethnic Chinese and intakes from Cambodia and Laos, slowly displaced Croats as the pre-eminent migrant 'Other.' Though their patterns of settlement did not differ much from those of other migrants, they became highly visible communities. In the 1980s, this was exacerbated by the settlement issues these refugees experienced, mainly due to the troubled economic environment of Australia, their low English language proficiency, and government inattention to the unique psychological aspects of the refugee experience, such as trauma and family separation.²⁸

The political symbolism of refugee settlement, therefore, displaced that which had previously imbued Croatian activism. At the same time, the problematic aspects of Croatian activism were no longer potent. The rhetoric of ethnicity and identity with which Croats had rebranded their activism was not only mainstreamed, but exalted as an intrinsically Australian quality. The promotion of ethnicity over nationality allowed Croats to sidestep the political issues their Yugoslav citizenship raised. The activities of faith, football, and folklore not only sat more comfortably within the expectations of the Good Australian Migrant, but were now celebrated, and even demanded, as cultural contributions to the nation. Though this activism still represented the political to

²⁸ Lack and Templeton, *Bold Experiment*, 157–60.

Croatians themselves, Australians perceived them as simply an expression of cultural identity.

The perceived threat of Croatian extremism had also diminished throughout the 1980s, as groups such as the Ananda Marga, Armenians, and Palestinians displaced Croatians as the face of terrorism in Australia. By 1983, ASIO had downgraded the threat of Croatian violence to low due to a perceived 'cooling of passions.'²⁹ The Sydney Hilton Hotel bombing in 1978, the assassination of the Turkish Consul-General and his bodyguard in Sydney in 1980, the Sydney Israeli Consulate and Hakoah Football Club bombings of 1982, and the 1986 Melbourne Turkish Consulate bombing occupied the bulk of Australia's legal, political, and media attention. The 1980s also saw the rise of domestic terrorism in the form of Jack van Tongeren and his neo-Nazi group the Australian Nationalist Movement in Western Australia, and National Action on the east coast. These groups pursued a right-wing, anti-multiculturalist agenda which used violence, intimidation, and bombings to terrorise those it saw believed threatening to their vision of Australia. This particularly targeted Asian communities, restaurants and businesses.³⁰ Furthermore, these incidents seemed comparatively more violent and extreme than those that had been ascribed to Croatians. Though this perception was 'informed by the same racial anxieties that had followed the introduction of non-European immigration, the fact remains that despite the frequency of alleged Croatian attacks throughout the 1960s and 1970s, none resulted in a fatality, and in most cases the only damage sustained was to property.

The change in positioning and posturing of Australian political parties, however, seemed to be the most important factor in the depoliticisation of Croatian activism. As Kelly writes, the 1980s saw the erosion of the Labor-Liberal paradigm of politics, where intra-party, rather than inter-party, ideological

²⁹ Blaxland and Crawley, *The Secret Cold War*, 356–57.

³⁰ For an overview of the various security concerns that arose throughout this decade, at least from the point of ASIO, see: "Politically Motivated Violence" in *ibid.*, 335–66.

battles dominated.³¹ Though there was general agreement that only serious reform could address the economic problems plaguing Australia since the 1970s, the question of how this reform would and should be achieved featured as much in debates within the parties as between them. The symbolic economy of politics in the 1980s therefore, centred on economic issues and how best to achieve the reform needed to combat recession, even if this still included aspects of the social and the political. This was confirmed by the triumph of Hawke's rhetoric of ending the 'politics of division' at the 1983 election.

Hawke and his Treasurer Paul Keating quickly instituted a program of economic reform that would transform both the Australian economy and society. Though the greatest and boldest legacy of the Government's reform agenda was the decision to float the dollar and deregulate the financial system, these were decisions that were replicated across most Western countries in this period. What was distinctive about the Hawke government's approach, Bongiorno argues, was that

It sought to combine a shift towards market with a commitment to social spending to reduce poverty, a basic level of government support for all, and a continuing role for unions in the workplace.³²

In this environment of reform and rapid change, however, the question of national identity was inevitable, and one that would come to define the period.

5.2.2. RISE OF ANTI-MULTICULTURALISM

The political strength of multiculturalism in the 1970s lay in its appeal to the growing number of electorates with sizeable immigrant minorities, and to those of the 'New Middle Class'- the suburban white-collar workforce that had emerged from the affluence of the 1960s who identified with the political activism of the

³¹ P. Kelly, *The End of Certainty: Power, Politics and Business in Australia*, Rev. ed (St. Leonards: Allen & Unwin, 1994), 1-3.

³² Bongiorno, *The Eighties*, 304.

left. However the appeal of multiculturalism was far from universal. As Jupp explains,

By appearing to deny Australia's British inheritance, [multiculturalism] alienated conservative elements in the Liberal Party. By encouraging cultural diversity, it annoyed those who had spent several generations building an Australian culture which, vague though its outlines were, was favoured well beyond conservative partisans.³³

Multiculturalism therefore only really appealed to a limited number of electorates, most of which were already Labor-controlled. It had almost no impact on rural and provincial districts, especially in conservative Queensland controlled by the National Party. Therefore, according to Jupp, the bipartisan consensus that developed in the 1970-80s was never as entrenched within the electorate as it seemed in public rhetoric.

By the end of the decade this dissonance would resurface in critiques of multiculturalism and immigration policy.³⁴ Early critiques of multiculturalism were mostly found in the work of academics, and came from both the political left and right. Leftist critiques argued that multiculturalism only valued the superficial aspects of cultural identity – faith, folklore and football – while doing very little to address the social inequality inherent in the migrant experience.³⁵ However it was the criticism from the political right which have the most influence on public debate, particularly when it became entangled in criticism of Asian immigration.³⁶

Early academic critiques from the right included the work of philosophers Lauchlan Chipman and Frank Knopfmacher, historian Geoffrey Partington sociologist Tanya Birrell, and political scientist Raymond Sestito. The basic arguments of these early critiques were that multiculturalism was a divisive force in Australian society which in turn encouraged separatism; that it denied a

³³ Jupp, 'The Politics of Immigration', 91.

³⁴ *ibid.*, 91–92.

³⁵ For example, See:
de Lepervanche, 'From Race to Ethnicity'
Jakubowicz, 'State and Ethnicity'.

³⁶ Bongiorno, *The Eighties*, 60.

distinct Australian heritage based on British origins; that it was simply a response to the ethnic vote or pressure from the ethnic lobby; or that it was ill-defined and an intellectual mess.³⁷ However, the Fraser Government's support of multiculturalism, with the bipartisanship of the Opposition, limited the reach of these critiques from the right, somewhat muting them in the public sphere. It was not until the defeat of Fraser in 1983 that these arguments against multiculturalism started to gain wider traction, finding a prominent outlet in *Quadrant*, which increasingly published academic critiques alongside more populist beliefs as the decade progressed.

Most historians situate the catalyst of the rise in anti-multiculturalism in Geoffrey Blainey's Rotary Club speech at Warrnambool on 17 March 1984. This speech was followed by a year of subsequent attempts to justify and elaborate his argument, and culminated in the publication of his book *All for Australia* at the end of the same year. Blainey argued that Australia's current immigration policy lent preference to Asian immigration, whose intake was far outstripping the pace of public opinion and the successful economic, social, and cultural integration of migrants into Australian society. This consequently 'tested' the racial tolerance of Australians and strained community relations, as evidenced by escalating tensions and social discord that was not characteristic of European immigration during the post-war period. Thus, Blainey called for a reconsideration of the current immigration policy, which he referred to as a product of collusion between left-wing historians, welfare workers, the ethnic lobby, government bureaucrats, and politicians, whose support for high levels of Asian immigration were motivated by personal agendas that paid little regard to the needs and interests of the general population.

The 'Blainey debate', as it came to be called, touched on a national nerve. As Bongiorno describes,

³⁷ Jupp argues that most of these criticisms were 'based on an abstract understanding of multiculturalism often drawn from controversies in the United States. It rarely looked at actual policies operating in Australia.' See: Jupp, *From White Australia to Woomera*, 102.

the editors of newspaper correspondence columns almost disappeared under the avalanche of letters from readers on the issue, covering almost every conceivable angle.

Though some media commentators and conservative politicians praised Blainey, particularly in the initial stages of the debate, criticism of his views were swift, and predominantly came from fellow historians. In the same way Tito's death came to represent the beginning of a long and slow unravelling for Yugoslavia, so too did the Blainey debate for bipartisan consensus in multicultural policy.³⁸ As the bicentenary year drew nearer, reconciling Australia's colonial history with its indigenous past, and navigating the place of Australia's migrants within this proved controversial. Debates about Australia's national identity asked questions about who we were, who we presently are, and who we wanted to be. Within this ideological climate, the assumed success of multiculturalism was increasingly questioned, particularly when faced with the practical issues of Asian immigration and settlement, the increasingly strained relationship with indigenous communities, and an increase of internationally-inspired terrorism.

5.2.3. "THOSE BLOODY CROATIANS..."

In January 1981, Croatian soccer club Dinamo Zagreb arrived for a tour of Australia. They were to play a series of friendlies with the NSW, South Australian and Victorian state representative sides, but the main attraction was to be their game against the Australian side as a special Australia Day weekend feature in Canberra. The tour attracted significant attention as Dinamo was considered to be amongst the strongest teams in Europe, the current cup-holder of the Yugoslav national league, and had thrashed the Australian side 4-0 at an international friendly in Zagreb just two months prior. The first game against NSW on 23 January passed without incident (and with a 2-1 upset win for the NSW side), with the 13,000-strong crowd was described as enthusiastic and

³⁸ The ascendancy of anti-multiculturalism and the end of bipartisan consensus both came in 1988, with the release of the FitzGerald Immigration Policy Review, and John Howard's *One Australia* policy.

mostly 'in the colours of Croatia.'³⁹ The big game in Canberra two days later, however, was marred by controversy.

Before the match began, a spectator had torn down the Yugoslav flag, while another had attempted to erect a Croatian flag. As police attempted to arrest the two men, the predominantly Croatian crowd yelled and whistled. The Dinamo side were outraged that the Yugoslav flag had been taken down, especially because the Australian flag was still up, and refused to take the field. After 25 minutes of delay, a compromise was reached between officials that no flags would be flown, and all ceremony, except for the exchange of banners between players, would be abandoned. This, however, was not communicated to the organisers in the players tunnel, and three young Croatian women, ball boys, and a Croatia-Deakin cheer squad led the teams onto the field, before an official unceremoniously and embarrassingly ordered them to leave. The game ended in a 3-3 draw, and a less than impressed Yugoslav delegation.⁴⁰

Though the next two games in Adelaide and Melbourne also passed without incident, the game in Canberra was a symbolic start to a decade where the perceived problem of soccer violence, and its relationship to Croatian activism, would be played out on the national stage. Though violence both on and off the field was not a new phenomenon to soccer, debates about immigration and multiculturalism in the 1980s nurtured the notion that the cause of soccer violence was the ethnic affiliations of the clubs themselves. Within this debate a difference arose between those activities that understood as expressions of culture ('national'), and those understood as 'nationalistic',

³⁹ B. Curran, 'Kosmina magic sinks Dinamo', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 24 January 1981, 70.

⁴⁰ J. Hourigan, 'Yugoslav flag pulled down, game delayed', *Canberra Times*, 26 January 1981, 1.

B. Curran, 'Dinamo erupt as national flag torn down', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 26 January 1981, 24.

Activities such as folk dancing, which seems to have become the symbolic cornerstone of multiculturalism, are depicted as 'national' rather than nationalistic and are, therefore, acceptable within the cultural mainstream. Conversely, displays of political allegiance to a former homeland are regarded as nationalistic rather than 'national' and do not achieve such acceptance.⁴¹

This connection between the political and ethnic allegiances of teams with soccer violence was also reinforced by soccer officials and sporting bodies, eager to distance soccer violence from the sport of soccer itself.⁴² Soccer and soccer violence therefore became politically symbolic and a proxy battle for the wider debate over multiculturalism and national identity.

This is not surprising, given that a degree of ambivalence had consistently been directed at soccer since the 1950s, not least because 'the most distinguishable feature of the game has been its migrant presence.'⁴³ Added to this was a resistance to the sport itself from other codes, who were increasingly wary of the growing popularity of soccer.⁴⁴ In the same way soccer violence acted as a proxy of the multiculturalism debate in the 1980s, it started as a proxy of the assimilation debates of the 1950s, where

Ignorance and prejudice easily mixed together as attitudes to migrants and attitudes to soccer shaded into each other. Incidents of violence particularly became a handy excuse for metaphorically bashing the game and its advocates.⁴⁵

Despite the significant involvement of British migrants, the game became so emblematic of post-war migrant communities it earned the disparaging title of 'wogball', or as the game of 'Sheilas, Wogs and Poofters', as described by Johnny Warren, a former Australian Captain, in his eponymous biography.⁴⁶

⁴¹ J. Hughson, 'Football, Folk Dancing and Fascism: Diversity and Difference in Multicultural Australia', *Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology*, 33(2), 1997, 173.

⁴² *ibid.*, 174

⁴³ P. Mosely, 'Balkan Politics in Australian Soccer,' in J. O'Hara (ed.), *Ethnicity and Soccer in Australia* (Campbelltown: Australian Society for Sports History, 1994), 33.

⁴⁴ *ibid.*, 59–63.

⁴⁵ P. Mosely, *Ethnic Involvement in Australian Soccer: A History 1950-1990* (Belconnen, A.C.T.: National Sports Research Centre, 1995), 61.

⁴⁶ J. Warren, *Sheilas, Wogs & Poofters: An Incomplete Biography of Johnny Warren and Soccer in Australia* (Milsons Point, N.S.W: Random House Australia, 2002).

'Jugoslavs' became a focus of soccer violence as early as 1952, even if initial reports focused on the violence between Yugoslavs and everyone else.⁴⁷ As Australians were made aware of the divisions between the Yugoslav communities, predominantly because of the activism of Croatians, this focus shifted to the violence between Croatian, Serb, and Yugoslav teams. Mosely argues that it was not so much the degree of violence that made the Yugoslav community stand out, but the frequency and level of nationalism displayed,

Rival supporters sought to goad and provoke each other with flags, chants, insulting songs and verbal abuse. Of course the same could be said for any match with any supporters but the difference was the nationalist fervour that went with it, a fervour spiced by recent wartime experience. It can be argued that only sticks and stones break bones, but the sort of taunts used by Croats, Serbs and Yugoslavs against each other did, metaphorically, cut and bleed people.⁴⁸

The 1980s were by no means the highpoint of Croatian soccer violence,⁴⁹ however the promotion of Croatian teams to state and national leagues made any violence that did occur more pronounced. This was reiterated by the rise of European soccer hooliganism, particularly in the United Kingdom, which was at its height in 1986, and of which 'a strong copy-cat element appeared to exist among adolescent Croatians.'⁵⁰

Hay, however, points out that although we know there was soccer violence from 1950-1990, there has been no empirical study of evidence with which to verify, measure or compare its extent. Instead,

⁴⁷ R. Hay, 'British Football, Wogball or the World Game? Towards a Social History of Victorian Soccer', O'Hara, *Ethnicity and Soccer in Australia*, 71.

⁴⁸ Mosely, *Ethnic Involvement in Australian Soccer*, 69.

⁴⁹ Mosely situates this in the decade between 1968-1978, when 16 incidents of crowd misbehaviour were recorded, including the 1972 expulsion of Croatia (Melbourne) and North Geelong Croatia from the Victorian State league and Provisional League respectively.

Mosely, 'Balkan Politics in Australian Soccer', 36-41.

It is interesting to note that this 'highpoint' coincides with both the period of the height of trouble with soccer violence generally, and the period of increased violence and allegations of extremism and terrorism attributed to the Croatian community generally. Like this violence, it could be that the increase in Croatian soccer violence was due to an extreme minority taking cues from their environment, the work of Yugoslav *agents provocateurs*, or simply a natural reaction to the hostile environment surrounding the community.

⁵⁰ Hay, 'Those Bloody Croatians,' 86.

The focus on violence associated with soccer, while it did have an evidential base, was shaped by the cultural attitudes of the early 1950s and much of what followed has to be seen as the fitting of subsequent events into a predetermined pattern. It is far too simplistic to account for the violence related to soccer in terms of the politics of war-time and post-war Europe or the characteristics of migrants, without taking account of the peculiar features of the host society and its interpreters.⁵¹

Other causes for violence, he argues, can be found in poor umpiring, overcrowding and unsuitable facilities, and a lack of crowd control. The reporting, and subsequent historical understanding, of soccer violence as politically or ethnically motivated, obscured other reasons for conflict, such as the difference between the physical style of British soccer and the more skilled European version, or even the mundane politics within clubs about which player starts and which player is benched, who should or should not be the coach, and various other personal conflicts.⁵²

Hay also argues that the conflict between Yugoslav teams has also been overstated, and is not necessarily supported by empirical evidence;

Despite tension, most matches passed off peacefully at times when there were serious incidents taking place away from the game in Australia and Yugoslavia[sic], particularly in 1972. Indeed it could be argued that the soccer clubs were not so much the focus of violence, but rather oases where non-violent exchanges between opposed political groups were possible.⁵³

Therefore, the hyper-attention paid towards Croatian teams in the 1980s was more a result of the historical example that had been made of Yugoslavs in general within the issue of soccer violence, and the reputation of political violence the Whitlam government had branded the community with.

Attempts to remove the nationalist elements from soccer first started in 1960.⁵⁴ By 1989, calls to 'Australianise' soccer were being made more forcefully,⁵⁵

⁵¹ Hay, 'British Football, Wogball or the World Game?', 71.

⁵² *ibid.*, 68–71.

⁵³ Hay, 'Those Bloody Croatians,' 88.

⁵⁴ Mosely, *Ethnic Involvement in Australian Soccer*, 74–79.

⁵⁵ For example, S. Kamasz, 'It's Time to 'Australianise' the Round-Ball code', *Weekend Australian*, 11-12 February 1989, 40.

and the de-ethnicisation' of the sport would define the 1990s.⁵⁶ Though violence associated with Croatian teams would worsen, rather than improve in the next decade, this violence would be framed as a minority or youth issue, rather than one endemic to Croatians or their political activism.⁵⁷ Part of the reason for this shift would come from the changes of the geo-political world in the late 1980s which would legitimise Croatian activism and precipitate the collapse of Yugoslavia.

⁵⁶ W. Vamplew, 'Violence in Australian Soccer: The Ethnic Contribution', in O'Hara, *Ethnicity and Soccer in Australia*, 9–11.

⁵⁷ For example, See: J. Hughson, 'The Boys in Blue and the Bad Blue Boys: A Case Study of Interactive Relations between the Police and Ethnic Youth in Western Sydney', *Australian Journal of Social Issues* 34(2), 1999, 167–82.

5.3. THE TIDE TURNS

The fall of the Soviet Union and the communist 'alliance' in Central and Eastern Europe was the necessary precondition for people to begin to imagine a world without Yugoslavia. It became more and more difficult to ignore the internal voices that demanded political freedom and equality. It was no longer possible to continue to label all oppositionists national extremists.⁵⁸

Despite the economic and political crises which beset Yugoslavia after the death of Tito, it would take almost a decade for the state to unravel. Though not the complete reason, the continued support Yugoslavia received from the West, and particularly from America helped Yugoslavia remain a viable state throughout the 1980s. In 1983 and 1984, an American-led group called the 'Friends of Yugoslavia' negotiated significant debt relief for the country, avoiding near-certain economic collapse, while in 1984, the Reagan administration confirmed its position that 'an independent, economically viable, stable and militarily capable Yugoslavia serves Western and U.S. interests.' For America, a unified Yugoslav state continued to represent a bulwark against Soviet expansionism, and Yugoslav-American relations a reminder to Eastern Europe of the advantages of friendly relations with the West.⁵⁹

By the late 1980s, however, Yugoslavia had lost its viability. As Drapac explains,

This was not because Tito had squandered a golden opportunity, but because the state had no obvious or admirable reason to exist... When Yugoslavia would no longer seem a necessity in the global context, and once powerful outsiders had less interest in its territorial integrity, then the will of the internal actors who wanted change prevailed.⁶⁰

The 1985 election of Mikhail Gorbachev in the Soviet Union and his introduction of the *Glasnost* and *Perestroika* policies had resulted in a number of nationalist

⁵⁸ Drapac, *Constructing Yugoslavia*, 251–52.

⁵⁹ NSDD 133, 'U.S. Policy toward Yugoslavia -14 MAR 84', National Security Decision Directives, 1981-1989, Reagan Presidential Library, accessed via <https://reaganlibrary.archives.gov/Archives/reference/NSDDs.html#.WNzqtvIppU0>

⁶⁰ Drapac, *Constructing Yugoslavia*, 257.

movements across the Soviet Union, prompting a movement away from the centralist communist model toward free elections and market economies. As the Soviet Union moved closer towards dissolution, the geostrategic importance of Yugoslavia to the West waned. Without the prospect of Soviet annexation, Yugoslav disintegration was no longer a threat. The eventual collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, the unification of Germany, and the fall of the Soviet Union itself eroded any interest the West may have had in supporting a Yugoslav state. However as Lampe states, 'these dramatic events cost Yugoslavia more than its strategic importance to the West. They also eliminated the legitimacy of one-party rule across Eastern Europe.'⁶¹ The economic, political and national issues that had been brewing in Yugoslavia since the 1970s were able to come to the fore and determine the future of Yugoslavia's republics, and Croatian political activism finally found legitimacy.

For Croatian activism in Australia, these changes in the international political environment were reinforced by the Hawke Government's commitment to its alliance with the United States, and as American interest in Yugoslavia waned, so too did Australian interest. Furthermore, unlike the previous ALP Prime Minister Whitlam, Yugoslavia did not factor into the foreign policy objectives of the Hawke Government, which was more concerned with regional engagement, and focused on its role as a 'good citizen' in the Asian-Pacific context.⁶² However, it would take one Croatian teenager to sour diplomatic relations between the two countries and turn the tide for Croatian activism in Australia.

5.3.1. TOKIĆ SHOOTING

On 27 November 1988, approximately 1500 Croatians gathered at the Yugoslav Consulate in Sydney for their annual 'Yugoslav Day' demonstration.

⁶¹ Lampe, *Yugoslavia as History*, 332.

⁶² J. L. Richardson, 'The Foreign Policy of the Hawke-Keating Governments: An Interim Review', IR Working Paper 1997/4, Canberra: Department of International Relations, Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, The Australian National University, October 1997.

Only a handful of police separating them from the Consulate, speakers addressed the crowd through microphones, outlining the plight of occupied Croatia. Details of what ensued next are not clear, but it seems as though the crowd had become rowdy, and the heavily outnumbered police struggled to maintain control. Meanwhile, a handful of youths had allegedly entered consulate grounds to tear down a Yugoslav flag. Noticing the youths, the crowd surged forward, and a few more jumped the fence. Meanwhile, a Yugoslav security guard for reasons unknown, fired his gun at the crowd through the gate, hitting 16-year old Josip Tokić in the neck.⁶³

Naturally, the Croatian community was outraged, and demanded nothing less than the immediate closure of all Yugoslav missions and expulsion of Yugoslav officials. Though gravely concerned, the Australian Government initially demanded only that the security guard - alleged Matijas Zoran - present himself to police for questioning, that his gun be made available for examination, and that the Yugoslav Ambassador, Boris Cizelj, would assure that Zoran would not attempt to leave Australia before the matter had been resolved. Cizelj agreed to these requests, and by 29 November, the police believed they had enough evidence to charge Zoran. However, diplomatic conventions meant that while he remained at the consulate they were unable to arrest him without the permission of Cizelj.⁶⁴

As the Australian government waited for Cizelj to respond to their requests, Croatians held meetings, demonstrations, and vigils out of protest, while Australians were left questioning the diplomatic implications of the situation, and how it had been able to occur in the first place. The diplomatic impasse slowly escalated, and on 30 November, both Hawke and his Foreign Affairs minister Gareth Evans warned that the Yugoslavs could face expulsions or closure

⁶³ J. Sampson and M. Seccombe, 'Consulate guard shoots boy', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 28 November 1988, 1.

⁶⁴ K. Scott, 'Envoys snag police', *Canberra Times*, 29 November 1988, 1.

R. Harvey, 'Yugoslav guard fired in the air, says consul', , says consul' *Sydney Morning Herald* , 30 November 1988, 12.

if they continued to hold out on the arrest. On 1 December, Cizelj received formal warning that if Yugoslav authorities did not hand over Zoran within 24 hours, the consulate would be closed and staff ordered to leave.⁶⁵

At 6pm on Friday 2 December, the Yugoslav Consulate-General in Sydney was closed, and all 21 people connected to the consulate ordered to leave the country by 6pm Monday– the first time any Government had closed a diplomatic mission in Australia.⁶⁶ On 6 December, Belgrade retaliated with the expulsion of three Australian diplomats. Though Evans ruled out the possibility of any further action against Yugoslav representatives or a complete severance of diplomatic relations, the relationship between the two countries had soured significantly.⁶⁷ Before reconciliations could be made, Yugoslavia would begin to unravel, and on 16 January 1992, Australia would become the first country outside of Europe to recognise the independence of Slovenia and Croatia.

⁶⁵ K. Scott, 'Surrender guard or be closed: Evans', *Canberra Times*, 2 December 1988, 1,3.

H. O'Neil, 'Ultimatum on Gunman', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 2 December 1988, 1.

⁶⁶ K. Scott, 'A diplomatic first: Yugoslavs forced out', *Canberra Times*, 3 December 1988, 1,2.

P. Grigson, 'Yugoslavs out: now for the backlash', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 3 December 1988, 1.

⁶⁷ K. Scott, 'Evans holds fire', *Canberra Times*, 7 December 1988, 1.

'Time for calm with Yugoslavia', *Sydney Morning Herald*, 7 December 1988, 18.

5.4. EPILOGUE

On 17 June 1989, the Croatian Democratic Union – *Hrvatska Demokratska zajednica (HDZ)* was formed in Zagreb, electing Franjo Tuđman as its president. Though it was not yet an official organisation, its policy of incorporating émigré Croatians into their political program, meant that almost immediately after its establishment, representatives travelled to diaspora communities around the world to establish branches and gather support. More practically, however, these travels through the diaspora resulted in substantially large financial contributions to the party. In late August, prominent Osijek lawyer and Croatian dissident Vladimir Šeks came to Australia, establishing official *HDZ* branches in Sydney, and Melbourne. With this act, the post-war political activism of the Croatian community in Australia was reconnected with its homeland, four decades after its expulsion by Tito. From this moment, Croatian political activism entered an entirely new period that would see Croatia declare independence, fight an incredibly violent war to do so, rebuild the country from its war-torn pieces, and eventually enter the European Union as a modern, if still nascent, country.

CONCLUSION



*The Mercury (Hobart), December 1988
as found in Lovoković, Hrvatske Zajednice u Australiji, 263*

On 18 July 2016, the ABC's panel discussion program Q&A hosted a Senator from each of the parties newly elected in the wake of Australia's 2016 election. This included Pauline Hanson, whose successful relaunch of her One Nation party resulted in four Senate seats. Just four days earlier, a radicalised Tunisian-Muslim man had deliberately driven a truck into crowds celebrating Bastille Day in Nice, resulting in 86 deaths and injuring a further 434 people. Naturally, conversation turned to this latest in a string of Islamic State-inspired terror attacks, and in defending her anti-Islamic rhetoric, Hanson declared that

We have terrorism on the streets that we've never had before. We've had murders committed under the name of Islam, as we have the Lindt café, Curtis Cheng and the two police officers in Melbourne, right? So this has happened. You have radicalisation...²

Before she could continue, host Tony Jones interjected to clarify her assertion that Australia had never experienced terrorism. He explained that:

When you say we never had terrorism in this country before, that's simply not the case. In the 1970s there were multiple bombings by Croatian Catholic extremists. This has happen in Australia before. It's not the first time. We should at least get that straight.³

Members of the Croatian community were outraged at Jones' assertion, with one even starting an online petition demanding Jones apologise that attracted over 4000 signatures.⁴ On 20 July, the front cover of Croatian newspaper *Za Dom Spremni* carried the headline of 'You have lied – Apology needed!' and labelled Jones the 'biggest enemy of Croatian Community in Australia.'⁵

² 'Senate Powerbrokers', Panel Discussion, Q&A (ABC, 18 July 2016), <http://www.abc.net.au/tv/qanda/txt/s4485524.htm>.

³ *ibid.*

⁴ S. Chingaipe, 'Petition from Croatian Community Takes Issue with Q&A Host', *SBS News*, 20 July 2016, <http://www.sbs.com.au/news/article/2016/07/19/petition-croatian-community-takes-issue-qa-host>, accessed 22 July 2016.

J. Miljak, 'Tony Jones: Croatian Community Demands Apology for Claims Of "terror" involvement', *Change.org*, <https://www.change.org/p/tony-jones-croatian-community-demands-apology-for-claims-of-terror-involvement>, accessed 2 August 2016.

⁵ *Za Dom Spremni*, 20 July 2016, 1.

Interestingly, in defending his claim, Jones and the ABC both cited the documents tabled by Murphy during his Ministerial Statement on 27 March 1973 as the evidence for their claims.⁶ Though Jones never did apologise for his statements, this incident demonstrates that the issue of post-war Croatian activism still reverberates in the present. Not only are responses still informed by misunderstandings, falsehoods, and the selections, simplifications, and silences in Murphy's Ministerial Statement, but post-war Croatian activism is still deployed as a political football whenever it seems fit. That Jones emphasised Croatian *Catholic* extremists demonstrates how easily Croatian activism was and is construed to meet the political purpose of the time. The Catholicism of Croats was incidental, rather than integral, to their activism, however, given that Jones was making his point in relation to the current political debate over Islamic-inspired terrorism, and Hanson's record of islamophobia, the nature of Croatian activism was simply equated with their religious identity.

The contemporary resonance of this thesis becomes even clearer when we begin to draw comparisons between the experiences of Croats, particularly in the 1970s, with the contemporary experience of Muslims in Australia, particularly since 2014, a year which brought the spectre of terrorism to the doorstep of a nation accustomed to being slightly removed from global conflict. On 15 December 2014, as Sydney went about its Monday morning rhythms, Mon Haron Monis took siege of 18 hostages in the Lindt café at Martin Place. Declaring it an attack on Australia by Islamic State, the ordeal lasted into the early morning of 16 December, and resulted in two civilian deaths and the death of Monis. For many, the 'Sydney Siege' capped off a year in which the spectre of terrorism loomed large over Australia - the radicalisation of young Australian Muslims, the rising number of individuals leaving the country to 'join the jihad', evidence of recruitment via social media, and claims of secret terrorist training camps, all shattered the illusion that terrorism was something that happened 'over there',

⁶ M. Robin, 'Croatian Newspaper Calls Tony Jones Its 'Biggest Enemy'', *Crikey*, 25 July 2016, <https://www.crikey.com.au/2016/07/25/croats-set-sights-on-tony-jones/>, accessed 27 July 2016.

by individuals that were ‘not us’. The Lindt Café siege was the realisation of Australia’s worst fears; a terrorist attack on home soil.

In Australia, these issues were steeped in a wider and longer context of political and social discomfort regarding the Muslim community in Australia. In the ‘post 9/11’ world, islamophobia had become a growing feature of the political and social landscape. The 2002 Bali Bombings, the 2004 Australian Embassy bombing in Jakarta, and the 2005 uncovering of a terrorist plot targeting Sydney provided the fuel for a growing cultural anxiety about the place of Muslim Australians in the nation, which spilled into the streets in December 2005 in what became the Cronulla riots. These anxieties blurred neatly with the issue of ‘boat people’, that is, asylum seekers arriving to Australia by boat, which rose to national prominence concurrently with terrorism and islamophobia. Both terrorism and asylum seeker arrivals concerned questions of national security, predominantly involving the Muslim ‘other’, and were underpinned by rising islamophobia. Thus, not only did both issues come to mutually reinforce the other, but were also mutually reinforced by the islamophobia that both underpinned, and arose out of, the issues. As events in 2014 escalated, so too did cultural tensions, which manifested in controversies surrounding Halal certification, calls to ‘Ban the Burqa’, accusations of ‘creeping Sharia Law’, proposed amendments to racial vilification laws, and the political return of Pauline Hanson herself. Perhaps the best indication of how entrenched the issue of islamophobia had become by the end of 2014 arose out of the Lindt Cafe Siege itself, when Australians, anticipating an islamophobic backlash, rallied around the twitter hashtag #illridewithyou in order to demonstrate solidarity with Muslim Australians.

To the casual observer, these events seemed indicative of an unprecedented chapter in Australia’s history, framed by a new and complex geopolitical reality. However to this fledgling historian, it all seemed a little too familiar. To borrow from Twain, while history may not have been repeating, it sure was rhyming. As events unfolded throughout my PhD candidature, the similarities between the

current events I was witnessing, and the past events I was researching were becoming increasingly harder to ignore. So when on 16 February 2014 the front page of the *Sunday Telegraph* declared that a ‘Secret bush terror camp’ had been in operation in regional NSW, I thought of the front page of the *Sun Herald* on 2 September 1978 declaring that police had raided the training camp of a Croatian ‘Secret Army’, also in regional NSW. When news broke in February and again in September that police forces had arrested and charged individuals with conspiracy to commit terrorist acts on Australian soil, I thought of the case of the Croatian Six, who were convicted in 1981 for the same reason. The moral outrage levelled at those leaving Australia to join ISIS echoed those in 1963 and 1972 over young Croatian men leaving Australia to mount incursions into the territories of Yugoslavia. The scenes that played out on my television of the dawn raids on September 18 replicated the images which arose out of the raids carried out on the homes of Croatians over multiple years, but particularly on 1 April 1973. And finally, the concern of the Islamic community in the wake of the Lindt Cafe Siege that the actions of one would come to define the many, was one voiced by Croatians over and over again.

Despite the differences in context, circumstance, and time, in each of these, the echoes of Australia’s responses to Croatian activism could be felt in the present. In part, it was Abbott’s exhortation to join ‘Team Australia’ on 18 August 2014⁷ that the sustained déjà vu started to make sense - it was not the *Croatianness* of the past that was resonating, but the *Australianness* of it all. Though the rhetoric of Team Australia may have been new, the ideas underpinning it were anything but, and bring to the fore a story as old as modern Australia itself – the relationship between Australia and the ‘Other’ in its midst. Put simply, Muslim Australians were now occupying the space Croatian Australians had once occupied, which has also been held by Asian Australians, Irish Catholic Australians, and a number of iterations of the ‘Other’. Likewise, in Abbott’s ‘Team Australia’, we can hear echoes of Pauline Hanson’s ‘One Nation’,

⁷ Commonwealth of Australia, *Prime Minister Tony Abbott, Interview with Ray Hadley, 2GB, 18 August 2014*, transcript: <https://www.pm.gov.au/media/2014-08-18/interview-ray-hadley-radio-2gb>, accessed 9 January 2015.

John Howard's 'One Australia' policy, Calwell's 'New Australians', and the 'White Australia' policy, all of which sought to mediate this relationship.

This thesis has argued that there are three aspects which mediate the relationship between Australia and its migrant 'Other'. The first are the push and pull factors which act as catalysts for migration, and determine the composition and characteristics of the community that develops in Australia. This in turn determines the activities and causes around which these communities in Australia organise. Without understanding these push and pull factors, the migrant 'Other' in Australia cannot be contextualised, explained, nor understood.

The second aspect is the concept of the Good Australian Migrant - a highly constructed identity, imbued with a set of expectations and provisions upon which migrant 'Other' is perceived, understood, and ultimately judged. It embodies what I call the 'expectations of oughts' - of what Australia ought to be, of how Australians ought to behave, and of who migrants ought to be and how they ought to behave. Though the substance of these expectations of oughts have evolved as historical, political, social, and cultural changes have exerted their influence, they still provide the foundations from which the relationship between Australia and the migrant 'Other' is mediated.

Finally, domestic, transnational, and international contexts arbitrate the first two aspects, establishing the paradigms within which they are created and understood. These paradigms shape the responses of legal, political, and media authorities to particular migrant groups, who occupy varying spaces and levels of the 'Other'. As these contexts change, so too do the paradigms through which migrants are understood, and therefore legal, political, and media responses. In the case of Australian responses to Croatian activism in the post-war period, there are three distinct paradigm shifts around which responses can be grouped, 1947-1971, 1972-1979, and 1980-1989.

The first period, 1947-1971, was informed by the experience and aftermath of WWII and Australia's establishment of the post-war immigration programme. These created conditions for the settlement and development of the post-war

Croatian community, who pursued a political agenda that sought to establish a Croatian identity as separate from a Yugoslav one and advocated for an independent Croatian state. Though this activism was problematic in the eyes of Australian authorities, responses were tempered by the Cold War myopia of Australian politics and the adage that the enemy of my enemy is my friend. These paradigms were disrupted by the changes of the 1960's in international and domestic contexts, as well as changes within the Croatian community itself.

The second period, 1972-1979, was defined by the symbolism of Croatian activism in Australia's changing social and political environment. At the beginning of the decade, the election of Whitlam and his government ushered in a disavowal of the Cold War myopia that had defined the previous period. As a result of this disavowal, Croats found themselves at the centre of a moral panic, their activism conflated with extremism and terrorism, they themselves a political football deployed by both the Australian and Yugoslav governments in their foreign policy endeavours. At the same time, the introduction of multiculturalism opened up a legitimate space for Croatian activism and allowed the community to address and redress the reputation that the Whitlam Government had ascribed them with, and an opportunity to re-brand Croatian activism. Though the Eden and Croatian Six arrests in 1978 and 1979 threatened to undo much of this re-branding, responses were mitigated by the paradigm shifts under way in the late 1970s that had changed Australia's social political environment once more.

The final period, 1980-1989 was defined by shifts in both the domestic and international contexts that caused Croatian independence to become politically acceptable, and in some corners, even desirable. The reconfiguration of Croatian activism within the paradigms of multiculturalism allowed it to sit better within the Good Australian Migrant framework, while the rise of second-generation Croats and the arrival of a third wave of Croatian migrants reinforced these changes. Asian immigration caused a disruption in immigration paradigms, challenging the general consensus on multiculturalism as a successful or desired

policy. However it was the death of the President of Yugoslavia, Josip Broz Tito, and the general demise of communism worldwide, that gave Croatian political activism its legitimacy, for Yugoslavia was no longer of strategic importance.

Like most scholarship that is concerned with establishing new paradigms through which histories can be approached, this thesis has served to exacerbate, rather than solve, the paradox of Croatian political activism in Australia, creating more and not less demand for further research. This thesis perpetuates many of the issues identified in the literature review in the name of scope, but which could and should be addressed. The first is the use of the customary post-war definition of the Croatian 'community' as those who organised around overtly Croatian organisations that were of the 'proper' political inclination, and in particular those associated with the Catholic Church, folkloric, and football organisations. The activism and responses of groups outside of these structures should be investigated in order to better reflect the heterogeneity of Croatians in Australia.

In particular, Croatian Yugoslav communities and Croatian Muslim communities both deserve further historical attention. Croatian Yugoslav communities stood in the most direct opposition to the traditional Croatian 'community', and would provide an interesting and important comparative study in the navigation of Croatian nationhood and identity during this period. The Croatian Muslim community, on the other hand, was initially integrated within the traditional Croatian 'community', and even established a Croatian Islamic Society that cooperated with other Croatian organisations. By the end of the 1980s, however, this section of the community had become completely invisible. Investigating how and why this change occurred would be another avenue of research that would result in a more nuanced understanding of Croatian activism in Australia.

This narrow definition of the Croatian 'community' also does not distinguish between the different communities across Australia, and perpetuates the unfair predominance of communities in NSW, VIC, and the ACT. Just as Australian

communities varied from state-to-state and city-to-city, so too did Croatian communities. Comparative studies need to be undertaken in order to capture this diversity. Particular attention should be paid to the Croatian communities of South Australia and Western Australia, who once formed the epicentres of Croatian communities, and whose histories vary significantly from those on the east coast of Australia.

A similar issue arises in the question of sources. This thesis has relied predominantly on Federal Hansard, the collections of the National Archives of Australia, and the three main newspapers of Sydney, Melbourne, and Canberra – the *Sydney Morning Herald*, *Age*, and *Canberra Times* respectively, which on its own contributes to the issue of fragmentation. Expanding the range of sources to State Hansard and archival holdings, as well as state and regional newspapers would mitigate the east-centric approach of this thesis and the study of Croatians in this period generally. The comparative histories that would arise from such research would better reflect the range of responses to Croatians and their activism, and incorporate regional or local contexts that have been overlooked by the general and national approach of this thesis.

Perhaps the most important undertaking for future research, at least in terms of the history of Croatians in Australia, will be to address the lack of primary sources and dearth of historical research into Croatians and their activism. The overwhelming majority of the everyday and grassroots history of Croatians and their activism remain behind private doors, uncollected and diminishing as time passes. Without a concerted effort to collect and archive these oral and ephemeral histories, this history will never be more than that which its leadership has portrayed it to be. Each and every period, moment, and form of activism mentioned in this thesis could make up a thesis of its own. These range from the more obvious cases, such as the two incursions in 1963 and 1972, the violence of the late 1960s/early 1970s, the Croatian ‘Embassy’, and perhaps most importantly, the case of the Croatian Six, to those that were less remarkable but no less significant, such as the yearly *10 Travanj* celebrations or November

Yugoslavia Day demonstrations. Plugging the gaps in the history of Croatians, as it were, will be an undertaking of unlimited size and scope, but a worthwhile one nonetheless.

The most politically fraught of future research directions will be to investigate the allegations of Croatian terrorism, counter-allegations of Yugoslav *agents provocateurs*, and the implication of Australian governments and their agencies within this. Though it is unlikely that a definitive answer will ever be found, any clarifications or new understandings that can be made, should be made. It is telling how little historical attention has been paid to this field when Murphy's Ministerial Statement of deliberate selections, simplifications, and silences is still taken as a benchmark of 'proof.' The importance of this research does not lie in its ascription of guilt or innocence – most of those involved in these activities have long passed – but in clearing up as much ambiguity as possible so as to depoliticise this history. When these competing histories are able to talk *with* each other, rather than *at* each other, we will be able to understand the context in which these events were able to occur. This knowledge can only become more valuable as the increasing spectre of global terrorism and politically motivated violence exerts its influence on our present.

Ultimately, it is hoped that the model of analysis adopted by this thesis can make an important conceptual contribution to the study of Croatians in Australia, as well as Australia's relationship with its migrant 'Other'. By applying the three aspects which mediate this relationship – the push and pull factors of migration, the concept of the Good Australian Migrant, and the intersections of domestic, transnational, and international contexts – further research of Croatians in Australia can move understandings away from the descriptive and confrontational histories that currently define it, to those of critical interrogation that integrate contextual environments in order to create more nuanced histories and knowledge. By changing the components of these three aspects – for example substituting Croatians for another migrant group, adjusting the contextual time periods, and maybe even substituting Australia for another country – new

historical perspectives can be developed and comparative studies produced from which historians can interpret the relationship between host societies and their migrant 'Others'.

This approach may also be able to be applied to more recent or even present situations that are comparative in nature in order better understand the various aspects influencing our perceptions, in an attempt to avoid the mistakes of the past, and perhaps even help prepare for the future. For example, Australia's current relationship with the Migrant 'Other' of asylum seekers and 'boat people' can be understood, managed, and even influenced through these three aspects. Understanding why asylum seekers are leaving the country of origin, and why they are choosing to come to Australia can have both practical implications, such as informing policy planning, and symbolic implications, such as influencing rhetoric. Interrogating what the expectations of the Good Australian Migrant currently are, and whether we accept this vision helps deconstruct why asylum seekers are perceived, understood, and ultimately judged, in the way that they are. Like the post-war government was able to deploy the Good Australian Migrant to promote acceptance of their mass immigration programme, so too can the figure of the Good Australian Migrant be deployed to influence immigration policy today. Finally, situating these two aspects within current national and international contexts can help determine the paradigms that are guiding responses.

This process will become more and more pronounced as conflict becomes increasingly global in nature and outcome. The devastation and displacement caused by the conflicts over the last few years have produced the worst migration crisis since World War II. Unlike previous years, where this displacement was relatively contained in the East and Africa, forced migration has begun to directly impact the West as larger numbers are travelling further and further to seek refuge. This is particularly the case in Europe, where in 2015 alone, over a million

people literally walked across the continent in search of safety.⁸ According to the UNHCR, global, social and economic trends indicate that not only will displacement continue to grow in the next decade, but will begin to take different forms. Population growth, rising poverty, food insecurity, urbanisation, climate change, natural disasters, and conflict over scarce resources are expected to become the main causes of displacement, and most of this displacement is expected to occur in Africa and Asia.⁹ Voluntary temporary and permanent migration is also increasing, as advancing technologies, emerging industries, and economic disparities facilitate the movement of people. Further complicating the situation is that it is becoming increasingly harder to distinguish between the causes of migration, and between forced and voluntary migration. As WorldWatch notes,

It will be increasingly difficult to easily categorize people displaced by separate causes. Environmental problems are often closely intertwined with socioeconomic conditions such as poverty and inequality of land ownership, resource disputes, poorly designed development projects, and weak governance.¹⁰

While Australia may be afforded some reprieve from these issues by virtue of its distance, to believe that the population movement will bypass it altogether would be an act of extreme naivety or wilful ignorance. The presence of the 'Other' in Australia, and indeed of multiple 'Others', is only going to become more substantial as voluntary and forced migration come to define our geopolitical reality.

How well poised are we as a nation to deal with this? If our history is anything to go by, the answer does not look promising. However, history is fundamental to understanding our perceptions and reactions to the world around us, and therefore it is important that the stories of our 'Others' be heard, to

⁸ T. Miles, 'EU gets one million migrants in 2015, smugglers seen making \$1 billion', *Reuters*, 22 December 2015, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-idUSKBN0U50W120151222>, accessed 23 December 2015.

⁹ Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees., *The State of the World's Refugees: In Search of Solidarity* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 1–5.

¹⁰ *Vital Signs: The Trends That Are Shaping Our Future*, Vol. 21 (Washington: Island Press, 2014), 99.

identify the rhymes in our history and make them work to our collective advantage, rather than disadvantage. As Lack and Templeton point out,

Social tensions may indeed arise from time to time, but is exclusion of the victims the only, the best, or the most realistic solution to such problems? Critics look pessimistically at ethnic conflicts elsewhere but too rarely at the histories behind such conflicts or circumstances in which they have arisen. Perhaps they should be taken as illuminating particular histories rather than as inevitable outcomes of any ethnic mixing.¹¹

This thesis is an attempt to bring one of the perpetrators of this social tension in Australia out from the periphery. Australian responses to post-war Croatian settlement in Australia and the political activism of its community are not simple narratives of Good Vs. Bad Migrants, but of competing, conflicting, and concurrent histories, contexts, and influences which demonstrate that Australians have never truly been 'excluded' from world events. As Tavan warns, 'history attests to the willingness of populations to scapegoat minority groups during periods of insecurity.'¹² With the beckoning of a future defined by greater insecurity than that which has come, it is important we explore this history and at the very least, learn to recognise the rhymes.

¹¹ Lack and Templeton, *Bold Experiment*, 163.

¹² G. Tavan, *The Long, Slow Death of White Australia* (Carlton North: Scribe Publications, 2005), 224.

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4/7/128, [5th Military District Intelligence Reports] Enemy Subjects in AIF [Includes translations of letters written to prisoners of war by Steve ERCEGOVICH, F STRIKE, Vjenceslav SUBAT for the Croatian Slavonic Society, Tome BERICH and list of Serbians on strength: M PIVAC, C BUCELIC, P ERICGOVITCH, P PASALIC, C MATUTINOVITCH, M VUGISICH, V SCUBAT, I BAKOTIC, J RODIN, M MACHICH]

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<http://www.msf.hr/Smotra/en/en-index.html>, accessed 9 September 2016

APPENDIX

MINISTERIAL STATEMENTS

APPENDIX 1A

MINISTERIAL STATEMENT – MENZIES

Australia, House of Representatives, *Parliamentary Debates*, No.HR.35,
1964, 678-680.

may have arrived. As the honorable member knows, educational matters are now dealt with primarily by Senator Gorton, who is in another place, and he may have received a communication. I will make it my business to find out whether he has, and to find out, also, the attitude of the Australian Universities Commission on the point. At present I am not informed, but I will inform myself and then I will inform the honorable member.

NYLON STOCKINGS.

Dr. MACKAY.—I should like to ask the Prime Minister a question. The Press recently has contained reports that a certain cross parliamentarian from Queensland has sent quantities of used nylon stockings to the Prime Minister. Has the Prime Minister received these stockings? Has he examined them carefully? Will he cause additional and equally independent scientific examination to be made of the strength of the fibres used and of the possibility of stronger synthetic fibres of suitable specifications being used by the manufacturers of stockings?

Sir ROBERT MENZIES.—This is a very interesting matter. I have received a letter from the honorable member for Brisbane. Did you also send some stockings?

Mr. Cross.—Yes.

Sir ROBERT MENZIES.—I am bound to tell the House, as I told him yesterday, that my wife, on reading newspaper reports that a miserable bachelor was taking an interest in this problem and making these complaints, said to me: "Heavens! He is on to it, is he? I have been complaining about it for years." I ended, as usual, by being wrong both ways.

UNITED NATIONS.

Mr. GALVIN.—I direct a question to the Minister for External Affairs. Is it correct, as recently reported, that Australia still owes to the United Nations an amount of £36,500, the balance of the £94,000 pledged for the maintenance of the peace-keeping force in Cyprus? If the report is correct, when is it intended to pay the outstanding amount?

Mr. HASLUCK.—I have not seen this report. My understanding of the matter is that Australia has paid both the first and the second instalments of the amount pro-

mised to the United Nations and is not in default in any way. In addition to making the payment promised, Australia is bearing the major part of the cost of maintaining the police force there. As I said, I have not seen the report and cannot comment on it. However, on the rendering of it given by the honorable member, I would say that it is false.

YUGOSLAV IMMIGRANT ORGANISATIONS.

Ministerial Statement.

Sir ROBERT MENZIES (Kooyong—Prime Minister)—by leave—For some time, there have been references both in the Parliament and elsewhere to the activities of certain Yugoslav immigrant organisations. The Government is, and over a period has been, in possession of considerable information on these activities. Certain of this information is embodied in replies which are being made separately to the series of questions on the matter which were asked in the previous parliamentary session. This applies to questions asked by the honorable member for Yarra (Dr. J. F. Cairns), answers to which he should get today. However, I feel I should also take the opportunity to make some observations to the House about the Government's general policy in relation to migrant organisations and about immigration from Yugoslavia.

In the years since World War II, Australia's immigration programme has brought to this country people from all parts of Europe with a diversity of historical and cultural backgrounds. Many of these people were refugees from oppression. Many derived from happier circumstances. This flow of new citizens has played an important part in building the nation. It is something which has given us great satisfaction and we wish to see it continue. However, it is basic to our immigration policy that all these new citizens should be integrated as fully, and as quickly, as possible into Australia's national life. The people of Australia endorse this approach and, as part of its migration programme, the Government has enlisted the help of community and public bodies throughout the Commonwealth in the vital work of assimilation. There has been a very gratifying response

In this regard and on the whole the programme of integration has met with great success.

The Government is not taking an attitude against immigrants from particular countries joining in their own associations. We do not expect newcomers to turn their backs on their original heritage. On the contrary, it is wholly understandable that immigrants should establish organisations amongst themselves for a variety of social and cultural purposes. It rather follows the precedents of the Irish and Scots in this country. These organisations, as honorable members will know, can also be a most valuable means of assisting migrants to become fully integrated into the Australian community. I have no doubt that the great majority of organisations and societies to which migrants belong come within the category to which I have just been referring. However, the Government looks with disfavour on any activities of any migrant organisation which tend to frustrate integration.

The possibility always exists that at some point, the activities of a particular immigrant organisation, or the activities of individuals within that organisation, may transgress the law. As necessary, investigations are made, and will be made, into the activities of various organisations including some which are not organisations of migrants alone or even primarily. If, as a result of these investigations, there is evidence of illegal activities on the part of an organisation, or individuals within an organisation, evidence which would be receivable in a court of law, then steps will be taken promptly, as may be appropriate to the particular case, to appeal to the law of the State or to invoke the relevant Commonwealth legislation. I add however, by way of reminder to the House, that it is not and never has been the practice to make details of security investigations available or public.

I turn now to the matter of immigration from Yugoslavia. To understand the attitudes of these migrants it is necessary to remind ourselves that this part of Europe has an exceedingly complex and troubled history. Yugoslavia emerged from the political settlements of World War I. It brought together as a union a number of southern Slav peoples including Serbs, Croats and

Slovenes, under the Serbian King Alexander. The Serbs obtained their independence from the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century and were numerically the largest group in the new State. The Croats had formerly enjoyed a degree of autonomy within the Austro-Hungarian empire and retained a national identity dating back as early as the ninth century. Deep differences of religious, cultural and historical kinds have existed between the groups despite kindred racial origins.

Within the new State, the Croats sought a federal concept of government with a large degree of local autonomy. In 1928, the leader of the Croats, Stjepan Radic of the Croatian Peasant Party and two of his colleagues were assassinated in the Parliament in Belgrade. This precipitated a profound breach between Serbs and Croats. The Croats developed strong agitation in support of independence, Peasant Party leaders taking their cause to the League of Nations. Some Croat parliamentary representatives were arrested, others, among them Dr. Ante Pavelic, went into exile.

It was at this time that a revolutionary movement called Ustashi, meaning "insurgents" was founded, both in Croatia and abroad, Pavelic being one of its first leaders. This movement, in common with other Croat organisations, took as its symbol the traditional Croatian emblem of a white and red check shield but associated with this emblem the letter "U". The traditional emblem, both with and without the "U", is to be found in extensive use today by Croatian migrant groups throughout the world.

It is difficult for people coming to Australia easily to forget their historical backgrounds. Since the war a number of organisations opposed to the present Government of Yugoslavia have developed throughout the world amongst refugees and migrants from that country. It is understandable that some Yugoslav migrants of Croatian origin should continue to hope for the establishment of an independent Croatia and within a democracy like Australia they have a right to advocate their views so long as they do so by legitimate means. I wish to make it perfectly clear that the vast majority of the migrants from all parts of Yugoslavia who have settled in Australia have proved to be law abiding, hard working citizens and a real asset to this country.

Commonwealth and State authorities are continuing their investigations of Yugoslav and other organisations. Recently the Acting Premier of Victoria issued a statement on police inquiries in that State. He said that the police had found "that isolated acts of assault and misbehaviour had occurred but found no evidence whatever to support allegations of Ustashi violence towards individuals of Yugoslav nationality from which systematic or organised attacks could be inferred". That I take to mean that individual attacks have been noted but not an organised or systematic series of attacks. Similar allegations made in Cairns also were, I understand, found by the Queensland police to be unsubstantiated. The Commonwealth's own investigations so far have not produced any evidence which would warrant legal proceedings.

I wish to make the Government's position in this regard quite plain, however, Sir, and that is the real purpose of this statement, as well as to intimate at the same time that the particular questions asked in detail have been answered in detail, though not in this statement. So I make the Government's position quite clear: This Government will not interfere with freedom of opinion. Equally, it will not tolerate any activities which constitute a breach of the law.

I present the following paper—

Yugoslav Immigrant Organisations—Ministerial Statement, 27th August 1964—
and move—

That the House take note of the paper.

Mr. Calwell.—Mr. Deputy Speaker, I wish to ask the Prime Minister (Sir Robert Menzies) a question about this matter. He has said that answers—long delayed—to questions that were put on notice on 5th March last will be forwarded to the honorable member for Yarra (Dr. J. F. Cairns) today, and, of course, made public. I ask: Will the House have an opportunity—indeed, will it be accorded the right—when the debate is resumed and this matter is discussed, to canvass the whole of the issues raised by the honorable member for Yarra in his questions, which may or may not in his opinion be answered satisfactorily? In other words, I want from the Prime Minister an assurance that the canvassing of any issues not covered in his statement, but related to it, will be in order from the

Government's point of view, if we are to have the full discussion on this matter that we believe we ought to have.

Sir ROBERT MENZIES.—The answer to that is: "Yes".

Debate (on motion by Mr. Calwell) adjourned.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE.

Motion (by Mr. Fairhall)—by leave—proposed—

(1) That Mr. J. M. Fraser be appointed a member of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs in the place of Mr. Howson, discharged from attendance.

(2) That the foregoing resolution be communicated to the Senate by message.

Mr. CALWELL (Melbourne—Leader of the Opposition) [11.28].—Mr. Deputy Speaker, I understand that the motion that we are discussing arises from the splitting of the Foreign Affairs Committee into two divisions—the first division and the second division. This is not a division, in cowboy fashion, between the goodies and the baddies. The Committee is split into two divisions each of which is composed of members who sit on the Government side of the Parliament. The honorable member for Moreton (Mr. Killen) was appointed to the Committee the other day, and the discharge of the Minister for Air (Mr. Howson) from it has necessitated the promotion of a member from the second division to the first division. So the honorable member for Wannon (Mr. Malcolm Fraser) is now to go into the first division.

Mr. Curtin.—That will improve it.

Mr. CALWELL.—I do not know whether it will. This Committee leaves us completely uninterested. We have never said at any time since 1951 that we would not join a foreign affairs committee, but we have always said that we would join one only on our terms.

Mr. Whittorn.—On your terms!

Mr. CALWELL.—Precisely, on our terms. That is clear enough. The Government's attitude is equally clear. It says: "These are our terms. We want you to join. We shall be very angry if you do not. But we will not change our terms."

Mr. Chipp.—That is not true.

APPENDIX 1 B

MINISTERIAL STATEMENT – MURPHY

Australia, Senate, *Parliamentary Debates*, No.S.13, 1973, 528-547.

- (2) that Mr President and Mr Speaker be joint chairmen of the joint meeting and be empowered, if they think it necessary, to draw up regulations for the conduct of such joint meeting; and
- (3) that at such a joint meeting there be no debate on the subject matter of the alternative sites and that the question be decided by a majority of votes;

Invites Members of the House of Representatives to join with Senators in the Senate Chamber or such other place as may be determined by Mr President and Mr Speaker for the purpose of the joint meeting;

And further invites the House of Representatives to suggest any alternative to or modification of the Senate's proposal, with a view to the convening of a joint meeting of members of the Senate and the House of Representatives to determine finally the question where the new and permanent Parliament House be situated'.

ESTATE DUTY

Notice of Motion

Senator KANE (New South Wales)—I give notice that on the next day of sitting I shall move:

That leave be given to bring in a Bill for an Act to terminate estate duty.

SUSPENSION OF STANDING ORDERS

Croatian Terrorism and Related Matters

Senator WITHERS (Western Australia—Leader of the Opposition) (3.4)—I move:

That so much of the Standing Orders be suspended—

- (1) as would prevent question time being postponed until after the Leader of the Government in the Senate, Senator Murphy, has made his statement relating to Croatian terrorism and related matters, which the public has been informed will be made this day; and
- (2) as would prevent questions being asked during question time relating to that statement.

I will be quite brief in what I have to say about this motion, Mr President. Since last Friday week the Senate and the public at large have been awaiting the making of such a statement. Certain statements have been made in the media in which it has been canvassed that certain persons in this place could have their political or personal reputations put at stake. This is a statement which ought to be made as early as possible. Therefore I commend the motion to the Senate.

Senator MURPHY (New South Wales—Attorney-General and Minister for Customs and Excise) (3.5)—Mr President, I would be quite happy if the ordinary course of con-

ducting business were to be proceeded with, that is, if honourable senators were to ask questions of Ministers about any matters that concern them. I also would be quite happy to proceed to the making of the statement which I had intended to ask the Senate to allow me leave to make. The only difficulty I see is the difficulty occasioned by the passage of a few moments while certain documents are brought into the chamber to me. I did not anticipate that it would be necessary to have them available right away. Perhaps I can table those documents at the end of my statement. I accede to the proposition that has been put by the Leader of the Opposition (Senator Withers).

Question resolved in the affirmative.

CROATIAN TERRORISM

Ministerial Statement

Senator MURPHY (New South Wales—Attorney-General and Minister for Customs and Excise)—Mr President, I seek leave to make a statement on Croatian terrorism, to table documents in relation to that subject and to have incorporated in Hansard a summary of the documents.

The PRESIDENT—Is leave granted?

Senator Withers—Mr President—

The PRESIDENT—Are you refusing leave?

Senator Withers—No, I am not refusing leave. Although I am prepared to allow such a statement to be put down without the normal 2 hours notice being given, I do not know whether I should permit documents which I have not seen to be incorporated in Hansard. Senator Murphy has asked for leave to do several things. The Opposition will grant leave to his making a statement. But, as to the other matters, I think he ought to wait until he has made his statement before asking for leave. I do not think he needs leave to table documents. He has the right to table documents. Therefore I do not see why he has sought leave in that respect. But I think we ought to deal with any request to incorporate documents at the moment he seeks leave to incorporate them. We certainly give leave to Senator Murphy to make a statement.

Senator MURPHY—Mr President, I want to put evidence before the Senate in a convenient form. There is a table of that evidence. I do not see why, even at this stage, the Leader of the Opposition (Senator

Withers) should be placing difficulties in the way of my doing so. However, I will do the best I can. I will proceed now, if there is no objection.

The PRESIDENT—Is leave granted for Senator Murphy to make a statement on Croatian terrorism? There being no objection, leave is granted.

Senator MURPHY—I have never accepted the proposition that we must get used to political terrorism, involving bombings, murder, intimidation and that democratic governments are powerless to suppress such activities. That such actions have occurred in Australia with increasing frequency in recent years is beyond dispute. There was a curious defeatism and lack of initiative in successive Liberal governments' reaction to these outrages. Honourable senators will recall that, throughout the last session of the last Parliament, the former Attorney-General was asked a great number of questions by Labor senators about the activities of Croatian extremists in Australia. A constant theme in his answers was that, although there were undoubtedly individual Croatian extremists in Australia who were prepared to resort to the most violent methods in alleged furtherance of their cause, there was no credible evidence that any Croatian revolutionary terrorist organisation existed in Australia. For example in the Senate on 24th August 1972, he said:

the searches and investigations carried out by the Commonwealth Police hitherto have not been able to discover any evidence of an organisation.

He again repeated this assertion on 19th September 1972 in answer to a question from Senator Douglas McClelland (Hansard, page 894). It is important to remember that the time when these questions were being asked and answered was a time of great public concern about terrorism.

The reasons for this were twofold. Firstly, in June 1972, a group of 19 Croatian terrorists crossed into Yugoslavia from Austria and engaged in terrorist activities in Bosnia. Six were Australian citizens and 3 others had previously lived in Australia. As a result the Yugoslav Government presented a strongly worded aide-memoire to the Australian Government alleging, inter alia, that the headquarters of the HRB (Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood) were located in Australia, that the Australian Government had provided shelter for the ringleaders (who were named) and that the HRB, which had been thought

by the Australian authorities to have been defunct for some years, had been reorganised early in 1972 as the HIRO (Croatian Illegal Revolutionary Organisation).

Following receipt of this aide-memoire, the Commonwealth and State police conducted a series of raids in Melbourne and Sydney during the month of August and a great deal of material was seized. It is to be assumed that the first law officer of Australia, the Attorney-General, would be kept informed by the police of the results of their investigations, especially as he continued to be closely questioned in the Senate about Croatian extremist activities. And, indeed, he admitted on 19th September 1972 (Hansard, page 902) that he had seen a lot of material in the possession of the Commonwealth Police.

Senator Wright—I rise on a point of order. It is the usual practice when a ministerial statement of even moderate significance is made copies are circulated to honourable senators. Are copies not available?

Senator Negus—I wish to speak to the point of order. How can anyone expect the Attorney-General to produce copies of his statement when the Opposition has asked him to make his speech some hours before he intended to do so?

The PRESIDENT—Order! I have made inquiries about this matter. Because it has been brought on much earlier than was anticipated by the Leader of the Government in the Senate, only 25 copies have been run off. So honourable senators will have to share the copies that we have. I am quite sure that honourable senators on the Government side of the chamber will be happy to hand their copies to senators on the Opposition side.

Senator McManus—I join in the protest which has been offered by Senator Wright. I do so because it is obvious from statements which have appeared in the Press over the past 2 days that members of the Press have received from Senator Murphy's office copies of the statement which he proposed to make. The Press was able to state categorically what Senator Murphy intended to say. I make a strong protest that members of the Press have been supplied with copies of the proposed statement but honourable senators have not.

The PRESIDENT—Order! When a Minister makes a statement it is customary to circulate copies of the statement. There are not enough copies. I have asked members on the

Government side, if they have copies, to surrender them to honourable senators on the Opposition side. I understand that a sufficient number of copies is now available and they will be distributed to all honourable senators immediately.

Senator MURPHY—The second factor which highlighted the question of Croat terrorism in Australia and which attracted special attention from the Commonwealth and State police was the occurrence of 2 bombing incidents in Sydney on 16th September 1972 involving premises and persons connected with the Yugoslav community. These incidents left unaltered the then Attorney-General's statement that there was no organised terrorism among the Croatian community in Australia. One must assume also that the Attorney-General would have known that a cache of explosives and documents had been discovered in the Warburton Ranges outside Melbourne about the middle of 1972 and that amongst these documents were several stating the aims and objects of an Ustasha-type organisation known as HIRO (Croatian Illegal Revolutionary Organisation). This is the very organisation to which the Yugoslav Government's aide-memoire made reference. However, when the Senate rose on 27th October 1972, neither the Attorney-General nor any other member of the Liberal Government had produced any evidence of the existence in Australia of organised Croatian terrorism and it held firmly to the position that no such evidence existed.

On taking over the office of Attorney-General, I considered it my duty to find out for myself whether this was true and to inform the Senate and the people of Australia of the facts. The impending visit to this country of the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia gave special urgency to this investigation since, if the true picture was different from that painted by the previous Government, the present Government was entitled to entertain grave fears for the safety of our distinguished guest and would be in duty bound to take adequate precautions for his safety. I am now in a position to state categorically that the Liberal Attorney-General's oft-repeated assertion that there is no credible evidence of the existence in Australia of organised Croatian extremism cannot be sustained. The contrary is true and was true at the time he made such statements.

The evidence—overwhelming evidence—is to be found in documents which I am about to table.

These documents come from the files of the Attorney-General's Department, the Commonwealth Police and the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation. I point out that although some of the documents tabled contain a classification stamp such as 'secret' or 'confidential' they are no longer so. They have all been declassified and no breach of security is involved in tabling them. In contrast to the last Government's policy of trying to sweep this problem under the rug, we propose to bring it into the full light of day. I now table the documents. These documents establish beyond doubt that Croatian terrorist organisations have existed and do exist in Australia today. There is incontestable evidence that 3 extreme Croatian terrorist organisations exist in Australia today. They are the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood (HRB); the United Croats of West Germany (UHNj); and the Croatian Illegal Revolutionary Organisation (HIRO). There are 2 youth organisations that have very revolutionary aims and have been used as recruiting grounds for the 3 extreme terrorist organisations. These youth organisations are the Croatian Youth (HM) and the World League of Croatian Youths (SHUMS). There are 2 umbrella type general organisations which by their publications, training camps, discussion groups, funds and close links with their national organisations provide the climate for the forming of the inspiration to the youth groups and the extreme terrorist organisations. These umbrella organisations are the Croatian Liberation Movement (HOP) with its official Ustasha movement within it (UHRO) and the Croatian National Resistance (HNO) and its Croatian Armed Forces (HOS). Also tabled is a summary of the documents which I seek leave to have incorporated.

The PRESIDENT—Is leave granted?

Opposition Senators—No.

The PRESIDENT—Leave is not granted. This question has been raised before and I have ruled that matter should not be incorporated in Hansard before honourable senators have had a chance to see it.

Senator MURPHY—The summary contains, inter alia, the report of the Crime Intelligence Bureau of the Commonwealth Police force dated 6th March 1968; papers about the notorious Andric brothers; papers about Jure Maric including the structure of

the Croatian troika terrorist cell, a self-contained group of 3 terrorists consisting of an intelligence officer, a scout and an explosives expert; documents concerning all of the Croatian organisations I have mentioned; and documents indicating links with overseas terrorist organisations as well as other related documents.

It is impossible to draw any other conclusion from the evidence than that Senator Greenwood, on the most charitable view of his conduct, displayed an irresponsible indifference to information which was available to him and which proved up to the hilt the seriousness of the problem to which Labor senators repeatedly attempted to alert him. Let me give a striking example. The Yugoslav aide-memoire was received by the Australian Government on 16th August 1972. Among those named in the aide-memoire as being one of the ringleaders of Croatian terrorism is one Jure Maric. He was already well known to the Commonwealth Police. He first came under notice in 1963 after a group of 6 Croatian terrorists, allegedly from Australia, entered Yugoslavia illegally for the stated purpose of waging a guerrilla campaign against the regime. Maric was linked with the organisation of this incursion.

Investigations conducted over a period of 4 years established the existence in Australia of a terrorist organisation known as the HRB (Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood). Maric was one of its leaders. After a number of police raids in 1967, including on Maric's premises, the HRB appeared to become moribund in a formal organisational sense, although as we now know it continued to operate through troikas or cells. However, Maric continued to be the subject of scrutiny by the Commonwealth Police and a possible prosecution of him under the Commonwealth Crimes Act was considered in October 1970. He was also the subject of memoranda from the Commonwealth Police to the Attorney-General's Department on 9th August 1971 and 12th September 1972. In view of the questioning in the Senate to which he was being submitted at the time one assumes that the former Attorney-General would have seen these memoranda.

Maric was one of those whose premises were searched by the Commonwealth Police under warrant on 22nd August 1972, following receipt by the Australian Government of the aide-memoire from the Yugoslav Government

in which he was named. Among the documents seized were a detailed map of the area where the Bosnian guerrillas had illegally entered the country, a letter discussing an initial ruling body of an independent Croatia including, significantly, the name Rover of whom more later, and a receipt from Wollongong Post Office for the transmission of a registered postal article to one Vegar at Offenburg, Austria; (Vegar was one of the guerrillas killed in the Bosnian operation); a bank slip issued by the ANZ Bank, Wollongong, acknowledging transmission of money to Vegar; a letter detailing future plans for the recruitment of volunteers to Australia for further incursions into Yugoslavia. One of the letters signed refers to the fact that the 'financial resources of the organisation which we took with us from Victoria as well as those received later, have now been used up'. Does this sound like an individual operating independently of an organisation? The Commonwealth Police certainly did not think so. Their conclusion is as follows:

The evidence contained in this document when taken into consideration with that enumerated in the aforementioned memorandum of 7 November 1972, would seem to irrefutably implicate Jure Maric with a Croatian Nationalist Organisation which apparently exists in both Australia and Europe and which has been engaged in an attempt to overthrow the recognised Government of Yugoslavia. It is also considered that, regardless of what this organisation is called, it is in fact a resurgence of the former Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood (HRB) and appears to involve a number of persons who were previously identified as members of the HRB. As you will recall in our initial assessment of the allegations made in the Yugoslav aide-memoire presented on 16 August 1972, we expressed 'serious concern about the possible existence of a clandestine terrorist organisation in Australia'. We also stated, *inter alia*: With regard to the allegations about the HRB, I would draw your attention to our earlier reports (reference 224/283 headed Croatian Nationalist Activities in Australia, dated 5 July 1972, and reference X.61, headed Srecko Blaz Rover, born 3 February 1920, Sarajevo, Yugoslavia, dated 20 April 1972) indicating the possible resurgence of a HRB type organisation. In the past it has generally been assumed that the HRB as such ceased to operate as an organisation in Australia circa 1967-1968. In the light of intelligence gathered by this Force over the past nine months, the allegations of its continued existence by the Yugoslav Government must be taken seriously.

The police report from which I have quoted is dated 23rd November 1972. However, a preliminary report on documents seized from Maric, Rover and others was made by the Acting Commissioner of Commonwealth Police to the Attorney-General's Department on

12th September 1972 and the Attorney-General would undoubtedly have seen this report. Though all the seized documents had not been translated at this stage, there were references to maps, to the receipt for the transmission of money to Vegar and to handwritten items relating to the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood and the organisational infrastructure of a troika group. In short, on or soon after 12th September 1972, the then Attorney-General was in possession of evidence that the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood had been revived, was functioning actively, and was associated with the June incursion into Yugoslavia which had been the subject of complaint in the Yugoslav Government's aide-memoire of 16th August 1972. Yet on 19th September 1972 he returned to his denials of the existence of any Croatian terrorist organisation in Australia and never resiled from that standpoint throughout the life of the Parliament.

A responsible Attorney-General, aware of Maric's past role as a leader of HRB, aware of the fact that Maric had been named as a terrorist in the Yugoslav document, aware of the anxieties about the resurgence of Croatian terrorism expressed almost daily by Labor senators, would surely not have reacted to the raid on Maric's premises and the seizure of documents I have referred to in the way in which Senator Greenwood reacted. Let us examine his conduct in this matter in some detail, since it is symptomatic of the previous Government's attitude to the problem. The first point to note is that the raid on Maric, and other suspected terrorists, was not made at the Attorney-General's instigation. On 23rd August, the day after the raids, in reply to a question from Senator O'Byrne, he stated in part:

The position as I have stated it for several weeks—that there is no credible evidence of any Croatian terrorist groups in Australia—still stands. The searches which were made yesterday by Commonwealth Police officers, together with State Police officers, were not directed towards obtaining any such evidence . . . I should state that the searches yesterday were made as part of a police investigation and were made without my knowledge.

I think that honourable senators may remember the anger with which that was expressed. Parliament rose on 27th October without any information being given to the Senate about the contents of the seized documents. Maric had been named as a terrorist in the Yugoslav Government protest presented to the Australian Government on 16th August 1972. A

bland interim reply was given to the Yugoslav Government on 20th October 1972, mentioning that the matter was being investigated but making no admissions about the presence of Croatian terrorist organisations in our midst, even though evidence of the existence of such organisations was in the possession of the Attorney-General when the interim reply was given. No further reply to these allegations was ever made by the Liberal Government to the Yugoslav Government. Yet the conclusion reached by the Commonwealth Police and conveyed to the Attorney-General's Department as early as 17th August 1972, was in these words:

It—

That is the aide-memoire—

does contain a core of almost irrebuttable fact.

In addition, the Director-General of ASIO on 7th September 1972 stated in reference to the aide-memoire in a letter to the Attorney-General's Department:

Also in general terms, some of the information is almost certainly inaccurate; other portions contain elements of truth but appear exaggerated; and yet other statements are well-based. Overall the Aide Memoire and enclosures contain sufficient accurate material to suggest that it would be ill-advised to dismiss the allegations as either exaggeration or fabrication until such time as the results of current inquiries are known.

ASIO never retreated from that stand and subsequently agreed with me that the aide-memoire contained a core of irrebuttable truth. And yet, on 19th September, the Attorney-General said in this place:

It comes to the question whether we should accept allegations made by the President and the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia as having a basis in fact notwithstanding that our investigation of those allegations in Australia has proved that the allegations are without such a basis. Simply, it comes down to this: Does this Senate accept what is alleged by the President and the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia in preference to what our own Commonwealth Police have found and what I have stated?

It had taken the then Attorney-General only a month to forget the Commonwealth Police's 'core of almost irrebuttable fact', and less than a fortnight to forget the cautionary advice of ASIO.

In one of the many debates on this subject last year Senator Greenwood indignantly asked me—Hansard, page 925—whether I gave greater credence to the allegations of the Yugoslav Government than to the statements which he had made. The answer is: Yes, and so do the Commonwealth Police and ASIO. As though the evidence I have already supplied

were not enough to convict the last Government, through its Attorney-General, of misleading the Parliament and the nation, of deceiving a friendly foreign power, of imperiling the lives of Australian citizens by shutting its eyes to the evidence of organised terrorism, there is yet another, perhaps more glaring example of the existence of a dangerous, violent Croatian revolutionary terrorist organisation in Australia.

This organisation, separate and distinct from the HRB—the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood—is the Australian Branch of the UHNj—the League of United Croats of West Germany. Its leader in Germany is one Ante Vukic whom our Commonwealth Police considered such a dangerous man that they advised the Department of Immigration against granting him a permit to visit Australia in May 1972. The organisation in Germany was associated over the last decade with attempted murders of Yugoslav officials and attacks on Yugoslav embassies and employed strong-arm squads to threaten other Croats living in Germany for the purpose of either conscripting them into the organisation or extracting financial contributions.

A branch of this murderous organisation was formed in Sydney around June 1971 and its membership and activities were well known to the Commonwealth Police. Its meetings, ironically enough, are or were held in the Ulster Room of the Irish National Association Hall in Devonshire Street, Sydney. Its leader is a man with a particularly violent record named Jakov Suljak. His name will certainly not come as a surprise to the former Attorney-General since he wrote to the senator on 25th October 1972, after being arrested on a charge of assault and mentioned in the course of his letter that he had also been accused of the 'city bombings', an obvious reference to the bombings in Sydney on 16th September 1972.

In June 1969 Suljak was jailed in South Australia for a period of 9 months for 2 particularly brutal assaults. He had already been charged with similar offences on 5 separate occasions and is at present on bail pending trial for assault and being found in possession of an unlicensed pistol. On 11th November 1969, the Commissioner of Commonwealth Police, Mr J. Davis, recommended that he be deported, but his recommendation was not acted upon.

Among the voluminous documents on Suljak and the Australian branch of the terrorist organisation UHNj which I have tabled today is a letter dated 30th May 1972 from Mr Davis, Commissioner of Commonwealth Police, to the Department of Immigration. The letter, a copy of which was in the files of the Attorney-General's Department, sets out the fact of the existence of this organisation, its meetings, its office-holders and its involvement in breaches of the peace in Sydney over the preceding months.

A brochure produced by the Special Reports Branch of the Department of Immigration in August 1972 on Croatian extremist activities makes special reference to the UHNj, its organisation in Australia, its activities and its members. A copy of this brochure was forwarded to the Attorney-General's Department on 25th August 1972 and it was specifically directed by the Permanent Head of the Attorney-General's Department to Senator Greenwood himself. His most vehement denials of the existence of extremist Croatian organisations followed shortly after his receipt of this document, which is among the documents tabled today.

Moreover, if the former Attorney-General was unwilling to accept the evidence which abounded in government files, he had only to read the daily newspapers to discover that the New South Wales police stated in court proceedings which were fully reported, that Suljak was a member of what was described in the press as a Croatian terrorist movement, the United Croats of West Germany.

When Suljak was arrested on 19th October 1972 a considerable quantity of documents was seized from his dwelling. These documents established the fact of transmission of funds from the Australian branch to the parent body in Germany. A number of photographs of armed men were also found, including one in which Suljak can be seen standing beside a Ustashi flag in the company of other armed men. There is no doubt that the members of the Sydney branch of UHNj consider themselves Ustashi. Both the letter of Commissioner Davis of 30th May 1972, and his detailed report of 26th October 1972 refer to incidents in which the organisation was involved which clearly demonstrate its Ustashi allegiance. For example, they publicly displayed an Ustashi flag at Sydney airport and also at a Croatia versus Yugal soccer

match in Sydney on 15th August 1971. Several of their members have admitted to the police that they consider themselves Ustashi.

In an article by Suljak in the November-December 1971 edition of the organisation's paper 'Croatian Call', he urged Croats in Australia to support UHNj and stated:

It is our duty to support the Croatian Liberation struggle . . . for without a bloody shirt there will be no Independent State of Croatia.

He does not confine his appeals to the journalistic level but regularly 'stands over' other Croats for donations to the cause.

At this point honourable senators might well ponder a few questions. Why was this man, Suljak, not deported in 1969 as recommended by the Commissioner of Commonwealth Police? Why has his organisation, which flaunts its Ustashi allegiance, and which is acknowledged by ASIO in another document which is tabled today, to be a terrorist organisation, been allowed to continue in existence? And, above all, why was this existence denied by Senator Greenwood?

A rather surprising beneficiary of the former Attorney-General's benevolence is one Zdenko Marincic. Marincic arrived in Australia on 16th January 1970. He became Secretary of SHUMS (Union of Croatian United Youth of the World), which, despite its innocent sounding name, is under the effective control of Srecko Rover and is suspected by the Commonwealth Police of being an extremist front organisation (see letter from J. Davis to the Attorney-General's Department, dated 8th June 1972). He first attracted police attention on 29th November 1970 when he removed a Yugoslav flag from the balcony of the Southern Cross Hotel in Melbourne during Yugoslav National Day celebrations and burned it. For this offence he was convicted on 9th February 1972 and fined.

On 19th May 1972 Marincic hastily left Australia. This was shortly before the 'Bosnian incident' which has already been referred to. Marincic turned up in Frankfurt, Germany, but the German authorities refused him entry. He had not obtained a re-entry permit before leaving Australia, so he has no right at all to be here. Nonetheless he returned to Australia on 24th May 1972 and was immediately arrested and charged the next day with having a firearm in his possession. He was convicted and sentenced to 9

months imprisonment. This was not a simple firearms offence. When he left Australia hurriedly on 19th May 1972 Marincic took with him a rifle and 4 silencers which he concealed in a toy koala.

Senator Withers—How could he conceal a rifle and 4 silencers in a toy koala?

Senator MURPHY—The 4 silencers were concealed in a toy koala. When the rifle was discovered the German authorities refused him entry and he returned to Australia with gun and silencers. He also was in possession of a booklet in the Serbo-Croatian language containing instruction on sabotage and of the names and addresses of Ambroz Andric in France, Adolf Andric in Germany and Pave Vegar in Germany. All 3 of these men were named in the Yugoslav Government aide-memoire as participants in the Bosnian incursion and it will be recalled that Jure Maric had also maintained contact with Vegar. All 3 were killed in this adventure, according to the Yugoslav Government. Surely it is a reasonable inference that Marincic went to Germany to join the Bosnian incursion or at least to help equip it.

On 18th October 1972, the Assistant-Director of the Special Reports Branch of the Department of Immigration recommended Marincic's deportation. In weighing up all the considerations, including Marincic's probable fate if returned to Yugoslavia, the Assistant-Director said:

I believe the strong doubts which exist about his past and future involvement in potentially violent Balkan politics should be exercised in favour of Australia and therefore recommend that Zdenko Marincic be deported. Such action, I suggest will have a salutary effect upon those Croats who use Australia as a base for pursuit of their ideals and will also provide the Yugoslav authorities with a positive indication that Australia neither supports nor condones extremism.

I venture to suggest that they are sentiments with which the overwhelming majority of Australians would agree. These sentiments, however, did not find favour with the then Attorney-General.

In a long and carefully argued submission to the Minister for Immigration dated 12th November 1972, Senator Greenwood reversed the priorities as between the interests of Australia and those of an obvious Croatian terrorist in favour of the latter. His letter, which is among the documents tabled, should be closely studied by everyone who is interested to discover the basis of his curiously tender

regard for men whose preferred methods of asserting their political beliefs are the bomb and the gun. Let me quote just one passage from this extraordinary letter:

I appreciate your concern that Marincic is a person whom we could not safely allow to remain in Australia. I understand your apprehension is that he is a man with a propensity to violence and that, in view of recent happenings involving violence to persons and property, we have a paramount obligation to the Australian community to remove him from the country.

Naturally I share your apprehension that we should knowingly allow a person of violent proclivities to remain in this country if he is an immigrant whom we can deport. But this is a matter of balancing the likely harm to Australia against the consequences of deportation. It is relevant in each case to note the country to which a person will be deported.

I have indicated the traditional and accepted rule—applicable not only in this country but also in the USA and the UK—that deportation or extradition does not take place where a person is likely to be dealt with for his political opinions by the country to which he is sent. I believe that this outweighs all other considerations in this case.

In the event, Marincic is still among us. However misguided one might consider an Attorney-General who placed the interests of an obvious terrorist ahead of the interests of the Australian people, there might be some who would be impressed by the countervailing libertarian considerations on which his submission is apparently based. There is, however, a fatal flaw in this argument, which assumes that the deportation of Marincic would inevitably place him at the mercy of the Yugoslav police. The chief law officer of Australia must have been familiar with the decision of the High Court in the case of *Znaty v. The Minister of State for Immigration and Another* (1972 *Argus Law Reports* page 545). Judgment in this case was delivered on 25th February 1972, that is, some 9 months prior to the letter to the Minister for Immigration urging him not to deport Marincic.

The judgment of the Court in that case clearly established the right of the Government to deport a person to anywhere. Counsel briefed by the Attorney-General submitted that the law was and had been since 1903 that the Government is not bound to send the deportee back to the place from which he came and the Court approved that submission. If we assume that he was familiar with this decision and surely he would not undertake to advise the Minister for Immigration without familiarising himself with the up-to-date state of the law regarding immigration

matters, we can only reach one conclusion about his conduct in this matter: In order to protect a terrorist from deportation, he misinformed the Minister responsible for the issuance of a deportation order about the legal consequences for the terrorist of such an order.

This is a serious charge but is supported by an earlier example of Senator Greenwood's benign view of the rights of terrorists. This case involved none other than Jure Maric, about whom I have already said a great deal. On 4th July 1972 the Attorney-General's Department put a submission to him that he should recommend that Maric's application for a passport be refused. The officer of the Department who made this recommendation pointed out that ASIO's latest report and the most recent Commonwealth Police report on Maric indicated that he was deeply involved in Croatian nationalist activities and was prepared to support acts of violence against Yugoslavia, that there was a real possibility that he would, if granted a passport, be a participant in acts of violence directed against Yugoslavia and that, if this occurred, it would be an embarrassment to Australia's relations with Yugoslavia. Senator Greenwood rejected this advice from his Department and was not in favour of refusing the passport to Maric. Fortunately, the Minister for Immigration did not grant Maric's application.

In a previous debate on this subject Senator Greenwood indignantly repudiated the charge that he was 'soft' on Croatian terrorists. Surely that was a mild charge to lay at the door of a man whom the documents prove to have been the active protector of terrorists! On 21st September 1972, 2 high-ranking officers of the Attorney-General's Department, alarmed by recent events, especially the bombings in the streets of Sydney, called on him and drew to his attention certain Croatian publications and discussed the various Croatian organisations. Their submissions to the Attorney-General are among the documents produced today to the Senate. One of these officers, who had been specially assigned 6 years earlier to Croatian affairs and was considered in the Department to be the expert on this subject, expressed the view that 2 of these organisations, HOP and HNO, 'were not primarily cultural but political and militarist'. A few weeks later this officer was relieved of all duties concerning Croatian matters.

The tone of the last Government's attitude towards Croatian terrorism was set as long ago as 27th August 1964 by Sir Robert Menzies. His statement was precipitated by a complaint by the Yugoslav Government following 2 incidents:

(1) The 1963 guerrilla incursion into Yugoslavia by 6 Croatians previously resident in Australia.

(2) The discovery of a military-style training camp for Croatian extremists near Wodonga, Victoria.

Mr Menzies gave a little lecture on Balkan history and stated that police 'had found no evidence whatever to support allegations of Ustashi violence towards individuals of Yugoslav nationality'. Mr Menzies went on to say:

It is understandable that some Yugoslav migrants of Croatian origin should continue to hope for the establishment of an independent Croatia and within a democracy like Australia they have a right to advocate their views so long as they do so by legitimate means.

That is a reasonable proposition but I leave it to honourable senators to judge whether the 'means' I have disclosed today are 'legitimate'. The long list of unsolved crimes of violence tells an eloquent story of the indifference of governments of 23 years duration to the 'means' used by Croatian extremists to attain the goals Mr Menzies smiled on so benignly. The police have done their best with inadequate resources and no encouragement. They could hardly fail to draw the conclusion that successive Liberal governments could not have cared less whether they succeeded or not in crushing Croatian terrorism. To be sure, there were sporadic cries of alarm from individual Ministers. For example on 3rd December 1969, the Honourable Philip Lynch, then Minister for Immigration, wrote to the then Attorney-General Hughes expressing:

... concern at the likely serious consequences if Croat nationals in Australia are permitted to continue unchecked their terrorist activities and outrages against representatives of the Yugoslav Government and authority generally in this country. I have reason to believe that the terrorists are endeavouring to create the impression amongst Yugoslav migrants in Australia that the Croatian extremists have the support of significant sections of Australian society and even the government. I am moreover concerned with the likely effect upon our relations with Yugoslavia, especially in terms of our migration arrangements with that country, of continued incidents of this kind and the apparent inability of the law authorities to apprehend offenders.

The Minister recommended that the Government should make a strong statement that outrages 'of this kind will not be tolerated'. That was Mr Lynch in government. Mr Lynch out of government speaks in a different tone. Last week he condemned the precautions taken to protect the visiting Yugoslav Prime Minister as 'hysterical'.

Sir Garfield Barwick, then Minister for External Affairs, also expressed his concern shortly after the 1963 incursion into Yugoslavia. In a letter addressed to the Attorney-General and the Minister for Immigration dated 6th January 1964, he wrote, in part:

In essence, the problem is one of 'keeping an eye' on immigrant extremists, while operating within the framework of existing law and practice. We should not abandon our democratic principles of free speech, belief and association but I would hope that migrants are left with no misunderstanding of the disfavour with which the Government would view any activities which might reasonably give rise to objections by the present governments of their countries of origin. With this end in mind, I should like to suggest that the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation should maintain some supervision over migrant groups (making no attempt to disguise its surveillance) and bring to your attention any activities which might be considered to have contravened sections 30 (A) or 30 (C) of the Crimes Act. In appropriate circumstances, it may be necessary to consider the desirability of prosecutions under the Act as a further deterrent to uncontrolled extremism, although this measure need not be adopted except in the last resort.

The story which I have unfolded today and the documents which I have tabled show how little heed was paid to the warnings of Mr Lynch and Sir Garfield Barwick. Indeed one can only agree with the comments made by one prominent politician in a letter which he wrote to the then Attorney-General on 16th December 1969. His comments included the following:

The extremists themselves may by now have come to believe that they can act with impunity and that they can therefore, without risk to themselves, step up the level and frequency of violence.

He went on to express some concern that:

On the only occasion when an offender (who was arrested at the time of committing the offence in the course of a public demonstration) was brought before a court, he was fined an amount which might have left an impression with the Yugoslav missions here . . . that the Australian authorities did not take the matter seriously.

For the benefit of honourable senators who are interested, those comments came from the Rt Hon. William McMahon, when he was Minister for External Affairs. Even after these ministerial complaints the attitude of Attorney-General Hughes and his successors was

one which ASIO described to me as that of 'indifference' to the problem of Croatian terrorism. In the view of ASIO the organisation was not given proper ministerial directives in regard to Croatian terrorism.

Passing reference has been made to Srecko Rover. He is a leader of the Croatian Liberation Movement in this country and, indeed, he is a world figure of considerable importance among emigrant Croats. He is the leader of HNO (Croatian National Resistance), based in Melbourne and linked with the Spanish headquarters of the organisation. Among the documents tabled today is a copy of an interview between a Commonwealth Police officer and Rover. The latter admits that he will use any means possible to achieve an independent Croatia; claims to know that one of the Andric brothers (since killed in the Bosnia incursion) made the pen bomb which exploded in Richmond Town Hall on 2nd September 1967, gravely injuring a young man; advocates the violent overthrow of the Yugoslav Government. Documents seized in the raid on Rover's home in August 1972, copies of which are tabled today including a map of the route to be followed by the incursionists, prove conclusively his personal involvement with the Bosnia incursion of June 1972. Also seized was a seal bearing the insignia of the Supreme Headquarters of the Croatian National Resistance and the Croatian Armed Forces, ammunition and documents relating to the instigation of guerrilla activity in Yugoslavia.

Senator Rae—Not in Australia but in Yugoslavia.

Senator MURPHY—Is the honourable senator implying that because the guerrilla activity took place in Yugoslavia and not in Australia this should be of no account to the Government of Australia? A most significant document seized was a report from the Supreme Advisory Council of the troika dated 15th July 1972, indicating that an organisation has been set up in Australia on the basis of small cells or troikas. The manner in which these troikas operate is set out in detail in a report from the Commonwealth Police prepared on 6th March 1968 which was always available to the former Attorney-General and which is among the documents tabled today. In a move to establish himself as the leader of Croatian nationalism in Australia, Rover was mainly instrumental in the setting up in May 1972 of KOHDA (Co-or-

dinating Committee of Croatian Associations in Australia). Affiliated with the Committee are such important organisations as HOP (Croatian Liberation Movement), HNO (Croatian National Resistance) and UHNj (United Croats of West Germany).

Now that it is clear that the new Government intends to cope vigorously with the problem of Croatian terrorism we hope and believe that it will be possible to gain the co-operation of that vast majority of peaceful Croatian citizens who are the first victims of the fanatical minority of their countrymen who engage in terrorism. The documents tabled show that Croats have been intimidated to contribute money to the terrorists. The measures which we propose will put an end to this. What I have said about Croatian terrorism applies to all terrorism. I point to the case of the Bulgarian terrorists, Daskaloff and Petroff, who were convicted of throwing a bomb into the grounds of the Russian Embassy in Canberra and were sentenced to terms of imprisonment. Despite that these men were clearly liable for deportation, the previous Government did not deport them and they are still in our midst.

The present Government's policy will be to deport aliens associated with terrorist organisations who have been convicted of crimes of violence, and become liable to deportation. Recommendations have been made that certain persons be deported, not necessarily to the country from which they came. All proper procedures and safeguards of civil liberties will be observed. The Minister for Immigration makes the necessary orders. The new policy is to cut out the cancer of terrorism from our body politic. This should apply to all who are liable to deportation and from whom violence can be apprehended. The law will be used to deal with terrorism and violence.

Important changes will also be made in our police and security arrangements. Pending the full report on the operations of ASIO and its relations with the executive government which I intend to present to Parliament during this session, the Director-General of ASIO will operate mainly from Canberra. This will ensure closer liaison with the Australian Government and the Commonwealth Police in combating terrorism. In the past there has been inadequate co-operation between ASIO and the Commonwealth Police in areas where

their operations overlapped. This is a problem to which I have given much attention in the past few weeks.

Another problem is that matters of national security often involve breaches of State criminal law. This has often meant that ASIO has not been supplied with information which bears on matters of national security. The conclusion I have drawn from this is that we need federal laws to cover crimes which may affect national security.

Senator Rae—One political police force? Is that what you intend?

Senator Webster—With Senator Murphy as head of the police.

Senator MURPHY—Before honourable senators opposite continue with interjections I think they would be better advised to wait and see what recommendations have been made in the past and from what distinguished quarters, which I am not in a position to put now before the Senate but which I assure honourable senators I will put later.

I intend to recommend to Cabinet that legislation be introduced for new or strengthened Federal criminal laws to deal with offences such as the use of telephones or postal services to convey threats to persons or property; committing an act of violence against a foreign guest of the Australian Government; against diplomatic or consular personnel or premises or against persons or premises engaged in or used for overseas or interstate trade and commerce; acts of violence or threats of violence against Australian Ministers or officials of the Australian Government and others; acts or threats of violence or extortion by aliens; inciting in Australia acts of violence against a person or property in a foreign state with which Australia has friendly relations or to collect money or to train persons in the use of weapons, explosives or poisons in Australia for this purpose. I will also propose legislation to supplement the powers already possessed by the Australian Government to prevent the entry into Australia of terrorists or persons associated with organised crime. The Commonwealth Police will be strengthened, especially in its criminal investigation unit. The Commissioner had requested the previous Government to be supplied with extra staff and additional translators but this request fell on deaf ears. These requests have now been examined by my Department, found to be reasonable and appropriate, and I have approved them.

I should like to add a word about events of last week. I am advised that terrorists came to Canberra last week with the intention of killing the Yugoslav Prime Minister. The Commissioner of Commonwealth Police, Mr J. Davis, advised me that, frustrated in that ambition by security precautions, the terrorists might make an alternative attempt on the life of the Australian Prime Minister (Mr Whitlam) or other Ministers of the Government. The unanimous opinion of the Federal law enforcement authorities was that it was unsafe for the Australian Prime Minister to walk through the Port Kembla Steelworks of Broken Hill Pty Co. Ltd on Wednesday last. In this situation, I make no apology for any steps which I took last week to ensure that the intentions of violent terrorists were thwarted. Those who take the view that those precautions were unnecessary because nothing happened are indulging in a twisted form of logic. Toleration of terrorism in this country is over. Whatever we import from the rest of the world we do not need that. This Government is determined that terrorism in Australia will be resolutely stamped out. A list of the documents has already been tabled along with the other documents. I ask for leave to have it and a summary of the documents incorporated in Hansard.

The PRESIDENT—Is leave granted? There being no objection, leave is granted.

(The list and summary read as follows)—

LIST OF DOCUMENTS RELATING TO
CROATIAN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES
IN AUSTRALIA

APPENDIX A

Document A.1—The Menzies Statement of 27th August 1964.

Document A.2—Letter from Dr Hefer to Mr Menzies received 2nd September 1964.

Document A.3—Letter by Sir Garfield Barwick as Minister for External Affairs to the Attorney-General of 6th January 1964.

Document A.4—Notation by Mr Snedden when Attorney-General, on a departmental submission dated 25th September 1964 relating to prosecution of certain Croatsians.

Document A.5—ASIO Position Paper of 1st May 1967.

Document A.6—ASIO Position Paper of 1st October 1967.

Document A.7—Report of the Crime Intelligence Bureau of the Commonwealth Police dated 6th March 1968 on the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood (HRB).

Document A.8—Letter by Mr Lynch, when Minister for Immigration to the then Attorney-General dated 3rd December 1969.

Document A.9—Letter by Mr McMahon as Minister for External Affairs dated 16th December 1969.

Document A.10—Commonwealth Police comments upon the two preceding Ministerial letters.

Document A.11—ASIO comments on the two preceding Ministerial letters.

Document A.12—Report of conference between Commonwealth Police and ASIO held on 17th February 1970 in respect of the Rolovic Note delivered to the Australian Government.

Document A.13—Background brief by ASIO dated 2nd April 1971 on Croatian National Resistance (HNO).

Document A.14—Memorandum from the Attorney-General's Department dated 10th June 1972 to the Attorney-General advising of the Croatian Illegal Revolutionary Organisation (HIRO).

Document A.15—Record of interview prepared by Senator Greenwood when Attorney-General, of his interview with the Yugoslav Ambassador on 19th July 1972.

Document A.16—Press Statement by Senator Greenwood, when Attorney-General, dated 30th July 1972.

Document A.17—Press Statement by Senator Greenwood, when Attorney-General, dated 11th August 1972 relating to the armed incursion into Yugoslavia.

Document A.18—Copy of a submission by the Attorney-General's Department to the Attorney-General relating to a passport application by Jure Maric.

Document A.19—Letter by Senator Greenwood, when Attorney-General, to the Foreign Minister, Mr Bowen, dated 27th November 1972.

Document A.20—Letters by Senator Greenwood, when Attorney-General, to the Minister for Immigration, Dr Forbes, dated 29th June 1972 (passport application by Josip Bogut) and 12th November 1972 (deportation of Marincic).

APPENDIX B

Document B.1—Constitution of the Croatian Liberation Movement (HOP).

Document B.2—Constitution of the official 'Croatian Ustashi Movement' and the seventeen principles of the Ustashi.

Document B.3—Correspondence between Josip Kovac of Canberra and Srecko Rover of Melbourne dated 14th and 21st July 1972.

Document B.4—Copy of a letter to Prime Minister McMahon by the Croatian Co-ordinative Committee of Victoria dated 25th May 1972 complaining about the cancellation of Srecko Rover's passport.

Document B.5—Letter to the Attorney-General from Ljubomir Vuina dated 23rd September, 1972.

Document B.6(a)—Copy of a record of A.B.C. television interview with Tomislav Lesic on 19th September, 1972.

Document B.6(b)—Copy of a record of interview on A.B.C. television with Fabian Lovokovic on 20th September, 1972.

Document B.7—A series of photographs taken at the Wodonga Training Camp in 1963.

Document B.8—Constitution of the Australian Croatian National Resistance—Oceania (H.N.O.).

Document B.9—Record of interview between Superintendent Milte and Srecko Rover.

Document B.10—Intelligence report by a troika terrorist group and a copy of a map of Yugoslavia which marks the route into Yugoslavia taken by the terrorist raiding party of June, 1972. Rover's papers (1972).

Document B.11—Letter by Srecko Rover to the Governor-General dated 20th October, 1972 complaining about Her Majesty the Queen's visit to Yugoslavia.

Document B.12—Aims and objects of the Croatian Youth (H.M.).

Document B.13—The principles and the oath of the World League of Croatian Youth (S.H.U.M.S.).

Document B.14—Constitution of the Croatian Illegal Revolutionary Organisation (H.I.R.O.) and the transcript of committal proceedings in Victoria against its leaders.

Document B.15—Letter by Joint Committee of Croatian Organisations in New South Wales to Prime Minister McMahon dated 31st August, 1972.

Document B.15A—Copy of police reports on the United Croats of West Germany (U.H.Nj.).

Document B.16—Oath of the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood (H.R.B.).

Document B.17—The papers of Adolf Andric.

Document B.17A—Photographs of the pen bomb, Richmond Town Hall, 2nd September, 1967.

Document B.18—The Jure Maric papers of May, 1967.

Document B.19—Record of interview by Sgt. George of the Commonwealth Police with Jure Maric of 5th June, 1968.

Document B.20—The Jure Maric papers of August, 1972.

Document B.21—Record of interview by Sgt. Brown of the Commonwealth Police with Blaz Kraljevic on 8th August, 1972.

Document B.22—Map of part of Germany obtained at the premises of Pericic in August, 1972.

Document B.23—A news sheet entitled 'Report from Revolutionary Front'.

Document B.24—Letter from H.R.B. Europe to A.S.I.O. and letter relating thereto by A.S.I.O. to Department of Immigration.

Document B.25—Copy of a Commonwealth Police report upon \$300 being forwarded to Sweden from Mount Gambier, South Australia.

Document B.26—Copy of a memorandum from the Australian Embassy, Washington, to the Department of Foreign Affairs about the American government's attitude on Yugoslavia.

Document B.27—Photographs of bomb incident in Sydney on 16th September, 1972.

APPENDIX C

Document C.1—Publication entitled 'Ustasa', 1941-1971.

Document C.2—Publication entitled 'Pregled', March, 1972.

Document C.2A—Letter by A.S.I.O. dated 24th April, 1972 to the then Attorney-General.

Document C.3—Publication entitled 'Spremnost', August, 1972.

Document C.4—Publication entitled 'Uzdanica'.

Document C.5—Publication entitled 'Vjesnik'.

Document C.6—Publication entitled 'Hrvatska Drzava', February, 1973.

Document C.7—Publication entitled 'Obrana', January, 1973.

Document C.8—Publication entitled 'Hrvatska Borba'.

Document C.9—Publication entitled 'Osvit', February, 1973.

Document C.10—Publication entitled 'Kletva'.

Document C.11—Publication entitled 'Instructions for Croatians outside their Homeland'.

SUMMARY OF THE DOCUMENTS

The documents constitute evidence that Croatian terrorist organisations exist in Australia and have so existed for many years.

(i) Background to the Documents

2. These documents come out of a background that effectively commences in Australia in 1956, although Croatian organisations commenced in Australia as far back as 1950 with the arrival of the early Croatian migrants from the refugee camps of Europe.

In 1956 General Luburic, who had his headquarters in Spain, split away from the general organisation that was continued after 1945 by the Ustashi leader, Dr Ante Pavelic. General Luburic was interested in a more militant revolutionary organisation. Dr Pavelic was advancing in age and died in 1959. Dr Pavelic, in 1956, created the 'Croatian Liberation Movement' (H.O.P.) with its headquarters in Buenos Aires, Argentina, as a general world organisation to incorporate and co-ordinate the various other organisations and movements within it.

One of these organisations, controlled by the military office of the H.O.P., is the official 'Croatian Ustashi Movement'. General Luburic on the other hand, created the Croatian National Resistance (H.N.O.) with its headquarters in Madrid, Spain. This organisation has proved to be a marked inciter of militant revolution against the State of Yugoslavia throughout the world.

Here in Australia, the split between the two Ustashi world leaders was reflected by the establishment of the Croatian Liberation Movement (H.O.P.) Australian Branch. It has been led since its foundation in 1956 by Fabian Lovokovic.

In Victoria, Srecko Rover followed General Luburic and formed an Australian Branch of the Croatian National Resistance (H.N.O.). The H.O.P. in Sydney is linked directly to the Buenos Aires headquarters of the world organisation of H.O.P. The Melbourne Croatian National Resistance (H.N.O.) is linked to the Spanish headquarters of that organisation which produces 'Obrana'.

3. Upon the death of Dr Pavelic the World Presidency of the H.O.P. was taken by Dr Stjepan Hefer who remains the current World President. Although the official 'Croatian Ustashi Movement' is incorporated within the Croatian Liberation Movement (H.O.P.) which, as we have seen, was the creation of the war-time Ustashi leader, Dr Pavelic, there are a number of other groups which claim to be the true descendants, in revolutionary spirit, of the terrorist military Ustashi of Ante Pavelic. These groups include the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood (H.R.B.); the Croatian Illegal Revolutionary Organisation (H.I.R.O.) and the United Croats of West Germany. (U.H.Nj.) All of these organisations exist in Australia and evidence of this fact is contained in the annexed documents.

4. The secret terrorist organisation, the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood (H.R.B.) has been involved with the two armed terrorist raids into Yugoslavia in 1963 and 1972. The documents contain evidence that members of the H.R.B. were associated with the Croatian National Resistance (H.N.O.) and its Victorian leader, Srecko Rover.

5. There are two militant youth groups to which the documents annexed relate. The first is the Croa-

tian Youth (H.M.), which has had Jure Maric, at one time the Australian leader of the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood, associated with it. The second of the youth groups is the World League of Croatian Youth (S.H.U.M.S.), which is one of the organisations contained within the general body of the Croatian Liberation Movement (H.O.P.). These two youth organisations have been used as recruiting grounds for the smaller terrorist organisations.

(ii) Documents, Ministerial Statement, Correspondence and Special Reports by Commonwealth Police and ASIO

6. Document A1 is a copy of a statement made by Mr Menzies the then Prime Minister in the House of Representatives on 27 August 1964 which had been precipitated by a complaint by the Yugoslav Government to the Australian Government following the 1963 armed terrorist raid into Yugoslavia and the holding of a military style training camp near Wodonga, Victoria in 1963. Mr Menzies stated that the Commonwealth investigations:

'so far have not produced any evidence which would warrant legal proceedings'.

The emphasis of this statement seems to have been that investigations would be made of various organisations and where evidence:

'which would be receivable in a court of law' . . .

was obtained an

'appeal to the law'

would be made. In addition details of security investigations would not be made public.

7. Document A2 consists of a letter to Prime Minister Menzies from Dr Hefer, the World President of the Croatian Liberation Movement (H.O.P.) dated 24 August 1964 in Madrid and apparently received on 2 September 1964. Dr Hefer is the current World President of H.O.P. and in Document C1 of the publication 'Ustasa' there is a picture of him on page 15 speaking from a podium with the Ustashi symbol of the 'U' with the bomb inside it.

8. Document A3 is a letter by Sir Garfield Barwick as Minister for External Affairs to the Attorney General. In this letter Sir Garfield Barwick expressed his concern at the foreign policy implications of terrorist activities which:

'may embarrass our relations with other Governments'.

He also stated in the letter:

'I should like to suggest that ASIO should maintain some supervision over migrant groups (making no attempt to disguise its surveillance) and bring to your attention any activities which might be considered by them to contravene Sections 30A or 30C of the Crimes Act.'

9. Document A4 is a copy of a memorandum by the Attorney-General's Department dated 25th September 1964. The submission dealt with the question of prosecutions of a number of Croats including the late Father Romac of Sydney for offences against the Passports Act and the Aliens Act. Mr Snedden who was Attorney-General at that time made the following notation on the submission:

'There is a period of public quiescence at present. I would not want to see the whole issue revived by prosecutions which are not in themselves of great proportion . . . signed BMS'.

10. Documents A5 and A6 are Position Papers produced by ASIO in relation to Croatian organisations on 1st May 1967 and 1st October 1967. These Position Papers were available and indeed were forwarded to all appropriate ministers of the Government including the Attorney-General.

11. Document A7 is a report on the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood (H.R.B.) by the Crime Intelligence Bureau of the Commonwealth Police force dated 6th March 1968. This document sets out in clear terms the full structure of this Croatian terrorist organisation including the Oath and the manner in which it is taken as well as the troika and stozher militarist structure.

12. Document A8 is a letter dated 3rd December 1969 from Mr Lynch, when Minister for Immigration, addressed to the Attorney-General. In this letter Mr Lynch expressed his concern:

'at the likely serious consequences if Croat nationals in Australia are permitted to continue their terrorist activities and outrages against representatives of the Yugoslav Government and authority generally in this country'.

Mr Lynch further stated that:

'I have reason to believe that the terrorists are endeavouring to create the impression amongst Yugoslav migrants in Australia that the Croatian extremists have the support of significant sections of Australian society and even the government'.

13. Document A9 is a letter addressed to the Attorney-General by Mr McMahon when Minister for Foreign Affairs, pointing out that over the last few years there have been a number of incidents or attacks by extremist groups, especially against Yugoslav official missions in Australia. Mr McMahon stated that:

'the extremists themselves may by now have come to believe that they can act with impunity and that they can therefore, without risk to themselves, step up the level and frequency of violence'.

14. Document A10 is a report by the Commonwealth Police commenting upon the two above mentioned ministerial letters. The conclusions to this report contain the following statement:

'It is quite clear that Australian Croats are involved in an international conspiracy directed against the Tito Government of Yugoslavia and it seems that members of the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood will persist in their attempts to attack people and premises of the Yugoslav Government in Australia'.

15. Document A11 is a memorandum by ASIO to the Attorney-General's Department dated 12th February 1970. This memorandum contains ASIO's comments upon the two above mentioned ministerial letters.

16. Document A12 is a report dated 20th February 1970 by the Commonwealth Police at a conference held on 17th February 1970 between Commonwealth Police and ASIO in respect of the Note delivered by Ambassador Rolovic of Yugoslavia to the Australian Government.

17. Document A13 consists of a background brief circulated by ASIO and dated 2nd April 1971. The brief is entitled 'The Croatian National Resistance (H.N.O.)—Recent Developments'.

18. Document A14 is a copy of a memorandum from the Attorney-General's Department dated 10th

June 1972 to the Attorney-General then Senator Greenwood. The memorandum informs the Attorney-General that a new terrorist organisation calling itself the Croatian Illegal Revolutionary Organisation (H.I.R.O.) has been discovered in Victoria. The memorandum had a report of the Commonwealth Police attached to it as well as translations of the documents of the organisation. These documents include the constitution of this terrorist organisation fully set out in Document B.14.

19. Document A15 is a record of interview prepared by the then Attorney-General of his interview with the Yugoslav Ambassador on 19th July 1972. In the last paragraph of that record of interview Senator Greenwood records the following;

'I said that it was very difficult to have this knowledge of a person's intent before he left Australia.

Where there was some reason for believing that a person because of his statements, activities and associates could be presumed to be fostering terrorist activities the Government could act and I instanced the refusal of a passport to Srecko Rover'.

20. Document A16 is a copy of the press statement issued by the then Attorney-General dated 20th July 1972.

21. Document A17 is a copy of a press statement issued by the then Attorney-General dated 11th August 1972.

22. Document A18 is a copy of a memorandum by the Attorney-General's Department dated 4th July 1972 to the then Attorney-General. That memorandum dealt with the application for a passport by Jure Maric. Jure Maric is covered at length in Documents B18, B19 and B20. The memorandum of 4th July 1972 recommended to the then Attorney-General that:

'On balance our view is that this is a case in which the issue of a passport might properly be again refused.'

Both ASIO and the Commonwealth Police had recommended to the Department of Immigration against the issue of a passport to Maric. Despite these recommendations the Attorney-General was not in favour of refusing a passport to Maric. Nonetheless the Minister for Immigration did not grant the application.

23. Document A19 is a copy of a letter by the then Attorney-General dated 27th November 1972 to the Minister for Foreign Affairs Mr Bowen expressing disagreement with a proposed course of action by the Minister for Foreign Affairs in relation to Croats who had gone from Australia to visit Yugoslavia and had been detained by the Yugoslav authorities.

23. Document A20 consists of 2 letters by Senator Greenwood, when Attorney-General to the Minister for Immigration dated 29th June 1972 relating to a passport application by Josip Bogut and 12th November 1972 relating to the deportation of Marinic.

Croatian Liberation Movement (HOP) and the Croatian Ustashi Movement (UHRO)

24. The Constitution of the Croatian Liberation Movement, as revised and issued by Dr Hefer in Argentina in 1967, was printed for the Sydney HOP

at the Mintis Press, 117 Burwood Road, Belmore, New South Wales. It is contained, together with a translation, in document B1. This document refers in Article 1 to the 'Croatian Ustashi Movement' and in Article 14 provides in Item 5, for a 'Military Office'.

25. The Constitution of the official 'Croatian Ustashi Movement' within the HOP is set out in document B2. It is taken from the book entitled, 'Croatian Liberation Movement 1929-59' issued by the HOP on the occasion of 30 years existence of—USTASA Croatian Revolution Organisation (UHRO) 1959'. The document is a translation that was done by Constable First Class M. Russell of the Commonwealth Police Force in 1964. Attached with that document is a statement of the 17 articles of the Ustashi embodied in a document issued in Germany in 1970 by a 'Ustashi Satnik' (i.e. 'Ustashi Captain')—Ante Vukic, who is the current President of the European Branch of the United Croats of West Germany.

26. Documents B1 and B2 need to be related to document B3, containing correspondence between Josip Kovac of Canberra and Srecko Rover of Melbourne dated 14th and 21st July 1972, in which Kovac writes that Mr Les Shaw stated to a group of 12 people that Lovokovic 'admits that Ustashi exist in Australia and that he is their leader'. Copies of these letters were obtained by the Commonwealth Police from originals found in Rover's premises in the searches made under search warrant in August 1972. The letter of 21st July 1972 further reads, 'He (Lovokovic) admits that people are being trained and says that he is not responsible for it'. Mr Shaw said that everyone, including Mr Rover, had stated on television that 'there are no Ustashi in Australia. Lovokovic claims that there are'. The first letter of 14th July 1972 refers to certain persons re-establishing an organisation with 'only those who will join as Ustashi'. That letter also reads,

'He (Ante Kovac) says that our politicians have degraded the letter "U" and that he will have it rectified'.

27. The reference in these letters to 'politicians degrading the letter "U"', relates to document B4. This document contains a copy of a letter to Prime Minister McMahon by the Croatian Co-ordinative Committee of Victoria, dated 25th May 1972, complaining about the cancellation of Srecko Rover's passport and that the Australian Government is 'hampering Australian-Croatian politicians in exile'.

28. Document B5 contains a copy of a letter addressed to the Attorney-General (then Senator Greenwood), dated 23rd September 1972, from Ljubomir Vuina. Vuina in referring to the Ustashi said:

'In fact it is or was a body of people who resisted the Communist Government in Yugoslavia during the War and of course became an unpopular body with its Government. Violence is far removed from its concepts in this country'.

The writer of that letter is a former Colonel in what was the elite Black Legion of the Ustashi in the Hitler puppet regime of Croatia during the Second World War.

(The Black Legion was an elite part of the Ustashi Army similar to the German SS and had the concentration camps under its control.)

29. Document B6 (b) contains a copy of a record of interview on ABC television on 20 September 1972

with Fabian Lovokovic, the leader of HOP in Sydney and the man referred to in the correspondence in document B3. In that interview Lovokovic did not deny or refute that the Constitution of the Croatian Liberation Movement (HOP) contained a provision providing for a 'Military Office'.

30. Document B7 is a series of photographs taken at Wodonga, Victoria, during a training camp organised by the Croatian Liberation Movement (HOP) in 1963. A Unit of the Citizen Military Forces associated itself for reasons of public relations, with the training by these men of the Croatian Ustashi Movement within the HOP. The photographs show the heavy black 'U' of the Ustashi under the chess-board shield of Croatia with the letters 'HOP' over the top. These photographs corroborate the statements attributed to Lovokovic in the Kovac/Rover correspondence in document B3 for he was at the Wodonga training camp.

Croatian National Resistance (HNO)

31. The Constitution of the Australian Croatian National Resistance—Oceania, is set out in document B8. That document states that:

'We regard Yugoslavia and Yugoslavianism as the greatest and the only evil that has caused the existing calamity . . . Therefore we consider any direct or indirect help to Yugoslavia, Croatian national treason.'

Also included in this document is a report upon the General Assembly of the Croatian National Resistance in Australia of 18th October 1969. This Report refers to a world tour of Croatian Associations by Mr Srecko Rover including a visit to Spain 'on a matter of importance'. Reference is also made to fraternal greetings and 'thoughts' of officials and members of Croatian National Resistance in Europe, 'stressing the special importance and significance of our Associations in Sweden and Germany', as well as of members in Argentina and South America. This greeting also extends to the United States members.

32. A significant record of interview is contained in document B9. This is a record of an interview held on 16th February 1970 between Superintendent Milte, when a Commonwealth Police Officer, with Srecko Blaz Rover. In this interview, Rover at the outset attempted to forestall the interview by seeking Superintendent Milte to inquire of ASIO about Rover. Rover's words were, 'Why don't you 'phone ASIO first before you talk to me.' The record of interview shows where Rover stands on the question of terrorism and the overthrow of Yugoslavia by force and violence. When asked by Superintendent Milte how he and his people proposed to achieve their aims of a recognised state for Croatia, Rover replied:

'We will do it by any means possible.'

When Superintendent Milte asked him which organisation he belonged to in Australia, Rover stated, 'None, Sir. I was a member of the HOP but they expelled me because of my radical views.' When asked did he know Jure Maric, the Andric brothers, Ivica Kokic and Josip Senic, Rover replied:

'I know all these people. Andric was the person who made the pen bomb.'

The pen bomb referred to is the one that exploded at the Richmond Town Hall on 2nd September 1967 when a youth suffered grievous bodily harm. It was at a Yugoslav National Day.

When Superintendent Milte put to Rover that Father Kasic advocates violence to free Croatia from Yugoslav tyranny, Rover made the following statement:

'But this is alright because it is just, like Victoria wanting to govern in its own right from New South Wales.'

The most significant statement by Rover in this interview, which is a clear admission by him that he supports violence and terrorism is shown by the following:

'Milte said: How do you propose to overcome the present Yugoslav Government

He said: By similar means to that being used in Vietnam today.

Milte said: What do you mean?

He said: Your Government is trying to overthrow the North Vietnam Government by means of force and we intend to do the same in Yugoslavia. I will do anything in my power to assist them in achieving this aim.'

33. Document B10 contains irrefutable evidence of Srecko Rover's close personal involvement with terrorism including the armed terrorist raid made into Yugoslavia in June 1972. The evidence contained in these documents fully corroborates the statements made by Rover in the record of interview with Superintendent Milte on 16th February 1970, as set out in document B9. The papers in document B10 are translations and copies made from documents that were obtained by the Commonwealth Police under search warrant in August 1972. Other documents and articles were obtained from Rover at the same time. These included the following:

- (i) A Seal bearing the insignia of the Supreme Headquarters of the Croatian National Resistance and the Croatian Armed Forces (HOS);
- (ii) Ammunition for a fire-arm of a calibre the possession of which is illegal in Victoria;
- (iii) A list of names and addresses, overseas as well as local, of persons involved in Croatian organisations;
- (iv) Documents relating to the Conference of Croatian National Resistance held in Toronto early 1972, which indicate that Rover was elected at that Conference to the position of Deputy World Leader of HNO.
[It was while Rover was attending that Conference that his passport was cancelled.]
- (v) Documents relating to the instigation of guerrilla activity in Yugoslavia.

All original documents and articles that had been obtained under search warrants in August 1972 from Rover and other persons were returned to Rover and those persons in November 1972 as required by the then Attorney-General. Paper (a) of document B10 is an Intelligence Report (translation attached) from a 'Troika' terrorist group operating secretly in Australia. Paper (b) of document B10 is a copy of a map of Yugoslavia which marks a route into Yugoslavia to an area where the armed terrorist raiders of June 1972 were crushed in an armed skirmish with the military and security forces of Yugoslavia.

[The Croatian Armed Forces (HOS), the seal of which is in the possession of Srecko Rover and referred to above, was formed, according to ASIO, after 1945 and was the successor to the Ustasha Army. General Max Luburic was its world leader

and his successor was considered by ASIO to be Josip Bicsic. The organisation publishes a paper in Argentina entitled 'Hrvatska Gruda'.]

Srecko Rover has, in a past police interview, supplied the following information about himself:

He was born, Sarajevo, on 3rd February 1920 where he was educated to Matriculation standard and later attended the University of Zagreb, the capital of Croatia. He studied Electronic Engineering. However, he left University in 1943, having been called up to serve in the Second Bojna Ustaske Vojnice (i.e. Second Battalion, Ustashi Armed Forces). He joined as a Private and in June 1944 was promoted to commission rank of Lieutenant. He served in Armoured Units in Sarajevo in the First Ustaski Zdrug (i.e. Brigade), ready to repel any Allied landing that might take place on the Adriatic Coast by the Western Allies. In 1945, on the downfall of the Axis powers, Rover went to refugee camps in Italy and Austria and in the next few years was involved in several guerrilla terrorist raids into Yugoslavia. In 1950 he migrated to Australia and has ceaselessly pursued the aims of organising the overthrow by force and violence the State of Yugoslavia.

34. Document B11 is a letter signed by Srecko Rover to the Governor-General dated 20th October 1972, with a covering letter to Senator Greenwood, the then Attorney-General, complaining about the visit of Her Majesty the Queen to Yugoslavia. This document needs to be seen in the light of document B4 which refers to Srecko Rover as being an 'Australian-Croatian politician-in-exile'.

Croatian Youth (H.M.)

35. Document B12 contains an extract from the Croatian Youth Journal, 'UZDANICA' of the May 1965 edition. A translation is attached. It sets out the aims and objects of Croatian Youth (H.M.) as embodied in a Resolution carried at the Foundation Meeting of the organisation on 28th March 1965. In Article 1 it states:

'We do not recognise any Yugoslavia, Monarchist or Communist, and we will fight against her by the use of all means of total destruction. . . .'

Article 3 states:

'We remain loyal to the ideas and principles underlying the Croatian Right of State Party . . . as well as to the principles of the Croatian Ustashi Movement of Dr Ante Pavelic, the Poglavnik.'

World League of Croatian Youth (S.H.U.M.S.)

36. Document B13 contains the text setting out the principles upon which the World League of Croatian Youth (S.H.U.M.S.) is based. Translations are attached. The document also contains application forms and the form of Oath required to be taken by its members. The originals of these documents were obtained by the Victoria Police Force, together with the documents relating to the Croatian Illegal Revolutionary Organisation (H.I.R.O.) that were found with the cache of arms and ammunition in the Warburton Mountains in Victoria in May-June 1972. This organisation is referred to in document B1 as it is a youth organisation within the Croatian Liberation Movement (H.O.P.) and there is an express provision relating to it in the Constitution of H.O.P.

Croatian Illegal Revolutionary Organisation (H.I.R.O.) and Croatian Revolutionary Army (H.R.V.)

37. Document B14 contains the Constitution of the Croatian Illegal Revolutionary Organisation (H.I.R.O.) which claims to have been made at the Ustashi Supreme Headquarters in 1972. A translation is attached. It also contains stationery headed 'Croatian Revolutionary Army' (H.R.V.). The originals of these papers were obtained by the Victoria Police Force as the result of searches in the Warburton Mountains of Victoria where a cache of arms and ammunition was found in a training area in the bush. The leaders involved in this organisation have been prosecuted by the Victoria Police and the transcript of the committal proceedings against them is attached to document B14. The Constitution of H.I.R.O. provides: 'A Chemical Branch for bomb and explosion production is to be formed'. It also provides:

'A militia is to be formed in any case; they are to be given military training and preparations for their arming are to be made:

Further:

'The Supreme Stozer will open special training schools for terrorism and for all 'activist' activities on assassinations, raids, sabotage, arson, etc.'

Joint Committee of Croatian Organisation in New South Wales

38. Document B15 is a copy of a letter by the Joint Committee of Croatian Organisations in New South Wales to Prime Minister McMahon dated 31st August 1972, complaining about searches made on the premises of certain Croatians. The letter contained a printed sidenote with the names of the following organisations:

- (a) The Croatian Liberation Movement (HOP);
- (b) The Croatian National Resistance (HNO);
- (c) The Croatian Country Club; and
- (d) The United Croats (UHNJ)

The document is clear evidence of the unification which had been achieved in 1972 of all the militant and extremist Croatian organisations. The United Croats (UHNJ) has its associations overseas, as with HOP and HNO, and is a terrorist organisation. The United Croats is an organisation based directly on Ustashi principles and methods of operation. This is shown in document B2. Press reports on State Police proceedings in New South Wales and Commonwealth Police reports on this terrorist organisation are contained in document B15A. That document contains the criminal record of the Australian leader of the United Croats of West Germany as well as a full statement of the structure of this terrorist organisation.

Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood (HRB)

39. Document B16 contains the Oath of the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood. A translation is attached. The oath is taken at a ceremony before a black draped table on which is placed a rifle, dagger, crucifix and two candles. The rifle and dagger are in a crossed position. The oath is in the following form:

'I swear by Almighty God and things that are most sacred to me (or 'by all the Saints') to fight, until the end of my life, for the liberty and sovereignty of the Croatian People. By voluntarily joining the ranks of the Croatian Revolutionary Brother-

hood, I pledge myself to obey and carry out without demur any orders and instructions, given me and to serve loyally the Brotherhood's Revolutionary Principles.

I pledge myself to keep any secrets entrusted to me and not to disclose anything that might damage the interest of the Brotherhood and of the Croatian People.

If I offend against this Oath and the Brotherhoods Revolutionary Principles, my penalty under the organisation's laws, shall be death.

So help me God.'

40. Document B17 contains a series of papers that were obtained by the Commonwealth Police under search warrant at the premises of Adolf Andric, in 1966, in Geelong, Victoria. Translations for each of the papers are attached, together with a record of an interview by Sergeant E. H. George of the Commonwealth Police with Adolf Andric on 21st June 1966. Adolf Andric is very important in that he was an active terrorist member of this terrorist organisation while he was in Australia. After returning to Europe in 1969 he carried on his terrorist activities and maintained his association with other Croatians in Australia. Adolf Andric was a leader with his brother Ambroz, of the armed terrorist raiding party which entered Yugoslavia in June 1972. Many of the members of that raiding party had been recruited in Australia. Adolf Andric was an industrial chemist having had technical training in this trade in Yugoslavia before migrating to Australia. Many of the papers in document B17 indicate considerable experimentation in relation to poisons, explosives and bombs. These documents portray a picture of terrorist planning that is almost beyond comprehension. Several of the papers set out the fundamental principles of HRB. They also evidence a close association of other important members of the Croatian community with Adolf Andric. This is especially so in the case of Tomislav Lesic and Jure Maric.

41. Document B17A consists of four photographs of the pen bombs and the scene of the washroom where it exploded in the Richmond Town Hall on 2nd September 1967. Rover informed Superintendent Milte in the interview recorded in document 9, that Ambroz Andric, the brother of Adolf Andric, made the pen bomb.

42. Document B18 consists of a series of papers that were obtained by the Commonwealth Police under search warrant at the premises of Jure Maric in May 1967 in Wollongong, New South Wales. These papers are a few of the many that were obtained from Jure Maric's premises at that time and they are all of a similar nature. Translations are attached to each of the papers contained in document B18. They portray a picture of a tightly-knit, well-disciplined secret militarist structure. One of the series (000290) of papers in document B18 is headed as follows:

'Croatian National Resistance 'SUD' Armed Forces Headquarters

25th March 1964

Top Secret

Operation area 8

To gentlemen Croatian Officers, NCOs and Soldiers.

Top Secret'

Document B8 to B11 already set out the evidence in respect of Croatian National Resistance and that it is led in Australia by Srecko Rover, who, as

already stated, possesses the seal of the Croatian Armed Forces (HOS). Another document in the series in document B18 contains a copy of the print from the seal containing the insignia of the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood. Bound in a red folder contained in document B18 is the Croatian text, together with a translation, of a Handbook or Manual of Croatian Revolution.

43. Document B19 is a record of an interview by Sergeant E. H. George of the Commonwealth Police with Jure Maric on 5th June 1968. The interview was based on the papers that had been obtained under search warrant in 1967, some of which are contained in document B18. Jure Maric was the leader at that time of the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood in Australia.

44. Document B20 contains papers that were obtained by the Commonwealth Police from the premises of Jure Maric in August 1972. These documents show that Jure Maric was still involved with terrorist activities in 1972. The original with translations and clear diagrams of the organisation structure of a terrorist group with its associated Troikas is clearly seen in these documents. This series of papers contain copies of bank and receipt documents evidencing the fact that Jure Maric had sent money to Paul Vegar in Europe. Paul Vegar was one of the Australian naturalised Croatians who took part in the armed terrorist raid into Yugoslavia under the Andric brothers in June 1972.

45. These papers contained close-up maps of a special area of Yugoslavia and an accompanying letter referring to the maps and events that were planned to take place in a town called Severin that is detailed on the maps. These maps and correspondence are associated with the armed raid into Yugoslavia in June 1972. One of the letters refers to the fact that the 'financial resources of the organisation which we took with us from Victoria as well as those received later, have now been used up'. The letter goes on to speak of the organisation bearing the burden from Australia and also refers to the Australian organisation. That letter also refers to the HRB. There is a sheet in Maric's papers accompanied by a translation with the number '1382' on it, which is a statement of a constitution for units within the HRB. The diagram is an illustration of an HRB unit.

46. Document B21 is a record of an interview by Sergeant Brown of the Commonwealth Police with Blaz Kraljevic on 8th August 1972. Kraljevic relates how he was recruited to take part in the armed terrorist raid into Yugoslavia of June 1972, and how Lovric and Glavas were also recruited for that raid. Lovric and Glavas took part in the raid. Kraljevic missed joining the group in Germany-Austria, due to his arrest for liquor offences in Victoria. Another Croatian named Zdenko Marincic who was associated with Kraljevic, left Australia at that time, but was turned back by German police at Frankfurt-on-Main. Upon his return to Mascot Airport he was arrested, charged and convicted of having unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm—a rifle and four silencers secreted in a toy koala bear. He was sentenced to nine (9) months imprisonment. Although an alien he was not deported.

47. Document B22 is a copy of a map of part of Germany that was obtained by the Commonwealth Police under a search warrant at the premises of Pericic in August 1972. Although Pericic's passport

had no marking on it, airline tickets and other documents evidence that he had travelled in Europe in May/June 1972. The terrorist raid into Yugoslavia in June 1972 was mounted from Germany and Austria. This can be related to the document that contained a record of an interview between Superintendent Milte and Rover in which Rover stated that persons would be sent through Germany to fight in Yugoslavia. The evidence contained in Document 20 of Maric sending money to Vegar in Europe can be related to the statements made by Tomislav Lesic on the ABC television on 19th September 1972, and contained in document 6 (a). In that interview Lesic stated that funds were sent to guerrilla fighters in Europe and Croatia.

48. Document B23 is a news-sheet entitled 'Report from Revolutionary Front'. A translation is attached. This report indicates that it is produced by the H.R.B. It relates to the terrorist raid into Yugoslavia in June 1972.

49. Document B24 is a copy of a letter from the Deputy for External Affairs, Headquarters of the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood, Europe, addressed to the Regional Director for Victoria of A.S.I.O. There is also a copy of a letter by A.S.I.O. to the Department of Immigration relating to an H.R.B. proposal to allow a group of 15 of their members to leave Australia.

Funds to Sweden

50. Document B25 is a copy of a report by the Commonwealth Police dated 7 March 1972, relating to \$300 forwarded from Mount Gambier, South Australia, by bank draft to Goteborg, Sweden, to aid Croatian extremists in Sweden.

Attitude of the United States Government

51. Document B26 is a copy of a memorandum No. 2205/72 dated 31 July 1972, to the Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs, from the Counsellor of the Australian Embassy, Washington, D.C. That memorandum states that the attitude of the United States Government is that the United States would gain nothing and lose much if Yugoslavia were to break-up or be weakened by internal divisions and separatism, particularly if such developments were encouraged or promoted from abroad. It also states that in recent years the United States Administration had been concerned to chip away at the roots of the Croatian extremist strength in the United States.

Photographs of bomb incident, Sydney, 16 September 1972

52. Document B27 consists of photographs of the bomb incident in Sydney on 16 September 1971.

PUBLICATIONS

53. A range of Croatian extremist publications is produced in Australia and overseas with distribution in Australia.

54. All these publications are a source of incitement to and encouragement of violence and terrorism.

'USTASA', (JUBILEE), 10 April, 1941-1971 edition. Page 38 carries a poem by Venco, AUSTRALIA, titled 'TO CROATIA'.

'Oh my beloved Homeland, turned into a dungeon,
Thy children's innocent blood continues to flow
Because of their Croatian name.

Today thou enjoyest neither freedom nor justice,
With the symbols of thine old fame defaced,
With the soulless foe trampling thee underfoot.
But not so forever, for the Croatian fighters,

The creators of another Tenth of April will rise,
And a dawn of freedom shall yet be born for
Croatia.

Au revoir, oh my ancestors' cradle,
My brothers and sisters, my sea, my clefts dales
and my hills,

Au revoir, for the hour is nigh.
A new generation has arisen from the graves of
thy martyrs,

Woven from the fibres of sacrifice and permeated
with love

For thee, oh my Homeland of knights.

Ustasi Private Soldier. C.1

'PREGLED' (REVIEW), March, 1972, Page 17 carries a picture titled 'ON THE EVE OF CROATIAN REVOLUTION' and showing perched in a tree a sniper with his rifle at the ready. The caption says, 'HAVE A LOOK AT THE ABOVE PICTURE'. 'SPRINGTIDE IS APPROACHING IN PRENJ AND PAPUK MOUNTAINS (Translator's note—two mountain ranges suitable for guerrilla operations). LONG LIVE THE YOUTHFUL SPIRIT OF CROATIAN REVOLUTION'.

The Director-General of A.S.I.O. wrote on 24 April 1972 to the Attorney-General (Senator Greenwood) enclosing copies of translated articles and commented that the Attorney may 'wish to examine' (the articles) 'in the light of the Crimes Act'.

'SPREMNOST' (READINESS), August, 1972, front page. Under the title of 'THEY HAVE DIED FOR CROATIA', the paper lists the nineteen participants in the incursion into Yugoslavia saying that 'WE MUST ALL AGREE' THAT THEY HAVE GIVEN THEIR LIVES FOR CROATIA.

'UZDANICA' (MAINSTAY), No. 1, 1972 Page 1. It carries an article signed by 'T. S.' and titled 'OUR ANGLE ON BUGOJNO', which identifies its readers with the terrorists taking part in the June, 1972 raid in BOSNIA, YUGOSLAVIA. Page 13 carries an article by 'STEF' and titled 'A CROATIAN DEATH MORE HONOURABLE THAN LIFE' dealing with Dr Jelic's death copied from the 'CROATIAN STRUGGLE'. It contains another article headed 'THE REVOLUTIONARIES' BREAD IS COVERED IN BLOOD', signed by 'BUKO', which praises the June, 1972 raiders.

'VJESNIK' (CHRONICLE) OF THE CROATIAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT H.O.P., in Canberra, July, 1972. Page 7 carries an anonymous article headed 'WE HAVE FOUND THE ANTI-VENOM TO SERBO-COMMUNIST VENOM'. The article praises the Ustashi movement and its aims. Its conclusion calls on Croatians to answer the call of duty, their motto being 'A PAINFUL WOUND CAN BE TREATED ONLY WITH AN EVEN MORE PAINFUL MEDICINE'.

'HRVATSKA DRZAVA' (CROATIAN STATE) February, 1973. Page 8 carries an article by Ivan JELIC headed 'SPEAKING FRANKLY', which calls for the establishment of a Croatian government in exile, to include the best, most able and most resolute exiled Croatians who will 'COORDINATE OUR STRUGGLE' AND LEAD IT ALONG THE MOST EFFECTIVE LINE SO THAT 'THE WORD "STRUGGLE" WILL ASSUME ITS TRUE MEANING'.

'OBRANA' (DEFENCE), January, 1973. The paper front-pages a picture of GENERAL LUBURIC in a dress uniform, complete with the Nazi decoration of a Knight's Cross. Pages 4 and 5 carry Swedish press comment on the September 1972 airliner hijacking. The Swedish papers quoted from are picked in a manner presenting the hijackers in a most favourable light, behaving like perfect gentlemen throughout the episode. The article's purpose of praising the hijackers is transparent. Page 9 carries extracts from the text of a leaflet received by the paper from Cleveland, U.S.A., titled 'A PROCLAMATION TO THE SERBIAN PEOPLE' and signed by the 'UNION OF SERBIANS AT HOME AND ABROAD'. The extracts call ON THE SERBIAN FIGHTERS TO FOLLOW THE CROATIAN PATRIOTS' EXAMPLE OF MURDERING YUGOSLAV AGENTS AND HIJACKING AND BRINGING DOWN AIRCRAFT. WITH CHRISTMAS APPROACHING, 'LET US BARE OUR TEETH AT THE YUGOSLAVS! WRECK TITO'S EMBASSIES AND CONSULATES!' The text purports to use the Serbian variant of the Serbo-Croat language. But its grammar, style and terminology are such as could never have been used even by a simple Serbian. The 'PROCLAMATION' is a transparent plant, most probably composed by a Croatian born or at least educated in ZAGREB.

'HRVATSKA BORBA' (CROATIAN STRUGGLE). It has a routine Croatian extremist inflammatory approach.

'OSVIT' (DAWN) CROATIAN WEEKLY, No. 69, 14.2.1973, front pages under the title of 'THE TRUTH ABOUT THE ANDRIC BROTHERS', its reporter's interview of 'a person who does not wish to disclose his name for personal reasons'. The paper goes on to say that it does not 'belong to any political party and, as such, does not engage in politics'. Its only desire is to 'write for and inform the Croatian people of developments both inside the country and outside'. Stating that it will follow its regular practice of not commenting on any political articles, the paper adds that what it wishes to serve is 'the interest of the Croatian people and their freedom'.

The interview itself is most strongly pro-Andric-brothers.

The end of the interview makes it clear that the paper has the interviewed person's full name and address.

'KLETVA' (CURSE), a roneoed booklet circulating in the Croatian community. It is a manual for revolutionary armed forces and irregulars. It includes chapters on the general REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION, SABOTAGE, INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, SECURITY SERVICE, PROPAGANDA SERVICE, REVOLUTIONARY COURTS, GUERRILLA WARFARE and on REGULAR ARMED FORCES, complete with diagrams on basic army units. 'INSTRUCTIONS FOR CROATIANS OUTSIDE THEIR HOMELAND' an openly H.R.B. leaflet signed by the CROATIA'S NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT and circulating of late in the Croatian community. It opens by calling on the Croatians abroad to wreck Yugoslav embassies and consulates, and to kill Yugoslav diplomatic representatives. The leaflet is highly inflammatory.

Senator MURPHY—I move:

That the Senate take note of the statement.

Senator WITHERS (Western Australia—Leader of the Opposition) (4.3)—At this stage I shall speak briefly to the motion that the Senate take note of the statement. The Senate will appreciate that a paper which has taken about an hour to put down and which has been supported by a large number of documents cannot be considered immediately by the Opposition. Therefore we will seek to adjourn the debate on the motion which has been moved by Senator Murphy. Before we do so I think that a few comments may be in order. Today we have listened to Senator Murphy's statement, which, as I have said, occupied almost an hour. It has been delivered in an almost theatrical atmosphere. I suppose the honourable senator ought to be pleased that he had a full house. I am only pleased that people have not paid to come otherwise they would be asking for their money back because they must have been disappointed at what the statement contained. I thought that after the raid on Friday, 16th March—

Senator Wilkinson—Visit.

Senator WITHERS—I used the word 'raid'. One would have thought that that would have been adverted to somewhere in the statement. But the most that can be said is that it was dismissed in 2 minor paragraphs on page 28 of a 30-page document. All we have listened to this afternoon has been a reiteration of statements about a reign of terror—most of which we have heard time and time again. One would have thought that Senator Murphy would have at least attempted to justify his actions of the last 12 days and not make the statement which he made this afternoon. One is left with the impression that all that Senator Murphy has attempted to achieve is a state of tension, and it is a state of tension which is often brought about by the continual presence of police. We have heard of threats of death, threats of bombings, threats of bombs in the Senate and of bullet proof g'ass. What happened here today? We heard nothing at all about those things. All I can say, Mr President, is that Senator Murphy has deliberately not attempted to answer the question before the Senate: Why did he destroy the Australian

Security Intelligence Organisation? Why did he run away from speaking about the subject today? That is why we thought it would be far better to wait and see what this great statement was all about before proceeding to question time. Question time will be called on shortly and we will then be in a position to ask questions in order to try to fill in the gaps, because gaps do exist and they ought not to exist. Rather than spend some 60 minutes in this place trying to destroy his predecessor in office as Attorney-General it would have been far better for Senator Murphy to justify his own actions over the last 12 days, which have put the total security of this nation at risk. As I said earlier, I think the Senate ought to come back to the paper at a later stage and therefore I ask for leave to continue my remarks.

Leave granted; debate adjourned.

PERSONAL EXPLANATION

Senator GREENWOOD (Victoria)—Mr President, I claim to have been personally misrepresented and I seek leave to make a statement.

The PRESIDENT—Is leave granted? There being no objection, leave is granted.

Senator GREENWOOD—I have listened for the greater part of an hour to what I regard as not an exposure, not an identification of terrorist individuals or organisations in this country but what I have interpreted as a challenge to my integrity, a challenge to my honesty and a challenge to the bona fides with which I discharged the office of Attorney-General last year. It accords with what was forecast in Press statements. I propose to reply not today but in due course and in detail, chapter and verse, in the course of the debate, because I have been subjected to a monstrous vilification in which truth has played virtually no part. I have sat here—

Government senators interjecting.

The PRESIDENT—Order! I will not have this Senate governed by a claque on the back bench either on my right or on my left.

Senator GREENWOOD—I have sat here and I have listened to and I have read excerpts of things I have said taken completely out of context and not put in the balance which an objective examination of what has been occurring would require. It will take

APPENDIX 1C

MINISTERIAL STATEMENT – GREENWOOD

Australia, Senate, *Parliamentary Debates*, No.S.14, 1973, 798-807.

Senator Withers be entitled to speak in the debate, in effect, as though he had not yet spoken.

Senator Withers—I would be agreeable to that course if all other honourable senators agree.

The PRESIDENT—What does Senator Drake-Brockman say on the matter?

Senator Drake-Brockman—I am glad that we have been brought into it. On behalf of the Australian Country Party, I agree.

Senator MURPHY—Would Senator Gair indicate whether he concurs with the proposal?

Senator Gair—I would hate to disturb the harmony that appears to exist. I have no objection to that procedure.

Senator Negus—On behalf of myself and the independent senators, I state that we agree.

Senator MURPHY—May it be taken that by general concurrence this will be the course of the proceedings?

The PRESIDENT—Is there any objection? There being no objection, leave is granted for this course to be followed.

Motion—by leave—withdrawn.

CROATIAN TERRORISM

Ministerial Statement

Debate resumed from 27 March (vide page 547), on motion by Senator Murphy:

That the Senate take note of the statement.

Senator GREENWOOD (Victoria) (3.7)—The Attorney-General (Senator Murphy) said last week that he would inform the Senate and the people of Australia of the facts—the facts of organised Croatian terrorism in Australia. He has not done so. What he has done has been to choose his target, select his facts and give those chosen by him and those only to the Senate and to the nation. What he has done in the name of the truth has been to accuse some, to judge some, to vilify some, and to deceive all the people of Australia. He has done this by concealing the truth; not by exposing it. If the facts did not support his beliefs, then he ignored and suppressed those facts. What he has done has disgraced his office. As the Attorney-General of the Commonwealth he claimed to be giving the facts on a serious matter of whether or not there are terrorist activities and terrorist organisations in this country. But he has

ignored what is relevant, concealed what is inconvenient and refused to table all the documents which would enable people to find out where the truth lies. The truth has not been told and the reason that the truth has not been told has been because the Attorney-General has chosen not to do so.

He stated that there are terrorist organisations in Australia. He has named certain organisations. But who are their members, what are their activities, what have they done? What is there to justify his claim? Where is the substantiation? Where indeed, is the credible evidence? What does the Attorney-General say? He says that the evidence is in the documents that he piles on the table of the Senate—some 2,000 or more pages of documents. For what purpose? Is it to allow the assumption to be made: 'Well, if there are 2,000 pages there must be something'? But he does not identify what he relies on as evidence. Above all else, he has refused to prosecute anybody or any organisation for any criminal activity of any kind. Nor has he said that he will prosecute—if indeed, in the prejudiced atmosphere he has created, any person he has named could expect a fair trial before a jury.

Senator Murphy claims that there is overwhelming evidence, incontestable evidence, of his allegation of terrorist organisations in this country. There are laws—in the Commonwealth Crimes Act—under which he can prosecute persons and apply to the courts to declare such organisations to be unlawful. Persons who cause death, injury and terror by exploding bombs are terrorists and liable to the full rigours of our criminal law. It is not only persons who commit the crimes but persons who conspire to commit crimes or who attempt to commit crimes who can be prosecuted. The laws exist, the offences exist, the determination to stamp out political terrorism is asserted—and yet there are no applications to the courts. It is inconceivable that if there is evidence of organised terrorism there should be no prosecutions. And, naturally what we are concerned about are not prosecutions of individuals following police raids and arrests since the Attorney-General made his statement last week. We are concerned to challenge and deny the Attorney-General's assertions that last year the evidence was available in abundance to support prosecutions. Why, if the evidence is there, have there been no prosecutions? No reason is

given. The fact is—it must be—that there is no evidence which would enable prosecutions. There is no credible evidence to support the allegations. This is what the Commonwealth Police, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation and the Attorney-General's Department of the Commonwealth confirmed to me and what the documents the Attorney-General concealed and the facts he withheld plainly disclose.

The Attorney-General had an abundance of material available to him. What he chose not to reveal is revealing. I have a document, received from ASIO last year and dated 13th April 1972, which Senator Murphy has available to him and which he has not tabled. And what does it say? It expressed, in 11 closely argued pages, that it is difficult not to believe that the majority of violent incidents involving Yugoslavs in Australia:

—if they are indeed the work of Croatian nationalists—must also be the result of activity by isolated individuals or very small groups. Certainly the incidents themselves have been of a type not requiring organisational support, but rather, limited ingenuity on the behalf of an individual to obtain explosives and construct a simple detonating mechanism.

Did Senator Murphy refer to this statement? Did he table this document? He did not. The document concluded:

that while there were grounds for presuming that the Croatian nationalist organisations as entities are unlikely to be involved in such violence in Australia, a more probable explanation lies in the activities of individuals and small groups acting independently without organisational support.

I shall table the document and I challenge the Attorney-General. Why did he not table it? Why did he make no reference to its conclusions?

Senator Murphy denied that there was basis for my assessment that there was no credible evidence of the existence in Australia of Croatian revolutionary terrorist organisations. He said that at the time I made those statements they were untrue. But what are the facts? What was the statement I had made? I had said on 20th July 1972:

Investigations by the Commonwealth Police so far have not revealed any credible evidence that any Croatian revolutionary terrorist organisation exists in Australia. The Government cannot positively reject assertions that individuals or groups of individuals may be engaging in terrorist activities directed in some way to achieving Croatian independence.

Allegations of such activities and other matters are frequently brought to the notice of the police and these are subject to continuous investigation. If investigations disclose such activities, the persons so engaged will be prosecuted if their activities are in breach of the law.

This statement, which Senator Murphy describes in effect as a lie, I made as Attorney-General. I made it responsibly. It is not a lie, in fact or in effect. I made it after consideration of the recommendations, the factual material, the reports and the relevant information which had been supplied to me. The responsibility for the statement naturally is and must be mine, but it was made as a considered statement of the position as I and the agencies of the Commonwealth for whom I was responsible knew it.

A further document from ASIO, undated, which Senator Murphy did not table, was an initial assessment after the bomb explosions which occurred in Melbourne in April 1972 and which I received about that time. The document stated:

However, even if it can be shown that within the Croatian nationalist organisations there are some individuals with a propensity to violence this would provide insufficient grounds for general condemnation of the organisations when there is no evidence to indicate that bomb attacks are other than the violent expressions of individual extremists.

If requested I shall table the document. These assessments are entirely consistent with the view that is to be found in the documents, which Senator Murphy was prepared to table, of what was said in 1971.

I note, for example, from those tabled documents, that on 2nd February, 1971 the Director-General of Security stated:

It should be understood that, so far, evidence is lacking that any of the bomb attacks on Yugoslav establishments have been planned by specific organisations, rather than by individual extremists. The detection of individuals, or small isolated groups, is obviously a more difficult matter than the penetration of established organisations.

I note also that at the conference attended on 20th February 1971 to deal with co-operation between the Commonwealth Police and ASIO the Commissioner of Commonwealth Police reported to the Secretary of the Attorney-General's Department that the recent acts of violence were discussed and that:

. . . the indications were that Croatians were involved but whether this was as the result of activity and control by Croat organisations was not clear.

It was also said that:

. . . evidence is lacking that bombings etc. have been the work of organisations but may be the work of small groups which are not integrated.

It is obvious that the ASIO and the Commonwealth Police assessments of 1971 still remained the same in 1972. Why did the Attorney-General not table those documents I

received in 1972? They do not support his elaborate thesis but why should they not be revealed?

Senator Murphy claimed that there was an irresponsible indifference to information available, but he makes this charge only on the basis of that information which he regards as relevant for the Senate and the people of Australia to have. It may be clever politics but it is unworthy of the principal law officer of the Commonwealth. I was consistently receiving submissions from the Police, from ASIO and from the Attorney-General's Department on the whole question of terrorism. Senator Murphy referred to the aide-memoire from the Yugoslav Government and the allegations about the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood. But, again, what are the facts? I received a departmental submission on 18th August 1972 which stated:

The reports by ASIO to the Department of Foreign Affairs dated 24th March 1970 and to this Department dated 15th August 1972 both indicate that, in ASIO's view and that of 'the relevant law enforcement agencies' no evidence has been found to support the Yugoslav contention of 1970 that the groups gathered round the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood were still in existence in this country, and were operating on a scale comparable with pre-1963 activities.

If requested I shall table this document. Will the Attorney-General say why he declined to put this material before the Senate and the people of Australia?

The aide-memoire contained numerous allegations. Persistent among the allegations in the document were the assertions that terrorist training by terrorist groups was taking place in Australia. Senator Murphy claimed that what he called a bland interim reply was given on 20th October to the Yugoslav Government which maintained that the matter was still being investigated but made no admission of the presence of terrorist organisations in our midst. It was this which, subsequently, the Prime Minister (Mr Whitlam) has stigmatised as a lie.

But how could the reply say anything else in the light of the facts? Senator Murphy chose to withhold the facts. What are the facts? All the detailed aide-memoire allegations were being investigated. Searches of homes had taken place. I was constantly being informed that documents seized—and nothing other than documents had been found by the Commonwealth Police in these searches—were awaiting translation. I would

be kept informed. But the final report apparently was not available until 23rd November—by which time, because of the dissolution of Parliament, I had ceased to receive any reports or submissions from the Commonwealth Police. One of the last Commonwealth Police documents I received was a submission from the Commissioner of Commonwealth Police dated 19th October 1972. It said:

From time to time, allegations have been made by both the Yugoslav Government and various groups in Australia that clandestine training is being given to Croatian 'terrorists' in this country prior to their returning to Europe to carry out guerilla activity against the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY). All such allegations have been scrupulously investigated but to date no viable evidence at all has been uncovered to support the contention that Croatian terrorists have been trained in Australia.

I shall table this document. Surely this is highly relevant. It was the day before the reply was given to the Yugoslav Government. Why did not Senator Murphy choose to make this information available? The Commonwealth Police had reported to the Attorney-General's Department on 17th August 1972. At that stage they had before them the aide-memoire which had been presented by the Yugoslav Ambassador on 16th August. Senator Murphy has placed reliance upon this aide-memoire and drawn certain conclusions from it. But his conclusions are based on the same tactic, of selecting what he wants and ignoring what is to the contrary or is inconvenient, as characterises his whole statement.

What are the facts? What are the matters Senator Murphy withholds? First he refers extensively to the police report of 23rd November which he has tabled and which represented, apparently, the final conclusions of the Commonwealth Police. It is a document never produced to me and he would know this. And yet he attempts to build a case on the assumption that it was material known to and in the hands of the previous Government. Second, he tables the Commonwealth Police report dated 17th August 1972 which, of course, was stated by the police to be a preliminary study. He refers to one sentence only—that it, namely the aide-memoire, does contain a core of almost irrebuttable fact.

But what was the core of irrebuttable fact? The Commonwealth police did not expressly say what that core of irrebuttable fact con-

sisted of. Nor does Senator Murphy. I shall refer to what it might be at a later stage. Third, what the report did say was:

For the first time we have been given clear evidence that the Yugoslav authorities have been making a detailed study of leading Croatian nationalist figures in Australia and that they may well be in possession of credible evidence which would support their allegations. Whilst we would disagree at this juncture with some specific aspects of their claims, particularly in relation to the links between HRB and HIRO, basically they seem to have evidence pointing towards the existence of a Croatian terrorist organisation in Australia.

The evidence referred to consisted of what was alleged by the Yugoslav Government. It had to be tested by investigation. As the report said, they may well be in possession of credible evidence which would support their allegations. The report expressed serious concern on what the material in the aide-memoire contained about the possible existence of a clandestine terrorist organisation in Australia.

It is proper and only fair to consider what the 5 pages of the police report of 17th August indicated. What was the core of irrefutable fact? Surely it was, as a study of the report discloses, that there had been a raid, an unlawful incursion, by persons intending violence, into Yugoslavia. Some of these persons came from Australia. They had links with Australia. The report stated:

Attacks have taken place on Yugoslav missions without detection of the culprits.

That is fact—irrefutable fact—but in the light of the many reservations and qualifications the report contains it is difficult to see what other irrefutable fact, relating to Australia, is referred to. As I have indicated, Senator Murphy did not specify what it referred to.

But the balance of the report, which was tabled in the Senate, on a day subsequent to the making of Senator Murphy's statement, indicates that, until investigations were made, the claims of the Yugoslav Government could not be the subject of more than initial comment. For example, the report says: 'We are not in a position to comment on the veracity of all the claims'. That was relating to allegations of Australian involvement in organisation and training of terrorist groups. It says: 'Until detailed substantiating evidence is provided'. That was relating to individuals' alleged involvement in particular acts. The report states: 'This Force has been unable to obtain evidence to support a prosecution of

either the movement'—Croatian National Resistance—'or Rover'. It also states: 'We are not yet in possession of evidence', to support alleged assessments of individuals. Further the report says: 'The names and premises . . . are the subject of current investigation'. Then it says: 'We are unable to obtain any credible evidence to support these allegations'. They related to training and terrorist groups. The report also states: 'Police have been unable to obtain formal complaints from witnesses who would testify in Court'. That was referring to allegations of apparent extortion. Finally, it states: 'Our investigations failed to produce credible evidence to support such claims'. That was relating to claims of blackmail with respect to the purchase of so-called Croatian passports.

These are, as I have indicated, the statements to be found in the police report of 17th August. These statements are highly relevant but were not even referred to by Senator Murphy. They represent the state of police investigation and their assessment of the position before they proceeded to make the detailed inquiry into the Yugoslav Government's allegations in the aide-memoire.

They represent the considered police viewpoint at about the same time as I made the statement which Senator Murphy categorised as a lie. I had said that investigations by the Commonwealth police so far had not revealed credible evidence that any Croatian revolutionary terrorist organisation existed in Australia. But there was no denial. There was a willingness and preparedness to investigate all allegations. And this, as the police report indicates, as the departmental submission supports and as the various ASIO reports confirm, was the position at that time.

And I reiterate again: Why, if the Attorney-General was concerned to present the facts, was no mention whatsoever made of these specific matters? The Attorney-General also revealed his partisanship and limited presentation of the material available to him when he chose to quote part, and part only, of the initial ASIO assessment of the aide-memoire. I refer to the ASIO document of 7th September 1972 which he has tabled. What he did not refer to was the part of the ASIO report immediately preceding the passage which he quoted. What he omitted was as follows:

Until such time as inquiries in Australia and overseas have been completed it is difficult to provide any

useful assessment of the aide memoire. In general terms, it would appear that none of the material provided would be of any great value as evidence in a legal sense, but rather that it consists of a series of allegations requiring investigation.

He committed the cardinal sin of quoting out of context. The police report concluded by stating that a detailed list of specific questions was being prepared for clarification by the Yugoslav authorities. And the ASIO report indicated that inquiries had been instituted in an effort to establish the international links, the nature of organisational support, the origins of the initiation and planning of the Bosnian raid and the location of any possible military training. Yet when all the police searches, the investigations, the interrogations and the inquiries and translations of seized documents had been completed what did the police report? They reported—and as I have said, because of the dissolution of Parliament, it was not a report which came to me—that the allegations of a secret terrorist organisation must be continued to be taken seriously. And this, of course, was no more and no less than what they had said in August.

All allegations of terrorism and terrorist organisations must be taken seriously. And they were taken seriously. What was available was the allegation. But to say that X or the X organisation is terrorist is not proof that he or it is—any more than to say that X is a murderer is to establish that he is. And what I have said is a fundamental aspect of our civil liberties. We value certain rights as part of our free society. And one of them is that a person accused of a crime is obliged to be and is entitled to be tried in a court, under due process of law, and not to be judged criminal simply on the assertion of a policeman, a foreign government or an Attorney-General. Arising out of the many allegations in the aide-memoire the final police report of 23rd November recommended only that one Jure Maric was implicated with an unidentified Croatian nationalist organisation which the report stated 'apparently existed in Australia and which has been engaged in an attempt to overthrow the recognised Government of Yugoslavia'. There was no credible evidence of the other allegations, and no prosecutions eventuated.

The police reports taken together reveal the facts and they present a vastly different picture from that which was presented by the Attorney-General. But there is one aspect of this whole question of Croatian terrorism to

which Senator Murphy did not refer. It is a significant omission. The Commissioner of the Commonwealth Police in his report of 17th August 1972—that was one of the tabled documents—described it as one of a number of disturbing aspects. Maybe the susceptibilities of the Attorney-General were offended when he learned that there was a police suspicion of one or more Yugoslav agents provocateurs. What was omitted from his statement was the police comment on the aide-memoire assertions of the existence of a secret terrorist organisation HIRO. In respect of this a prosecution for possession of explosives was and is still to be heard in Victoria. I quote from the report of 17th August:

There are a number of disturbing aspects, particularly in relation to one of the 4 allied conspirators, Ivan Mudrinic. This force has received information from a number of sources that Mudrinic was in the pay of the Yugoslav Consulate-General, Melbourne. This gives rise to the suspicion that he played the role of agent provocateur in the matter of the Warburton explosives cache and, in fact, possibly in relation to the constitutional documents of HIRO. These documents appear to be almost a text book example of prima facie evidence of illegal associations under section 30 of the Commonwealth Crimes Act.

It is difficult at this juncture to see any viable reason why the Bosnian incident group would be carrying such documents, which in view of their apparent lack of relevance to anywhere except Australia, would be an unnecessary burden. It is possible that the Yugoslav authorities may have obtained copies through Mudrinic or possible other informants in Australia. In view of the pending trial of Mudrinic et al, any enquiries which might overtly suggest an agent provocateur would prejudice the Crown case. The matter is therefore the subject of discreet inquiry.

I repeat that Senator Murphy did not refer to this allegation. Why? Surely it is relevant in any assessment of whether the allegations of Croatian nationalist organisations being terrorist organisations are justified. Surely it raises questions as to whether the sweeping condemnation of the Croatian migrant community is justified. The real point about this matter is whether the organisation known as HIRO exists. If it does, has any part been played by the Yugoslav authorities themselves in respect of its creation or existence? Obviously the police have their suspicion.

The suspicion to which the police report gave expression is certainly a view held by a number of Croatians. These allegations of agents provocateurs, of which I readily concede there was no credible evidence to enable action to be taken, were made by a number of members of the Croatian community who

passed on their views to me last year. Certainly there are Croatians who regard their troubles in Australia as having been fomented by Yugoslav secret police in Australia. The Attorney-General would be aware of these allegations. He would also be aware of the ASIO appreciations, of worldwide assessment made by other nations' agencies, and the information possessed and suspicions held by the Commonwealth Police. And yet he has not referred to any part of this in his statement. He ought to have been frank with the Senate and the Australian people.

The Attorney-General has not tabled a number of documents which raise, as they ought to raise in the mind of any scrupulous Attorney-General, the questions of whether or not there are agents provocateurs in Australia and whether they have been involved in any of the incidents attributed to Croatian terrorists. I received an ASIO appreciation shortly after 29th August 1972 in which reference was made to the activity of the Yugoslav intelligence service in Australia in an effort to penetrate and fragment emigre organisations and to sow distrust so that the Croatian emigres would be unable or unwilling to act as a cohesive anti-regime body. Reference was also made to the beliefs held in emigre and security intelligence circles as to the techniques which have been used by the Yugoslav authorities and the anticipation as to the actions which might be expected in this country by Yugoslav authorities. It was stressed that no hard evidence was held to support these beliefs. This is a document available to the Attorney-General. It would be unreasonable to suppose he has not seen it. He did not table it. Again I challenge the Attorney-General to say why he chose to ignore its implications.

Another document not tabled deals more specifically with the alleged implication of the Yugoslav Consulate with the as yet unheard trial relating to the cache of explosives and documents discovered in the Warburton Ranges. I specify the document as a letter to the Secretary of the Attorney-General's Department dated 29th August 1972. I do not say anything more about the contents of the document because it purports to relate conversations with named persons employed by the Yugoslav Government. But Senator Murphy knows the gravity and the relevance of the information it contains. Yet he did not take it into account in any way in his state-

ment. Is it because it supports the allegation of an agent provocateur to which the Commonwealth Police referred in their report of 17th August?

I consider it my duty, as the Attorney-General has not done, to raise the question as to the extent to which Croatian nationalists are properly to be regarded as suspects in a number of unresolved incidents. I say, without making any conclusion on the matter, that these allegations ought to have been placed alongside all the other allegations and assertions which Senator Murphy made in his statement. If he says he is proposing to give the facts he should give all the facts and not only some of them. What the Australian people are looking for is not only the truth but the whole truth and nothing but the truth, and an Attorney-General should aid them and not hinder and mislead them in that quest.

I turn now to the claim that the Sydney bombings of 16th September 1972 highlighted the question of Croatian terrorism. Why? It may be that these bombings were the work of politically motivated Croatians. It may be that they were the work of Croatians not politically motivated. They may have been the work of any Australian, immigrant or otherwise, who had some criminal objective to pursue or, they may have been the action of an agent provocateur. We do not know.

That it was terrorist in character is unquestioned. But no-one has been charged and police investigations have still not revealed material upon which a prosecution may be made. The ASIO in an assessment dated 19th September 1972 expressed the view that there was nothing to link the 2 bomb explosions and a hijacking of a Swedish plane which occurred on the previous day to any investigations of Croatian terrorist activities. They expressly left open the possibility that some form of organisation may yet prove to exist. I shall table the assessment I received from ASIO—a document available to Senator Murphy which again he did not table. I challenge him to say why this document was not tabled.

The distortions I have pointed to in Senator Murphy's statement are founded on a comparison of what Senator Murphy said and the material he had available to him and to which he either gave no weight or which he declined to disclose in any way. His statements and the allegations he founds upon those statements

are not only improperly based, they are dishonestly presented. It is a biased and selective presentation of facts. The Attorney-General has misled the Senate and the people of Australia by making a statement, tabling documents and ignoring and concealing material which may exculpate those whom he traduces. This is injustice and when the weight of parliamentary privilege is also placed on the scales against the persons who are traduced the justification on him who does it is so much the greater. But what injustice is caused if the persons who are vilified and convicted by parliamentary accusation are not even aware—let alone able to have access to—documents, information and material which, if it may not declare them innocent, raises that reasonable doubt which is the cornerstone of our criminal law.

Is it too weak to describe Senator Murphy's conduct as inexcusable? It is, surely, the more reprehensible when, in addition to tabling documents containing rumour, suspicion and unverified allegation, he permits a roving expedition to the media and the public to print and say what they please—with absolute privilege concerning the individuals named in the parliamentary documents. It is a denial of fundamental human values which this country has long cherished—and for which, I hope, the lack of challenge over so many years has not weakened our firm desire to sustain.

Senator Murphy's statement is a monumental misrepresentation. He accuses the former Government—and its predecessors—of defeatism and lack of initiative. Nothing is further from the truth. And Senator Murphy knows from the records available to him what the truth is. Yet he denies it by his refusal to acknowledge what occurred. He conceals it by withholding from the Senate documents of undoubted relevance. He knows—but he did not acknowledge it—that the pattern of police investigations, of ASIO intelligence assessments and an active pursuing of all leads and information was maintained at all times. Everything the police heard was investigated. Everything I heard or received was investigated. Newspaper stories were investigated, journalists were interviewed and, from the information obtained, what was able to be investigated was investigated. I detail, for example, what I said on 20th July 1972 in the major Press release which, as Attorney-General I issued that day—and thereafter I

held a Press conference when questions could be asked of me and answered. I said, in full and frank detail:

Commonwealth Police have investigated allegations reported by the Australian Broadcasting Commission concerning the use of premises at the rear of a shop in Shannon Avenue, Geelong and that Croatian men and youths met in Geelong and proceeded to different parts of the You Yang mountains for training. There is no evidence to support the claim that groups of more than 30 men met in the shop or slept in the shed in the backyard of a house behind the shop. Both the Victoria Police and the Commonwealth Police are satisfied these allegations are not true. Other allegations reported have been investigated and no evidence to support them has been found.

Specifically—

'Press reports that a woman said that Yugoslavs often spent weekends at a You Yangs farmhouse have not been borne out by investigation.

Reports of shooting noises and gunfire in the area are explainable by the fact that there is a rifle range in the area used by the reputable Australian Sporting Shooters Association.

The local President of the Shooters Association has stated that the presence of 40 or more men on the You Yang rifle range was common and had no connection with political matters. The Association has conducted both day and night firing exercises for the last 14 years.

Local police in the area have reported that no complaints relating to 'groups of armed migrants' have ever been received by them.

Local inquiries have elicited that no military training of the type alleged in a newspaper report could have possibly been carried out in the You Yangs area without it becoming a matter of public knowledge. The You Yangs are a highly popular recreation area used by sporting bodies and the general public. It is also used for motor sports including car trials and rallies, some of which are conducted after dark.'

It is apparent that inquiries conducted by the Commonwealth police and the Victoria police have produced the same result. There is no evidence to substantiate reports and allegations of Croatian military training activities in the You Yang area.

This is not the mark of irresponsible indifference. It is the mark of concern and willingness to test every allegation that is made. Senator Murphy must know, because the material is available to him, of the detailed investigations which occurred. And yet he chose to ignore them. I had stressed many times in many places in 1972 the strongest denunciation of terrorism of any description. Violence of any kind is to be deplored. And I knew that, in what I said, I had the full support of my colleagues in government. I had constantly reiterated the Government's position. If there are groups in this country engaged in training for terrorist

or subversive activities—to be carried out either in this country or overseas—they would not be tolerated. As far as the Government was able it would put a stop to them. And numerous steps were taken, apart from requiring and ensuring that police and other investigations were maintained.

Senator Murphy must know, for the documents he tabled reveal it, that the earlier surveillance and other lawful activities of the Commonwealth police and other police forces were effective—so effective that the organisation known as the Croatian Revolutionary Brotherhood virtually disbanded and ceased to exist by 1967. One organisation reasonably suspected in those days of possible complicity in or preparedness to assist acts of violence against the Yugoslav Government therefore ceased to be a cause for concern. And this is what all the subsequent assessments of the Commonwealth agencies confirm. Whether, as police reports of 23rd November 1972 received by Senator Murphy after he became Attorney-General suggest, the body has been revived is for Senator Murphy to determine. But if he has evidence he has an obligation to take action.

Senator Murphy knows, or ought to know, that in conjunction with the Department of Foreign Affairs an interdepartmental committee to consider existing legislation and practice in Australia in the detection and countering of terrorist activities was established. It was to consider, as I indicated to Mr Bowen as Foreign Minister in a letter of 16th October 1972, a conspectus of Commonwealth and State and territorial laws having a bearing on terrorist activities—not only with a view to ascertaining whether Australian law was adequate to deal with terrorism, but also to ascertain what changes would be required to give effect to any new international treaties and obligations. Senator Murphy must know, because it was public knowledge, and the material is available to him, of the efforts which the Government made to persuade the United Nations General Assembly to take a strong and positive stand against terrorism throughout the world.

Senator Murphy must know because the Attorney-General's Department has the material which I asked to be prepared, of the summary of laws throughout Australia relating to the storing and acquisition of gelignite. It is an area of concern and action ought to be taken to ensure that these laws are as strin-

gent as practicable. He should know, if he has inquired, that this was a matter on which I had requested the Attorney-General's Department to prepare a submission for my consideration as a uniform laws project to be presented to the Standing Committee of Attorneys-General. Naturally, this is a matter falling within State responsibilities. Senator Murphy should know of the work of the Central Crime Intelligence Bureau and its special interest in criminal activities within migrant communities. He knows or should know of steps initiated to review the effectiveness of the Commonwealth Police Force. He should know of steps taken to improve liaison between police forces.

I have mentioned these matters because they refute the portrayal of apathy and disinterest which Senator Murphy so selectively sought to create. Senator Murphy has claimed that ASIO described the attitude of my predecessor Mr Hughes and, thereafter, Mr N. H. Bowen and myself, as indifferent to the problem of Croatian terrorism. This, for my part and on the part of my predecessors I entirely repudiate. The statement emanating from ASIO, which Senator Murphy declared subsequently by an answer to a question to have come from the Director-General himself, is a curious self-serving statement. Its significance would not be lost on the Attorney-General. Yet it was not associated with the same strength, priority or vehemence of expression which has characterised the other condemnations in his statement. Are we to believe that a man who has never previously complained, now, in the extraordinary atmosphere which the Attorney-General by his raid on ASIO has created, suddenly discovers an indifference in the former Attorneys-General?

For my part, I had numerous conferences and discussions with the Director-General of Security. Senator Murphy should have known, for the information must be available to him, that on 27th September I summoned a conference of the Director-General of Security, the Commissioner of Commonwealth Police and senior officers of the Attorney-General's Department to consider amongst other things more effective means of liaison, investigation and dissemination of intelligence relating to allegations and counter-allegations of Yugoslav terrorism. The document which I shall table indicates not a picture of indifference but a concern to ensure, as the document states, that the Attorney-General was in the

best possible position to provide the Prime Minister and Cabinet with assessments of intelligence relating to terrorist activities in Australia. The document, which is a submission by the Secretary of the Attorney-General's Department approved by me on 6th October 1972, states:

The purpose of this minute is to seek your formal approval to the arrangements agreed on at the discussion you had with Mr Barbour and myself on 27th September last for a group to be established to co-ordinate intelligence and investigations relating to politically motivated acts of violence.

The co-ordination group is to consist of a senior officer of this Department who will be in charge of the group, a senior officer of the Commonwealth Police Force and a senior officer of ASIO.

After setting out the functions of the group the document records:

In accordance with your requirements the group will make frequent and regular reports on at least a daily basis to yourself.

If the Director-General of Security is accurately reported by the Attorney-General, he has a curious idea of 'indifference'. The group was established for one reason, and that reason was that as a Government we were not prepared to tolerate violence or terrorism and any step to further our determination was worth while. I shall also table an earlier document, being a memorandum to me by the Secretary of the Attorney-General's Department headed 'Yugoslav Migrant Problems and Related Matters' dated 29th August 1972, concerning the need for a thorough appraisal to be made of troubles in the Yugoslav community in Australia and for improving liaison between the various Commonwealth agencies. The memorandum I table was in response to initiatives which I had taken and I refer to them only to establish that, if Senator Murphy had wished to do so, he could have acknowledged them himself. It was from this appraisal and subsequent consideration that the co-ordinating group on politically motivated acts of violence was eventually established in the Attorney-General's Department.

But these are all matters to which Senator Murphy makes no reference. The documents were available to him but were excluded. They demonstrate, as almost all of what I have said today demonstrates, that the vilification in which Senator Murphy has engaged was derived from a highly selective, partisan and completely misleading collection of facts. There are also matters alleged by

Senator Murphy which I mention only because they were specific and ought to be answered. They also are the results of slanted and selective presentation of material. He states, for example, that, on 19th September, I had claimed in the Senate that the allegations of the President and Prime Minister of Yugoslavia had been proved as allegations without basis. He contends that this was contrary to the 'core of almost irrefutable fact' which was an expression contained in the preliminary assessment by the Commonwealth Police of the Yugoslav Government's aide-memoire. But what he omits and it is the fact, is that the debate in the Senate was about statements which had been made by President and Prime Minister prior to the aide-memoire being received. These statements were part of the subject matter of Senator Murphy's motion which was being debated. And the Commonwealth Police report of 17th August had confirmed that these broad allegations were without basis—as subsequently the allegations in the aide-memoire about specific bases and training camps were said to lack viable evidence.

But the quotations and imputations which Senator Murphy chose to make are contrived to create a different impression from what the record shows. And this, of course, appears to be the quite deliberate pattern of what Senator Murphy said. Senator Murphy accused me of being an active protector of terrorists. It is a charge unsupported by evidence and absolutely unwarranted. It derives from the letter I forwarded to the Minister for Immigration which last week was incorporated in Hansard. To that letter I then and now fully adhere. Zdenko Marincic was a convicted person. That he was a person who must be taken either to have been prepared to engage in violence overseas or to support the violent acts of others I plainly acknowledged. But he had committed no act of violence in Australia and in my opinion, to deport a person to such a country where he will be persecuted for his political opposition to the Government of that country is not my concept of how an Australian Government should act—or of how the Australian people would expect it to act. I do not know how any Attorney-General with a sense of justice and a respect for human values could have taken a different view.

Further, I categorically deny the imputation that I caused an officer of the

Attorney-General's Department to be relieved of his duties because of some supposed refusal to accept his advice. If he was relieved, and I do not know that he was, it was an internal decision of the Department. It was not mine. In any event the officer whom I identify as the one allegedly relieved was communicating with my office, as my records reveal, on Croatian matters at the end of October. Senator Murphy must know the facts—but he has chosen again, not to state them but to leave the matter open for innuendo and assumption. I also say, to illustrate the character of the case sought to be made, that the opinion I expressed as Attorney-General on the question of the grant of a passport to Jure Maric, which was in any event refused, by the responsible Minister, namely the Minister for Immigration, was not included in the tabled documents. I retained my copy of my notation on the 3-page submission dated 6th July, wherein I expressed my views and acknowledged completely that the decision was for the Minister for Immigration. Why the departmentally noted copy of a 2-page submission dated 4th July and never presented to me was tabled I am unable to say.

In conclusion I say that Senator Murphy's statement should never have been made. It was made in a highly charged atmosphere of unprecedented acts—of raids on security headquarters by Commonwealth Police, of intensive house searches, of massive security precautions. In this atmosphere, charges have been made contrary to the usual processes to which we are accustomed and a whole migrant community is virtually accused of guilt—because every Croatian-born citizen tends to be regarded as a potential criminal. It is alien to our traditions and the Attorney-General's statement has done nothing to allay the widespread fears and concern to which expression has been given.

The statement accuses organisations of being terrorists, of being recruiting grounds, of being umbrella organisations for terrorists. But is there credible evidence to sustain those accusations? If there is none he has monstrously maligned and condemned a group of Australian citizens who have no redress and who will long bear the scars of his action. But if he has the evidence why has he not used the courts? Why has he chosen the Parliament to present a slanted and highly prejudicial distortion of the truth? These are the

questions the statement does not answer. It is a statement for which the Attorney-General must carry the shame of the Australian nation that it was ever made.

The PRESIDENT—Order! Senator Greenwood, you indicated to me that you wished to table some documents. Do you seek leave to table the documents?

Senator GREENWOOD—Yes. I seek leave to table the documents which I said in the course of my statement I would table.

The PRESIDENT—Is leave granted? There being no objection, leave is granted.

Senator GREENWOOD—I table those documents which are as follows:

1. 13th April 1972—ASIO Appreciation headed: 'Croatian Nationalism and Politically Motivated Violence in Australia'.
2. 29th August 1972—Memorandum by the Secretary of the Attorney-General's Department headed: 'Yugoslav Migrant Problems and related matters'.
3. 19th September 1972—ASIO note headed: 'Recent Events in the field of Croatian Nationalism and Politically Motivated Violence'.
4. 4th October 1972—Submission by the Secretary of the Attorney-General's Department headed: 'Co-ordinating Group on Politically Motivated Acts of Violence'.
(approved by Attorney-General, 6th October 1972)
5. 19th October 1972—Commonwealth Police Submission to the Secretary of the Attorney-General's Department headed:
'Parliamentary Question—Croatian Nationalist Activities'.

Senator JAMES McCLELLAND (New South Wales) (4.1)—It is a great pity that Senator Greenwood did not wait until after last week-end to compose his speech, or at least he was not adroit enough to make a few amendments to it after the events of last week-end. Otherwise, presumably, he would not have brought himself to say:

Above all else, he—

referring to the present Attorney-General (Senator Murphy)—

has refused to prosecute anybody or any organisation for any criminal activity of any kind.

I am perfectly aware—and I will keep well within your ruling, Mr President—that these charges against these particular people are sub judice and I will make no comment at all upon their guilt or otherwise. But surely, I am permitted to say that Senator Greenwood's statement is already out of date, because we, as a government, have done within 4 months what his Government and its predecessors did not get around to doing in 23 years. I would

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MINISTERIAL STATEMENT – PEACOCK

Australia, House of Representatives, *Parliamentary Debates*, No.HR.14,
1978, 993-995.

new incentive scheme to encourage and assist exports. That scheme has been under examination. Industry people have been consulted and have made comments. There has also been an Industries Assistance Commission report looking into the export market development grants scheme as well as other export incentives. All these matters are being considered by the Government and until they are resolved I am not in a position to make any further comment. As soon as the matter has been finalised by the Government, an announcement will be made in this House.

INTEREST RATES

Mr BARRY JONES—I direct my question to the Treasurer. Is it a fact that the Reserve Bank has been pushing down forward margins on the United States dollar below the relative differential between interest rates in Australia and interest rates in the United States? Is the present margin unrealistically low and is it intended to reduce it further? Is the Reserve Bank pushing down forward margins in order to bring the Australian dollar to parity with the United States dollar? If so, does this indicate that the Government wishes to establish an open foreign exchange market in Australia?

Mr HOWARD—On a number of occasions, in response to questions and also through statement, I have provided to this House and to the community generally, a description and explanation of the current management of the Australian exchange rate. Frankly, I have nothing to add to those descriptions.

ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION

Mr SHIPTON—I direct a question to the Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs concerning illegal immigration to Northern Australia. Is the Minister aware that numbers of Papua New Guinea citizens are over-staying their traditional, normal and usual visits to Australia and have settled permanently in northern Australia, particularly in Queensland? Has the Minister's Department investigated this matter? Does the Minister have an estimate of how many such people are over-staying in Australia? Have they come to Australia under any special arrangements?

Mr MacKELLAR—This matter was brought to my attention last year. Following that, I consulted Ministers of other interested departments and an interdepartmental committee was set up to look at the implications of the question. A task force was established and that task force journeyed to Thursday Island in the Torres Strait in October last year and again in February of this

year. The task force has reported back to the IDC which is composed of interested departments. The task force was charged with the responsibility of investigating the allegations, keeping firmly in mind the traditional rights and traditional movements of people from Papua New Guinea in the Torres Strait area. The interdepartmental committee is at the present time considering the report of the task force. The response to that report has not yet come to me, but the initial investigations show that the movements referred to by the honourable member are not considerable.

TRANSPORT PLANNING AND RESEARCH

Mr NIXON (Gippsland—Minister for Transport)—For the information of honourable members I present a report prepared by the Department of Transport entitled 'The Transport (Planning and Research) Act 1974 Report of Progress to 30 June 1977'. The report was produced at the request of State authorities and provides an example of the co-operation between State and Commonwealth which is being achieved under the Act.

COMPENSATION: COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES

Mr HUNT (Gwydir—Minister for Health)—Pursuant to section 122 of the Compensation (Commonwealth Government Employees) Act 1971 I present the annual report of the Commissioner for Employees Compensation for the year ended 30 June 1977.

ENVIRONMENT

Mr GROOM (Braddon—Minister for Environment, Housing and Community Development)—For the information of honourable members I present the summary report of the sixth meeting of the Council of Nature Conservation Ministers, Cairns, 29 July 1977, and the summary record of proceedings of the ninth meeting of the Australian Environment Council, Canberra, 11 August 1977.

'CROATIAN EMBASSY'

Ministerial Statement

Mr PEACOCK (Kooyong—Minister for Foreign Affairs)—by leave—I wish to make clear the Government's position with respect to the creation of establishments, institutions or organisations which can, because of the diplomatic terminology used, result in substantial difficulties in Australia's relations with other countries and impede the operations of Australia's foreign policy, the effective conduct of which is vital to the

well-being of the nation. This is particularly so when such an establishment is referred to as an 'embassy'. Australia is a party to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. That convention, in article 22—which has the force of law in Australia—imposes on Australia a special duty to prevent any impairment of the dignity of a diplomatic mission accredited to this country. It is not a matter which can be dealt with in any sense of compromise. It is a matter of our international obligations and the domestic law which gives effect to these obligations. I need hardly add that this would not apply to such establishments as the so-called Aboriginal Embassy as it did not affect the standing of any other nation with which Australia has diplomatic relations.

It has not been necessary in the past to treat this matter as one for legislative action. However, this has now become necessary because of the establishment in Canberra late last year of a so-called Croatian Embassy. It is because the establishment of the so-called Embassy has had important ramifications for Australia—ramifications with respect to the Vienna Convention, Australia's responsibilities under it, the effective operation of Australia's foreign policy, and our long-standing relations with a universally recognised nation, namely Yugoslavia—that the Government now feels it necessary to consider legislation to put an end to this anomaly and to guard against any recurrence.

I therefore wish to set out the Government's position with regard to this matter. The so-called Croatian Embassy has been set up in Canberra by certain persons who may or may not be fully aware of the serious implications of their actions, which impede the correct and orderly conduct of Australia's international relations, for which I am directly responsible. It is therefore necessary that I now make clear to this House beyond any possibility of doubt the Government's views and intentions on this matter. These are in short that an establishment such as the so-called Croatian Embassy is damaging to the national interest and that such an establishment cannot therefore be tolerated.

Yugoslavia acceded to independence in the context of the post-World War I settlement, to which Australia was a party. Australia has long-standing and friendly relations with that country. By mutual agreement many people from Yugoslavia have settled in Australia. This has strengthened our ties. We respect Yugoslavia's sovereignty. The Government cannot therefore view with indifference an attempt to establish and maintain on Australian territory any organisation which not only is openly dedicated to the

destruction of a state in friendly relations with Australia but which also arrogates to itself an unacceptable title and status which could in turn disrupt the orderly conduct of Australia's relations with another universally recognised member of the international community. This could clearly have a substantial adverse effect on our international standing, the conduct of Australia's foreign policy and our national interest, thus affecting all Australians.

It can scarcely be maintained that the setting up of a so-called Croatian Embassy is not an impairment of the dignity of the diplomatic mission which in law, and in fact, represents Yugoslavia in this country. It is of no less concern that the unauthorised establishment of this so-called Embassy interferes with the exercise of the executive power of the Commonwealth to conduct Australia's international relations. The Government is thus deeply concerned lest other minority groups may be inspired by the continued existence of the self-styled Croatian Embassy to believe that they, too, may similarly interfere in and jeopardise Australia's relations with sovereign states. Furthermore, it has been a longstanding policy of Australian governments to oppose the importation into Australia of alien political and racial feuds. The Government is also concerned about the aggravation of tension between certain ethnic groups.

At this stage let me make it quite clear that it is not in any way the Government's wish to discriminate against the Croatian community or to stop, or hinder, members of that community forming their own groups and clubs where these are not aimed at a state and government with which Australia has normal diplomatic relations. The overwhelming majority of the Croatian community in Australia has shown, by its contribution to the development of Australian society and culture, a strong loyalty and commitment to its new homeland. It is an affront to this loyalty and commitment that a so-called Croatian Embassy should purport to represent them. The proper international representative of the interest of Australians of Croatian, as of other, origins is the Australian Government and no one else.

The only course of action for the authors of this enterprise is for them to abandon it forthwith and revert to the means by which dissent may be peacefully asserted within the law as it prevails in our society. In order to leave no doubt of the seriousness with which this matter is being regarded, and consistent with the provisions of article 22 of the Vienna Convention, I wish to inform the House that the Government will

introduce legislation specifically prohibiting institutions or bodies falsely representing themselves as diplomatic, consular or other official missions of another country or part of another country. Such action is essential not only to remove the anomaly which has already been created, but lest the practice of establishing so-called embassies be extended thus jeopardising Australia's foreign relations and national interest. The Government does not believe that the Australian community would support the establishment of organisations so obviously to the detriment of this nation. I present the following paper:

'Croatian Embassy'—Ministerial Statement, 5 April 1978.

Motion (by Mr Fife) proposed:

That the House take note of the paper.

Mr HAYDEN (Oxley—Leader of the Opposition) (3.13)—It is appropriate that the Government should take firm action on this matter, although it must be conceded that the action comes belatedly and grudgingly. The Minister for Foreign Affairs (Mr Peacock) has given a firm undertaking that legislation will be introduced to give effect to the sentiments he has expressed in his statement. I would wish that he might have more success in the introduction of that legislation than he has enjoyed so far in seeking to introduce legislation to prohibit the operation of the Rhodesian Information Office in this country. Honourable members will recall that Security Council resolution 409/77 co-sponsored by the United States of America, proposed among other things that member nations should take action to close down Rhodesian Information Offices. This Government gave a firm undertaking to the Australian people last year that that would be done. The right wing rump of the Government, which is large and even greater in its influence on the Government—

Mr SPEAKER—Order! The motion is to take note of a paper about legislation in relation to organisations declaring themselves to be embassies when that is not the fact. The honourable gentleman can make statements relevant to that motion but not to an entirely different subject.

Mr HAYDEN—Mr Speaker, I submit that what I am proposing is that on the Minister's record so far we have no reason to feel reassured that he will be successful in introducing the sort of legislation that is required here. In the case of the Rhodesia Information Office he has been constantly thwarted. Last year the promise was made but the matter has been bogged down in

Cabinet since then. I leave the matter there. The point, I believe, has been adequately made.

However, I will relate a few simple facts associated with this matter. The 'Croatian Embassy', as it is called, was opened on 29 November last year. It has taken something like four months to obtain this firmness of attitude from the Minister. In that intervening period it has become quite clear to those about Canberra who have contacts and who are concerned about these matters that relations between Yugoslavia and Australia have become increasingly strained and were reaching the point of jeopardy as a result of the absence of appropriate firm action by the Government.

I remind the House that on 29 November last year when the 'Croatian Embassy' was opened, the opening was graced with official Government presence. Senator Knight, formerly of the Department of Foreign Affairs, and Mr Haslem, of this House, were present. I think it is reasonable to ask, in view of the provocative statements that the Minister for Foreign Affairs has made, whether their presence at the opening of the embassy was with the knowledge of the Government and of the Minister and to what extent they were encouraged or discouraged. But there are more important questions to be asked. It is significant that although the embassy was opened well before the last general election, the Minister did not find his way clear to make a statement on the matter until well after the election, nearly four weeks later. Presumably he was waiting until the Croatian vote had been safely counted.

Mr Hodgman—How debased you are.

Mr HAYDEN—The Minister for Foreign Affairs—

Mr SPEAKER—Order! The Leader of the Opposition will resume his seat. The honourable member for Denison will withdraw that remark.

Mr Hodgman—I withdraw it, Mr Speaker.

Mr HAYDEN—The Minister for Foreign Affairs has attracted no stature to his presence by the way in which he has handled this matter. He has been tardy and unimpressive. His final action, the statement to the House today, comes, as I said before, grudgingly and belatedly and is a clear indication that action was finally extracted—I stress extracted—from the Government, not because it felt it should act as a matter of principle or because it felt the burden of its responsibilities internationally under the Vienna Convention which the Minister has quoted, but rather because it had been made abundantly clear to the Government that if the 'Croatian

APPENDIX 1 E

MINISTERIAL STATEMENT – DURACK

Australia, Senate, *Parliamentary Debates*, No.S.23, 1978, 2766-2768.

government they adopt another. Then they try to lay the blame on the shoulders of the Federal Labor Party, which Senator Webster said was not concerned with the interests of people in primary industry. I think that our record stands second to none and shows that we are concerned with the problems of primary industry. When we get into government again at the end of next year the people out in the country areas will throw up their hats and say: 'Three cheers for the Labor Party'.

Senator CAVANAGH (South Australia) (5.43)—I want to take only a few minutes in this third reading debate. In view of the way that the debate is going, I hope that we do not have another turmoil similar to that which we have had in the past on such occasions. I think it is very unfortunate that the Minister for Science and the Environment (Senator Webster) has adopted the attitude he has. One of the first things to learn on joining the Ministry is that, whilst it might be nice to answer statements made by the Opposition, one's duty as a Minister is to get Bills through the Parliament. Although Senator Webster might gain some satisfaction from adopting the attitude he has adopted, in doing that he is not carrying out his duty as a Minister of getting his Bills through the Parliament. Those Bills would have been passed by now had he not made his aggressive attack. That could lead to the irritation of senators, the calling of quorums, and senators being thrown out of the chamber. All that could happen simply because we have a Minister who is not carrying out what I believe is the duty of a Minister, namely to get legislation through this place.

Question resolved in the affirmative.

Bills read a third time.

'CROATIAN EMBASSY'

Ministerial Statement

Senator DURACK (Western Australia—Attorney-General)—by leave—Because of the interest shown in the Senate in the activities of the so called 'Croatian Embassy' in Forrest, I inform the Senate that the Government has decided to take action in relation to it under the Diplomatic and Consular Missions Act.

Senator Georges—What are you going to do, storm it?

Senator DURACK—Would the honourable senator like to hear the rest of the statement? This afternoon I sent a letter to Mr Mario Despoja, the self styled 'Charge D'Affairs' of the 'Embassy', informing him of the provisions of the Diplomatic and Consular Missions Act and

indicating to him that he is engaging in conduct considered by me to be contrary to the Act. I have told him that unless that conduct, which includes the display of the sign 'Croatian Embassy', a flag and a shield, is discontinued within 14 days after today and undertakings are given that it will not re-occur, an application will be made to the Federal Court of Australia for injunctions preventing that conduct from continuing. There have been indications that Mr Despoja does not wish to engage in activities which are contrary to the Act and is seeking to make representations on them. If this is so, I shall be willing to examine these representations within the next 14 days. Needless to say, if Mr Despoja ceases to engage in activities contrary to the Act and undertakes not to engage in them further, no injunction proceedings will be necessary.

The Government's decision to pursue this matter should not in any way be interpreted as an act of discrimination against the Croatian community. The Government has no wish to stop or hinder members of the Croatian community forming their own clubs, groups or associations. The Croatian community has, and continues to demonstrate it by its contribution to the development of Australian society and culture, a strong loyalty and commitment to its new homeland and the Government welcomes this contribution. I hope Mr Despoja and those associated with him take advantage of the next 14 days to make the institution of such proceedings unnecessary.

Senator MULVIHILL (New South Wales)—by leave—On behalf of the Leader of the Opposition (Senator Wriedt) I simply say that the Opposition regards this situation that besets the Government as one in which a very fine decision has to be made between liberty and licence. The Attorney-General (Senator Durack) and I had some experience of this situation in a committee context. Although we may perhaps differ on emphasis I am sure that we both appreciate the deep-seated antagonisms that exists in the Yugoslav community. The point at issue is how far certain elements can go in a community. Any government has to have a foreign policy that at least observes certain conventions.

It could be said that the cultural aspirations of an ethnic community are under siege, but I do not know of any part of Australia in which Croatian clubs have not proliferated. They have been approved by councils and State governments of different political colour. But, that is not the issue. I think the much wider issue is the fact that Australia has ties with many countries. The

plain fact is that Yugoslavia is in a unique situation. It is a country which is more or less in between the Warsaw and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation power blocs. I will not elaborate on that point. I commend to honourable senators the statement made some years ago by a former senator, Senator Wright, when he was the Foreign Affairs spokesman in the Senate for the Liberal Government in which he spelt out in detail the situation if there were a fragmentation of Yugoslavia. Unfortunately some people have sought such an event.

It is not my purpose, or the Opposition's purpose, to score any political points on this matter. I think we are encouraged by the fact that people who are to the Right have to observe the law in the same way as people who are deemed to be to the far Left. On behalf of the Opposition I say that a democrat does not have any satisfaction in having to curb self-expression. However, there is a dividing line. I do not want to stifle debate so I will conclude my remarks with that point.

Senator GIETZELT (New South Wales)—by leave—I move:

That the Senate take note of the statement.

I wish to endorse the remarks made by Senator Mulvihill. We all recognise that he has played a significant part in resolving the problems associated with some of the groups that have occupied a more than unusual role in recent years in endeavouring to divide the Yugoslav communities in our country. I think I can say that the Opposition would support the Government's intentions in this matter. Legislation on this matter was passed some time ago and we have been awaiting the second stage of the legislative process—that is, for the Government to make a decision to apply the Act, and to call upon those who designate themselves as the 'Croatian Embassy' to cease activities which relate to our relationship with other countries.

I think it is a matter of great regret that some of these people have been able to create the impression in the Australian community that they represent a strong view in the Yugoslav community. In fact they represent a small minority view that is associated with an expression of nationalism which in itself contradicts the very strong trends of federalism that exist in the state of Yugoslavia. Of course, their view ignores the very important role that Yugoslavia is playing in developing the bridges between the major powers of the world. I refer particularly to the non-aligned movement which now embraces some 81 countries. Yugoslavia is playing a very

important role in that movement for a new international economic order and for raising the living standards of all of the people in what can be generally described as Third World nations.

I think it is a matter of regret that small groups in our community should seek to establish a position independent from that of the State of Yugoslavia which, after all, suffered greatly during World War II. In the intervening years it has endeavoured, quite successfully I believe, to raise the living standards of its people. Yugoslavia also occupies a very important role in the divided Europe that arose at the end of World War II.

We have been aware of the development of terrorist movements that claim to speak on behalf of the Croatian community. We are aware, of course, that these groups do not speak on behalf of that community; that in fact the overwhelming majority of Croatians and Yugoslav migrants who have come to Australia have settled and have proved themselves to be good citizens willing to accept the democratic and open way in which Australian community life develops. They do not want to be caught up in the web of international intrigue which unfortunately has been part of the movement around the 'Croatian Embassy'.

We do not, of course, want to go over the difficult days of 1973 when the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia came to this country as a guest of the Government following an invitation extended by the previous Government during 1971-72. We know of the endeavours of a small minority of malcontents who tried to create social tension within the Yugoslav communities and within the Australian community generally, and all that flowed from that. I think we have waited long enough for steps to be taken by the Federal Government to put an end to self-styled embassies that seek to abrogate the right of the official embassies of governments with which we enjoy close and friendly relations.

I think there has been a very good relationship between the Government of Yugoslavia and the Australian Government regardless of the changes in composition of the Australian Government, and that is the way it should be. I think the Opposition would commend the Government for the steps it has taken in accordance with the legislation. The Attorney-General (Senator Durack) indicated in his statement that some negotiations will take place with those people who style themselves as the 'Croatian Embassy'. As a result of those negotiations the 'Croatian Embassy', so styled in Canberra, should cease to exist as an institution and as an

embarrassment to the Australian Government. I seek leave to continue my remarks later.

Leave granted; debate adjourned.

EXCISE AMENDMENT BILL (No. 2) 1979

Second Reading

Debate resumed from 4 June, on motion by Senator Chaney:

That the Bill be now read a second time.

Senator WALSH (Western Australia) (5.55)—This Bill is also a product of the Fraser-Howard horror mini-Budget of 24 May. The purpose of the Bill is to ensure that any further increases by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries in oil prices will be passed on in the prices paid by Australian refiners for domestically-produced crude oil, but that the additional revenue flowing from OPEC price increases after 1 January 1979 will accrue entirely to the Government instead of, as under the previous arrangements, being shared between the Government and the Australian crude oil producers. The Government estimates that, as a result of the OPEC 1 April increase of 9.5 per cent, this measure will raise \$166m in a full year. It is widely expected, indeed almost certain, that on 1 July there will be a further OPEC price increase of 10 per cent or thereabouts, so it is probable that over the entire year this measure will yield government revenue of some \$320m or \$330m.

The history of this measure has demonstrated—if further demonstration were needed—how the Government has lost control both of the process of government and of parliamentary business. The blunder which the Government made was summed up succinctly in the current issue of the *Laurie Oakes Report* as follows:

. . . The National Development Minister, Mr Newman, insisted on the amendments—

The reference is to amendments which were made after the Bill had been originally introduced in the House of Representatives—

after studying the legislation on his return from an overseas trip. In an extraordinary blunder, the original legislation provided for all oil fields to be treated in the same way, even though the Treasurer, Mr Howard, had said in his expenditure and taxation statement to Parliament: 'The implications of these new levy arrangements on small producers and marginal fields will be kept under review.'

To some extent the Government, in introducing this legislation, has recognised its past errors. It has implicitly recognised the foolish decision—although it fails to acknowledge it, of course—that it made in the 1978 Budget when it decided that an increasing proportion of the windfall

gains accruing to the production of oil from low-cost Australian fields, principally those of Bass Strait, would go to the Australian oil producers, principally Esso-BHP. The Government has decided to take a larger share of the revenue itself.

To that extent the Opposition approves of what the Government has done, although, for reasons that I will outline, it would prefer a resource tax to apply. The Opposition also has reservations in that clearly this measure, like so many of the measures in the 1978 Budget and the 1979 autumn horror mini-Budget, will significantly increase the consumer price index and ensure that the rate of inflation will continue to rise.

It is perhaps nice for Mr Newman that he should have managed to score a small victory in this matter, given not only his troubles of the last couple of weeks but also the way in which he has stumbled along in the shadow of the Australian Labor Party's shadow Minister in this area, Paul Keating. Mr Newman has been trying desperately to be noticed, while stumbling along in Mr Keating's shadow. Mr Newman has been able to point out, apparently, to the Government the error in the original legislation. He has certainly been noticed now, not so much for pointing out this error but for not being able to hear, or so he tells us, in the House of Representatives. We have a Ministry in which the Prime Minister (Mr Malcolm Fraser) cannot remember and Mr Newman cannot hear.

This measure represents a movement away from the Government's import parity pricing policy, but it is an inferior type of tax to the resource tax which the Australian Labor Party has long advocated. A resource tax seeks to tax away the pure economic rent component of mineral and oil deposits. By economic rent I mean any return over and above that necessary to call forth the factors of production which would produce the desired or existing level of output.

Sitting suspended from 6 to 8 p.m.

Senator WALSH—Prior to the suspension of the sitting I was saying that in one sense the Opposition welcomes this measure insofar as it ensures that the additional windfall gains which accrue to crude oil producers from low cost Australian fields do so entirely for the public revenue rather than being divided, as was the case under the previous arrangements, between the Australian producers and the public revenue; on the other hand we have a reservation. That, of course, is that this measure, like so many other measures which were announced a fortnight ago and in the 1978 Budget, will continue to feed